



Bréfa- og málasafn 1968, seinni hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnmal – Forsætiráðherra – Bréf – Ásgeir Ásgeirsson – Guðmundur Í. Guðmundsson – Pétur Thorsteinson – Stefán Ísaksson – Sigurbjörg Jóhannesdóttir – William frá Cargo – Gunnar Thoroddsen – Gunnar Helgason – Tryggingastofnun – Samband ungra Sjálfstæðismanna –

Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

bjarnibenediktsson.is

Einkaskjalasafn nr. 360
Stjórnmalamaðurinn
Askja 2-35, Örk 3

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Frú Sigríður Benediktsson

Brussels, Belgium
June 27, 1968

My dear Frið Benediktsson:

My husband and I
want to thank you -
and through you all
the Icelandic ladies -
for making our stay
in Iceland so extra-

Mr. and Mrs. William Swearing

ordinarily pleasant.

Not only did I have
a wonderful time on
every tour, but I feel I
now have a better idea of
Iceland and know some
wonderful Icelandic
ladies!

I particularly want to thank
you for the lovely luncheon
at Stal Valholl. Sincerely Margaret

Eimil 6, 18. jan. 1969.

Kari forsætisráðherra,
Bjarni Benediktsson.

Jeg þakka sendingu þv. um
forsætisráðgjafi. Þv. er vel og
þyggilega sarnið. Hlittstæðar
reglur áður samþykktar og
eru í gildi. Jeg þakka því mitt
legti. En heldur Kjís jeg þakku
en hárðar dular, þegar til Kasta
alþingis kemur. Sjá þú að minni
árlegi rekstur verður þjóna
hár, samþant-vegna sextán
ára fortíðar í forsætisembætti.

Jeg sendi þér þú með mynd
frá mótöku Nixon, þú var forsætis-
seta að Bessastöðum á Fotlaugs-
messu 1956 til eignar og birtingar

í Mbl., af þín svo sýnist. Myndin
er ágæt af góðum öllum. Í miðid
er Mr. Roger (?), þáverandi vara-
dómsmálaráðgjafi. Hann varð
fullgildur dómsmálaráðgjafi
árið eftir, en er nú utanríkis-
málaráðgjafi Nixons frá 20. þ.m.
síð teli.

Með vinsemi og virdingu,

Ág. Ásgveirsson.

Einismel 17. 8. 68.

Góði vinnu!

Teg þakka viðtalið í gær. En það var eitt sem jeg gleymdi að minnst á: endurskipun Rafuseyjar-
nefundar, sem jeg þó hefði áður minnst á. Teg sendi þjer bryt um það á
mánuðag.

Mín stærstu compliment* fyrir
spjónvarpsviðtalið í gær, bæði efri
og mynduina af þjer, sem var mjög
góð. Svona viðtal við fólk, glælegt
og samgjarnt í Roosevelt-stíl gerir
meira gagn en bládagreinar með
útvörsumningum andstæðinga, og
þú skalt halda þú áfram. Forsætis-
ráðherra á að hafa forgang fyrir
öðrum. Þvíverju.

Ásg. Ásguðsson.

Kar kveðja

P. Þ.

Db. sr. 46. G. 1.
2. ágúst, 1968.

Nr. 520
Bleðaskrif um Ísland.

Óvenju mikið hefir verið skrifað um Ísland í amerísk blöð undanfarið, og á NATO ráðherrafundurinn í Reykjavík sjálfsagt nokkurn þátt í því. Hér með sendast 5 blaðaúrklippur sem sýnishorn. Þar er m.a. útdráttur úr ræðu Hannesar Kjartanssonar um Kínamálið á þingi S.Þ., rætt um afstöðu Íslenskra kommúnista til Tékkoslóvakíumálsins, og tvær greinar um Ísland eftir Elmer Roessner.

Sign. Pétur Thorsteinsson

Utanríkisráðuneytið
Reykjavík

Stokkhólmi , 27. marz 1968 .

I framhaldi af skeyti og express-bréfi sendiráðsins 25.p.m. sendist hér með "Hufvudstadsbladeti" frá 23. og 25.marz s.l., með nánari fréttum um hina nýju stjórn í Finnlandi.

F.h.s.

Samuð Hafsteið

Forsætisráðuneytið
Att. Knútur Hallsson, deildarstjóri
Stjórnarráðshúsinu v. Lækjartorg
R e y k j a v í k .

UTANRÍKISRÁÐUNEYTIÐ

Reykjavík, 13. ágúst 1968.

F. —

Db. 45.X.1.
(óskast tilgreint í svári)

Hér með sendist yður, herra forsætisráðherra, til athugunar ljósrit af bréfi sendiráðsins í London, dags. 16. þ.m., varðandi sýningu brezkra skáta hér í þessum mánuði, en eins og sjá má munu skátarnir hafa meðferðis kveðju frá Wilson forsætisráðherra til forsætisráðherra Íslands.

F. h. r.

e. u.

Halldór Sverga

Hr. forsætisráðherra
Bjarni Benediktsson,
Reykjavík.

LONDON.

Db. 39.F.4.

16. júlí 1968.

Nr. 407
 Heimsókn borgarstjóra
 Burton-upon-Trent
 til Íslands.

Alderman Michael Fidler, borgarstjóri í Burton-upon-Trent, hefir komið í sendiráðið vegna væntanlegrar Íslandsferðar í ágústmánuði. Skýrir borgarstjóri svo frá, að fyrir tveimur árum hafi hópur skáta úr borg hans farið til Íslands og verið svo ánægðir með förina, að þeir hafi ákveðið að efna til annarar ferðar. Sagði borgarstjóri, að þessir skátar hefðu fyrir nokkrum dögum tjáð sér, að nú væri för þeirra til Íslands á ný fullráðin og undirbúin. Stæðu 30 verzlunarfyrirtæki í borg hans á bak við för skátanna til Íslands og myndu skátarnir halda vörusýningu í Reykjavík á meðan þeir dveldu þar. Hefðu skátarnir tjáð sér, að þeir hefðu meðferðis til Íslands kveðju frá Wilson forsætisráðherra til forsætisráðherra Íslands og óskuðu þeir eftir að mega einnig bera kveðju frá Fidler borgarstjóra til borgarstjóra Reykjavíkur. Borgarstjóri hvað sér hafa komið þetta framtak skátanna á óvart og hafi hann þá farið að rannsaka málið. Sú rannsókn hefði leitt til þess, að borgarstjórinn hefði sjálfur ákveðið að fara til Íslands og vera við opnun sýningarinnar. Sýningin verður opnuð 15. eða 16. ágúst og koma skátarnir með skipi nokkru áður, en Fidler borgarstjóri og frú hans koma með flugvél Flugfélags Íslands 14. ágúst og dvelja 4 eða 5 daga.

Borgarstjórinn virtist ekki vita mikið um vörusýningu skátanna umfram það, að hún væri undirbúin með aðstoð 30 brezkra verzlunarfyrirtækja, allra í borg hans, og einhverra íslenzkra aðila, sennilega skáta. Ræðismanni Brets í Reykjavík hvað borgarstjórinn kunnugt um málið. Sérstaklega kvartaði borgarstjóri undan því, hvað skátarnir gætu eða vildu lítið upplýsa hann um undirbúning og framkvæmd sýningarinnar í Reykjavík. Bað borgarstjórinn sendiráðið að útvega

framh./


sér upplýsingar um undirbúning sýningarinnar á Islandi og um hvar hún yrði, hve stór í sniðum og hverjir aðstoðuðu skátana á Islandi. Allt eru þetta að vísu upplýsingar, sem borgarstjóri ætti að fá frá öðrum en sendiráðinu, en engu að síður gat sendiráðið ekki annað en tekið erindinu vel og lofað að athuga málið. Alveg sérstaklega virðist ástæða til þess að reyna að afla þessara upplýsinga, þar eð fram kemur í bréfi frá skátunum, sem sendiráðinu barst í morgun, að dráttur hefir orðið á að svara bréfum, sem þeir hafa ritað félögum sínum á Islandi. Væri æskilegt að fá vitneskju um undirbúning sýningarinnar heima einkum, ef hætta er á, að einhver mistök séu á ferðinni og það því fremur sem mörg verzlunarfyrirtæki eru aðilar að sýningunni. Gefið verður út sérstakt blað í Burton-upon-Trent um för skátanna til Íslands og sýninguna. Forsætisráðherra Breta, Chamber of Commerce og borgarstjóranum í Burton hefir verið blandað í málið auk þess, sem haft hefir verið samband við BBC. Vill sendiráðið mælast til þess, að ráðuneytið leiti upplýsinga um hverjir og hvernig sýningin er undirbúin á Islandi og láti sendiráðinu í té. Íslenzkir skátar eru líklegastir til þess að geta gefið upplýsingar og er sendiráðinu kunnugt um, að fyrir tveimur árum hafði Hjálparsveit skáta umsjón með dvöl skátanna frá Burton-upon-Trent á Islandi.

Æskilegt væri, að borgarstjóri Reykjavíkur fengi að vita um væntanlega för kollega hans frá Burton-upon-Trent til Íslands, enda óskaði borgarstjórinn eftir tækifæri til þess að heilsa uppá kollega sinn í Reykjavík.

Hr. Fidler hreyfði því einnig, hverja hann ætti að heilsa uppá í stjórnarráðinu. Sendiráðið komst hjá að svara því að sinni.

Hjálagt bréf 26th Burton Venture Unit dags. 12. júlí 1968 ásamt fylgiskjölum sendist hér með.

Guðm. → Guðmundsson



ALMENNUR FUNDUR
stuðningsmanna
GUNNARS THORODDSENS

27. júní 1968

ALMENNUR FUNDUR
 STUÐNINGSMANNA GUNNARS THORODDSENS
 Í LAUGARDALSHÖLLINNI
 fimmtudaginn 27. júní kl. 21:00.

Dagskrá:

Fundurinn settur, Gunnar Friðriksson,
 formaður samtaka stuðningsmanna
 Gunnars Thoroddsens


Ávörp flytja:

Eggert G. Þorsteinsson
 Oddur Ólafsson
 Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir
 Örlygur Hálfðánarson
 Ólafur B. Thors
 Hermann Guðmundsson
 Sr. Ólafur Skúlason
 Ásgeir Magnússon
 Kristinn Ágúst Eiríksson
 Dr. Bjarni Benediktsson

Að lokum ávarpar dr. Gunnar Thoroddsen
 fundinn.

14 Fóstbræður syngja
 með hljómsveit Ragnars Bjarnasonar.

Lúðrasveit Reykjavíkur leikur
 frá kl. 20:15 við höllina.



Bjarni



Kristinn



Ásgeir



Gunnar



Eggert



Oddur



Jóhanna



Örlygur



Ólafur B.



Hermann



Ólafur



OrnaFak. nr.

Talset. við gl. d.
Reykjavík 20/8. 1968.

Dohtor Bjarni Benediktsson
okkur langar til að biðja
þig að hjálpa okkur svölitit
og það er að fara þess á
leit við Hóskuld Ólafsson
Eða Kristján Ólafsson að
þeir láni okkur 75 þúsund kr
að vissu skuldum við þau
er þeir hafa gjöf þriggri
þeir þriðri er og þeir vita
báðir það er skiptilinn okkur
er þriggri þúsund og það eru
rösk 2000 þúsund á mánuði
og tvo vinnur konum hjá
B. u. r. og hún dttla að
borga 1000 kr á vikun og það
meira þeir taka sjálfir
mánu á skrifstofu hjá
gjalkera við göngum frá
þriðri og þetta verður rösk 6 þúsund
á mánuði sem sagt 72 þúsund

á ári. Kari Bjarni minn
jég vona að þú getir hjálpað
okkur og við munum geta
alt sem í okkur valdi stendur
þegar til okkur verður leitað
með kvæðins hjálpa handa
flaknum við kosningur
og annað svo hefur þú góðan
mann á þetta þú er
Hilmar Þórhalsson
~~Þorsteinn~~ Þorsteinn
Hampiðjunnar

Virðingur þín

Stefin Þorsson
Ligurbjörg Jóhannsdóttir

Gröndurveg 34 R

22/6'68

Gunnar Helgason telur

Stefan 'Isaksson hálfgerður
vandrestamaður. Þar þínur
inn í húsnæði hefur
erit Gnodsvog á þess
er uppfylla skilyrði.
Hafði verið sjúklingur
á Reglspálandi. Er frá
Muregi. Hann og kona
vinnu, en ekki sam-
felld. 'Oregla á heurilinn.
Nagrunna þvarta.

Sveinn Þarsson er í vand-
satum met hann, en ekki
ekki er þerra hann í
nema þá í annat hú-
næði. (Lengi í sukki hjá
Einar) og þá yfir okk þessum
húsnæði.)

Merkur í Þessu

F

Frásögn

Að fyrirlagi forsætisrh. hringdi ég í morgun til ísl. sendiherrans í Stokkhólmi. Kynnti ég honum efni gráinnar í norska blaðinu Aftenposten 2. þ.m. varðandi orðróm um hugsanlegar launa- og verðstöðvanir og afnám vísitölubindinga í Finnlandi. Bar sendiherra þau skilaboð rh., að hann kannaði strax, hvernig þessi mál standa nú í Finnlandi.

Sendiherrann hringdi ~~eftur~~ skömmu eftir hádegi í dag og hafði þá haft samband við Helsinki. Hann gat gefið þær uppl. einar, að á þessu stigi væri einungis um að ræða bollaleggingar í dagblöðum. Ennþá væri stjórnarkreppa í Finnlandi og verkföll. Kekkonen hefði gefið Koivisto umboð til stjórnarmyndunar með aðild færri stjórnmalaflokka en áður; að öðruleyti væri ástand og horfur í framangreindum málum óbreytt.

Sendiherrann var beðinn að fylgjast vandlega og nákvæmlega með framvindu þessara mála í Finnlandi og gefa jafnharðan skýrslu og hann yrði þess vís, að eitthvað skeði í þessum málum.

13/3 '68.

F

Forsætis-
ráðuneytið

Lördag morgen *Aftenposten* 2. mars 1962

Pris- og lønnsstopp er på tale i Finland

Aktuelt også å sløyfe hele indeks-ordningen

Fra Aftenpostens korrespondent Helstagfors, 1. mars.

En «maktlov» med fullmakter for prisstopp oppgis å være et ledd i de planer som diskuteres i regjeringens forhandlinger for å få slutt på inflasjonen. En slik maktlov skal tilbys organisasjonene som motydelse for en prisstopp og tre i kraft for sammensens avtale om lønnsforhøyelse på 3,5 prosent. Også den feriebattie justertingen av landbraksprisene neste høst vil dermed eventuelt bli sløyfet. Samtidig skal de nevnte indekx-bestemmelsene som holder inflasjonsmålingen i gang avskaffes over hele linjen.

Forberedende forhandlinger med de internasjonale organisasjoner om pris- og lønnsstoppet har allerede vært ført i noen tid, og innvaler fra den avgående regjering. I disse forhandlingene skal Riksbankens direktør, Miksa Ekström som har fått i oppdrag å danne en regjering, ha spilt en fremtredende rolle. Disse forhandlinger er blitt ført i tyve stykke diskusjoner, og man har ennå ikke noen garanti for at de planlagte tiltak har gjennomføres. Men det viser et meget viktigende ansket om de tilknyttede samt den aktuelle situasjonen.

En «maktlov» som innledningsvis beredtes er en utbredt av riksdagen

mennene, og det er blant annet ved denne bakgrunn at man nu gjør et forsøk på å sløye et bredere grunnlag for regjeringen. Svenske Folkpartiet fikk fredag invitasjon om å medvirke i regjeringsforhandlinger etter at regjeringen hadde ledde innlevert sin avskjedsseddel, og sjefdirektør Ekström offentlig hadde fått i oppdrag av presidenten å danne en regjering på bred parlamentarisk grunn. Liberale Folkpartiet er svært lite sannsynligvis å medvirke med regjeringsoppgjøret i tillegg om å medvirke.

Hv' legger Folkpartiet skulle kunne med i regjeringen og dermed bare Sosialistpartiet med sine 25 riksdagsmedlemmer styrt opppekket, vil regjeringen faktisk ha den innkjøpt i riksdagen som trengt for å bringe lovgivningen over av grunnlovsensessy karakter.

Tjente 33000 kr. på å selge stjalne svenske biler

En 25 år gammel bilhandler som skaffet seg en selskapskonto på vel 33000 kroner ved å selge stjålne biler, er i disse dager satt til 10 måneders fengsel for forbudet. ASi Måne var stilet i Hvervig, og bilhandlernes vedte å hente i Norge etter at han hadde prøvet på å selge stjålne biler.

Artikkel om bilhandleren som stjalte biler for å tjene penger.

Artikkel om bilhandleren som stjalte biler for å tjene penger.

Artikkel om bilhandleren som stjalte biler for å tjene penger.

et omkrino

FINNISH FEATURES

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No 7/68

THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMME

Foreign Policy

The government will continue the present line of foreign policy and support endeavours to relieve international tension and to safeguard Finland's international position and world peace. It will pay special attention to the further development of good and trustful relations with the USSR and the Nordic neighbour countries as well as to the careful observance of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the USSR, and other state treaties to which we are a party. The government cherishes the development of good relations with all nations and regards it as its aim to increase in accordance with our resources Finland's contribution to the improvement of the social and economic standing of the developing countries.

Commercial policy

The government will develop and expand foreign trade to the benefit of the national economy and in accordance with the policy of neutrality, within the framework of agreements made, with all parties concerned, taking into consideration the great significance of trade with the Socialist countries, especially the USSR, for the Finnish economy. The government considers it important to study and strengthen conditions to ensure the undisturbed and balanced development of

multilateral trade in convertible currencies and the expansion of economic exchanges, in accordance with neutrality, to this end.

Economic policy

The most important task of the government in economic policy is the elimination of unemployment. This presupposes the acceleration of economic growth to increase the number of jobs available, checking the rise in the cost level and adaptation of incomes and prices policy to long-term growth policy targets. The government will co-operate in bringing about an agreement this spring on an incomes policy for 1969 which will keep the average increase in income within the limits of the average growth of productivity and narrow the difference between large and small incomes. In order to bring about adequate conditions for such an incomes policy, the government will take immediate steps to brake the upward movement of prices and costs and to abolish index linkages in agreement with the labour market and other interest organisations. If necessary the government will ask Parliament for special powers.

By applying an active employment and growth policy, an endeavour will be made to revive both private and public entrepreneurial activity. The establishment of new basic industry is primarily the responsibility of the community. State action is required especially for the implementation of industrial projects on a national scale. Private entrepreneurial activity for the wellbeing of the community must be assisted effectively. Mainly on this depends improvement of the employment situation in Finland.

More planning will be applied to the State economy and the work in progress for the development of long-term budgeting will be continued and made more effective. Overall planning will be developed. Special attention will be paid to the examination of the direct of investments and the order of priority and importance of the projects.

At the same time as resources will be directed to a greater extent to speeding up industrial development and diversifying the structure of production, care will be taken to ensure that the manpower freed from agriculture will not be left idle and dependent on public employment works. To improve agricultural employment, seeding and planting of forests and forest improvement work through drainage etc., will be intensified especially. An active labour force policy will be developed by improving schooling and labour exchange activity. Measure

to stimulate industry in districts that have made slow economic progress will be intensified and provincial initiative will be encouraged.

The realisation of the above targets of incomes policy will make it possible to ease the money market and facilitate the financing of investments.

To ease the employment situation, special attention will be paid to the revival of building activity. Care will be taken to ensure that all construction projects for which the necessary primary loans are available in the money market will be started this year in order to increase housing production supported by the community, especially the building of tenant housing. Other construction activity will also be increased as far as possible.

Measures will be taken to stimulate productive investments and to channel them to purposes promoting economic growth, the structural changes needed in the economy and the foreign liquidity ratio. A round wood price and sale recommendation for the next felling season must be effected as soon as possible.

The pending reform of the taxation of trade and industry will be completed rapidly. Preparations for the reform of turnover tax will also be speeded up to ensure that the competitive position of Finnish industry will be no worse than that of competing countries because of taxation. The reform will be implemented in such a way that the living conditions of the section of the population in a poorer economic position will not suffer in consequence. The income taxation of natural persons will be simplified and married couples will be taxed on a just basis.

Public finance

At the same time as measures to ensure employment and economic growth are intensified, care will be taken to preserve the equilibrium of public finance and the liquidity of the State. The growth of administrative and other consumption expenditure and the increase in transfer payments will be restricted in order to keep total State expenditure within the limits of anticipated revenue.

Agriculture and forestry

The price level for agricultural products will be guaranteed

in accordance with the principle that the increase in the productivity of labour input will redound to the benefit of agriculture. If the index linkage system is abandoned in other spheres, the Agricultural Price Act will be amended correspondingly. Measures will be taken to organise a price system by which the price level of agricultural products will be determined from the crop year 1969-1970 in accordance with the principles of the present law, but taking into consideration what might be agreed concerning other linkages. The volume of agricultural production will be equated by degrees to domestic consumption by cutting down overproduction of agricultural produce. Funds will be directed to development of the structure of agriculture, other forms of agricultural rationalisation and raising the international competitiveness of agriculture in general.

Local government reform

The communal reform under preparation will ensure that the independence of viable communes is preserved. The opinions of the communal population will be considered in the development of communal government. The aim of the communal reform is to make it possible to raise the standard of services and save costs by establishing effective working units.

Social questions

To develop social security, the government will seek to remove the injustices in the present system and will urgently draw up a list of priorities for implementation of the reforms in the next few years.

The Family Pensions Bill which is before Parliament will be passed. The drawbacks arising from the application of income es and how the scheme is to be financed will be clarified.

The position of ex-servicemen in difficult financial straits will be eased.

The government will begin to correct the failings and in labour legislation and will devote special attention to the democratisation of work, increasing the rights and responsibility of workers, improvement of labour safety and public health at the working site. The failings of unemployment security will be examined and the necessary action taken.

Cultural policy

The government will promote cultural policy on a democratic basis. The gradual implementation of the basic school reform will be continued. The question of language instruction in the basic school will be taken up again for discussion to find a solution to the organisation of teaching of two languages in addition to the mother tongue. Continuation schooling and vocational schooling of different degrees will be modernised under an overall plan that is to be prepared. The university and college system will be developed, the aims of teaching will be scrutinised and the status of the students will be improved.

The government is aware that the improvement of the employment situation and the acceleration of economic growth do not depend solely on its own action. If we are to overcome the difficulties facing us and achieve the desired social policy objectives, more initiative and activity from all circles of citizens, more trustful co-operation between the government and the organisations and the support of Parliament for government policy will be needed. The government stresses the application of democratic principles in all spheres of society in order to create a climate favourable for the co-operation of the different strata of the population and to improve the living conditions of all citizens.

Tryggingastofnun ríkisins

Reykjavík — Laugavegi 114
Nimnefni: Ríkistrygging
Sími 19300

EJ/GG

Reykjavík, 9. okt. 1968

Minnisblað um greiðslur Bjarna Benediktssonar, forsætisráðherra, í Lífeyrissjóð starfsmanna ríkisins og væntanlegan lífeyrisrétt skv. núgildandi ákvæðum.

Almenna deildin:

Greiðslutímabil

1/9 1933 - 31/12 1940	7 ár 4 mánuðir
1/5 1954 - 31/1 1957	2 " 8 "
	<hr/>
	10 ár 0 mánuðir

Ellilífeyrir miðast við 10 ára greiðslu iðgjalda, þ.e. 20% af launum eins og þau voru í janúar 1957, en tekur breytingum eins og lífeyrir annarra, eftir að taka lífeyris hefst. Launin í janúar 1957 voru kr. 6.136.50 skv. skilagrein ríkisféhirðis. L.nr. 29/1963, 17. gr.

Alþingismannadeildin:

Iðgjaldagreiðslur frá 1/10 1953 og síðan. Þingseta í 20-25 ár veitir rétt til lífeyris, er nemur 60% af þingfararkaupi, en hvert ár umfram 25 veitir rétt til 1% hækkunar til viðbótar, þó verði lífeyrir aldrei hærri en 70% af þingfararkaupi. L.nr. 46/1965.


Ráðherradeildin:

Iðgjaldagreiðslur frá 1/6 1965 og síðan. Fyrir að hafa gegnt ráðherraembætti 5 - 8 ár samanlagt, er lífeyrir 40% af launum, en 8 - 12 ára starf sem ráðherra veitir rétt til lífeyris, er sé 60% af launum. Hvert ár umfram 12 veitir rétt til hækkunar, er nemur 2% fyrir hvert ár, en þó verði hundraðshluti lífeyris ekki hærri en 70% af launum ráðherra. L.nr. 47/1965.

Um allar deildir sjóðsins er það almennt skilyrði lífeyristöku, að hlutaðeigandi hafi náð 65 ára aldri og látið af störfum, er veita aðgang að sjóðnum.

Ath. hvort forsætisráðherra á innistæðu í öðrum lífeyrissjóði (e.t.v. Reykjavíkurborgar), sem flytja mætti í Lífeyrissjóð starfsmanna ríkisins til aukningar réttinda.

Lífeyrissjóður starfsmanna ríkisins



Samband ungtra Sjálfstátismanna,
Sjálfbætiskvírnis og Bushavöll.

Ógæva bréfs dags 5. febr.

o. l. skal tekið fram, að ég
hef marghjátt þeirri skotun
mínni, að ég ~~hafi~~ ^{þi} fylgjandi
~~ákvæði~~ til einbætur
kjördæmi (A) ásamt sem
jöfnustun atkvæðisreitti (D)
vera orðilegasta fyrir komu-
lagit. Hins vegar hefur ekki
verið mi á einn nokkur
raun hefur möguleiki til
að þi marghjátt fylgi vit
þá lausn ~~og~~ heldur
hefur ^{við hlíta ykkar} jöfnun
þeir atvinnu þess, að
hlutfalls þess ^{í þess munningskjördæmi} þess
egg teknu. Að minn viti
er ekki á höfðsmál, að
jöfnun þess ^{þess} er
margvæðit og þess vegna

er mikil framför að
reiverandi bjórdenaskipar
mítat vit þat, sem áton
va. Einnmunningsbjórdeni
met uppbotar setum (B)
eitt forur blutfalls bosninga
og má vissulega ~~þat~~ i huga
þann möguleika, ef jöfnun
bosningarettan verður frá
elbi borin þar burt.
Fjölgun þingmannanna ^(G) er öfuf
euda aðilegt, at þarfitt
verti frá deildasbiftunum
þingmanns.



SJÁLFSTÆÐISFLOKKURINN

SAMBAND UNGRA SJÁLFSTÆÐISMANNA

Reykjavík 5. febrúar 1968.

Rannsóknar- og upplýsingastofnun Sambands ungra Sjálfstæðismanna og Heimdallar, F.U.S., vinnur nú að margvíslegri gagnaöflun um kjördæmaskipan o.fl., sem komið gæti að notum við stefnumótun ungra Sjálfstæðismanna í þessum málaflokki. R.U.S.U.S. telur í því sambandi gagnlegt að kynnast viðhorfum alþingismanna Sjálfstæðisflokksins til eftirtalinna atriða:

- A. Einmenningskjördæmi og/eða fleirmenningskjördæmi.
- B. Ef einmenningskjördæmi, hvort þá skuli höfð uppbotarþingsæti til jöfnunar milli flokka.
- C. Fjölgun þingmanna.
- D. Er æskilegt að atkvæðisrétturinn sé sem jafnastur, þ.e. atkvæði á Vestfjörðum vegi jafnt og atkvæði t.d. í Reykjavík.

Svör við erindi þessu óskast send fyrir 30. marz í skaplega löngu máli til Sambands ungra Sjálfstæðismanna, Sjálfstæðishúsinu v/Austurvöll.

F.h. R.U.S.U.S.

Armann Sveinsson

Til alþingismanna
Sjálfstæðisflokksins.

Meeting Moscow's 'Limited Coexistence'

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

WHAT IS THE significance of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia? What conclusions should we draw from it, either concerning the Soviet system or East-West relations? These questions continue to be discussed daily in Western chancelleries by both journalists and scholars. The following analysis is a highly condensed effort to advance some tentative answers. It takes the somewhat schematic form of six general analytical propositions and five broad policy recommendations. First, of course, the propositions.

1. The Soviet Union is beginning to undergo an internal political crisis. As a result, the ruling elite attaches the highest value to internal political stability. The leadership, increasingly mediocre in quality, confronts an alienated intellectual community, a bored youth, and restless national minorities. Unlike the United States, where similar phenomena are vented and diffused by open discussion, in the USSR political suppression contributes to accumulated tensions and a widening gulf between society and politics. The gap between the political system and Soviet society augurs ill for the stable evolution of the system. Because of the internal tensions and contradictions, significant shifts in the composition of the leadership are to be expected.

The ruling elite's overriding interest in stability has led it to disregard the views of international Communism concerning Czechoslovakia, even though it must have known in advance that its invasion would not meet with much support in the international Communist community. Clearly, to the present leaders Soviet supremacy in the bloc is more important than ideological unity in the international movement.

The new Kremlin outlook, with its emphasis on nationalism, anti-intellectualism and anti-Semitism,

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, *Professor of Government at Columbia University, is the author of Alternative to Partition, which was recently highly recommended by Walter Ulbricht (Neues Deutschland, October 25, 1968) as a book that "Marxists . . . should read very carefully."*

bears striking resemblance to some prewar fascist tendencies in Europe. Similar internal changes are taking place in East Germany and in Poland. Cumulatively, they suggest the ominous conclusion that the highest stage of Communism is . . . fascism: the appearance in power of an intensely chauvinist, first-generation, lower middle-class political elite.

2. Shortly after the fall of Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership gradually began reassessing the value of détente and "peaceful coexistence." It has now concluded that peaceful coexistence—which meant that the Soviet Union exploited political openings in the West, and the United States, France and even West Germany probed for similar openings in the East—is more dangerous to it than to the West. Consequently, it has decided to opt for a policy of "limited coexistence," in which greater emphasis is put on hostility and ideological rigidity vis-à-vis the West. Limited coexistence does not exclude specific arrangements with the West, particularly in such ideologically neutral areas as arms control, but it does mean much less fraternization.

Precisely because they fear an overall confrontation with the United States, the present Soviet leaders will no doubt intensify their feelers toward the new Nixon administration. They will do so in the context of the new doctrine of "limited coexistence," however, in the effort to perpetuate their hold on Eastern Europe, minimize ideological and social contacts, yet not exclude specific arrangements with the United States in areas where the Soviets have a particular interest.

3. The Kremlin places a high priority on preserving the division of Europe. In this connection, it has developed two new ideological concepts. One is its new theory of intervention, designed to justify a policy that aims at reconsolidating the Soviet bloc, more or less to the degree that existed in the early 1960s. This means that in the foreseeable future there is potential danger to the independence of both Yugoslavia and Rumania, but especially the latter. It is likely that the Soviets will exploit the hiatus in U.S. policy leadership between

now and January by pressuring the Rumanian leadership to fall back into line.

The second formulation is the Kremlin's new concept of "peaceful counterrevolution," of which I am allegedly the principal author. In the Soviet view, peaceful counterrevolution—*i.e.*, the transformation of Communist totalitarianism into social democracy—is the ultimate objective of peaceful engagement and cultural bridge-building, and therefore must be resisted at all costs. The rejection of closer East-West contacts is inherently related to the conservatism of the current Soviet leaders, and is a doctrinal component of the new strategy of limited coexistence. In the final analysis, it is also a sign of fear and an admission of the fundamental weakness of today's Communist systems, not only in Eastern Europe but within the Soviet Union itself.

4. The impact on the West of recent developments in the East poses the danger that rigidity there, and even reconsolidation of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, will not lead to greater unity in the West but rather the opposite. The Western European nations, uncertain of American commitment and involvement, instead of rallying together, may move toward neutrality, seeking security in independently arrived at arrangements with the Soviet Union. Should this happen, Moscow would then be able to resume its more activist policy of fragmentation in the West. This negative outcome is all the more likely if the Soviet Union succeeds in drawing the new American administration into purely bilateral arrangements, which would implicitly convey American indifference to recent developments in Europe.

5. Disillusionment with the prospect for gradual liberalization of the East European states and of the Soviet regime—the probable product of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—could have a further unsettling consequence. It could lead increasingly to revolutionary tendencies in the Eastern European states, as well as in the Soviet Union itself. Disaffected youth, intellectuals, and eventually workers, losing faith in gradual liberalization, could opt for violence, especially if at some point paralysis in the Soviet leadership were to produce what might appear to be an opportunity. The inclination to rely on revolutionary change within the Communist states could affect the American attitude toward them, reawakening some of the more rigidly anti-Communist sentiments of the 1950s. Greater international polarization and perhaps even a greater threat to international peace would follow.

6. The USSR is too weak to be a global partner of the United States and too strong not to be a rival; it is ideologically too rigid not to be a revolutionary force, but the ruling Communist bureaucracy is so status quo-minded that the Soviet Union cannot be

a truly militant power. Its felt weakness stimulates among the Soviet leaders a competitive desire to match and eventually to surpass the United States in power and influence; its available strength makes the USSR an impressive rival, capable of at least indirectly assisting its far-flung friends, of abetting anti-U.S. actions, and of threatening directly the security of the United States and its allies. Ideological conservatism, reflecting the institutional vested interest of a doctrinaire ruling bureaucracy, conditions in the Soviet leaders an almost automatic sympathy for radical revolutionary movements and a desire to assist them, particularly if they have an anti-U.S. orientation; at the same time, the Soviet vested interest in the status quo, enhanced by steady bureaucratization and a better appreciation of the dangers of nuclear weapons, makes the Soviet Union unwilling to run major risks on behalf of militant causes.

The consequence of these mixed motives and interests is an uneasy pattern of both rivalry and accommodation with the United States. Depending on the specific circumstances and regional conditions, it makes possible some cooperation and some conflict, in the context of broader competition for influence, prestige and power. Competition will remain the central characteristic of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the foreseeable future. It will not preclude some limited arrangements, but it does pose the major danger that both sides will be compelled, by the dynamic of events, into an accentuated arms race. This condition is likely to be aggravated by the Soviet development of long-range intervention forces, whose availability in the years to come may tempt Moscow into undertakings it heretofore had no choice but to eschew.

IN THE light of these six propositions, I think it is possible to formulate five general policy recommendations.

1. It is essential to create new momentum in Western unity. This requires not only revitalizing NATO, giving the Europeans a greater voice through a European caucus, and possibly the appointment of a European as NATO commander, but also movement in the fields of education, technology and science. A European-American common market in science and technology might be one effective approach, as was suggested by Vice President Humphrey during the recent Presidential campaign. The younger Western European generation must be given new objectives on which to focus its energies and idealism. The goals of the 1950s and even of the 1960s in the area of Atlantic unity no longer suffice to mobilize Western European public opinion.

2. It is important to deter the Soviet Union from further use of force in Europe. While there is not much that the West can do about the existing spheres of

preponderance, it cannot afford to be indifferent to their respective internal political content. It cannot watch with apathy a return of Stalinism to Eastern Europe, because world peace eventually becomes affected. The important point to realize here is that the division of Europe is inherently unstable, making any attempt to create détente on the basis of accepting this division self-defeating. For neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is powerful enough to impose its hegemony successfully, and efforts to do so prompt resistance, new instabilities, and eventually new confrontations. Precisely because of this, the Soviets were properly reminded by NATO recently that use of force across national frontiers in Europe could bring about unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences.

3. The only way to seek enduring peace in Europe is to promote the gradual erosion of the partition of



Europe. Thus we should maintain a generally positive attitude toward East-West relations. It is striking that people who advocate peaceful engagement have been attacked most strongly by Soviet spokesmen, even after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The rigid and hostile Communists prefer a rigid and hostile policy from the West; they fear more imaginative relations.

Czechoslovakia has shown the success of the policy of peaceful engagement. What was lacking was Western will to try to deter Soviet invasion, and imagination to try to deflect it by timely political initiatives. The West should now advance proposals for an East-West security conference on Europe, as well as other cooperative ventures, thereby making it more difficult for the rigid Communists to undertake unilateral actions. The ideal Western policy from the Soviet standpoint would combine verbal hostility, based on a reinforced NATO, with political passivity on the East-West front.

4. It is desirable for the United States to try to improve relations with China. It is a mistake for America to appear to be an implicit partner of the Soviet Union in the isolation of China. Our chances of accommodation with both increase with our willingness to accommodate separately with each. One should have no illusions that a new American stance toward China will itself immediately bring about a positive response. Given the new Soviet rigidity in Europe though, it may be useful to remind the Soviet Union of its stake in improved relations with the West. Admittedly, this represents a major change in my own view; until now, I felt it was desirable to continue the isolation of China for the sake of improved relations with the Soviet Union. But my present feeling is that the United States should respond favorably to any indications of Chinese interest in broadening contacts, such as hinted by the late November Peking overture to reopen the Warsaw talks. More specifically, since China is a nuclear power, it might be well—and appealing to China's pride—to propose U.S.-Chinese arms control talks and a Washington-Peking hot line.

5. We should continue our efforts to promote arms control, and the Europeans must realize that there is a general global interest in U.S.-Soviet accommodation on that issue. At the same time, we should not have excessive expectations that arms control will be easy to arrange. Such concepts as superiority or parity are essentially meaningless, and they confuse public discussion. Accordingly, until such time as workable arms control arrangements are mutually agreed upon, it will remain necessary for the United States to seek to maintain what might be called "asymmetrical ambiguity" in the nuclear relationship—*i.e.*, a qualitative advantage in deliverable weapons, but no longer a clearly calculable superiority in survivability—and to develop new weapons systems, so that Soviet leaders will not be tempted to take calculated gambles based on what may erroneously appear to be a measurable equilibrium.

In conclusion, I would emphasize that the above views and recommendations have to be seen in a broad perspective. East-West stability will not be built by itself; it will only develop if the world becomes a more organic and interrelated community. Irrespective of the rate of progress, or the absence of progress, in East-West relations, it is essential for the United States to pursue its efforts to build a community of advanced nations which includes itself, Western Europe and Japan. Eventually, the Communist leaders will realize that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can exclude themselves from such a community only at major costs to their own modernization and development. As the world becomes more stable and organic, the ideological civil war that today divides us on the East-West front will gradually begin to fade.



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A LITERARY CONVERSATION WITH
MILVAN ŽILJAS
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