



Declaration of Atlantic Unity 1955

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Dómsmálaráðherra – Utanríkismálaráðherra – Bréf – Walden Moore – Porter McKeever – *Harpers Magazine* – *Declaration of Atlantic Unity* – *Resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention* – *Atlantic Treaty Association* – *How to Throw Away an Air Base* – Varnarmál – Utanríkismál

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Atlantic Treaty Association nefnast félagssamtök, er stefna að því að fræða almenning í Atlantshafslöndunum um tilgang Atlantshafsbandalagsins og hugsjónir þær og lífskoðanir, sem bandalagið er stofnað til að standa vörð um. Ennfremur vinna samtökin að því að efla menningarlega, félagslega og efnahagslega samvinnu og samskipti bandalagsþjóðanna.

Þessum ~~xxk~~markmiði vinna samtökin að m. a. með útgáfu bóka og bæklinga, fyrirlestrahaldi og ennfremur efna þau til fundarhalda og ráðstefna.

Aðalbækistöðvar samtakanna eru í London, en félagsdeildir eða nefndir starfa í öllum löndum bandalagsins, nema Íslandi, Lúxemborg og Portúgal. Starfsemin er kostuð með frjálsum framlögum einstakl., fél. og stofn., en bandalagið og viðkomandi ríkisstjórnir styrkja fjárhagslega sérstök verkefni, er samtökin taka sér fyrir hendur, svo sem útgáfu ákveðinnar bókar eða sérstakt ráðstefnuhald.

Þar sem meginþættirnir í starfi samtakanna eru fræðsla um A-bandalagið og menningarsamvinna á vegum þess, hafa samtökin látið sig menntamál allmiklu skipta. Hafa þau boðað til einnar ráðstefnu um þau mál og eins undirbúningsfundar undir aðra ráðstefnu. Nefndur fundur var haldinn í París í sept. sl. og mættu á honum fulltrúar frá öllum menntamálaráðuneytum aðildarríkja bandalagsins. Hætti ég á þessum fundi f.h.r. okkar, þar sem stofnuð var föst menntamálanefnd (Atlantic Treaty Education Committee), og hef ég nýlega verið tilnefndur fastafulltr. rn. í nefndinni. Verkefni nefndarinnar er fyrst og fremst að kanna, hvernig nú er háttað kennslu um alþjóðanál og alþjóðastofnanir, og þá sérstakl. um A-bandalagið, í skólum aðildarríkjanna og hvort þörf muni vera að bæta og auka þá kennslu, og þá með hverjum hætti.

Frankvæmdastjóri samtakanna er Breti, John Eppstein að nafni, en aðstoðarmaður hans heitir Jacques Ludovicy (var á ráðstefnunni í Bruges). Forseti er Lester Pearson, en formaður er Dr. Flynt, Bandaríkjam. (titill: director, Higher Education Programs Branch, U.S. Office of Education).

Í samtölum í París og síðar í bréfum til mín hefur Mr. Eppstein látið í ljós áhuga á stofnun A.T.A.- nefndar hér á landi. Færði ég þessa málaleitan í tal við Hans G. Andersen, sendiherra Ísl. hjá Nato, og var Hans hugmyndinni hlynntur, en lagði áherzlu á, að farið væri að öllu með gát í þessum efnum. A-bandalagið væri viðkvæmt, háþólitískt deilumál hér á landi, og ef slík

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nefnd færi að starfsmátt o fforsi eða á annan óhönduglegan hátt, yrði slíkt einungis vatn á myllu andstæðinga bandal. hér á landi.

Mr. Eppstein mun koma við hér á landi 4. febr. nk. og dveljast hér til 7. s.m. - Hann hefur beðið mig að reyna að hlutast til um, að hann fengi náð tali að framámönnum í menningar- og stjórnmálum. Þetta mér vent um, ef þér vildum veita manninum viðtal stutta stund, en þetta er skilmerkilegur og notalegur maður. Væntanl. mun hann einnig fá viðtal við utanríkisrh. og menntamálarh. o.fl. - Einnig óskar Mr. Eppstein, að ég hlutist til um að kalaa saman fámennan hóp manna, er myndað gæti ~~meina~~ kjarna þeirrar nefndar sem áður er að vikið, til skrafs og ráðagerðax við Mr. E.

Ér hefur dottið í hug að hafa samband við nokkra prófessora og Frjálsrar menningar-menn, svo og nokkra menn frá þeim flokkum, er styðja aðild Ísl. að Nato. Held væri eskilegt, að nefndin væri ekki of einlituð Þjálfstæðismönnum, en vandfundnir munu vera frambarilegir A&F-menn.

Þins og reynslan sýnir t.d. um félag SP, hafa slík félög reynzt ~~afkast~~ athafnalítið og held ég að frekar sé að óttast athafnaleysi og skeytingarleysi slíkra félaga eða nefnda en hið gagnsæa. Því þyrfti umrædd nefnd að hafa á að skipa manni eða mönnum, er a.m.k. hirtu um að svara bréfum erlendis frá. Þætti t.d. hugsa sér Sigurð A. Magnússon, blm., í ritarastarfið.

20.1.75
Kristinn Halldór.

N.B. Við Kristur og Agnýlfur K. höfum þatt þetta mál okkur í neiti og vildum helst koma allri til þín þegar þú ert þínum að skr. þetta. Gætu þú látið okkur vita þegar þú heurtar?

Ag. P.

Linhverja af eftirt. mönnum mætti hugsa sér í umrædda nefnd, en nóg væri, að 10-15 menn mynduðu hana.

- 1) Ásgeir Pétursson,
- 2) Eyjólfur K. Jónsson,
- 3) Knútur Hallsson.

- 4) Tómas Guðmundsson,
- 5) Þorkell Jóhannesson,
- 6) Helgi Sæmundsson,
- 7) Halldór Halldórsson,
- 8) Magnús Torfason,
- 9) Vilhjálmur Árnason,
- 10) Þórarinn Þórarinsson,
- 11) Sigurður A. Magnússon,
- 12) Stefán Pétursson,
- 13) Lúðvík Gissurarson,
- 14) Gunnar Gunnarsson,
- 15) Freysteinn Gunnarsson,
- 16) Ármann Snævarr,
- 17) Ragnar Georgsson,
- 18) Guðmundur Ásmundsson,
- 19) Pétur Benediktsson,
- 20) Gunnl. Pétursson,
- 21) Benjamín Þiríksson,

Atlantic Treaty Association nefnast félagssamtök,
er hafa að markmiði að fræða almenning í Atlantshafslöndunum
um tilgang Atlantshafsbandalagsins og hugsjónir þær, sem bandalagið,
er stöfnað til að standa vörð um.

Declaration of Atlantic Unity

We 271 citizens of Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Germany, address this APPEAL FOR ATLANTIC UNITY to our fellow citizens and to our governments which are represented on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

President Eisenhower has warned that "unity among free nations is our only hope of survival" and has declared that "NATO symbolizes the unity of free men in an age of peril." This is our conviction also. We must never forget that we are all bound together by our common belief in freedom under law.

The fourteen members of NATO have mutually guaranteed each other against armed aggression and merged under one command parts of their land, sea and air forces to make their pledge effective. NATO has succeeded in vastly reducing the danger of direct military attack in Europe. This success has caused the enemies of freedom to divert their military aggression to other areas and to concentrate on diplomatic manoeuvres to disrupt the unity of the NATO nations. Their efforts have been aided by voices of isolationism in each of our countries and by mutual recrimination. Thus, our peril from disunity has increased.

This is no time for half-hearted measures. While welcoming the progress made towards European union, we believe that nothing less than an effectively integrated Atlantic Community, which would include German defense forces, will in the end adequately meet the challenge of the times. Defense in today's terms extends beyond military requirements and into the political, economic and cultural aspects of our lives.

Yet NATO is still basically a military alliance. It is as long ago as 25 April, 1953, that the NATO Council of Ministers stated in their communique: "Convinced that in unity lies their greatest strength, they are resolved to broaden cooperation in every field, economic, political and social, as well as military, and so make the Atlantic Community a lasting reality." But little has since been done.

We call upon our governments to proceed now to redeem that pledge by initiating the following measures for which there is already authority under the North Atlantic Treaty:

1. The development of NATO as a central agency to coordinate the political, trade and defense policies of the member nations.
2. The elaboration, pursuant to Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, of a comprehensive mu-

tual program for lowering tariffs, freeing currencies and eliminating trade restrictions so that there may be established an adequate economic basis for the Atlantic Community and associated nations. Common economic action will give us not only better defense at less cost, but also the benefits of an expanding and thriving economy, thus raising the standards of living for the Atlantic Community and the whole free world.

3. The establishment by each of our legislatures of a parliamentary committee or association for NATO to further understanding in each member country of its progress and potentialities.
4. The creation of an advisory Atlantic Assembly, representative of the legislatures of the member nations, which would meet periodically to discuss matters of common concern. Observers could be invited from associated states.
5. The establishment by NATO of an Economic Advisory Council comprising representatives of employers and employees to advise the Council and other NATO bodies on the effect of their policies on the standard of living in the NATO countries, especially upon the working population.

We endorse the words of the Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, spoken at Bonn on February 10, 1954:

"Perhaps the time has now come to consider whether some of the steps toward closer integration which we must take if our concept of civilization is not to perish, should be taken within the larger framework of the North Atlantic Community . . . many of us believe the peoples living about the great basin of the Atlantic Ocean might well seek the solution of their problems of economic betterment, political stability and self-defense in this closer integration of their national resources and of their machinery of government."

We remind our governments that NATO, in the words of its Secretary-General, "is something new and exciting and revolutionary, the most challenging and constructive experiment in international relations ever attempted."

We ask our fellow citizens to urge our respective governments to make this experiment succeed. We are convinced that in our ability to do so lies the well-being of us all.

First Issued OCTOBER 4, 1954

Walden Moore.

Short Biographical Statement.

Born, 1900, New York City, U.S.A. Educated Harvard College (AB 1922), The Sorbonne (1923-24), Columbia University (MA 1930).

Employment: Reporter New York World (1923). League of Red Cross Societies, Paris, France (1923-24). League of Nations Association, New York 1925-28. University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y. 1930-42. Assoc. Professor of Government (International Relations) and Acting Head of Government Department. Candidate for Congress 1942 (Democrat - not elected). 1942-48 Captain then Major U.S. Army, Military Government Division. Served in Washington, Britain, France and Germany (1944-48) 1945-48 Director of Civil Administration, Regierungsbezirk Niederbayern-Oberpfalz, 1948-53 Secretary and Executive Director, Atlantic Union Committee. 1953 to present - Project Director, Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

Porter McKeever

How to Throw away an Air Base

An American authority on Iceland brings back a surprising report on the reasons why we are being pushed off that priceless island . . . and how our losses might still be repaired.

A LESSON in how to lose an air base—plus radar and naval facilities of immense importance to American security—can be had these days in Iceland with no difficulty whatever.

You don't have to search for any clever Russian plot. There is no need to apologize for the behavior of our 4,000 troops there; in fact, they have behaved quite well. No unpleasant cultural conflict lurks beneath the surface; on the contrary, the Icelanders are among the most pro-American people in the world. There is no clash of basic strategic or diplomatic interests.

Yet the fact remains that we and our allies in NATO have lost a major battle in Iceland. That island has taken Communists into its government, and has told us to call our troops home. The reasons for this disaster—it can't be called anything else—are very different from what most Americans believe. They are worth examining with some care, because the disaster might still be repaired—and because the lesson they offer might save us endless trouble in other parts of the world.

Curiously enough, no one is more dismayed at what has happened than the Icelanders themselves. Throughout the long autumn days the local politicians gather over coffee tables in anxious search for some way to rescue their international obligations from the tangle—a tangle partly of their own making, although the British and the Americans both helped to snarl things up.

In 1944, at the end of a long stay in Iceland,

my farewell visits included a call upon a lady who, throughout the two years I had been there had been notably vitriolic in her attitude toward the foreign troops on Iceland's soil. When she began telling me how sad she was that all the Americans were leaving, I reminded her of past comments.

"But," she insisted, "it really is terrible all of you are going. Now we shall have to go back to talking about each other."

When I returned to Iceland this summer I was curious to know what her attitude would be toward our troops there now.

"They have been no help at all," she told me. "Their conduct is so admirable, we have to go right on talking about each other."

When one considers the beauty of Iceland's women, and the Icelandic zest for personal gossip, the complete absence of critical comment concerning our men is truly impressive.

NEWS stories out of Iceland this summer have focused on the troops. But to discover what is really happening there one has to start not with troops but with trade.

Iceland must import to live. It pays for its imports through the sale of fish. Nature covered much of the island with barren lava plains, then apologized by surrounding it with rich fishing grounds. Fish, in one form or another, constitute 97 per cent of the country's exports. In 1951, Iceland was exporting nothing to the Communist bloc. Four years later, the Soviet Union and its satellites were absorbing 28 per cent of the island's exports and providing 22 per cent of its imports.

The irony is that the Soviets achieved their position through no particular cleverness of their own—they were drawn into a vacuum created mainly by conservative commercial interests in Britain. The political impact of such a drastic

shift in trade is one of the first lessons to be learned from events in Iceland.

The story begins in 1943 when Icelanders noted with alarm a steady decline in their catch and decided that conservation measures were needed in the bays and fiords where spawning occurs. Their worries were placed before international conservation conferences in London in 1943 and 1946 and in Washington in 1949. In 1950, the Icelandic government decided to extend the three-mile boundary for fishing vessels to four miles, and draw straight lines across all bays.

The British, who fish extensively in these waters, asked that application of the new regulations be withheld until the International Court at The Hague reached a decision in a case the British had brought against Norway for taking a similar step. Iceland agreed. Then, apparently to Britain's surprise, the Court decided in favor of Norway. The Icelandic government at once announced that as of May 15, 1952, the four-mile limit would apply to all vessels, Icelandic as well as foreign. British trawler owners protested vigorously. When Iceland stood firm, the British Trawler Association notified all British purchasers and processors of fish that their supplies would be immediately cut off if they accepted fish from Iceland. Until that point, in October 1952, nearly one-fourth of all the whitefish caught by Icelandic trawlers was landed and sold in the United Kingdom. But the boycott was instantly effective and still continues.

THE U.S.S.R. AS SAVIOR

THE Icelanders began searching for alternate outlets. Fish that would normally have been landed fresh in Britain were killed and salted aboard ship for sale in Italy. Through British and German sales agents other new markets for dried fish were developed in Africa. This year sales in Africa, which four years ago took nothing, will return more than \$6,000,000. But despite these various efforts, Icelandic storehouses continued to bulge through the winter of 1952 and into the next spring. Then came what was clearly intended to appear as a life-saving offer.

At the end of World War II the Conservative party, with the flexibility characteristic of Icelandic politics, had formed a coalition government with the Communists. During this government's short life the Soviet Union paid its Icelandic comrades the compliment of negotiating a purchase of fish. The Communists were ousted

and the purchases stopped. Although the Icelanders thereafter sent Moscow a note each year asking if Russia was interested in buying more fish, the notes were never even acknowledged. But in April 1953—five months after the British boycott began—the Soviet government, without waiting to be asked, told Iceland it would like to buy 21,000 tons of frozen fillets. At that moment Iceland's entire output was 25,000 tons.

Icelanders recognized the political motivations behind the offer and were reluctant to become dependent upon a market that could be turned off as quickly as it was turned on. They informed their NATO neighbors of the development. But the reaction of the NATO partners was an indifference it is to be hoped they now regret. So the Icelanders agreed to sell Russia 14,000 tons—a third less than the Russians had asked for—with deliveries spread over the next eighteen months.

Ever since, the Icelanders have been trying to minimize the political pressures inherent in an annual contract by asking for a two- or three-year contract. But the Russians refuse. In 1955 Iceland's exports to the Soviet bloc totaled \$14,400,000. This was \$3,000,000 more than the combined purchases of the U.S. and the entire sterling area. Icelandic production of frozen fish has almost doubled—it is now about 50,000 tons annually—and Soviet willingness to buy has more than kept pace with the gain. Nevertheless the Icelanders are trying to keep Communist purchases to less than one-third of the export total.

"We don't want to become too dependent on anyone—including our friends," a key trade official explained to me. And my mind shot back to a somewhat similar comment by a government official twelve years earlier:

"We are a small nation," he observed, "and suspicion must be our navy."

It is wise for us to remember that in this respect Iceland and many other small nations are well defended.

Icelandic resentment against the British boycott remains intense, and some of it has rubbed off on the United States, especially since Icelanders consider it a clear violation of the U.S.-U.K. Marshall Plan agreement pledging action against "business practices or business arrangements affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control."

Although the boycott is being carried on by private commercial interests, the Icelanders feel that the British government could and should

step in and call a halt, and that the United States should urge it to do so.

Unhappily, the role of the United States in Iceland's search for non-Communist markets has been worse than passive. Our purchases have declined steadily. Moreover, in May 1954 the U.S. Tariff Commission recommended an increase in tariff rates and the imposition of quotas on fish imports. President Eisenhower rejected the recommendation, but New England fishing interests kept up their cries for protective action, even though American purchases of Icelandic fish continued to decline. Then, this June, with a singular insensitivity to timing, the Tariff Commission reopened the case and actually held public hearings at the very moment the Icelandic election campaign was entering its critical phase. The decision, yet to come, can have a profound effect on Iceland's political future—a fact which seems to have escaped the Commission's notice.

The Communists have, of course, exploited the issue vigorously. NATO, they shout, is the means by which American troops gained a foothold on Icelandic soil while their British partners choked off the lifeblood of the country. Only the Soviet Union thwarted this sinister plot. And the Soviet "assistance" has had its impact even on strongly anti-Communist Icelanders who see reminders of it on every side.

Because sales to the Soviet bloc are on a barter basis, visible manifestations of Soviet purchases dot the Icelandic landscape. There are Russian cars on Icelandic roads and Russian trucks on Iceland's farms. The filling stations may have Shell or Esso or British Petroleum signs, but the gasoline coming out of the tanks is more often Russian. Many of Iceland's new capitalists live in homes built with air-base construction money and Russian cement. Going through a freezer plant currently in construction, I noticed that the materials were Russian and the power tools Czech.

Normally the Icelanders import almost all their cereals from us. This year they will be eating 400 tons of Burmese rice delivered by the Russians.

The many material Soviet offerings have been accompanied by comparable cultural ones. Last summer when President Eisenhower stopped off in Iceland en route to the "summit" meeting in Geneva, Iceland's wise and friendly President Asgeir Asgeirsson tendered him luncheon at the Keflavik air base. Had he driven into Reykjavik, he would have seen the streets of the capital city lined with the red flags of the Soviet countries, for a huge Soviet Trade Fair was in full swing.

The Russians have also sent their leading conductors, musicians, ballerinas, athletes, and chess players to perform in Iceland, as well as the entire production of a Chinese opera.

When I was there, in mid-July, a delegation of Chinese Communists was touring the farm co-operatives. On their heels came a concert pianist from Poland, followed by the Minister of Trade from Czechoslovakia, and a Moscow soccer team.

But in this field the United States has not lagged behind. Musicians like Isaac Stern, Blanche Thebom, and E. Power Biggs have discovered enthusiastic audiences in Iceland. The Robert Shaw Chorale was a huge success with the chorus-conscious Icelanders. Last October William Faulkner lectured to overflow crowds at the University of Iceland and left a lasting impression, especially among the nationally revered Icelandic intellectuals. Our Air Force men arranged an air lift to carry an Icelandic naturalist on a hazardous trip into the glacial hinterland to search for the rare Pink-Footed Goose—amid the cheers of bird-watching enthusiasts from the visiting string section of the Boston Symphony.

In general, Soviet efforts at cultural propaganda have been more lavish and spectacular, but ours have been praised for their individual quality. Yet while we are fighting the Russians to a standstill on the cultural front, the crucial struggle is being waged on the economic front. There we will continue to be driven back until we close the opening we ourselves made.

"PROGRESS" AT FULL SPEED

TO BE sure, our expenditures on the air base have hovered in the vicinity of \$15,000,000 a year for the last three years. But we must bear in mind that wherever we build bases we create economic dislocations as well as benefits. Viewed objectively, our air-base expenditures have undoubtedly been a net asset to Iceland's economy. But we cannot expect the average Icelander to be an objective student of economics. Construction at Keflavik air base has meant that a large percentage of Iceland's labor force has been drawn to the southwestern corner of the country. And although wage rates are regulated, overtime pay has brought a general rise in the cost of labor. Farmers and regular commercial industries find labor scarce and expensive—a grievance creating more genuine complaints than the presence of American troops. At the height of the fishing and farming season

last year Iceland had to import more than a thousand workers from abroad. Most of them came from the Faroe Islands, but some were even brought from Germany.

Contractors working at the base are getting rich, and the undercurrent of resentment among the less fortunate is spreading. The inflation spiral has shot upward. It is a moot point whether this has been caused by a too-rapid rate of expansion at the air base or by the Icelandic government's failure to maintain proper controls. But most Icelanders are concerned mainly about the soaring cost of living.

Furthermore, the Icelander does not regard air-base construction expenditure as a normal or continuing part of his country's economy. Therefore he tends to deprecate the benefits. The \$3,000,000 we did not spend on fish last year, as compared with the year before, was far more potent politically than the \$15,000,000 we did spend on the air base.

These external influences have placed added burdens on an already unstable political and economic structure. Since the war, Iceland has developed at a driving pace, creating a curious political situation which helped to produce the new cabinet. Returning to Iceland this summer I was immediately struck by the new homes, schools, hospitals, factories, public buildings, roads, and parks that were not there twelve years ago. Later, statistics backed up the evidence of my senses.

Agricultural land in cultivation has been increased 60 per cent; one-third of all the farms have been electrified and nearly all have telephones. Before the war Iceland's hydro-electric plants were producing 22 million kilowatt-hours; today they have an installed capacity of 550 million. Marshall Plan funds have made possible the completion of two new hydro-electric projects; and a fertilizer plant that last year produced 18,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizer saved Iceland nearly \$2,000,000 in foreign exchange and permitted an export of 4,000 tons. A huge new cement plant with a 75,000-ton capacity is now under way. Textile plants have been modernized and expanded; shoe and glass factories have been built.

The merchant fleet has grown from seventeen to twenty-nine ships, and its tonnage has nearly tripled. The fishing fleet has more than doubled in tonnage and almost all of its 619 vessels are new. Three airlines have been developed, two of which operate to the United States and Europe.

Inevitably this feverish economic activity has

had far-reaching effects on the country's social structure. Between 1940 and 1950 the number of people engaged in agriculture declined more than 10 per cent; the number engaged in fishing, more than 5 per cent. At the same time, the number working in industry and construction rose 10 per cent. This trend has continued. Today nearly 50 per cent of the population clusters in and around Reykjavik, the one large city.

UNEASY TIES

THE change has strained the country's political machinery to the breaking point. Iceland's election laws, like our own, are weighted in favor of the rural areas. But now, because of the population shift, this has made one vote in an eastern farm area equal to ten votes in Reykjavik.

All these changes have been putting the political parties through some extraordinary gyrations—which played their part in this summer's election. Traditionally, Iceland has four political parties: Communists, Social Democrats, Progressives, and Conservatives, to read from left to right. Since the war, the Communists' voting strength has fluctuated between 15 and 20 per cent of the electorate, but the intellectuals and students who used to be attracted to the party have fallen off significantly. To compensate for this, the hard-core Communists have fought persistently to capture the labor movement, and perhaps the most lasting damage of the British boycott will be the impetus that it gave to this effort.

At the same time, the Social Democrats, who used to have a strong appeal to labor, have been steadily declining in power, and losing their ties with the union movement. The present leaders are, generally speaking, a group of idealistic Fabians being slowly ground down by militant Communist activity on the one hand and the adoption of liberal welfare programs by the Conservatives on the other, until it is doubtful whether the party can long survive except by some merger or coalition. This it tried in the last election by an arrangement with the Progressives.

The Progressives, originally a purely agrarian party, are today the controllers of Iceland's huge co-operative movement which extends into every facet of national life and has an annual turnover greater than the national budget. The Progressives' problem is that they have been so pre-occupied with their economic construction that they have neglected their hold on the electorate.

The Icelandic farmer who moves to town usually continues to do business at the co-op, but he is more and more apt to vote Conservative.

The Conservative pattern has been the exact opposite of the Progressive. Originally the party of Iceland's economic overlords, the Conservative party has today a program so liberal that the Social Democrats complain the Conservatives have stolen most of their ideas. The Conservatives have concentrated on appealing to young people and intellectuals, and in Reykjavik's labor unions they are stronger than the Social Democrats. In this summer's election the Conservatives won 42 per cent of the votes, but because the ballots came largely from the Reykjavik area, they resulted in only nineteen seats, whereas the Progressives, with only 16 per cent of the votes, got seventeen seats.

It was this growth of Conservative strength that alarmed the Progressive leader, Hermann Jonasson, sixty years old but still energetic and desperately anxious to be Prime Minister again before age would shove the office from his grasp. Before the election he worked out an alliance with the Social Democrats by which neither would put up candidates in opposition to the other. Then he seized on the troop issue as a possible vote-getter among the dissidents and the chauvinists. Yet when I told him he was being accused of being anti-American, he flushed with anger. His only son is married to an American girl and works in California for an engineering firm. He is quick to point out that he was the very Prime Minister who, in 1938, refused a Nazi request to set up installations in Iceland and who, three years later, invited American forces to occupy and protect the country in place of the British who had arrived just a step ahead of a Nazi invasion in 1940.

Jonasson's gamble for complete power almost won. His coalition got twenty-five seats, just two short of a clear majority. But this shortage of two made the Communists with their eight seats indispensable to him. He could not turn to the Conservatives and survive as a political leader. Ambition was stronger than his dislike of the Communists—whom he calculated he could isolate from foreign policy. So Hannibal Valdimarsson, a dissident and opportunistic fellow-traveler, became Minister of Health and Social Affairs, and a genuine Communist, Ludvik Josefsson, Minister of Fisheries and Commerce.

The rest of the cabinet is composed of firm friends of the United States. The Foreign Minister, Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson, has been Sheriff of the district in which the air base is

located, since 1945, and is so well liked and respected by all the Americans who have dealt with him on defense matters that the Communists call him the "Occupation Boss." The Finance Minister, Eysteinn Jonsson, is the cousin of the University of North Dakota's outstanding Scandinavian scholar, Professor Richard Beck. The Minister of Education and Industry, Gylfi Gislason, like his fellow Social Democrat, Gudmundsson, has strongly asserted his allegiance to NATO.

At best the new cabinet is an uneasy coalition. The Communists tried unsuccessfully to keep such an outstanding pro-American as Gudmundsson out of the Foreign Ministry. The authority of the cabinet posts given the Communists was whittled down; social security was taken out of the jurisdiction of the Welfare Ministry; economic co-operation abroad and responsibility for new investment were taken away from the Ministry of Commerce.

The government is likely to have a short and stormy life, and new elections next spring or summer are highly probable. Therefore we should waste no time taking the steps that will protect our investment and our stake in the security of Iceland, the United States, and the NATO alliance.

WHAT WE CAN DO

FIRST, the United States should help persuade the British to end their boycott and re-establish markets for Icelandic fish in the United Kingdom. By the same token, we should take care to not raise our own tariffs or impose quotas on Icelandic fish.

Second, NATO should consider the creation of an association of its members with possessions or interests in Africa which would buy fish from Iceland for distribution in that vast protein-hungry area.

Third, while helping to find markets for fish, we must not lose our temper or patience over the troop issue.

The Icelanders know their centuries of isolation are ended and that the emotions surrounding their independence—they severed their last ties with Denmark only twelve years ago—must be adjusted to the requirements of interdependence.

"We Icelanders have become quite cosmopolitan these last few years," a farmer in the far north told me. "But like you Americans, we sometimes do or say things that look otherwise."

No responsible, non-Communist Icelander

ANNE GOODWIN WINSLOW

HADRIAN'S LULLABY

(Animula Vagula Blandula . . .)

IN ATHENS once he had designed
 A temple for Olympian Jove, and since,
 With marble and magnificence,
 He had done other things he had in mind.
 Now he must go, but they would stay behind.

So, at the end of his conspicuous day,
 The emperor gave the world away:
 Gave the cities and the sea,
 The monuments and history—
 Gifts that only an emperor gives:
 Gave the words that he had loved too long—
 All but a few diminutives
 To make that little song.

thinks of withdrawing the base from American or NATO use when he speaks of troop withdrawal. All thoughtful Icelanders want the base and vital radar installations secured against surprise seizure by enemy forces—and the “enemy” they mean is the same country we mean.

But in signing the NATO treaty, Iceland expressly specified that no foreign troops should be stationed in the country *in peacetime*. Just after the outbreak of the Korean war, a new Defense Agreement with the United States permitted the return of American forces. Now the Korean war is past, the Icelanders wonder if it is not time to return to the original agreement. At least they would like a clearer understanding of what we consider “peacetime.”

The base issue is still a negotiable matter. We have a year in which to negotiate, and wise use of that time on the economic front should achieve a satisfactory political solution for everyone concerned—except the Russians and their few Icelandic puppets.

Probably many or even most of our military personnel will have to be replaced by civilian “technicians.” Perhaps we will have to help train a special Icelandic police force to guard the base. Certainly we should be able to reach an agreement that would enable Air Force units in nearby Greenland and other military

personnel to have immediate access to the base in the event of emergency or surprise attack. Unless we ignore obvious problems we should be able to obtain a reasonable accommodation of the security requirements of the base to U. S. cuts in military manpower and the Icelandic aversion to men—anybody's men—in uniform.

Finally, this country should resume its interest in the college and technical training of Icelanders which has lapsed shockingly in the last ten years. No country on earth has greater regard for education and the educated man. Therefore the place and manner in which its leaders are educated are critically important.

In 1946, 34 per cent of all Icelanders studying abroad were in the United States and Canada. Today we have fewer than 6 per cent. Icelandic students would still prefer to come to the United States, but the higher costs here are pushing them toward Europe. We must find some way to bridge the economic gap.


The importance of the intellectual to Iceland cannot be overestimated. Poets are their national heroes; writing, one of the most honored professions. Last year, Iceland's book publishers produced over 300 titles in editions ranging from 2,000 to 15,000 copies. This in a country having a population less than Des Moines, Iowa, or Wichita, Kansas, means an average of about eight books per year for every living Icelander!

The Communists' richest asset is Halldor Kiljan Laxness, last year's Nobel Prize winner in literature. He was rebuffed as a young writer trying to make a living in the United States in the 1920s, befriended by the Communists on his return home—and became a fellow-traveler.

He is almost the last Icelandic intellectual of any importance on whom the Communists retain a hold. The reason, mainly, is that the new generation has had much happier associations with this country than Laxness did in the 'twenties, and they know his view of us is dated. Nothing is more in our national interest than to keep this sentiment strong. We can do this only by keeping young people coming to us for an education.

In Iceland, in the months immediately ahead, we have a chance to demonstrate—not only to Iceland but to the world—that the NATO alliance is a positive, constructive relationship. Out of what now appears to be the beginning of its disintegration we can build its renaissance. And in continuing to develop a mutually beneficial relationship between a small nation and a large, we can dramatize our concept of the world we would like to see.

DECLARATION OF



ATLANTIC UNITY

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	<i>pages 5 to 9</i>
DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY..	<i>pages 10-11-12</i>
LIST OF SIGNATURES BY COUNTRIES.....	<i>pages 13 to 22</i>
COMMENTS BY NATO OFFICIALS.....	<i>pages 23-24-25</i>
COMMENTS BY PRESIDENTS, PRIME MINISTERS, FOREIGN MINISTERS AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS	<i>pages 25 to 42</i>
COMMENTS BY THE PRESS.....	<i>pages 42 to 46</i>

APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.....	<i>pages 47 to 50</i>
SUMMARY OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS.....	<i>pages 51-52</i>
LIST OF PARLIAMENTARY AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS PROMOTING ATLANTIC UNITY.....	<i>pages 53 to 62</i>
LIST OF KEY SPONSORS OF THE <i>Declaration</i> IN NINE COUNTRIES.....	<i>page 63</i>

*Resolution for an Atlantic
Exploratory Convention*

Statement by
Hon. Estes Kefauver
of Tennessee
Introducing the Resolution
in the
Senate of the United States
Wednesday, February 9, 1955

*Not printed
at Government
expense*

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II. EUROPE, AFRICA AND AUSTRALASIA

12. Mr. Black left on March 17 for discussions in London, Zurich, Rome and Paris. He is expected to return to the Bank about March 27.

Austria

13. Messrs. Umbricht and Spottswood are expected to return to the Bank about March 26 (R-941). Mr. Kanters left for Rome on March 18.

Finland

14. Messrs. Paterson and Finne arrived in Finland on March 18 for further discussions of the proposed loan of about \$15 million for electric power development (R-937, R-941).

Iceland

15. The Government has asked the Bank to send a mission to review economic conditions.

Italy

16. Mr. Kanters joined the mission in Rome on March 18; Messrs. Armstrong and Bryce will join the mission on March 23 (R-937, R-946, R-950).

Netherlands

17. A group of twelve Netherlands industrialists headed by Dr. Paul Rijkens, of Unilever NV, will visit the Bank early in May.

Nigeria (Federation)

18. Chiefs Obafemi Awolowo and C. D. Akran, Premier and Minister of Development, respectively, of the Western Region, accompanied by Western Region officials, visited the Bank on March 19 and discussed development problems of their region.

Norway

19. As soon as necessary legislation is presented to the Storting (Sec. Memo. 1-391), the Bank intends to invite negotiators from Norway to discuss a possible loan to the Government for the Tokke hydroelectric project (R-908, R-919, R-917, R-930, R-936).

20. Miss Morsey arrived in Norway on March 7 to discuss legal questions about the proposed loan.

Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Federation)

21. Mr. Richards returned from Salisbury via London on March 19. Mr. Lejeune returned on March 22 and Mr. Kamarck is expected to return on March 23 (R-941).

*Mr. Cope sagði mátt Jón Arnarson hefur um þetta
Sec. 10-170 19/3, skv. bréfi frá Eysteini 8/3. Cope sagðist ekki vita*

*hver gæti afstada bankans vegna stíðustu atvinnu og vartanlegru kosninga.
allavega hefur engi að senda í April. Kemur má ekki víð!*