



Communist Policy and Tactics 1962 – 1963, 2. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

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His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Ministry of Justice.

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September 19, 1963.

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POLICY AND TACTICS

SEPTEMBER 1963

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3. The dialogue over collateral measures of disarmament (i.e., the Warsaw Pact and NATO Non-aggression Pact, Observation Posts, reduction of foreign troops in Central Europe, de-nuclearisation of Germany, etc.) which the Russians seem anxious to keep alive should be seen as part of the new pattern of Soviet tactics inaugurated by the Tests Ban decision. Many of the motives which prompted the latter decision are also behind the Soviet desire to keep talking now. This is not so much because they believe intrinsically, or more than they have done hitherto, in the need and feasibility of agreement on partial measures, but because they seek to maintain an atmosphere of détente with the West and hope that there may be side-effects from the discussion of such measures.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

AUGUST 1963

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The talks which Soviet leaders had with United States and British Ministers after the Tests Ban Treaty, the subsequent meetings of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva and the attitude adopted throughout the month by the Soviet Press indicate that Soviet tactics are likely to be as follows:

- (a) Moscow does not appear to have any intention of making important concessions on any of the main East/West issues, e.g. Berlin and Germany, Disarmament or Laos; but
- (b) they will seek to promote an atmosphere of détente with the West as initiated by the Tests Ban Treaty; though
- (c) they appear to be in no hurry to reach agreement on any particular collateral measure of disarmament.

2. The Soviet decision to agree to the Tests Ban Treaty probably arose from a mixture of strategic, political and economic motives. Strategically they were anxious to try to arrest the arms race, and prevent it galloping into yet more expensive fields which the United States could afford more easily than themselves; in the meantime they would hope quietly to build up their own strength. Politically they probably decided that the time had come to revert to talking as the best and safest means of achieving their objectives, instead of relying on the tough methods of 1960-62, e.g. Berlin ultimata, rocket threats and the Cuba missile gamble which had led to the strengthening rather than disintegration of the West. Economically the Soviet leaders must have been anxious to avoid the further very heavy expenditure which the research into, and development of, new weapon systems would have entailed; instead they wanted to divert more resources to the civilian economy so as to be able to compete more effectively with the West in industrial production, which Khrushchev has always characterised as the decisive battle field in the struggle between capitalism and communism. Finally, as mentioned below, the sharp deterioration in Sino/Soviet relations which occurred from the Autumn of 1962 on (cf. Peking's attitude over Cuba and Moscow's reaction to China's attack on India) must have removed a serious obstacle in Khrushchev's mind to a Tests Ban Treaty - as it also created a need to show that negotiations could usefully be conducted with the "imperialists" and that the policy of "peaceful coexistence" could bring worthwhile results for the bloc.

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4. Obviously such tactics will raise problems for the West; more so, in some ways, than the direct methods of the cold war. Clearly too, there can be no assumption that the present more flexible Soviet line will continue for long. On balance a state of détente rather than tension in East/West relations is advantageous to the West since,

(a) it reduces the risk of nuclear war, and removes the dangers of fall-out;

(b) if agreement can be reached on some collateral measures, (e.g. anti-surprise attack) it might pave the way for progress with measures of real disarmament and,

(c) détente helps the prospects of evolution within the bloc and provides more fruitful ground for the West to increase its contacts and so further *the* process.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

5. The Chinese were outraged by the Tests Ban Treaty which they regarded as an act of blackest betrayal by the Soviet Union, in collusion with America, aimed at preventing China from becoming a nuclear power. In deciding to sign, the Russians clearly and finally wrote off an accommodation with China as too remote a possibility to represent any longer an objection to an agreement with the West in which, for reasons described above, they were interested.

6. The breakdown of the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow in July, the Tests Ban Treaty, the subsequent uninhibited polemics between Peking and Moscow, and Khrushchev's present visit to Yugoslavia, mark a decisive point in the evolution of relations between China and Russia, and perhaps in the evolution of the world Communist movement. In future both governments will be even less interested than heretofore in papering over, and far less in compromising, their differences with each other, and may be expected to concentrate on pursuing their own interests, in active and open competition with the other. There is obviously no chance of any accommodation between them at any rate so long as the present leaders remain in office in both countries.

Effect on China of the worsening of the dispute

7. The sublime Chinese conviction in the rightness of their cause will sustain them in facing the present situation without dismay. They are likely to consider that it calls for maintaining if not intensifying present policies, rather than for adopting new ones.

8. The immediate effect of the recent deterioration will be to underline the isolation which the leaders of the Chinese regime have presumably come to accept as part of the short term price they must pay for refusing to compromise on what they regard as the long-term interests of China. There are few states in the bloc which side with China (Albania, North Vietnam, and North Korea). She has support from only a few Communist parties outside though there are a number of splinter parties which take the Chinese line. It will be a prime object of Chinese policy to win support from Communists everywhere, thus polarising the Communist movement between Moscow and Peking.

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9. It seems likely that China's intention is to overcome her isolation by continuing to concentrate on the areas which she considers herself particularly suited to lead, notably the Far East, South East Asia, Africa and Latin America. Her long-term aim will be to lead the "have not" peoples, and indoctrinate them with her own concept of revolutionary Marxist-Leninism, in opposition if necessary to the more advanced and comfortable Communist states, for the eventual destruction of capitalist imperialism everywhere. She may therefore be expected to continue her present line of truculent opposition to "imperialism" everywhere, to compete, if necessary, with Soviet bloc activities in under-developed countries, and to continue her incitement in Indo-China and opposition to Malaysia. Exploitation of racialism is well adapted to this general policy, and the fact that Mao chose the subject of negro emancipation for one of his now rare speeches on August 9, suggests that this theme, and the equation of the racial problem with the class struggle, will be developed by the Chinese propaganda machine.

10. The weakness of the course on which the Chinese are set is that it lacks appeal for the peoples at which it is aimed, unless coupled with the ability to confer large-scale material benefits, which China palpably lacks. Moreover she will have to compete not only with the United States and the Western Powers, but also with the Soviet bloc. Her denunciation of the Tests Ban Treaty, and her attitude to nuclear war may cause difficulties for her in the propaganda field. Their sweeping proposals for the elimination of all nuclear weapons and other measures, which were recommended to all heads of government in personal communications from Chou En-lai, seem to have made little impression. Russian charges of aggressiveness and indifference to human life may have struck home.

11. Economically China faces the permanent prospect of no further aid from the Soviet Union, and the possibility of a total trade embargo, and she can scarcely expect aid from the West. She is therefore confronted with the necessity of industrialising her largely medieval economy from her own resources and from what she can earn abroad from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities, minerals and some manufactured goods. This implies a very long haul indeed before there can be any prospect of a significant advance in the standard of living; but it does not exclude the possibility of moderately rapid progress in a few selected fields for special purposes, e.g. for the support of agriculture, or for military supplies.

12. After her experience of virtually complete dependence on supplies from the Soviet bloc, for the last eighteen months China has been devoting considerable attention to the possibilities of Western and Japanese production. We expect this trend to be intensified, and to include the opening up of alternative sources of P.O.L. as an insurance against Soviet sanctions in this crucial field. The Chinese Government's present policy of promoting, and even insisting on visits to Peking by foreign business delegations, and its encouragement of exhibitions there of Western and Japanese industrial goods, is probably aimed both at assisting in the choice of new sources of supply, and in offsetting the sense of isolation resulting from the reduction in trade with the bloc and the withdrawal of bloc technical assistance.

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13. Militarily the trend in Chinese relations with the Soviet Union is highly unfavourable to her. The equipping of her armed forces with modern weapons without Soviet assistance, must absorb a high proportion of scarce resources unless they are to be left at a serious disadvantage. Furthermore she is faced with the prospect of a potentially hostile and very strong power on one of her longest and most vulnerable frontiers, which is straddled for most of its length by races alien to the Han Chinese, and probably more in sympathy with the Russians. The overriding caution that China has habitually displayed towards any initiative that might involve direct conflict with the United States is now likely to be heightened by these considerations, and also by further doubts about Soviet support in the event of a show-down with the Americans.

14. In the period immediately following the setback the Chinese have suffered, they may be more than usually prone to imagine provocation and to react militarily to any move in which they detect, rightly or wrongly, an intention to apply pressure, or exploit their present predicament. They will be concerned to show no sign of weakness. The principal danger point is the Sino-Indian border but recent Chinese notes are not consistent with the setting of the propaganda stage for an attack, and seem designed rather to counter Soviet and Indian charges of aggressiveness.

15. Internally, we expect a general tightening-up of Party control as the corollary to the widening breach with Revisionism abroad.

16. Khrushchev's Visit to Yugoslavia

There were probably a number of reasons for Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia and the timing itself is significant.

- (i) It underlines the Soviet intention to pay no heed to the Chinese and indeed their urgent desire to snub them publicly.
- (ii) It gave Khrushchev an opportunity to pose before the Yugoslavs and before the ^{non-}aligned nations generally as a man of peace, ready to reach limited agreements with the West and determined above all to avoid the risks of nuclear war.
- (iii) it provided an opportunity to try to bring Yugoslavia closer into Soviet economic planning for Eastern Europe.

17. So far as can be judged at present, and subject to the final communiqué, the reactions of the Yugoslavs have been predictable. They repeatedly expressed sentiments of friendship for the Soviet Union and interest in increasing trade, but no substantial concessions have been made to the Soviet point of view either in ideological matters or as regards closer ties with COMECON. Moreover, it is far from clear what form of closer economic co-operation would be mutually acceptable. Khrushchev has made much of his interest in Yugoslavia's domestic innovations and indicated that the Soviet Union might learn useful lessons from the Workers Councils but these remarks, widely reported in the West, have received no publicity inside the Soviet Union. Their main purpose was probably to flatter the Yugoslavs though we are keeping an eye out for any other consequences they may have foreshadowed.

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CHRONOLOGY

- August 2 Chou En-lai wrote to all Heads of State calling for a World Conference to discuss the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.
- August 3 Lord Home and Mr. Rusk arrived in Moscow for the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- " " Chinese People's Daily denounced the Test Ban Treaty as "a betrayal of the Soviet people".
- August 4 U Thant arrived in Moscow for the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- August 5 Khrushchev received U Thant, Lord Home and Mr. Rusk.
- " " Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow by Gromyko, Mr. Rusk and Lord Home. Khrushchev and U Thant were present.
- August 5-8 The Council of Community of European Writers began its discussion in Leningrad. A group of participants, including Angus Wilson and John Lehman, were subsequently received by Khrushchev at Gagra.
- August 5-7 9th World Congress against the atomic and hydrogen bombs held in Hiroshima.
- August 8 Mao Tse Tung issued statement supporting United States negroes in fight against racial discrimination.
- August 9 Pravda published message from Pope Paul VI congratulating Khrushchev on the conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- August 12 Official Chinese statement denounced Soviet attitude at Hiroshima conference.
- " " Peking mass rally supported "United States negro struggle against racial discrimination".
- August 13 Indonesian Communist Party Delegation led by Aidit arrived in Moscow.
- August 14 Bulgarian Government Delegation led by Zhivkov arrived in Moscow.
- August 15 Chinese Government statement claiming that the Soviet Union had refused to supply China with a nuclear bomb and technical data on its manufacture.
- August 20 Khrushchev began his visit to Yugoslavia.
- August 21 Soviet Government statement (replying to Chinese statement of August 15) accused Chinese Government of divulging bloc defence secrets.

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- August 21 Agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Jordan signed in Moscow.
- " " Chinese People's Daily attacked Soviet military aid to India and Soviet position on Sino-Indian dispute.
- August 22 Czech Government closed down the New China Agency Office in Prague.
- August 23 Soviet Government Note criticising the attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom to the signing of the Test Ban Treaty by East Germany.
- August 28 Indonesian Communist Party Delegation left Moscow for Peking.

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POLICY AND TACTICS

JULY 1963.

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3. In a speech on July 19 Khrushchev also specified four
other "collateral" measures of disarmament as worthy of
further pursuit. These were mutual limitation or reduction
of military budgets, the reciprocal stationing of observers
with the Western forces in Germany and Soviet forces in the
D.D.R., the reduction of foreign troops in both parts of
Germany, and the positioning of fixed observation posts in
the Soviet Union and other countries, on a reciprocal basis.
These proposals are not novel; some of them date from as
far back as 1955. But they do have points of interest, the
main one perhaps being the apparent readiness to accept
fixed observation posts on Soviet territory.

4. In the Moscow negotiations Soviet insistence that they
would not accept any agreement which involved inspection
ruled out any progress on a comprehensive agreement in all
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of the negotiation reduced itself to discussion and finally
acceptance by the Soviet Government of the Anglo-American
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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JULY 1963.

Agreement on a partial test-ban treaty was reached after a tough but fairly amicable negotiation. A notable first step in improving East-West relations has thus been taken but this should not be taken as justifying any conclusions as to a fundamental shift in Soviet policy. The talks between the Russians and the Chinese ended inconclusively as expected and new fuel has been added to the flames by Chinese criticism of the test ban treaty. The communiqué issued after the long-deferred C.M.E.A. Summit meeting struck a temporising note. Soviet-Iraqi relations have reached a new low point.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

2. The initialling of a draft treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water by the special representatives of the United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. in Moscow on July 25 was a notable step in East-West relations. This was achieved without the close link which Khrushchev had originally made between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact States: in his speech of July 2 he proposed that the two should be signed simultaneously. The communiqué issued at the end of the discussions said only that the three governments had agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organisations concerning the talks on the Soviet proposal for such a pact and "to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement on this question satisfactory to all participants."

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or strategic objection to it. The political advantages are obvious; the agreement can be presented as a long-^y delayed fruit of Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-existence" and as such it comes usefully in the face of bitter Chinese attacks on it. The economic advantages in the present state of the Soviet economy need not be spelt out, and there is no doubt that the agreement has been heartily welcomed by the Soviet public at large.

5. Though a success, the initialling of the agreement is only a first step towards a better East-West understanding. Khrushchev in a statement to the editors of Izvestiya and Pravda on July 26 clearly laid down his priorities for discussion at the next stage. He suggested that the "over-riding international problem", on which attention should now be concentrated, was the conclusion of a non-aggression pact which "would have the more significance as it would embrace all the states at present possessing nuclear weapons". We can therefore expect intense Soviet diplomatic and propaganda activity in pressing for progress on the non-aggression pact issue, combined with variations on the latest package of "collateral" measures mentioned above. It is unlikely that the Russians will make much effort to be forthcoming on other issues of interest to the West unless their own priorities are first satisfactorily met.

6. In all Khrushchev's comments he continues to assert the need for the settlement of the German problem, "the main problem on which the ending of international tension depends". But there is no evidence of any more forthcoming Soviet attitude on Germany and Berlin; indeed such evidence as there is suggests that at present the German situation suits the Soviet Union quite well. In Laos too the Soviet attitude remained un-cooperative throughout July and it would be over-optimistic to expect early progress on this front.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

7. The Moscow talks between high-level Party representatives of the two sides lasted from July 5 - 19. Little is known about their course but it is easy to infer from the barrage of polemics between the two sides before, during and after the talks that Sino-Soviet relations are worse now than when the meeting began. A major contribution to this further exacerbation of relations was the Soviet "Open letter" of July 14 which replied to the Chinese diatribe of June 14. It continued the attack on Chinese attitudes to problems of war and peace paying the Chinese back in their own coin of misrepresentation and distortion of the other's position (a familiar technique generally reserved for use against the West). It raised two other emotive issues for Soviet readers - the Chinese attack on de-Stalinisation in the U.S.S.R. and Chinese ingratitude for Soviet aid. This was followed by a nation-wide internal propaganda campaign aimed at impressing the Soviet people with the degree of Chinese ingratitude, chauvinism and colour-consciousness.

8. The Chinese published the Soviet letter on July 20, describing it as a "singular document", alongside a reprint in full of their own letter of June 14 and a promise to reply in full. They will no doubt do so magisterially in due course. Their major attack is however now centred on

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the Soviet agreement to conclude a test ban treaty. They have argued that the Russians have fallen for a United States device to inhibit other Communist countries from acquiring a nuclear capability; that an agreement to cease testing in isolation from an agreement on general disarmament risks blunting the revolutionary fervour of the entire Communist camp, and that attempts by the existing nuclear powers to monopolise nuclear weapons and control the destiny of the world would fail. There is no doubt that they resent very strongly what they interpret as an attempt both by the United States and the Soviet Union to isolate them further and inhibit them from acquiring nuclear weapons.

9. The most immediate result of these developments will almost certainly be an intensification of the competition between the Russians and the Chinese for influence in other Communist Parties, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America, in the Front Organisations and in the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. The Chinese are already successfully exploiting existing discontent with the leadership in a number of parties, notably in Latin America. Even in the West European Communist Parties they seem to have made headway in their efforts to establish contacts and organise support for their case; the activities of pro-Chinese "splinter elements" in the Italian and Belgian Parties are an indication of their success so far, and there is probably more to come. Nor can we exclude the possibility that the Chinese may consider whether they should take or encourage some limited militant action to demonstrate the validity of their case against the U.S.S.R. But it seems very improbable that they would be prepared to run any great risks in doing so.

C.M.E.A. SUMMIT MEETING

10. The long-deferred Summit meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) took place from July 24-26. The communiqué issued after the meeting contained no new decisions of importance and was more remarkable for what it did not say. For example, there was no mention of the dispute over the extent to which Roumania's industrial plans should be adjusted to fit in with those of C.M.E.A.; nor of Khrushchev's November 1962 proposal for a joint (i.e. supra-national) planning organ, to which the Roumanians are thought to have taken particular exception. It is impossible to say, on the evidence so far available, whether this means that a compromise between Roumania and the Soviet Union has been achieved; or merely that the issue was shelved.

IRAQ

11. Soviet political and propaganda pressure on Iraq built up steadily during the month with accusations of "genocide" committed by the Iraqis in Kurdistan and of interference by outside powers, including members of CENTO, in support of the Iraqis. Outer Mongolia was put up to inscribe the genocide as an item on the Agenda of the General Assembly (which led to the rupture of Iraq-Mongolian relations), and after an unsuccessful attempt by the Soviet

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representative at the ECOSOC Meeting in Geneva to have the subject of genocide discussed there, the Soviet representative at the United Nations sent a letter to the President of the Security Council on July 9 drawing the Council's attention to the dangerous consequences of alleged outside interference, the continuance of which might necessitate convening the Security Council. These allegations were clearly intended to represent the Kurdish question as having an international character and thus afford a pretext for Soviet Union's own interference. The letter was backed up by Soviet notes to Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria.

12. Soviet/Iraqi relations must now be considered at a very low ebb. But there are no signs of a total suspension of Soviet economic and military aid, or of any great reduction in the number of Soviet experts in Iraq. Nor is there any reason to suppose that either side is actively contemplating an immediate breach of diplomatic relations.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

13. Speaking in Peking on July 23, Marshal Ch'en Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, expressed "concern" at the proposed British-United States-Indian joint air exercises planned for this autumn, which he claimed to be a "threat" to both China and Pakistan. He drew the attention of the Colombo Conference nations to the matter. From the Indian side there have been claims that China is preparing for renewed aggression and reports of a significant increase in Chinese military forces in the area from Western Nepal to the Eastern end of the N.E.F.A., particularly in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan. It is too early to say whether this presages some new action by China but certainly there is greater tension on this issue than there has been for some time.

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CHRONOLOGY

- June 28 - July 4 Mr. Khrushchev visited East Germany, making a major speech in East Berlin on July 2.
- July 1 - 6 Visit of the Soviet Minister of Culture, Madame E.A. Furtseva; received by the Prime Minister on July 4.
- 1 - 12 A Roumanian delegation, led by General Salajan, Minister of Armed Forces, visited the Soviet Union; Received by Mr. Khrushchev on July 11.
- 2 - 13 Air Marshal Engineer, the Indian Chief of Air Staff, visited the Soviet Union.
- 3 - 16 Marshal Malinovsky, Soviet Minister of Defence, on leave in Hungary.
- 3 - 6 The Seventh Session of the C.M.E.A. Executive Committee meeting in Moscow.
- 5 - 19 Sino-Soviet inter-Party talks on ideological differences took place in Moscow.
- 7 Rally held in Peking to welcome back the five Chinese expelled from the Soviet Union for distributing anti-Soviet literature.
- 7 - 9 M. Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, visited the Soviet Union; received by Mr. Khrushchev in Kiev on July 8.
- 9 Soviet Note on the treatment of the Kurds in Iraq. Similar statements handed to the Iranian, Turkish and Syrian Ambassadors.
- 9 - 22 Mr. Kadar, Hungarian Prime Minister, led a high-level Party-Government delegation to the Soviet Union. The delegation was received by Mr. Khrushchev on July 10; and Mr. Kardar remained on in Moscow for the C.M.E.A. Conference on July 24.
- 12 A Yugoslav trade delegation arrived in the Soviet Union for an exhibition of Yugoslav consumer goods at Kiev.
- 14 "Open letter" from the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to all Party organisations and Communists of the Soviet Union published in Pravda.
- 15 Three-power talks between representatives of the United Kingdom, United States and the U.S.S.R. on a nuclear test ban began in Moscow. The first session was attended by Mr. Khrushchev.

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July (cont.)

- 16 An Indian Mission left for Moscow to purchase Soviet equipment for the Indian Army and Air Force.
- 17 - 19 An East German delegation, led by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Bolz, and including the Minister of Defence and other Ministers, visited Moscow.
- 17 The Czechoslovak authorities gave an N.C.N.A. correspondent forty-eight hours to leave the country.
- 18 Rally held in Peking to welcome back delegates to the World Congress of Women.
- 19 Mr. Khrushchev spoke at a Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Rally.
- 20 Indonesian Communist Party delegation led by D.N. Aidit, arrived in Moscow.
- 20 People's Daily published the text of the C.P.S.U. "open letter" of July 14.
- 21 Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai present at a rally in Peking to welcome back the Chinese delegation to the Sino-Soviet talks.
- 21 Identical Chinese and Soviet communiqués issued at the end of the Sino-Soviet talks.
- 24 - 26 Meeting of the First Secretaries and Heads of Government of C.M.E.A. countries in Moscow.
- 25 A test ban agreement in three environments (i.e. excluding underground tests) initialled by United Kingdom, United States, and Soviet representatives, in Moscow.
- 26 Mr. Khrushchev's statement to Pravda and Izvestiya on the agenda for further East-West discussions.
- 29 People's Daily printed full text of tri-partite test ban agreement with critical commentary.
- 30 Pravda leader "The Party is leading to Communism" contained a further attack on the Chinese.

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1963

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art in mid-July. His sudden visit
Democratic Republic seemed aimed
resident Kennedy's successful
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been a deeper reason behind the
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a settlement.

significant development was
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Kennedy and the Prime Minister in
discussions on problems connected
he Soviet Government were then
otiating position. Khrushchev

impressed privately on Mr. Harold Wilson and other visitors that
he had decided to withdraw his offer, made on December 19, of two
to three on-site inspections a year. In public he has been
careful not to suggest or admit that the offer had been withdrawn.
While therefore it will still be possible for the Russians to
accept once again 2 to 3 inspections during the negotiations
without public loss of face, their initial position will almost
certainly be that the offer no longer stands.

3. Further confirmation of the uncompromising toughness of the
Soviet position on the test ban issue came in a Pravda article
of June 27 entitled "It's up to the West". This took the same
line as Mr. Khrushchev in his interview with the editors of
Pravda and Izvestiya on June 14, that the outcome of the talks
depended on the "baggage" the Western negotiators brought with
them. Inspection connoted espionage; national means of control,
combined with a limited number of "black boxes" on the territory
of treaty countries must suffice.

4. At a speech in East Berlin on July 2, Khrushchev offered to
conclude an agreement on the ending of tests in the atmosphere,
outer space and under water. He made no mention of his earlier
stipulation that there should also be an unpoliced moratorium
on underground tests, but he did claim that a test ban agreement
in these environments should be linked with the signing
of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty. At its face value
this proposition is a slight advance in the Soviet position.

5. At the disarmament conference in Geneva, Soviet-U.S. technical
negotiations for a direct emergency communications link (the "Hot
Line") reached a successful conclusion - the first concrete
achievement of the Conference - when an agreement was signed on
June 20. The idea of such a link had been put forward by the
Americans as one of their suggested measures to reduce the risk
of war.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JUNE 1963

The month ended on a note of unparalleled acrimony in Sino-Soviet relations. Throughout June the prospect of high level inter-Party talks heavily overshadowed the attitudes and actions of both the Russians and the Chinese and reinforced the Soviet inclination to sit back and let the West come to them. To justify his policy of peaceful coexistence, however, Khrushchev was careful to foster the public impression of willingness to keep talking with the West; the month even saw the conclusion of a modest Soviet-United States agreement. Privately he staked out a tough opening position for the high level test ban talks due to start in mid-July. His sudden visit to East Berlin and the German Democratic Republic seemed aimed at countering the effects of President Kennedy's successful tour; the desire for consultations with East European leaders on intra-bloc matters may have been a deeper reason behind the visit. The Iraqi scene is causing the Russians marked concern and they have come out forcefully against the present Government. In Laos the situation is potentially very-serious; the Pathet Lao pursued salami tactics against neutralist outposts and the Russians were consistently unwilling to play any positive part as Co-Chairman under the Geneva settlement.

NUCLEAR TESTS AND DISARMAMENT

2. On nuclear tests the most significant development was Khrushchev's agreement, announced on June 10, to receive special representatives from President Kennedy and the Prime Minister in Moscow in mid-July for further discussions on problems connected with a test ban treaty. But the Soviet Government were then quick to stake out a tough negotiating position. Khrushchev impressed privately on Mr. Harold Wilson and other visitors that he had decided to withdraw his offer, made on December 19, of two to three on-site inspections a year. In public he has been careful not to suggest or admit that the offer had been withdrawn. While therefore it will still be possible for the Russians to accept once again 2 to 3 inspections during the negotiations without public loss of face, their initial position will almost certainly be that the offer no longer stands.

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BERLIN AND GERMANY

6. On June 22, Neues Deutschland published three decrees on "measures for the defence of the State frontier between the D.D.R. and West Berlin". These provided for a no-man's land of varying depths all the way around West Berlin. The three Western Commandants declared these to be illegal and harsh measures and confirmed that they could not end the right of the Western Allies to circulate freely in Berlin.

7. To the extent that they declare the sector/sector and the sector/zonal borders to be the "State frontier", these decrees may be intended to constitute a new legal claim by the East Germans designed as yet another step towards the formal incorporation of East Berlin into the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.). To the extent that they forbid all citizens of other states (military and civilian) from entering the no-man's land, they purport to restrict the right of the three Western Powers to circulate throughout Berlin. The decrees will add to the difficulty of refugees seeking to escape from East Germany. Otherwise the decrees do not change anything very much; there has long been such a no-man's land around Berlin.

8. The event of the month was undoubtedly Khrushchev's decision, announced during President Kennedy's visit to the Federal Republic, to visit East Germany on the occasion of Ulbricht's 70th birthday (June 30). Khrushchev toured East Berlin on June 28 amidst scenes of enthusiasm rather less remarkable than those noted during the President's visit. One aim of this sudden descent on the city was presumably to counter the overwhelming success of President Kennedy's visit and to reaffirm yet again continuing Soviet support for the Ulbricht regime. Khrushchev also clearly set some store by the opportunity for private consultations with East European Party leaders. Of these only Mr. Gheorgiu-Dej, the Roumanian leader, was conspicuously absent, as in January, when the other notable absentee was Mr. Kadar. (See also paragraph 17 below). It can safely be assumed that tactics at the July 5 talks and the implications of the present grave state of Sino-Soviet relations figured high on the agenda of these consultations.

IRAQ

9. The Iraqi Government's resumption of hostilities against the Kurds coupled with its continuing action against the Iraqi communists led to increasingly bitter Soviet propaganda attacks. As well as giving propaganda support to the Kurdish cause the Russians by implication threatened to cut off aid to Iraq if the Iraqi Government did not mend its ways. An "Observer" article in Pravda of June 20 stated: "The Soviet people cannot reconcile themselves to the fact that the resources which they supply to the young states should be used against the interests of the people of those states, for ends which have nothing in common with the struggle against the harmful remnants of 'colonialism'". It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Union will entirely sever aid, however, since this would mean abandoning its position in Baghdad and publicly confirming the fact that Soviet aid has strings.

10. The Russians may well also be cautious on material aid for the Kurds. The Iraqi campaign has only just begun, and on past form the Russians will probably hesitate to commit themselves

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too far before the likely outcome of the fighting becomes clearer. There is also the risk to Soviet-Arab relations inherent in any form of material subvention to an insurgent non-Arab minority.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

11. On June 7, Marshal Abdul Hakim Amir, Vice-President of the U.A.R., arrived in Moscow on an official visit at the head of a strong delegation of military leaders. He and his colleagues were paid marked attention and a reception in their honour was attended by Khrushchev, Kosygin, Mikoyan and others on June 18. The Marshal concluded two separate inter-Governmental agreements, on further industrial credit and military supplies. The Cairo Press has claimed that the industrial credit is worth about £16 million at 2½%. The Soviet Government is clearly concerned to consolidate its friendship with the U.A.R. Government in a period of some instability in the Middle East as a whole.

LAOS

12. The political stalemate has not yet been broken, and there has been some deterioration in the military position, as the Pathet Lao proceed with what appears to be a policy of reducing Neutralist outposts in Central and Southern Laos, one by one.

13. Prince Souvanna Phouma remains in good heart, and has apparently some hope of increased Soviet intervention in defence of the Geneva settlement after the meeting between the Chinese and Soviet Party representatives due to start in Moscow on July 5. During June the Russians were, however, consistently unhelpful, and it seems unlikely that their meeting with the Chinese will result in any notable increase in Soviet willingness to use what influence they have in favour of a compromise. The trend towards a de facto partition in Laos is therefore likely to continue, with the Pathet Lao strengthening control over what they consider to be their own zones and either suborning the Neutralists they find there, or propelling them into the arms of the Right-Wing. For the time being, however, they appear willing to tolerate the facade of central government in Vientiane.

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STIRRINGS IN EASTERN EUROPE

(a) Czechoslovakia

14. President Novotny's speech of June 12 at Kosice was aimed at reimposing control after the recent sudden acceleration in the pace of destalinisation in Czechoslovakia.

15. At a Central Committee meeting on April 4-5, two Party officials were dismissed from top posts, leaving in high office only four of the old guard Stalinists, including Novotny and Siroky, the Prime Minister. (An official announcement of the dismissals did not appear until May 15). Since then political events have taken place under a cultural cloak with the Slovaks making the pace. Under the leadership of the recently rehabilitated Slovak poet, Novomesky, an appeal was made for the rehabilitation of Clementis and the Dav group of writers: this was followed by a posthumous denunciation of Kopecky, a former Deputy Prime Minister, and at the Slovak Journalists' Congress the campaign moved into higher gear with an attack by Hysko, a leading journalist, on Siroky, the Prime Minister. This was the first attack on a high official not previously condemned by the Party and suggested that matters might be getting beyond the régime's control.

16. Novotny, however, counter-attacked without any conciliatory gesture to the Slovaks. His speech cautiously defended Siroky and condemned excessive Slovak nationalism, drawing attention to Slovak debts to the Czechs and Slovak failures in agricultural and industrial performance: without actually threatening cultural nonconformists, he made it clear that criticism of the Party was impermissible. The speech did not suggest that Novotny felt his own position insecure. Though heavily implicated in the Stalinist errors of the Slansky era, he no doubt counts on his support in Moscow and in Prague to maintain his image as a reformed character. The chances seem to be that Novotny will remain in control in the absence of an effective challenger; the process of destalinisation will continue though at a more controlled tempo, and in the longer term a new constitutional relationship between Czechs and Slovaks may develop.

(b) Roumania

17. Roumanian/Soviet relations appear to be under some strain. A series of ambiguous gestures culminated in the publication in the Roumanian press on June 20 of the gist of the Chinese letter of June 14 to the C.P.S.U., and Mr. Gheorgiu Dej's remarkable absence from the ad hoc gathering of East European Party Secretaries in East Berlin on June 29-30. It seems likely however that the Roumanians do not at present want to do more than use the Sino-Soviet dispute as a tactical lever to secure Russian concurrence in their national economic objectives in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). No Roumanian pronouncement in the last two years suggests that their leaders have any interest in or intention of espousing the Chinese view on basic foreign policy issues such as, for instance, peaceful coexistence, a concept to the Soviet interpretation of which the Roumanians are

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devotedly attached. But there is undoubtedly a strong element in the Roumanian leadership who are prepared to exploit Sino-Soviet differences in what they regard as the Roumanian national interest.

THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, JUNE 18-21

18. Preliminary impressions of the Central Committee Plenum have already been sent to you and do not require modification. A new development was the publication on June 29 in Pravda of Khrushchev's speech to the Plenum, a typically vigorous, discursive and earthy effort. The general tone of the speech was similar to that of the Plenum's Resolution on ideology; Khrushchev again stressed the link between a correct ideological approach and industrial and agricultural production. He did not indulge in whip-cracking and his pillorying of individuals was confined to very few targets. However in criticising the failure of literary critics and art experts to act as sieves, he directed the Party authorities to "enlist qualified people who will delve deeply into the work of the Press, radio and television, and who will read closely works of literature, familiarise themselves with the works of composers, film producers, theatre productions and will correctly assess manifestations in literature and art". In other words, he called for a tightening up of preliminary censorship through Party channels. This suggests that one of the major remedial measures is to be prophylactic i.e. to deny facilities for publication and transmission of ideas rather than to criticise the authors ex post facto.

19. Only one paragraph, presumably an extract from a longer passage, was published on the Sino-Soviet dispute. In this Khrushchev deliberately accused the Chinese leaders of "aggravating to extremes their differences with the CPSU and the whole international communist movement."

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

20. Guidance savingram No. 363 and Guidance telegram No. 364 of July 1 (Saving to some posts) give a considered assessment of the background, present state of the dispute and prospects for the July 5 talks.

/CHRONOLOGY

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CHRONOLOGY

June

- May 24-June 5 N.V. Podgorny led a C.P.S.U. delegation to Roumania.
- May 29-June 14 Mr. Amery, Minister of Aviation, visited the Soviet Union.
- 3 Dr. Fidel Castro left the Soviet Union to return to Cuba.
- 5-23 Choi Yong-kon, President of North Korean Supreme People's Assembly, visited China.
- 7-19 Marshal Abdul Hakim Amir, Vice-President of the U.A.R., led a delegation to the Soviet Union.
- 8-15 Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P., visited the Soviet Union and had discussions with Mr. Khrushchev on June 10 and June 14.
- 10 Five year trade agreement (1964-68) signed between India and the Soviet Union in Moscow.
- 13 Agreements signed in Moscow between Indonesia and the Soviet Union for economic and technical cooperation.
- 14 Mr. Khrushchev's interview with the editors of Pravda and Izvestiya published.
- 14 Soviet Note handed to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protesting about American bases in Japan.
- 14 Vostok V launched containing Lt.Col. V.F. Bykovsky.
- 15 Mr. Harold Wilson met Mr. Gomulka in Warsaw.
- 16 Vostok VI launched containing Miss V.V. Tereshkova.
- 16 The letter of June 14 from the Central Committee of the Chinese C.P. to the Central Committee of the Soviet Party was published, enumerating 25 points for discussion at the joint meeting on July 5.
- 18-21 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on ideological matters. L.F. Ilichev presented the main report and Mr. Khrushchev made a lengthy speech on June 21.
- 18 Central Committee of CPSU stated that they did not intend to publish the Chinese letter of June 14.

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June

- 20 Agreement on the use of a "Hot Line" communications system signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva.
- 20 "Observer" article published in Pravda warning Iraq that Soviet aid might be withdrawn if "genocide" of the Kurds continued.
- 21 The Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU passed resolutions on ideology and Sino-Soviet relations.
- 21 President Brezhnev and N.V. Podgorny appointed Secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
- 24-29 World Congress of Women, Moscow.
- 24-26 CMEA Permanent Committee for Foreign Trade met in Warsaw. The Chinese present as observers.
- 25 Pravda and Izvestiya published editorials accusing the Chinese of breaking the agreement to end open polemics.
- 28-30 Mr. Khrushchev visited East Germany (in East Berlin on June 28). Joined in East Berlin for consultations by President Novotny, Mr. Kadar, Mr. Gomulka and Mr. Zhivkov on June 29.
- 29 Chinese stated that a Soviet Note of June 27 had demanded the recall from Moscow of three Chinese diplomats, a postgraduate student and an official for distributing the June 14 letter.
- 30 The Chinese Central Committee declared that they would send a delegation to the July 5 talks in spite of these expulsions.

July

- 1 Madame Furtseva, Soviet Minister of Culture, arrived on an official visit to the United Kingdom.
- 2 Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin offering a test ban agreement in three environments on certain conditions.

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