



Bréfa- og málasafn 1969, seinni hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnmal – Forsætisráðherra – Bréf – Clarence K. Streit – Richard Nixon – Manillo Brosio – Eugene V. Rostow – NATO – *McCarthy, Rockefeller, Kennedy* – Atlantic Resolution

Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

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Einkaskjalasafn nr. 360
Stjórnmalamaðurinn
Askja 2-36, Örk 4-1

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PROGRAM FOR THE ATA GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN WASHINGTON

Saturday, October 18

- 10:00 a.m. Young Leaders Caucus for the younger delegates to the ATA General Assembly. Subject: "NATO's Third Dimension". Dr. Moynihan, Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs, or a member of his staff, will give the opening address.
- 12:30 p.m. Luncheon for Young Leaders Caucus.
- 2:30 p.m. Caucus resumes to debate and draft Resolutions
- Evening Reception for younger delegates

Sunday, October 19

- 10:00 a.m. ATA Council meeting (at the offices of the Atlantic Council of the United States: 1616 H Street, N.W.)
- Noon Luncheon for the Council members upon the invitation of the Atlantic Council of the United States
- 3:00 p.m. Continuation of Council meeting
- Evening Buffet dinner offered to the Council members by the Hon. W. Randolph Burgess, Vice Chairman of the ATA, and Mrs. Burgess, (1248 30th street, N.W.); the Hon. William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, guest of honor.

Monday, October 20

- Opening session of the Fifteenth ATA General Assembly, chaired by Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Chairman of the ATA.
- 10:00 a.m. Welcoming statement by the Hon. Livingston T. Merchant, Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States.
- Opening address by the Hon. William P. Rogers, Secretary of State.
- 10:45 - 11:00 a.m. Coffee break.
- 11:00 a.m. Introductory report by the Hon. Eugene V. Rostow, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
- Noon Lunch, free

3:00 p.m. Introductory report by General Hans Speidel,
former NATO Commander-in-Chief Land Forces
Central Europe.

3:45 - 4:00 p.m. Coffee break.

4:00 p.m. Beginning of Committee meetings.

6:30 - 8:00 p.m. Reception for the delegates given by the Hon.
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State.

Tuesday, October 21

10:00 a.m. Round table discussion with the signatories
of the Atlantic Pact.

11:00 - 11:15 Coffee break

Continuation of Committee meetings

Noon Lunch, free

3:00 p.m. Address by M. Manlio Brosio, Secretary
General of NATO, Chairman of the North Atlantic
Council.

3:45 p.m. Question and answer period.

4:00 p.m. Coffee break.

4:15 p.m. Statutory General Assembly, and continuation
of Committee meetings.

Evening Reception given by the Atlantic Council of
the United States, at the Corcoran Gallery.

Wednesday, October 22

Morning General discussion.

10:45 - 11:00 a.m. Coffee break

Afternoon Continuation of general discussion.

4:00 - 4:15 Coffee break.

Evening Free for embassy receptions.

Thursday, October 23

10:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. Meeting of the Drafting Committee with Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak and the Rapporteur, Sir Frank Roberts

10:45 - 11:00 and
4:00 - 4:15

Coffee breaks.

For the Delegates: Visit to SACLANT

10:00 a.m.

Arrival at Norfolk Airport
Visit to a carrier in port; viewing of a submarine.
Presentation by Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

Noon

Cocktails and lunch at the base.

Afternoon

Presentations by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

Late afternoon

Return to Washington.

For the Observers: Tour of Colonial Williamsburg.

Friday, October 24

10:00 a.m.

General report presented by the Rapporteur, Sir Frank Roberts.

Debate

10:45 - 11:00

Coffee break

Adoption of final Resolutions

Closing speech by Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak

Adjournment of the Fifteenth General Assembly.

PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Memorandum for discussion during the Annual Assembly of
the North Atlantic Treaty Association, October 20-24, 1969, at
Washington, D.C.

by

Eugene V. Rostow
Sterling Professor of Law and
Public Affairs
Yale University

I

The political and economic future of the Atlantic Community is not written in the stars. It is a function of will and insight -- the will and insight, primarily, of our own peoples and our own governments : above all, of their will. We have the capacity to assure our own future freedom and prosperity, and therefore the opportunities for progress of most of the rest of the free world as well. But we cannot be certain, nor even confident, that we shall in fact do what is necessary to achieve that end.

This fact -- and it is a fact -- measures the importance of our Assembly, and of the educational and political efforts to which it should give rise.

For we know all too well that the incantation of our interests and our hopes, however eloquent, is not enough to secure them. The continued development of the Atlantic Community, and of a corresponding concert involving the nations of the Atlantic Community, on the one hand, and Japan and the other free countries of Asia, on the other, is a matter of vital national interest for every nation represented in our Association, and for the hope of general peace.

The location and the resources of these nations make it entirely possible for them to protect the conditions of their freedom, if they act together. They constitute a reservoir of the skills, habits, capital and values indispensable to the programs of the developing world. It is more obvious every day that the developing world will fall even further behind in the task of modernization without broader and more sustained access to the schools and the markets of the developed nations.

Without allied cohesion, every task is difficult, and many are extremely chancy indeed. Time has underlined the wisdom of President Kennedy's remark about our alliances : "United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do -- for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder".

But the history of this dismal century is a chronicle of interests neglected, and of opportunities missed. This assembly will be a failure if we do no more than recite to each other once more what we know so well already. The situation calls for a radical

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intensification of our educational and political efforts, not simply among the converted, but in the dust and heat of the political forum in each of our countries.

The possibility of progress towards peace is a function as well of sustained and detached research. The need for critical scholarship has never been greater. The World is changing far more rapidly than our perceptions of it can change. In every country, men are prisoners of the views they inherited, or absorbed from their own particular experience. Often they cling to such opinions long after they have ceased to correspond to reality. How we visualize the world in 2000 can profoundly influence the course of events. So I should urge that in all our programs we take pains to encourage the most independent and imaginative research of creative and detached minds.

Perspectives towards the political and economic future of the Atlantic Community are a function first of what we do, and fail to do, in the military sphere. Without effective deterrence of military adventures in Central Europe, and the achievement of a just and lasting peace on the Mediterranean and Near Eastern flanks of Europe, all aspects of the future become uncertain, and indeed volatile. It is too late to contend that economic events determine the pattern of politics and of military conflict. As all our recent experience attests, the chain of causality goes the other way.

This memorandum, therefore, will take advantage of the principle of the division of labor by assuming that General Speidel's paper, and the discussions based on it, will define the main themes of a military policy that could achieve deterrence in Europe, and peace in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Persian Gulf, if only our diplomacy takes full advantage of the military posture, and the military policies, to be recommended on the basis of his paper.

II

The politics of the Alliance should reflect our military, economic, cultural, educational and scientific interdependence.

While scholars, journalists, and politicians repeat older formulae, the interdependence of the nations of the free world becomes more profound, and more irreversible, with every passing month. The time has come for our political methods to acknowledge this cardinal fact about the nature of the social processes which dominate our daily lives.

Let me take up the military aspects of this thesis first.

The implacable logic of the nuclear weapon had made the Atlantic Alliance, and a corresponding set of relationships in the Pacific, even more necessary to European security than was the case in 1949. The diverse expansionist pressures we confront are now stronger, more numerous, and more difficult to deal with than was the case in 1949. Naval and air power at distant points ; a full panoply of nuclear weapons under the control of the Soviet Union and of China ; wars of national liberation and the Brezhnev doctrine ; these new and striking developments supplement and transform the

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simpler menace of twenty years ago -- the glacial movement of continental land masses, and political demands backed by the threat of such movements.

It is sometimes said, on both sides of the Atlantic, that the political premise of the Atlantic relationship is not interdependence among Atlantic nations, but European dependence on the United States.

No system of deterrence or of defense for Europe, the Mediterranean, or the Near East is credible, obviously, without the full commitment of the American nuclear arsenal, and of American force more generally. This is true today, and will be true for the indefinite future, even if a political and military Europe were formed tomorrow.

Why should Europe endure the expense and strain of participation in the military and political life of the Alliance, some men ask, if the critical relationship is and will long remain that between two nuclear super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States? Wouldn't Europe be just as secure as it is now if it became neutral? Advocates of this view point out that the United States has an obvious national interest in preventing the resources and people of Western Europe from becoming assets of the Soviet system. Europe can rely on the United States to protect that interest, these men contend, without military or political efforts of its own.

This argument reveals how dangerous it can be in politics to rely on logic alone. In the life of politics, to paraphrase a famous judge's remark, a page of history is worth a volume of logic. And in this area, the lesson of history is plain, and ominous.

The United States is today in the grip of a powerful ebb tide -- an irrational rush to escape into its isolationist past. This movement compares in intensity with the isolationist passions of the Harding period, and the early Thirties, and those generated by Henri Wallace's campaigns in President Truman's time.

This political fever has an irrational cast, because almost all the participants now realize that the nineteenth century, which allowed the United States the luxury of an isolationist policy, is over. The Concert of Europe can no longer maintain the world balance of power within which the United States flourished a hundred years ago. In the second half of the twentieth century, they know, the safety of the United States cannot be assured by the painless and costless methods of isolationism.

These facts are acknowledged, but put to one side, by a considerable fraction of American opinion.

No stress is required to highlight the dangers of American isolationism to security and peace.

Yet powerful voices in the United States are advocating a foreign policy of abdication, for the fourth time since 1919. Aroused by the costs and complexities of the campaign in Viet-Nam, they urge a program of general retreat, involving the withdrawal of

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forces from Europe and the Far East ; the "reexamination" of military commitments ; and policies of avoiding involvement at almost any cost, in almost every part of the world. They never explain how deterrence could function under such circumstances, or how we could preserve non-nuclear options in the event of crisis. The leaders of this movement have fought for the abolition of American programs of economic assistance to the developing nations, and succeeded in reducing them drastically, on the ground that economic assistance leads to involvement, and then to military troubles.

The disease of isolationism is by no means unique to the United States. Many Europeans, and some Japanese, are equally attracted by the illusory prospect of security without tears. Isolationism on the part of our Allies stimulates the isolationist impulse in the United States.

Out of such a course can come the miscalculations, the sudden changes, and the sense of panic which are the occasions of war. While such possibilities may seem unthinkable at the moment, let us recall that the United States did follow the policy of isolationism in the Twenties and the Thirties, when it proved to be just as disastrous as it would be tomorrow. Men of great influence advocated a return to that policy in President Truman's time, as they do today.

President Nixon, like his predecessors, has spoken out strongly against the isolationist movement. It remains to be seen whether he can resist and overcome it.

We should dedicate ourselves here to supporting him in this basic effort, indispensable to the common defense of all the members of the Alliance.

The best political antidote for this disease, on both sides of both oceans, is an active sharing of political and military responsibility among the members of the Alliance. It is as well the course of fairness and of reality.

We all have the same interest in the achievement of a political equilibrium to replace the system of peace which disintegrated between 1914 and 1945. We are all equally threatened by some of the implications of present trends. Political and military arrangements which correspond to these facts should provide in all our countries the most stable and mature possible foundation for a sustained and consistent Alliance foreign policy.

The strongest forces in the American mind make it extremely difficult for us to conduct a Roman policy. The idea of Pax Americana is at war with our history. The lonely burdens we have sustained since 1945 have proved politically vulnerable within the United States, and elsewhere. Allied nations which do no share in the making of decisions find it easy, and tempting, to dissociate themselves from them. We can and will, I believe, do our share as allies in maintaining and developing a system of collective security. The political risks of a unilateral American defense system are too serious to be undertaken lightly. Certainly such a course should not be considered so long as the Alliance alternative remains possible.

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The moral to be drawn from the patterns of economic and intellectual life is the same as that of the military situation : -- deepening interdependence, which should be guided by arrangements of political cooperation capable of governing them.

With improvements in transportation, and the secular decline in the fraction of the population engaged in agriculture, the effective size of the operational social unit is becoming larger. The village gives way to the province or region ; the region to the nation ; the weak national government to the strong ; the small nation to the federation or the larger nation. Men and women who once found it rare to travel 50 or 100 miles to work, study or enjoy a holiday, now go thousands of miles routinely. This process would continue, and accelerate, even without the strong pressure of concern about security. The impact of changing technology alone forces the continuing integration of all our economies and educational systems, with much greater degrees of specialization than have ever been known before.

The economies of Europe, North America and East Asia are more and more deeply interconnected. Trade, investment, and the migration of labor, management and entrepreneurship have made the economy of the free world a single entity. No nation, however large or small, can change its trade or monetary policy without taking into account the effect of such changes on the system as a whole.

These processes of economic integration have outstripped our governmental arrangements for controlling the world economy.

We have recently witnessed two great triumphs of international economic cooperation -- the Kennedy Round, culminating 30 years of effort in negotiating reciprocal tariff reductions ; and the Rio Agreement, continuing and strengthening the system of international monetary cooperation set up at Bretton Woods in 1944, and developed since then through a variety of imaginative arrangements which supplement the institutions and programs started at Bretton Woods.

Yet both these achievements, despite their intrinsic value and importance, are not enough. In a sense, both are already obsolete.

The succession of monetary crises during the last few years, the level of interest rates, and the problems arising from the balance of payments adjustment process make it desirable -- indeed necessary -- to consider plans for the further consolidation of the monetary system.

The International Monetary Fund last month announced the activation of the S.D.R. plan tentatively approved at Rio in 1967 : -- an immense step forward, and a most constructive one, in the development of the monetary system. The essentially extraneous accident of the availability of gold should no longer limit the freedom of monetary authorities to finance

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economic growth and development. On the basis of this change in the structure of the monetary system, and the powers of the Fund, the monetary authorities should be able more directly to face their responsibilities for managing the world monetary system in the interests of economic stability, economic discipline, and economic growth.

But we cannot pause in the effort to bring the world economy under effective control. Further measures are urgently needed to establish methods for administering a system which will use several forms of reserves -- gold, SDR's, and foreign-exchange balances. Prudent steps will have to be taken through cooperative action to safeguard the system during this period of transition, while adjustments are still in process, both to minimize risks and to perfect our methods of cooperation under changing circumstances.

The essential problem of the Free World economy is that of success. The volume of international trade and investment has increased more rapidly than the capacity of the international monetary system to govern it. The need at the moment is to perfect the machinery of monetary cooperation so that monetary management can coordinate economic policy and control the process of balance-of-payments adjustment.

The pressures within the system now require a choice among three broad lines of policy ; (a) flexible tariffs, advocated as a way to permit balance-of-payments adjustment ; this course would lead toward protectionism and autarchy ; (b) flexible exchange rates, advocated on the same ground ; unless very carefully circumscribed, such policies would restrict trade and investment and would threaten anarchy in the money system ; in any event, their potential contribution to successful monetary management is much less than that of alternative approaches ; and (c) the more complete integration of the monetary systems of the chief trading nations.

Only the latter course could safeguard the gains, and the promise, of international economic cooperation during the last generation, which has opened the way toward a common market of the Free World.

The pressures in the field of commercial policy parallel those in the monetary area. Here again, the course of economic rationality is clear. Every nation has a stake in the policy of continuing to remove barriers to trade -- non-tariff barriers, now that tariffs have become relatively low. That policy has made an enormous contribution to economic welfare since the war. The growth of international trade has been one of the key tools of rapid economic progress throughout this period. It has much to contribute in the years ahead. The pressures against it, apart from the normal instincts of protectionism, -- always strong -- are those arising on the side of monetary management and balance of payments adjustment.

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If we fail to consolidate the monetary systems of the chief trading nations, liberal trade policy will be one of the first victims.

The pressures for integration in the sphere of cultural and intellectual life, and in technology, parallel those we have remarked in the military and economic areas. More and more students, professors, and research workers cross all the oceans in both directions to study, to teach, and to conduct research. This is as true in industry and finance as it is in education. And the field of advanced science and technology is even more international in character than any of the others. Culturally and intellectually, the Atlantic world is a single community, although its institutions need to be changed in many ways to acknowledge that fact, and to facilitate intellectual interchange.

Twenty years ago, it was common both in Europe and the United States to argue for the formation of a political Europe on the ground that such an entity, comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union in population and economic power, could take on full responsibility for its own defense, and allow the United States to bring back its troops without risking a war. Comparable arguments for a strong, independent Europe as an autonomous body, and something of a buffer, and a mediator, between the United States and the Soviet Union were familiar on economic, technical, and cultural as well as military grounds.

Time has negated the possibility of a Third Force Europe in any one of these realms. The development of nuclear weapons has made the military link between Europe and the United States tighter and more complex than ever. And in economics, in science, and in education, the Atlantic nations, along with Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand, Iran, Israel and a number of other countries, now constitute a single pool of brains, ideas and techniques.

This is not to suggest that the idea of Europe has become obsolete, or that a political, economic, and military Europe could not now make a great contribution to the vitality and quality of our societies and our polity. Quite the contrary, experience has confirmed the wisdom of the great leaders of the European movement -- Monnet, Hallstein, Birrenbach, and many, many others -- who have proclaimed through thick and thin that a strong and united Europe within the Atlantic Community is the best guaranty of the common interest, and the development of an Atlantic relationship of true equality over the long run.

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III

If this conclusion is sound, what follows for the development of Atlantic institutions, and of the institutions through which a larger number of nations cooperate for specified ends ?

I should contend that the path to the future of the Alliance is that mapped by the Harmel Resolution, adopted by the North Atlantic Council in December, 1967, and strongly upheld by President Nixon, in the statement he made at the Twentieth Anniversary meeting of the Council on April 10.

Those decisions were a call for action in developing the Alliance as a political influence, and the initiator of policies and programs intended to achieve and to consolidate peace. To this end, the Council decided to deepen and improve the practice of consultation within the Alliance, in order to facilitate the harmonization of policies, and the development of concerted policies.

These decisions should prove to be a political catalyst for the Alliance, if the nations decide to follow them up with energy and spirit. The ministers directed the North Atlantic Council to start its new political course by undertaking studies and developing plans for action with respect to a number of crucial problems -- particularly European security, including the German problem ; arms control and disarmament ; and the security of the Mediterranean flank of Europe. And they instructed the Council to turn its attention beyond the limits of the treaty area. The security of the Alliance, they said, "cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance". In carrying out this responsibility, the Council may use working groups consisting of those allies who wish to engage in such studies -- an important principle, which should make the Alliance a more flexible and effective instrument for harmonizing allied diplomatic policy on a number of fundamental problems -- those of the Middle East and Africa, for example. And the Council agreed to involve officials from the governments more regularly in its work. The relative isolation of the Council, as a club of Permanent Representatives at one remove from their governments, is a significant barrier to its effectiveness as a continuing high level participant in the processes of governmental decision.

The first public consequence of these decisions was the proposal at the June, 1968 meeting of the Council that the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe join with the members of NATO in seeking agreed ways to reduce force levels in Europe, and agreements of arms limitation. From such talks, President Johnson said later, no topic would be barred.

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This initiative was of course a casualty of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. But it remains the only rational line of policy available to us, and to the nations of Eastern Europe, if peace remains our goal.

But manifestly, no one can now anticipate a quick move towards a reduction of arms and tensions in Europe, and a condition of peaceful coexistence.

Last April, President Nixon forcefully supported the policy of sustained and improved political to make it more effective. He suggested that deputy foreign ministers meet regularly for high-level review of Alliance problems, and the establishment of a special political planning group. And he proposed the development of work within the Alliance to give it "a third dimension" -- a social dimension, he said, "to deal with our concern for the quality of life in this last third of the twentieth century."

President Nixon's suggestion has high promise, both in itself, and for the contribution it could make to educating a new public in the values and the importance of the Alliance. Under Article II of the Treaty, which had been relatively neglected until the Harmel Resolutions of 1966 and 1967, the Alliance could become the focal point for efforts to stimulate and to coordinate a wide range of political and social policies. An evolution of this kind could usefully supplement the primary work of the Alliance in achieving deterrence, and, on the basis of deterrence, in negotiating detente.

When the Alliance was formed, twenty years ago, few men foresaw or even imagined the situation which has emerged : the indefinite presence of American forces in Europe ; an apparently indefinite Soviet post onement of any moves towards true detente ; the development and spread of nuclear weapons, with all their implications for fear, conflict and disorder.

I assume, for purposes of this paper, that the Soviet Union will not soon accept NATO's proposals for balanced and agreed reductions of force levels in Europe, and for arms limitation agreements that could provide a new foundation for European security.

On that assumption, how should we describe the political goal of the Alliance ? All are agreed on the need for improved and more fundamental methods of political consultation within the Alliance. What is the purpose of such consultations ? Should it be a true harmonization of policies among the Allies, and a minimization of significant differences, on the basis of thorough joint examination of problems of common concern ? The transmission of information by the United States to its Allies, and a discussion among them intended to minimize Allied misunderstanding of policies which the United States adopts unilaterally ? Or a ritual through which the Allies cynically and routinely bless American policy in exchange for an assurance of continued American protection ?

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From every point of view, it would seem apparent that the wisest and most durable foundation for the Alliance would be a set of institutional arrangements whose goal is the true congruence of Allied policy, and nothing less, on the widest possible agenda of common interests.

Such was the recommendation of the Wise Men of 1956. It is the essence of the Harmel Resolution of 1957.

The political influence of concerted Allied policy should be far greater than the influence of any one member, however powerful. And the process of seeking concert should reduce the risk, which has been visible so often in recent years, of the Allies working at cross-purposes, and negating each other's efforts.

Over the long run, -- and we must plan for the long run -- the strains and risks of any alternative course are too great to be lightly accepted, on both sides of the Atlantic.

If the European nations, or Europe itself, do not have a genuine voice in the making of policy, a true sharing of responsibility will be an illusion, and frictions may cumulate to threaten the basis for the Alliance itself. The United States, resentful about having to be concerned with foreign affairs at all, can all too readily displace its frustration from the intractable facts of life to its relationships with its Allies. Europeans find a relationship of indefinite dependence distasteful, and therefore seek ways to manifest their independence and their sovereignty. Such a process could lead us to inflict irreparable injuries on ourselves.

It should be the goal of farsighted policy to head off these risks.

If a true harmonization of policy should be our aim in developing the political side of the work of the Alliance, then we should consider an institution or arrangement beyond those seemingly contemplated by the Harmel Resolution of December, 1967, or President Nixon's proposals of last March.

Both consultations prior to the making of policy, and crisis management, will require an intensification of high-level Allied contact at the political level beyond any we have yet known. True, the essential ideas for such a development have already been approved: the desirability of much more interchange between Headquarters and the capitols; the principle of Allied interest in problems arising outside the Treaty area, to permit the Alliance to fulfill its task as a factor for world peace; and, above all, the propriety of study groups and action groups dealing with problems of special interest to some but not necessarily all the Allies.

There is no reason of policy or of practice why such groups need meet only, or always, at Headquarters in Brussels. In the nature of things, decisions have to be made very quickly indeed in a period of crisis, and on other occasions when events require a nearly instantaneous response.

On the basis of my experience, I have concluded that Washington is the only possible base for the management of political crises, because of the pressures of time. Therefore I should recommend that improved arrangements for crisis management, which are an urgent task for the Alliance, should consider the feasibility of dual basing, to borrow a military term, or other devices to assure the possibility of a stronger, more regular, and more considered Allied voice in Washington. Such tasks are beyond the reach of Ambassadors alone, however expert and experienced. They cannot take the place of experts and of ministers responsible for policy in the particular area which is the subject matter of the crisis.

Not all the Allies will desire to participate in advance consultations on issues which may involve the assumption of responsibility. And, obviously, only Allies willing in principle to take responsibility should undertake such consultations.

This is not in any way to suggest a diminution in the functions and responsibilities of the Council or the Secretariat. On the contrary, my thought is to extend and enlarge those responsibilities, by involving the Council more directly in the task of making decisions. The Council meets regularly in all our capitols. My suggestion is that we build informally and flexibly on that practice, as circumstance may make such developments desirable and feasible.

One of the most vivid impressions of my period of Washington service is that we lacked institutional machinery for bringing the full weight of Allied influence to bear on the Middle Eastern crisis which became acute in the fall of 1966, and exploded into violence in June, 1967.

A practice of this kind could and should lead to the emergence of a flexible device for concerting the influence of the Alliance in a wide variety of situations, and on a wide variety of problems involving policy consideration of great moment. In many instances, such policies would be translated into action through other institutions -- GATT, or the OECD, or the IMF or the IBRD, in the case of economic problems ; the U.N. or ad hoc negotiating groups, in the case of many security problems. Where the nature of the subject matter makes it desirable, the consultative group could well include countries outside the Alliance -- Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand, for example, on Far Eastern problems, and a number of other countries when problems of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Africa are being examined.

I have in mind the success of the Combined Boards during World War II as a flexible model for achieving the coordination of allied policy.

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IV

I conclude as I began, by stressing the importance of will. It will take determined effort to overcome the inertia of bureaucratic habits, and to undertake the risks and limitations of an obligation to consult Allies in advance of major decisions.

The period ahead is one of uncertainty, and of possible change in the policies of many important countries. Vigorous and constructive initiatives on the part of the Alliance should influence the direction of such policy decisions. If we stand by, like Micawber, and hope that something good will turn up, we are likely to be disappointed, and grievously disappointed. For the conjuncture of forces and trends in world politics hardly guarantees an outcome of peace, order, and regular growth.

There are powerful forces of fission at work in the world -- forces of suspicion, fear and hatred, rivalries that all too readily seek expression in irrationality and violence. There are forces of fusion as well - the influence of common interests in peace, and of benign principles which all profess to respect.

Our task, and the deepest interests of our peoples, is to help achieve the genuine acceptance of a new system of peace in the world, based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, and guaranteed by a calm and resolute equilibrium.

Allied Solidarity is the surest means to secure that end.

Address by
His Excellency Manlio Brosio
Secretary General
of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and
Chairman
of the
North Atlantic Council

Tuesday, 21 October, 1969
Main Conference Room,
International Conference Suite
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

NOT TO BE RELEASED BEFORE
3:00 P.M. 21/X/69

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Once again I have the honour of taking your time and asking your attention, but I fear I can contribute little strikingly new to the debates which have been proceeding in the past few days with the participation of such highly qualified people as those who preceded me at this podium. May I say how sincerely I congratulate your Association, your President Paul Henri Spaak, and the U.S. Government for having proposed and agreed to hold the meeting of the ATA in conjunction with the twentieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance, here in Washington. This is not only a justified and significant gesture; it is also a positive action at a moment when the fundamental role of the United States in the Alliance needs to be stressed, and the close relations between the American and European partners require to be re-asserted and strengthened. In this way, ladies and gentlemen, I am jumping immediately into the main theme of my present talk, that is, on one hand the basic aims and methods which today link the North American and European allies and, on the other, the necessity of and conditions for their solidarity and cooperation.

Peace-keeping and peace-making in Europe and in the North Atlantic area have always been the common tasks of our Alliance,

equally essential for its European and its American partners. Peace-keeping means security, prevention of further Soviet advances in Europe, the deterrence of possible military adventures. Peace-making means active political action intended to promote a solution to outstanding problems, and in that way, better consolidation of peace. You may use the formula of the Harmel Report: defence and detente, and it would convey exactly the same idea. The essential point is that the United States and Canada are directly interested in peace-keeping and peace-making in Europe, to the same extent and in the same way as the European countries. This common interest prompted the United States and Canada to take part in two world wars in Europe, and they are entitled to participate as fully equal partners in the settlement of problems still outstanding from the second world war. Not only are they entitled to do so, but they could not, without major prejudice to their vital economic and political interests, permit a further expansion of Soviet political and economic control in Europe. Quite apart from actual military occupation, such an expansion would be inevitable if the weight of the Soviet Union in Europe were to be no longer balanced by the potential of the United States and Canada in support of the Western European countries.

This remains as true today as it was twenty years ago. True, the economic and military strength of Western Europe has substantially increased in this period: but so has the strength of the Soviet Union and its allies, whose military expenditure and military forces have constantly grown in quantity and quality and maintained a clear superiority over Western European forces. That is why the United States and Canada continue to participate in the defence of Europe on the basis of the same enlightened and fundamental interests which prompted them to participate in two world wars and in the foundation of the Atlantic Alliance.

For the same reasons they continue to take part in the promotion and consolidation of peace, which is the second major aim of the Alliance. The policy of active peace-making confirmed in December 1967 by the Foreign Ministers of the Alliance is being persistently pursued by all member countries. It is a positive and optimistic, but in the same time, realistic policy. Positive and optimistic, because it does not give up hope of stimulating a favourable reaction from the Soviet side which could lead to serious negotiations. Realistic, because it does not ignore the difficulties and the unpromising response met with so far, nor does it abandon the necessary basis of strength, without which any effort toward detente would become too risky. The Atlantic

Allies are fully aware of the uncertain outcome of their studies and steps towards negotiations with the Communist countries.

The general attitude of the Soviet Union has recently been marked by moderation and a willingness to maintain and develop contacts with the West. At the same time, its positive contribution to the settlement of such major conflicts as Vietnam or the Middle East is still open to doubt and to different interpretations. The recent announcements of possible frontier talks with China have been welcomed by Eastern and Western opinion, but their effect on the opening of talks with the United States and its allies is so far uncertain. The US initiative for talks on limitation of strategic arms (SALT) has not yet met with a definite response. The Soviets have recently hinted at an early reply, but some people are inclined to wonder about the reasons for the delay, be they the new openings on the Chinese side or others. Not only the United States, but all the Atlantic Allies are extremely interested in a positive solution of these doubts, because negotiations on strategic weapons are of vital concern for the whole Alliance, and have been the subject of one of the best, and most timely consultations which have so far taken place in the Atlantic Council. In more general terms, it is fair to say that Soviet policy and tactics remain obscure and difficult of interpretation.

In view of all this, the method adopted by the Allies has been a pragmatic one, that of testing the Soviet attitudes with offers and suggestions, rather than renouncing all initiative for lack of a promising response. The golden rule of maintaining as far as possible a degree of diplomatic initiative has been followed. This course of action has kept the Alliance united in action and has avoided the frustrations of immobilism, so often a source of disagreement. This course is also the one most designed to satisfy the expectations of our peacefully-inclined Western public opinion. While the present efforts of the Alliance in seeking practical approaches for negotiations are free from vain illusions, they are at the same time quite serious, and the responsibility for any negative reaction rests with the other side.

The attitude of the Allies towards Communist proposals for a pan-European conference on security should be considered in the same light: the Atlantic Allies have not rejected the idea a priori, but have reserved their judgement, pending some indication of whether or not it is intended to promote serious negotiations, able to solve or to improve the outstanding political problems of Europe. If the conference is to be understood only as a means of consolidating the permanent division of Germany; of dissolving the alliances and replacing them by an ineffective treaty on European security; of breaking the solidarity between Western

Europe and North America and destroying the balance of forces which now ensures European freedom and independence, - in this case such a conference could hardly expect to meet with the approval of the Atlantic Allies. If on the contrary there appeared to be a serious possibility of discussing some of the outstanding political problems of Europe and a mutual reduction of forces or other relevant questions, any appropriate way of opening such a discussion, either by bilateral and multilateral negotiations, or by limited or general conferences, would be considered. This was the policy approved in Washington last April and reflected in paragraph 5 of the communique of that Ministerial meeting. The allies are aware that the first indications of the intentions of the Warsaw Pact countries in this respect are not very promising: an outline of Polish ideas on this matter, recently presented by their Secretary of State Mr. Boleslaw Winiewicz, quite clearly points to the first rather than to the second alternative. But the Allies are firm in their wish to explore all possibilities, including a possible European conference, without being discouraged by early reactions of this nature. This is a reflection of their sound, optimistic realism.

On the other hand, the Allied governments know perfectly well that no effort towards negotiations would have the slightest hope of success if the indispensable basis of sufficient strength

were to be abandoned. They do not want to start from a position of strength, aimed at imposing a solution on the other side. They simply want to avoid starting from a position of weakness, which would make all negotiations meaningless, or disastrous. They know perfectly well the hard realism of the Soviet leaders, and their readiness to negotiate, however cautiously and slowly, only with countries who are able to protect their own interests. The constant increase and improvement of Soviet land, air and naval forces have precisely this objective of exploiting their own strength and the possible weaknesses of others for the purpose of political advantage. This was just the kind of practical approach which inspired the firm commitment of the Ministers of Defence of the Alliance at Reykjavik in June 1968, when they "affirmed the need for the Alliance to maintain an effective military capability and to assure a balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Since the security of the NATO countries and the prospect for mutual force reductions would be weakened by NATO reductions alone, Ministers affirmed the proposition that the overall military capability of NATO should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balance in scope and timing." The Ministers noted that there would be no point whatsoever in simply offering to the Soviets balanced force reductions, so long as the latter felt they could count on further unilateral

reductions of Atlantic forces. They wanted to found the sincere good will of the Allies on a firm and realistic basis.

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Ladies and Gentlemen, all I have said means that, after twenty years, the Allied governments are still welded together by the twin purposes of peace-keeping and of peace-making, which are common to them all, and lead them by common paths of military preparation and political consultation and action toward a common goal of improved East-West relations. But I am speaking to the ATA, that is, the highest expression of Atlantic-minded public opinions in our countries, and the connecting link among all national Atlantic associations. I am speaking to you in Washington, the capital of the largest Atlantic ally, with forty per cent of the Alliance's population. In this forum we cannot afford to ignore the trends and even the moods of public opinion, both here in the United States and in the other Allied countries. Basically, we can safely rely on a general acceptance of the Alliance by our peoples. No Allied government, in this twentieth year of the Alliance, has had any really serious difficulty in obtaining approval of an Atlantic policy, aimed, of course, at the defensive and peaceful goals which I have mentioned. We are able to contemplate this situation with legitimate satisfaction,

and to look to the future with reasonable assurance. The cape of 1969 has been turned much more safely and calmly than was forecast by all the enemies, or critics, or faint-hearted friends of our Alliance.

While drawing your attention to this basically positive situation, I repeat that we should not ignore the problems created, here and in Europe, by varying reactions and trends of opinion. We should not be afraid of recognizing and facing such special situations and difficulties. The Alliance was born in difficulty and will always be confronted with problems: it has lived and progressed not by avoiding, but by facing and overcoming obstacles. Here in the United States there are strong feelings of disappointment and discouragement, due to financial and monetary difficulties, internal problems of order and unrest, war in Asia, complications in Latin America and elsewhere. They produce strong tendencies in favour of reducing the world responsibilities of the United States, and falling back on a more inward-looking foreign policy - understood by some as a return to a kind of neo-isolationism. This mood is coupled with a feeling critical of and impatient towards Europe and the European allies; there is a feeling that after having regained their economic strength, the Europeans are not shouldering a fair share of the common effort. This leads to recurring pressures for reducing the US military effort in Europe; such pressures subsided after the invasion of Czechoslovakia,

but are reappearing now. Even the fact that the police state is back in Prague, and the Iron Curtain has again been lowered on the Czech frontier by the refusal of passports and the banning of foreign travel, does not seem to have produced a strong counter-reaction.

In Europe, the basic feelings of admiration and friendship for the United States are still widely spread among large layers of the population; but among more politically-minded and educated people there is strong criticism of the Asian policy of the USA, which is intensely exploited by Communist and other leftist parties and turned into a general indictment of so-called American imperialism, no less violent because it is unfounded. All these feelings on both sides of the ocean, should be understood even if they are not justified. The elements of truth which may occasionally be rooted even in wrong attitudes have to be recognized and if possible satisfied.

It is my strong conviction that the dangerous consequences which may result from such opinions can be avoided, provided responsible people and the most reasonable part of public opinion keep clearly in mind some leading principles and basic facts, and are determined to be guided by them:

First, arguments and mutual criticisms among members of the Alliance have always taken place and have not caused any major damage to its unity and strength. The basic condition to be fulfilled if

discussions are not to turn into fundamental disagreement is that there must be no weakening of our conviction that we serve a common cause and have a common task to perform. If American criticism of the scale of the European contribution is allowed to turn into a rejection of America's common interest with Europe, the consequences may be incalculable. If, on the contrary, the argument remains directed towards a better sharing of a common effort, every difference can be settled. There is to be found sometimes in the language of American critics a degree of impatience and irritation, almost as if the Europeans did not care about their most vital interests and the Americans were tired of looking after alien affairs. This is a wrong and dangerous approach; the Alliance, I repeat, was born in acknowledgment of the common interest of all the North Atlantic countries in Europe. Without this fundamental conviction the very foundations of the Alliance may be shaken. Happily enough, this seems to be a limited and transient attitude, which does not appear to be shared by any responsible political leader.

The second point is that the alleged indifference of European peoples and governments towards their defence effort and the consequential difficulties of the North American countries should not be exaggerated. In the economic field, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany has gone a long way in comprehending the financial

implications for the United States and Britain of the stationing of their troops in Germany, and in offsetting their resulting foreign currency problems. Germany has shouldered 80% of these burdens, which is a very high degree of contribution. On the other hand, the European members of the Alliance as a whole have joined the United States in their efforts to maintain a stable international monetary system based on the dollar. This solidarity is illustrated by the fact that on a global basis, their Central Banks have over the past two years not only retained, but increased their dollar holdings.

In the military field, it would be incorrect to say that the European countries have maintained a rhythm of military expenditure equivalent to that of the United States. Even if the per capita gross national product of the United States is far larger than that of any European country; even if a considerable part of the overall military budget of the USA cannot be attributed to NATO expenditures; the fact remains that the percentage of military expenditure in Europe per inhabitant remains, as a whole, below the growing percentage of per capita national product. But it cannot be said that the European countries, as a whole, are reducing their military efforts. On the contrary, in most countries of the Alliance their defence expenditures, in constant prices, show a rising trend. Such increases in expenditure result not so much in increases of levels of forces, as in improvements in their quality and equipment. Many

countries of the Alliance are introducing large numbers of new European tanks: the British Chieftain and the German Leopard are coming into service in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. Italy is buying the new American M 60 tanks. New types of artillery are also in process of introduction: the 155 mm self-propelled United States gun is being bought by Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. Germany is producing its own multiple rocket-launchers. The same is true for the air forces: the United States Northrop NF5 is bought by the Netherlands, the Macdonald RF4 by Germany, the Phantom by the United Kingdom. New European planes are also coming into service: the Buccaneer in the United Kingdom, the French Mirage V in Belgium, the SAAB Drachen in Denmark. Maritime forces are also being improved with new submarines, new guided missile destroyers, new maritime patrol aircraft for anti-submarine warfare. And my list is far from exhaustive.

As a third point, I should perhaps emphasize that I do not consider the European effort to be sufficient and incapable of improvement. On the contrary, such a problem exists, and will remain with us, as long as the Soviet Union and its allies are not ready for serious talks about balanced reductions of forces. The need for the European countries of the Alliance to make a larger military contribution has been repeatedly raised, and sometimes linked with the movement towards European political and military unity.

The British Secretary for Defence, Mr. Dennis Healey, dramatically raised this question in his speech to the Socialist Commentary Meeting in Brighton, on 30th September. "Some re-distribution of the burden within NATO", he said, "is inevitable. It may also be possible to reduce the total burden of defence expenditure as regards agreement between the Warsaw Powers and the West. In either case a closer European unity in defence will not only increase the economy and efficiency of national efforts, but also build a solid foundation for the closer political unity which has always been the objective of the Common Market. Agreement in these matters of life and death will create links quite as important as agreement on the price of butter." I do not know when and how a global problem of increased European effort will present itself. I do not feel that it can wait until Europe is united, or until Britain has joined the Common Market. Mr. Healey is of the same opinion: "On the three tremendous issues I have outlined above", he has said, "we do not have to wait until Britain joins the Common Market." At the same time, however, one cannot expect that a change in the balance of NATO forces can be discussed, agreed and physically implemented in a short time. Modern military equipment requires time to create, design and produce; financial support cannot be improvised. We are an Alliance of free democracies, and parliamentary processes are more effective in cutting military expenditure than in increasing it. Here again, hurry and

impatience are not helpful; on the contrary, they can only create ill-feeling and complicate matters. The question of a better balance among European and American allies is there, but it requires time and fair consideration.

My fourth and last point on this matter is, I feel, the most important and indeed the fundamental one. As I have mentioned before, the allied countries in NATO are committed to maintain the present overall force ceiling, and not to reduce it except in case of an agreement with the Warsaw Pact countries on balanced force reductions. This is the basis of everything, and if this basis is abandoned, the very foundations of Allied solidarity may be shaken, and not only Allied military strength, but the Alliance itself compromised. This applies to all the Allied countries, but all the more, inevitably, to the United States, as the largest, strongest, and most influential country in the Alliance. We should all recognize that no further unilateral initiative in the field of reduction of forces should be permitted to happen. On the contrary, discussion and consultation aimed at reaching new agreements and a new distribution of effort can and should take place within the Alliance's framework at the request of any interested country; and they should be conducted with fairness, mutual understanding and speed. If this basic rule is breached, the whole policy of detente and negotiations of the Allied countries would be upset, and the Alliance itself jeopardized.

I am sure that all responsible **people** in the United States, whatever their political opinion, **whatever** their ideas about the necessity of a greater effort **by the** European allies, will keep this essential point in mind.

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Ladies and Gentlemen, I **should like** to conclude with an expression of my abiding confidence **in** the future of our Alliance and in our ability to overcome **the inevitable** difficulties which will face it in the future **course of** world events, which are so often obscure and ominous. My **confidence** is not rhetorical, nor emotional. It is justified by **a cold** assessment of the situation and by some hard grounds for **hope**.

The first of these is that **President** Nixon himself is fully aware of the value and of the **problems** of the Atlantic Alliance, and of its importance for his country. **He** has told us publicly and privately several times of his **keen** interest in the freedom and progress of Europe, and of how **deeply** he believes in the importance of NATO for both Europe and the **United States**, and the necessity of running the Alliance in full **and equal** cooperation and consultation between them. The consultations **in the** NATO Council about SALT and about promoting negotiation **between East** and West have confirmed the

seriousness of his intentions. On the other hand I know, from having followed the activities and listened to the opinions of the then Vice President Nixon between 1955 and 1960, and of Mr. Nixon between 1961 and 1968, that his present position with regard to the Alliance reflects his long-standing and deeply-felt convictions. While appreciating the tremendous problems he has to face at home and abroad, we can trust that the President will always defend to the best of his ability the cause of our Alliance. This fundamental attitude of Alliance loyalty is shared by all major political leaders in Congress, whatever their party allegiance and their special position on particular issues.

Another reason lies in the widespread and deep feelings of friendship and affection which unite the people of Europe with the United States. The current criticism which is heard in some European political and intellectual circles does not extend to the great mass of Europeans. They admire and like the generous, strong, and liberal people of this country. The spontaneously warm demonstrations which have recently greeted the three conquerors of the moon all over Europe were a genuine expression of these deeply rooted feelings. The people of Europe not only admire the courage of those three men, but they share with the American people a common joy in a victory that they feel a little as theirs, because it is the fruit of a process which Europe began and which the sons of Europe have developed in the new continent.

Such feelings are not only genuine, but rationally justified. Because, of course, everybody knows that Armstrong, Aldrin and Collines represent in their persons a collective achievement of the science, technology, industry and organization of the United States as a whole. A people which can achieve such an almost unbelievable perfection of invention, technique and of collective human effort has every right to be proud of itself and has no reason for disillusionment or discouragement. Nor has it any right or reason to renounce its world responsibility, and to withdraw in indifference and isolation. Successes and setbacks have been the lot of all peoples, and the achievements of the American people by far outweigh the other side of the balance. These achievements not only open the way to, but give positive promise of, a new stage in man's development. As a European, I think I should convey to the Americans here this expression of respect, confidence and admiration which are deeply felt by all that is best in Europe. The psychological bases of the Alliance, both in Europe and in the United States, are intact.

May I conclude, ladies and gentlemen, in wishing to the ATA a long continuation of fruitful work in the interests of Europe, North America and the Atlantic Alliance. Our policy of defence and of peace is sound. Our forces can be adjusted to the evolving needs

of a better cooperation between America and Europe. Our common solidarity is bound to continue. And the Atlantic associations, both national and international, under the wise and dynamic leadership of Paul Henri Spaak and of your Council will continue to spread in all the countries of our alliance the message of our firm determination to live in solidarity, peace and freedom.