



## Synopsis of Soviet Capabilities.

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(Part II, Section E, Paragraphs 27c and 27d, Pages 32 and 33)

E. SYNOPSIS OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES

27. Capabilities

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c. Iceland is almost at the extreme one-way range of Soviet CAB and COACH transport aircraft operating from Spitsbergen, and unless the defenses of Iceland are maintained, the USSR will have the capability of seizing Iceland by an airborne attack.

d. From either the Kola Peninsula or Spitsbergen, Soviet medium bombers of the BULL class could strike Iceland, Greenland, and parts of Canada on a two-way basis without refueling, and they could strike Iceland and most of Greenland from bases in East Germany.

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(Part II, Section G, Paragraphs 36 thru 43d, Pages 38 thru 42)

G. SOVIET THREAT TO ICELAND

36. Importance to Soviets. Under Soviet control, Iceland could serve as a base for interdiction of North Atlantic shipping routes and for air and guided missile attacks against the Western Allies.

37. Probable Soviet Estimate

a. The Soviets probably estimate that:

(1) The defense forces of Iceland will not be substantially reinforced for a considerable period of time after the beginning of a general war.

(2) The defense forces that would oppose them early in a general war would consist of only a small, local police force (approximately 160) and Allied air and ground defense forces.

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(3) Allied carrier task forces entering the area could be neutralized by submarines, bombers, and air-to-surface missiles throughout the area, and land or ice-based fighters within their combat radii.

b. The Soviets probably estimate that they could successfully defend Iceland after its seizure, and that they would have the capability to accomplish the following:

(1) To keep open the sea and air communications in the Barents and Norwegian Seas.

(2) To establish an effective AAA and surface-to-air missile defense of the critical areas in Iceland and to reinforce and extend this defense with fighter aircraft. (Fighters could be flown to Iceland if refueled enroute).

(3) To keep Allied carrier task forces from effectively interdicting their sea and air communications to Iceland by using Soviet submarines, land-based aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles.

38. Probable Time of Soviet Attack on Iceland. The Soviets would probably plan to seize Iceland as soon as possible after D-Day. They have the capability of launching an attack on Iceland at any time, utilizing presently held bases.

39. Soviet Capabilities to Attack Iceland. The Soviets have the capability of attacking Iceland by subversion, using local Communists, and by naval, air, airborne, amphibious, and small-size special operations employing submarines and fishing vessels, or by a combination of two or more of these methods.

40. Subversion. It is possible that the local Communists, who comprise a substantial part of the population, could be successful in an attempt to seize control of Iceland if its defenses were dependent only upon local forces. However, it is unlikely that they would exercise this capability except to assist an attack

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by Soviet forces. The Soviets could not expect to hold Iceland for any appreciable length of time with only the local Communists, and probably estimate that the Allies will either be in the area or could deploy to the area sufficient forces to overcome these Communists.

### 41. Airborne Operations.

a. By mid-1956, the Soviets could have 50 twin-jet medium transports as well as a considerable number of converted BULLS. By mid-1958, they could have as many as 200 of these medium transports in Aviation of Airborne Troops. With bases in Norway, they could also use their light transports on one-way or on two-way refueled operations. It is estimated that they could have the capability for air refueling and for the air drop of a substantial proportion of their airborne troops and equipment.

b. In mid-1956, total lift capabilities, utilizing 40 medium transports, would be on the order of 1,600 men in an initial lift. Over a five-day period, it is estimated that 4,000 men could be air lifted to Iceland. This total would include all air-transportable unit equipment and 35 pounds of resupply per man per day. In mid-1958, utilizing only 100 medium transports, the Soviets could lift 4,000 troops in an initial lift, and 10,000 over a five-day period.

### 42. Amphibious and Special Operations.

a. The USSR has sufficient shipping available in the Northern Sea area to transport a force of 20,000 to 25,000 troops. This force could consist of two rifle divisions, plus light support and service elements. However, other requirements for this shipping will be large, and its use prior to gaining control of the Barents and Norwegian Seas would not be feasible. Therefore, it is estimated that the Soviets would not use this force in initial operations but would probably use part of it for reinforcement after Iceland had been seized and communications secured.

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b. If the Soviets secure their exit from the Baltic and/or obtain bases in Norway, their on-station submarine capability in the Northern Sea area will be substantially increased. Under these conditions, they will have available a large number of submarines for transporting troops and supplies in an attack on Iceland. It is estimated that, under favorable conditions and through the employment of fishing vessels and submarines, the Soviets could deliver to Iceland, for an unopposed landing, a lightly armed force of approximately 3,000 troops. A submarine could carry more than 50 men and about 100 men could be transported on the larger fishing vessels.

43. Soviet Operations from Iceland.

a. Amphibious. Because of lack of naval and logistical facilities, it is unlikely that the Soviets would attempt to mount amphibious operations from Iceland.

b. Air.

(1) With Iceland in their possession, the Soviets could increase the number of two-way bomber flights against the United States and thereby improve their capability for sustained air operations.

(2) Soviet land-based aircraft in Iceland could assist in obtaining air superiority in the North Atlantic, over Great Britain, and the Norwegian Sea.

(3) These aircraft could provide air support for naval surface and submarine operations in the area.

c. Guided Missiles. Medium-range guided missiles could be launched from Iceland against Greenland, Great Britain, and parts of Europe to include the Paris and Berlin areas.

d. Naval. With Iceland under their control, the Soviets could

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substantially increase the number of submarines that they could maintain on station in the Atlantic. Iceland-based aircraft would enable the Soviets to extend the operations of their naval surface vessels to the Atlantic.

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(Annex A, Paragraph 11b, Page 58)

11. Economic Considerations.

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b. Iceland is chiefly an agricultural and fishing country. Though agriculture is the chief occupation, Iceland is not self-supporting in agricultural products. Fish and fish products are Iceland's chief and almost only exports. The Soviets are presently purchasing by far the largest share of Iceland's fishing catch, probably with the idea of dominating the native economy and thereby to exert pressure on the Icelandic Government, subvert the Icelanders, and promote Communist penetration and ideology. The end result desired by the Soviets is the denial to NATO of the privilege of using the island's military facilities.

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(Annex D, Paragraph 3, Pages 81 and 82)

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ICELAND

3. Location. Iceland lies just south of the Arctic Circle, 205 miles southeast of Greenland and 600 miles west of Norway. The capital, Reykjavik, on the southwest coast, is 2,602 statute miles from New York City and 1,171 statute miles from London. The strategic importance of Iceland's geographical position is illustrated by the following table of statute-mile distances over Great Circle routes from Reykjavik:

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Scoresby Sund, Greenland	450
Torshavn, Faroe Islands	516
Jan Mayen	600
Cape Farewell, Greenland	800
Glasgow, Scotland	850
Trondheim, Norway	1,000
Oslo, Norway	1,083
Longyearbyen, Spitsbergen	1,110
London, England	1,171
Stockholm, Sweden	1,356
Paris, France	1,425
Berlin, Germany	1,485
Murmansk, USSR	1,500
Goose Bay, Labrador	1,500
Helsinki, Finland	1,550
St. John's Newfoundland	1,725
Leningrad, USSR	1,775
Azores	1,777
Vienna, Austria	1,805
Arkhangel'sk, USSR	1,820
Rome, Italy	2,044
Gibraltar	2,047
Quebec, Canada	2,189
Istanbul, Turkey	2,558
New York City	2,602
Washington, D. C.	2,800
Chicago, Illinois, USA	2,954
Fairbanks, Alaska	3,175

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(Annex "H", Pages 93, 94 and 95)

ANNEX "H"

POSSIBLE SOVIET OPERATIONS TO OCCUPY ICELAND (SECRET)

SCOPE

(1) The USSR would attack Iceland shortly after occupation of Norway.

Special Operations

(2) Initial attacks by local communists and Soviet forces landed from submarines and fishing vessels to seize the Keflavik-Reykjavik area.

Airborne

(3) Initial airborne attacks directed against the airfields of Keflavik and Reykjavik would be coordinated with the ground attacks on these fields.

Amphibious

(4) Waterborne forces, landed on the west coast of Iceland, could be used to reinforce the attack or for the defense of Iceland after seizure.

MAGNITUDE AND COMPOSITION

(2) A lightly armed force consisting of about 300 local Communists and approximately 3,000 Soviet troops could be available for this attack.

(3) Approximately 1,000 airborne troops could be utilized in the initial attacks. After seizure of the airfields, about 4,000 troops could be air-landed over a five day period in 1956, and 10,000 troops in 1958.

(4) The force could consist of two rifle divisions, plus light support and service elements.

CAPABILITY W/O OPPOSITION

(2) The Soviet force could be transported to landing areas on the west coast between Sandgerdhi and Akranes by submarines and fishing vessels.

(3) Light, medium and converted BULL transports will be available in sufficient numbers to support the attack.

(4) The USSR has sufficient shipping available in the Northern Seaarea to transport and resupply this force.

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SCOPE (Cont'd)

Naval

(5) Naval operations to obtain control of the sea enroute to and in the objective area.

(6) Naval operations in support of special operations.

(7) Naval operations in support of amphibious landings.

(8) Naval operations against Allied shipping and naval forces.

MAGNITUDE AND COMPOSITION (Cont'd)

(5) The following could be available in the Northern Sea area in 1956-1958:

5 - 7 CL            9 - 17 DC/DDE  
29 - 36 DD        88 - 207 SS

Soviet control of egress from the Baltic would make all or part of the following available:

2 CA    23-25 DC/DDE  
9 CL    105-150 SS  
48-58 DD

CAPABILITY W/O OPPOSITION

(5) A maximum of 80-200 Northern Fleet long-range submarines could be initially available for operations. About 50-95 of these submarines could be maintained on station for an extended period.

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SCOPE (Cont'd)

MAGNITUDE AND COMPOSITION (Cont'd)

CAPABILITY W/O OPPOSITION (Cont'd)

Air

(9) Main air tasks in operations against Iceland would be:

(a) To protect air and sea communications against Allied air and naval attacks.

(b) To destroy Allied air forces based in Europe, Great Britain, Greenland, North America, and Iceland.

(c) To provide airlift and escort for a/b operations.

(d) To support ground and naval forces involved.

(9) The only soviet combat aircraft with range capabilities to attack Iceland are the medium and heavy bombers; however, the use of heavy bombers is extremely unlikely because of higher commitments. The necessity for refueling light bombers and jet fighters enroute makes their use unlikely unless they could be refueled in the air or on ice floes. Therefore, the most probable aircraft for a Soviet attack on Iceland would be jet and piston medium bombers. Approximately the following Soviet aircraft (including naval but not air defense) would probably be present in Northwestern USSR and Eastern Europe, and could be drawn on for this operation. Allocations would depend on Soviet commitments elsewhere and the importance the Soviets attached to this operation:

Fighters (jet)	3,450
Attack (jet) (Aprx 1/3 ftr, 2/3 LB)	300
Light Bombers (jet)	1,500
Medium Bombers	
Jet	500
Piston	650
Transports	
Medium	50-200
Light	800

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