



Communist Policy and Tactics 1962 – 1963, 3. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF
HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S EMBASSY

POLICY AND TACTICS

1963

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

April 23, 1963

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4. These themes were elaborated in a Pravda editorial of February 10 in direct response to the People's Daily statement of January 27. The Peoples Daily had singled out Khrushchev's policy towards Yugoslavia as a cardinal issue in dispute at the present time. Pravda copiously rejected the Chinese contention that the Yugoslav rapprochement was the source of the "difficulties that have arisen in the Communist world", affirmed that the rapprochement would continue and insisted that the Albanian leaders must abandon their erroneous views. It reaffirmed Moscow's interest in a conference of world Parties but appeared to make it conditional on one or more bilateral preparatory meetings. A further insight into typically pragmatic Soviet thinking about ways of glossing over ideological differences was given in an article in the February issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism, which suggested that existing differences did not relate so much to principle as to the way these principles were put into practice.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICSFEBRUARY 1963

Sino-Soviet relations are again exceptionally poor, following the monumental Chinese rejection of Soviet suggestions for damping down on public polemics. Soviet reactions to European developments have been tentative; opportunities for wedge-driving between the N.A.T.O. Allies have conflicted with apprehensions about increased possibilities of West German nuclear armament. At Geneva the chances of a test ban treaty seem to be receding. The Russians appear prepared to diminish their presence in Cuba to some extent, but equally concerned to show that they have a continuing interest there. Since the Iraqi coup the Soviet position in that country looks much less assured. The long-term implications of the incidents at Sofia University must be causing anxiety.

2. Khrushchev in his electoral speech on February 27 was pessimistic about the prospects of any advance on major East-West issues. On internal matters his main concern seemed to be to accustom his listeners to the need for a "long haul" in the Soviet defence programme, and the slower rise in their standard of living which this implied.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

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5. The treatment by the two sides of the thirteenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance on February 14 gave little hint of what the outcome of these Soviet manoeuvres might be. The Russians treated it fractionally more generously than in 1962, the reaffirmation of the Soviet defence commitment to China being nicely balanced by a catalogue of Soviet aid to China since 1950; the Chinese celebrations were a shade less friendly than last year. But Peking's intention to have the last word became obvious when there began in the Chinese press a pregnant series of reprints, without comment, of recent Soviet statements of position, starting on February 20 with the most offensively anti-Chinese speech (that of December 12) that Khrushchev has made for some time. Against this piece of stage-setting one can assume that the purpose of the "cordial" occasion on February 23 at which Mao Tse-sung, flanked by his two principal lieutenants, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai and supported by Wu Hsiu-ch'uan, (who represented China at the recent Party Congresses in Eastern Europe) received the Soviet Ambassador, was to present him with an advance copy of the Chinese statements whose publication began with the Peoples Daily editorial of February 27. This philippic contained a massive indictment of Khrushchev's policies. Preserving by a thread the convention of not attacking Khrushchev or the C.P.S.U. by name (but quoting Khrushchev lavishly and precisely to make sure that there could be no misunderstanding) it exacerbated Sino-Soviet differences by specific accusations against the Soviet Union concerning their false neutrality as between China and India; perfidy in withdrawing technicians from China in July 1960; bullying of Albania; military aid to India; rigging of the recent Party Congresses in Europe; hypocrisy in seeking an end to polemics while encouraging their satellites to attack China; and falsity in misrepresenting China to the British Communist Party. Behind these accusations lay an elaborate attempt to prove that the C.P.S.U. had both caused the dispute by ignoring agreed and basic positions, and repeatedly and gratuitously aggravated it by crude pressure (including economic sanctions) on both China and Albania. The C.P.S.U. was furthermore challenged to publish the Chinese case, and allow its satellites to publish it also, and then refute it as the Chinese had done.

6. The Chinese ended the editorial by claiming to want a meeting to "settle these differences", and suggested that the following steps (which they took care not to present as conditions) were necessary to prepare the ground: a "mutual and general" cessation of polemics; a total cessation of attacks on Albania; and an uninhibited and general attack on Yugoslav revisionism. As the Chinese must be well aware, these conditions could only be totally unacceptable to the Soviet Party. In effect, therefore, the Chinese have stood pat and defied the Russians. Khrushchev in his speech of February 27 appeared to suggest that the Russians were still keen on keeping the temperature down, but it is unlikely that they had had time to digest the Chinese statement before Khrushchev spoke. The month ended with the complete failure of the Russian attempt to gloss over the differences between the two parties, and with the next move up to them.

NUCLEAR TEST ...

NUCLEAR TEST BAN PROSPECTS

7. The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference resumed at Geneva on February 12. It would have been standard practice for the Russians, in the hope of whipping up pressure on the West to make concessions, to seek to put Khrushchev's offer of last December in the best light, without making any improvement on it for the time being. In fact they showed themselves highly inflexible, opposed attempts to revive the Nuclear Tests Sub-Committee, and seemed to be trying to divert attention from the nuclear tests question by repeated attacks on the Nassau Agreement and the Franco-German Treaty. In doing so they appear to have overplayed their hand and to have thrown away much of the goodwill they might have expected from the non-aligned delegations.

8. Khrushchev again gave no sign of a concession on nuclear tests in his speech in the Kalinin electoral constituency on February 27. It is however still arguable that the Russians would like to conclude a treaty, provided that they can extort, and show that they have extorted, maximum concessions from the West. Their recent attitude might be explained first by genuine surprise that Khrushchev's new offer ("a serious concession by our side") was not acceptable to the West, and second by a deliberate desire to go slow, possibly until the results of the Nassau Agreement became clearer and in the hope that delay will tell as much against the Americans and the United Kingdom in world opinion.

9. The Russians have tabled two new documents at the conference, a draft declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territory for the stationing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and a draft NATO/Warsaw Pact Non-Aggression Treaty, (an old favourite from former years). Both documents have a large and obvious propaganda element. Pravda on February 14 pointed out that the need for the first document sprang from the new United States strategy of creating "mobile bases afloat" to replace the old fixed bases in Britain, Italy and Turkey from which world opinion had now compelled the United States to withdraw. Apart from the possibility that these drafts have been served up now to distract attention from the test ban issue, they may also be meant as a counter to the measures to reduce the risk of war proposed by the United States shortly before Christmas.

CUBA

10. Demands voiced in the United States Congress in the first half of February for a tougher United States policy towards Cuba in the face of the continuing Soviet presence were followed by the news from Washington that the Russians had agreed to withdraw several thousand Soviet troops by March 15. No echo of this has yet appeared in the Soviet press, but Soviet statements have been at pains to dispel the impression that any Soviet withdrawal might signify a reduction of the Soviet stake in Cuba. Marshal Malinovsky, the Minister of Defence, making the main speech on the eve of the 45th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, accused the United States Government of conniving at the recent Congressional campaign for direct action over Cuba, /and warned

and warned "aggressive United States circles" in more specific terms even than in the Tass statement of September 11, 1962, that an attack on Cuba would mean the beginning of the third world war, with retaliation against United States soil. Given the fact of the Soviet defeat last October and the traditionally self-congratulatory nature of the occasion, the tenor of the speech was not surprising; it followed the Khrushchevian tactical pattern of making a high-sounding guarantee when the likelihood of having to carry it out has, as a result of the proposed Soviet withdrawal, receded; but it did serve to underline the continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. Khrushchev made the same points in his speech of February 27.

SOVIET REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S DESIGN FOR EUROPE

11. Soviet press comment throughout the month continued markedly unresponsive to the recent crop of rumours about a Gaullist initiative towards a European settlement. The only new twist has been to suggest that de Gaulle is being unconsciously used by the Germans in their desire to set up a Paris-Bonn axis; the thought last month was that he was deluding himself if he thought he could be the dominant partner in such an alliance. The dominant theme was still the dangers of what the Russians represented as the increased likelihood, under the Franco-German Treaty, of the Bundeswehr acquiring control over nuclear weapons. Soviet apprehensions on this score were voiced in similar Notes to the French and German Governments delivered on February 5; a common point was the warning that either direct (through the Franco-German Treaty) or indirect (through a NATO multilateral force) West German access to such weapons would be regarded as a threat to vital Soviet interests. In an embellishment of the same theme an Izvestiya article of February 26 claimed that President Kennedy's grand design for a NATO multi-national nuclear force was being reshaped so as to give the leading rôle to West Germany and not to Britain, to the alarm of London, Rome and the Benelux countries. This American intention was then contrasted unfavourably with the apparent United States willingness to renew the dialogue with the Russians (see paragraph 13 below) for a peaceful solution of the German problem.

12. These traditional and to some extent probably unfeigned apprehensions over the possibility of West German nuclear armament represent one strand of Soviet thinking about General de Gaulle's plans. The other side of the coin is the belief that nevertheless the General's ideas will provide a fruitful field for exploitation in Soviet efforts to weaken the Atlantic Alliance, and material for the Soviet case on other issues. The first signs of such exploitation were evident in the tactics adopted by the Russians at Geneva. Beyond this, the Russians show no sign of having considered General de Gaulle's ideas at all seriously. They almost certainly believe that, in the short term, de Gaulle would be most unlikely to gain acceptance by
/the other

the other European powers of the terms of any settlement which might be acceptable to the Russians. There is moreover no doubt that de Gaulle's long-term ideas of a wider, stabilised Europe stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals" are incompatible with the Soviet conception of how Europe should develop, since they depend by implication on the irrevocable break-up of the Communist bloc. Khrushchev dismissed completely the "Third Force" concept in his talk with Mr. Roy Thomson (proprietor of the "Sunday Times") when they met in Moscow on February 9.

GERMANY AND BERLIN

13. About a month ago Gromyko suggested to the United States Ambassador in Moscow that the time had come to continue the Soviet/American exchange of views on the German question and Berlin. This looked like the Soviet initiative which had been expected for some time. The Russians have given no sign yet that they have modified their negotiating position, in spite of Western press reports that they were no longer opposed to the presence of Western troops in West Berlin. Their purpose could be no more than to give colour to their claims that 'peaceful co-existence' is the correct policy to adopt towards the West on every front; and Khrushchev may be anxious to demonstrate that the subject of a German settlement, which he has declared to be an urgent problem, is not being neglected.

IRAQ

14. The new régime's firm and rapid action against local Communists was publicly condemned in a statement put out by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. on February 15, and in subsequent comment in the World Communist Press; there is no sign of this criticism abating. (Similar Central Committee statements criticising suppression of the Algerian and Tunisian Communist Parties were issued in December and January respectively.) Simultaneously Peik-e-Iran, the clandestine Iranian Tudeh Party radio station in East Germany, broadcast appeals to Communists and Kurds to unite and overthrow the régime, adding an Arabic programme to its previous repertoire of Persian, Kurdish and Azerbaijani. The Soviet Government itself, however, has carefully avoided any such incitements to revolt, and although it clearly considers that it cannot allow the persecution of Iraqi Communists to go unremarked, it seems unlikely that it will adopt a policy of open hostility to the new régime, thereby weakening the position it has achieved through its very substantial military and economic assistance programme. A long Pravda editorial of February 25 warned the Iraqi Government that its policies were of benefit only to "imperialists and reactionaries" and appealed to it to see the error of its ways.

15. The new régime has sharply rebutted the Communist press and radio attacks. Its spokesmen have been at pains to state that the Government's hostility to the Iraqi Communist Party, made necessary by its treachery and record of violence, in no way reflects Iraq's basic attitude towards the Soviet Union and that there is no intention of
/expelling Soviet

expelling Soviet experts or technicians. There seems little doubt, however, that events in Iraq since the coup of February 9 have caused a setback to the Soviet position in Iraq which is now likely to be much less strong than in the days of Qasim; though the Russians will probably retain some influence as a major source of aid.

AFRICAN STUDENTS IN BULGARIA

16. The unrest among African students which erupted so dramatically on February 12 arose largely as a result of the attitude of the Bulgarian authorities to the All-African Students' Union; the Government had found themselves able neither to prevent the formation of this Union nor to control it. After the arrest of three students closely connected with the Union, some 200 Africans started a march to the Ministry of the Interior; this demonstration was violently broken up by the militia. As a result seven students were deported by the Bulgarian authorities and some 30-40 others have already left the country with or without the help of their Governments.

17. The immediate consequences of the unrest have been wide publicity of the difficult conditions under which the students lived and significant loss of prestige by the Bulgarian Government. The wider implications are still not clear. Despite Bulgarian pressure, African students have continued to seek help in leaving the country and it is not easy to see how the local authorities can stop the exodus without some concessions to student demands. Bulgarian propaganda has sought unsuccessfully to represent the unrest as being confined to a small minority of students inspired by imperialism. Reports from Sofia are likely to induce other Communist Governments to reconsider their present policy towards foreign students which is substantially the same as that of Bulgaria. It seems not unlikely that Soviet concern on this score was at least in part the reason for the summons to Moscow of Zhivkov on February 19.

CHRONOLOGY

January 31 - February 2

Novotny, President of Czechoslovakia, visited the Soviet Union, for talks with Mr. Khrushchev.

February

- 5 Soviet Notes of protest handed to French and West German Ambassadors on possible consequences of the Franco-German Treaty.
- 6 U.S.S.R.-Cuba trade agreement and long-term credit grant signed.
- 8-11 Mr. Roy Thomson, Proprietor of the "Sunday Times", visited the Soviet Union with a party of businessmen and met Mr. Khrushchev.
- 11-18 Laotian delegation, led by King Savang Vatthana, visited Soviet Union.
- 12 Nation Disarmament Conference resumed at Geneva.
- 14 13th Anniversary of Sino/Soviet Treaty of Alliance.
- 17 Statement by Central Committee of C.P.S.U. on reprisals against Iraqi Communists printed in Pravda.
- 15-21 4th Meeting of Executive Committee of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) held in Moscow.
- 18-25 Madame Furtseva, Soviet Minister of Culture, visited Finland.
- 19-20 Zhivkov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, visited Moscow and had talks with Mr. Khrushchev.
- 20 People's Daily printed Mr. Khrushchev's December 12 speech on foreign policy to the Supreme Soviet: the first of five major reprints.

February 20-March 2

Mr. Karjalainen, Prime Minister of Finland, visited Soviet Union

February

- 22 Marshall Malinovsky spoke on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day.
- 23 Mao Tse-tung, flanked by Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai and Wu Hsin-chuan, received Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Chervonenko.
- 24 Kuznetsov left Geneva Disarmament Conference for Moscow.
- 26 People's Daily editorial "Whence the difference: a reply to Comrade Thorez and other Comrades".
- 27 Mr. Khrushchev spoke at election meeting in the Kalinin district of the Moscow constituency.
- 27 Mr. Gromyko started his visit to Norway.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

APRIL 1963

In the Soviet Union the emphasis has been heavily on the need for vigilance and stricter discipline; unofficial contacts with the West may suffer and there is a possibility of an espionage scare. The Chinese reply to the Soviet letter of March 30 is still outstanding. Castro's unexpected arrival in Moscow on a lengthy official visit can be seen as a softener of Cuban resentments. At Geneva the prospects for further progress on a test ban seem minimal. Malinovsky's tour of Indonesia does not seem to have been a great success, but the Chinese who followed him may have been more welcome. The fate of the Geneva Agreement on Laos may be in the balance in spite of protestations from the Communist powers that it must be preserved.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

2. The Party's preoccupation with the need to reimpose ideological discipline throughout Soviet society has been marked throughout the month. Pravda announced on April 10 that a Plenum of the Party Central Committee would be held on May 28 to discuss "forthcoming tasks of the Party in ideological work". This confirmed the Party's concern at excessive experimentalism in intellectual life, and the consequent need which the Party has felt to reassert its authority. A Pravda editorial commented that consideration of ideological questions followed logically on the preceding Plenums (devoted to agriculture and economic matters), because the successful implementation of plans in these fields demanded a high degree of social responsibility throughout Soviet society.

3. Khrushchev in his speech of April 24 at the Kremlin conference on industry and building in the Russian Republic (RSFSR) made similar points with great force. He suggested various unpleasant penalties for slackers, to be given legal force if moral example and sense of duty continued to prove inadequate. Otherwise this marathon performance was devoted to a review of the "tremendous" resources of the Soviet economy, which he suggested were sufficient to allow for continued growth in all sectors (including the consumer sector) if their exploitation was properly planned and if everyone's sense of personal commitment and responsibility could be braced up. He showed considerable sensitivity to Western criticisms that the new "hard line" amounted to a step backwards towards Stalinism. Whatever Khrushchev may have been signalling about his personal intentions or position, he said clearly that there was to be no "relaxation of the [Party] leadership, of the organised administration of State and public life in the country". As far as can be judged he still appears to be firmly in the saddle.

4. The repercussions of this reassertion of discipline are likely to be far-reaching and have already begun to appear. Individual contacts with the West which might result in the spread within the Soviet Union of free ideas, have already suffered; for example the visit to Moscow of the Great Britain/USSR Association planned for mid-April to discuss an agenda entitled "The search for common ground" was postponed indefinitely at Soviet request. Khrushchev has also been concerned to reinforce the need for vigilance by reviving fears of Western espionage: this trend was evident in his interpretation (to an Italian journalist on April 20) of United States motives in pressing for more than three on-site inspections a year, and in the decision to hold the Wynne and Penkovsky trials in open court, after Wynne has been held incommunicado for six months.

SINO-SOVIET

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

5. Up to April 20 the Chinese had still sent no reply to the Soviet Party's letter of March 30 (proposing inter alia that Mao should visit Moscow for bilateral talks to settle outstanding differences).

6. The correct attitude to national liberation movements is an issue very much at the centre of the dispute at present. Soviet propaganda in support of the "struggling peoples" of South Vietnam, the Yemen, Africa and Latin America has become more strident. This may be in response to the Chinese challenge on this issue flung down at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Moshi in Tanganyika, and to the decision of the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference in Bandung to grant the Soviet delegation no more than observer status. It may well be that the Russians hope to regain some of the initiative as pacemakers on this issue as a by-product of Castro's visit to the Soviet Union (paragraph 11 below). The situation in Laos also affords both sides a practical opportunity for demonstrating their support of a "national liberation struggle."

7. It is however clear that Khrushchev is not prepared to compromise on another prime issue in dispute, his Yugoslav policy; the rapprochement is to continue. This seems clear from the extraordinary amendment of the Soviet May Day slogan on Yugoslavia. The first version repeated the wording of the slogan issued last year for the celebrations of the October Revolution, and referred to Yugoslavia simply as a "Federative Peoples' Republic". The correction published separately by Pravda on April 11 referred to "the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and to the "building of socialism", thus putting Yugoslavia" on a level with the other bloc countries. Whatever the reason for the correction, which followed very shortly after the promulgation of the new Yugoslav constitution in which the new style was formally set out, the publication of the first version cannot have been an oversight; it could suggest at least a lack of enthusiasm for the rapprochement within the Soviet Party itself. It seems that Khrushchev is determined to return Tito's visit during the summer, and is thinking in terms of the second half of June.

THE NATO NUCLEAR FORCE

8. Almost identical Soviet Notes containing strong attacks on the proposed NATO nuclear force and on the Federal German Government were delivered at the British, American and German Embassies in Moscow on April 8. These were not particularly threatening but expressed in concrete terms the action which the Soviet Government might take in wartime against subscribers to the force; for example, direct and immediate retaliation against fixed and mobile bases and ports used as anchorages for submarines and surface craft ("chameleon ships"), whether in the North Sea, the Mediterranean or the Baltic. The main complaint was the familiar one that the plan for a NATO Nuclear Force was conceived "with the object of satisfying the ever-growing demands" of the West German Government, and other NATO powers, that the Bundeswehr should be given access to nuclear weapons. The principle of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the plan for setting up a multilateral nuclear force were categorically claimed to be incompatible. The clear-cut formulation in the Soviet Notes of February 5 on the Franco-German treaty - that the Russians would regard direct or indirect West German access to nuclear weapons as a direct threat to their own vital interests - seems to have been superseded, perhaps because the Russians have now written down the significance of Franco-German military cooperation.

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TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

9. It was plain throughout the month that the talks at Geneva were deadlocked. A joint Anglo-American approach aimed at getting negotiations going again was made in Moscow on April 24, when the British and United States Ambassadors discussed the test ban problem with Khrushchev. The approach took the form of a joint message to the Soviet Premier from President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan suggesting further tripartite talks.

10. Meanwhile Khrushchev in replies to questions put to him by the Director of Il Giorno on April 20 had done his best to discourage the idea that any further move from the Soviet side could be expected. He alleged that the Soviet offer of two to three on-site inspections a year had been extracted from him virtually under false pretences, "responsible representatives" of the United States having, he claimed, said earlier on that they would agree to two to four inspections a year. As the United States had now gone back on this, the Soviet Government had seriously to consider whether to withdraw their own offer. Khrushchev's reaction to the Anglo-American approach of April 24 was also discouraging; and the prospects for further progress on a test ban at Geneva must now be considered exceedingly slim.

CUBA

11. The end of the month saw Castro's unheralded arrival by air at Marmansk en route to Moscow on April 26. Pravda of April 17 had announced only that Castro had accepted an invitation from Khrushchev to pay a "friendly visit to the Soviet Union and to acquaint himself with the achievements and successes of the Soviet people". Khrushchev no doubt hopes that red-carpet treatment for Castro at the May Day celebrations, backed up by recent promises of further Soviet aid, will go a long way towards relieving Cuban resentment over the events of last October. (How strong this still is was revealed in Castro's interview earlier in the year with Claude Julien of Le Monde.) By this move the Russians may also hope to check the appeal of Chinese military vis-à-vis the U.S. among the wilder elements in Cuba and Latin America.

LAOS

12. Skirmishing between the Neutralist Army and dissident Neutralists, after the murder on April 1 of Quinim Pholsena, the Left Wing Foreign Minister, developed into large scale fighting. This culminated in the expulsion of the true Neutralists from several of their positions, under pressure from the dissident Neutralists, helped by the Communist Pathet Lao, who are themselves probably stiffened with North Vietnamese. An uneasy truce was patched up on April 21 and was being generally observed, in spite of skirmishes and troop movements, as the month ended. The International Control Commission has decided by majority vote to station a team at the Neutralist Headquarters, as a re-insurance against further attacks. The Poles have refused to accept the decision and are not on the team. Discussions aimed at a more permanent settlement are expected to begin shortly and may well be protracted.

13. The origins of this conflict may have been local, but the Communist powers seem to have been prepared to back up the Pathet Lao to secure the maximum advantage from it, even to the extent of jeopardising the Geneva Settlement. The Chinese, keen to demonstrate the correctness of a tough revolutionary line in dealing with the imperialists and prompt to hint that the Russians are already inclined to betray Laos as they betrayed Cuba in the interest of Soviet-U.S. relations, probably welcome a forward policy by the Pathet Lao egged

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on by the North Vietnamese, provided always that the risk of a confrontation with the United States forces does not become too great; here of course they may themselves be to some extent at the mercy of North Vietnamese extremists.

14. The reaction from Moscow has been equivocal. By refusing to delete references to the Chinese accusations of United States responsibility for events in Laos from the Soviet draft of a message from the co-Chairmen to the Laotian Government, and publishing the text unilaterally, the Russians effectively blocked any possibility of the co-Chairmen being able to take joint action on the crisis. In spite of Khrushchev's assurances to Mr. Harriman on April 26 that he fully supported the Geneva Agreement the Russians seem unlikely to go out of their way to be helpful. The signs are that Khrushchev is fed up with the Western allies and particularly with the Americans for blocking his path on a number of problems. Moreover though the Russians certainly do not want the Laotian situation to deteriorate into a major international crisis, they will not wish to give the Chinese a handle for further criticism at this juncture in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and there is no reason to believe that they object to the progress which the Pathet Lao have made so far. They may think there is room for a bit more of this before the risk of a confrontation with the West becomes serious.

INDONESIA

15. The visit of Marshal Malinovsky to Indonesia ended on April 4 apparently in a slightly strained atmosphere. The usual communique was not issued at the end of his visit. Difficulties which may have occurred during it could have sprung from Soviet refusals to make satisfactory concessions about the repayment charges on Soviet arms loans or to provide arms supplies and training in accordance with Indonesia's present requirements. The visit was also overshadowed by the imminent arrival of the President of the Chinese People's Republic on a State Visit. The Chinese visit seems to have been more successful; Liu Shao-chi made promises of aid and cooperation and gave widely-publicised support for Indonesian opposition to Malaysia. An Indonesian military mission led by General Jani reached Canton on April 21 and has since been received by Mao Tse tung himself.

16. Not to be outdone, the Russians have now sent a trade delegation to Indonesia which will no doubt try to regain any lost ground. Factors which may however tell against the continued growth of Soviet influence are the greater Indonesian need of economic aid (of which the West is the most obvious source) rather than of military supplies since the West New Guinea settlement; and the apparent strengthening of the influence of the Indonesian Communist Party with the Indonesian Government. At present the pro-Chinese faction within the P.K.I. seems to be dominant.

SOVIET-VATICAN RELATIONS

17. A great deal of speculation about a possible Soviet-Vatican rapprochement followed Adzhubei's visit to Italy (during which he was received by the Pope on March 7) and has been given new life by the relatively favourable treatment of the Papal Encyclical "Pacem in Terris" in the Soviet press. Reporting on this was in fact highly selective concentrating mainly on the passages on disarmament; Khrushchev himself singled these out for praise in his interview with the Director of Il Giorno.

18. A hardy rumour made a good deal of the possibility that the Vatican might be negotiating to open a number of Consulates in the East European States. It is difficult to see how these could operate satisfactorily in present conditions. There has also been speculation about a Concordat; this would of course involve concessions of principle by each side and is clearly inconceivable at this early stage. Adzhubei remarked at a Press Conference in Vienna after his Italian visit that there could be no question in present circumstances of ideological coexistence between the two sides, but he saw no reason why they should not enter into diplomatic relations. Khrushchev has a certain admiration for the character and public image of Pope John XXIII and overtures of this sort directed at the Vatican recur periodically. But there will have to be a marked decrease in pressure on religious bodies within the Soviet bloc before we can expect any practical results from the latest exchanges.

ROUMANIA AND C.M.E.A.

19. It now seems likely that there has been disagreement between Roumania and some of her partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance over the manner and pace of bloc economic integration. The Central Committee of the Roumanian Party devoted its meeting in March entirely to discussion of C.M.E.A. affairs. It then issued a communique which emphasised the importance of respect for national interests and sovereignty in bloc planning. The Roumanian leadership later took steps to brief Party members on the need for further development of the country's industrial potential and signed agreements providing for increased trade with Albania and China. The most likely interpretation of these moves is that the Roumanians are anxious to assert their national interests in the face of C.M.E.A. pressure to turn Roumania into a mere supplier of primary products. No open breach between Roumania and C.M.E.A. is likely but concessions may well have to be made to Roumanian demands for a fair share of bloc industrial development.

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CHRONOLOGY

April

- 2 Mr. Hughie Green's aircraft fired on in Berlin Air Corridor.
- 2 Soviet Party's letter of March 30 proposing an early visit by Mao to Moscow, or high level talks about May 15, handed to Chou En-lai by Soviet Ambassador.
- 3 Mr. Khrushchev saw Yugoslav Trade delegation at Gagra.
- 4 Great Britain - U.S.S.R. Association's visit to Moscow postponed at Soviet request.
- 4-11 Mr. Kosygin led Soviet delegation to Finland for 15th Anniversary of Fenno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.
- 4-11 Marshal Malinovsky paid a goodwill visit to Burma.
- 8 Anglo-Soviet approach to coalition government in Laos on the murder of Quinim Pholsena.
- 8 Soviet Note on the NATO Nuclear Force handed to German, British and American Ambassadors in Moscow.
- 10-13 2nd All-Union Congress of Soviet Artists met in the Kremlin.
- 11 Pravda published correction to May Day slogan on Yugoslavia.
- 12-20 Liu Shao-chi visited Indonesia.
- 16 Chinese statement called for speedy United Kingdom/ U.S.S.R. consultations on Laos, in view of United States "interference".
- 17 Mr. Khrushchev's 69th Birthday.
- 17 Pravda announced acceptance by Castro of an invitation to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union.
- 17-25 Fifth regular session of CMEA Executive Committee held in Moscow.
- 19-21 M. Ali Sabri (President of U.A.R. Executive Council) visited Moscow and met Mr. Khrushchev.
- 20 Russia and China signed Trade protocol for 1963.
- 20 Mr. Khrushchev returned to Moscow after five weeks at Gagra on the Black Sea.
- 20 Liu Shao-chi arrived in Burma.
- 22 Herr Ulbricht visited Prague and met President Novotny of Czechoslovakia.
- 21-24 M. Ali Sabri visited Peking

/April 23

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April (continued)

- 23 Izvestiya published exchanges by Lord Home and Mr. Gromyko on Laos.
- 24 British and American Ambassadors saw Khrushchev to deliver joint message on nuclear tests from President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan.
- 24 Mr. Khrushchev spoke at the RSFSR Bureau Plenum on building.
- 27 Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Averill Harriman discussed the situation in Laos.
- 28 Dr. Fidel Castro arrived in Moscow on official visit (to attend May Day celebrations).

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PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

IDEAS AND TACTICS

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF
HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S EMBASSY

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Ministry of Justice.

May 8, 1963.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

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4. The previously rapid and visible deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations was suspended by this exchange, but the differences (e.g. on the Yugoslav issue) were clearly as wide as ever under the surface. There was no sign of any basis for a meeting of minds between the two sides and as the new month opened the Soviet reply put the ball firmly back in the Chinese court by inviting Mao to visit Moscow (making it

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

MARCH 1963.

The rapid deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations seemed temporarily to have been suspended as a result of a qualified Chinese acceptance of proposals for bilateral talks. Soviet policy on East-West matters has appeared uncertain. There is stalemate at Geneva and little new on Berlin. This may be a reflection of continuing debate and possibly controversy within the leadership on bloc and internal problems; two more major changes in the organisation of the economy have been announced. These confirm a trend towards greater central control of the economy with sustained emphasis on defence. There has also been a reassertion of discipline at home, especially in the arts. The Chinese continue to wage propaganda war on the Indians but a resumption of border attacks does not seem imminent.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

2. Soviet attempts to keep the temperatures down by minimising differences in the world communist movement met with little response from the Chinese. On the contrary, the Chinese in an 80 page article published in Red Flag of March 4 elevated the dispute into the position of the "third great debate" in the history of the movement, and cast Peking in the rôle of the latest defender of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.
3. Once the Chinese had thus got in the last word in formal polemics there occurred a dramatic new development with the publication on March 14 by both sides of an exchange of letters. The Soviet letter, dated February 21, was markedly conciliatory in tone; it avoided bones of contention and formally proposed bilateral talks between Parties at a high level. The Chinese reply of March 9, accepted the idea of a moratorium on public polemics "temporarily". On bilateral talks it proposed three alternatives: a visit by Khrushchev to Peking; or by a Soviet delegation headed by a lesser light to Peking; or by a Chinese delegation to Moscow. Mao Tse-tung himself did not offer to visit Moscow, even though it was his turn to do so. Neither letter suggested that its authors were yet ready to offer any concessions of substance; indeed the Chinese agenda of what should be discussed both at bilateral talks and at any international conference was heavily slanted to favour Peking's approach. It placed the "unity of the socialist camp" which the Russians have stressed so often fourth on the list and made no mention at all of "peaceful coexistence".
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clear that it was his turn to travel) and proposing an agenda heavily slanted in favour of the Soviet theses. Although therefore there has been a temporary suspension of the earlier vituperative propaganda attacks, these have now been replaced by "polemics by agenda" and carefully reasoned Soviet replies, which preserve the decencies but are designed to point up the irresponsibility and lack of realism of the Chinese presentation of events. For example, an essay on these lines in Pravda of March 23, by the leader of the Soviet delegation to the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Congress in Tanganyika, contained implied criticism of Chinese activity at the conference by emphasising the danger of a split between the Afro-Asians and "other democratic movements and forces" in the great struggle for national liberation.

SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

5. An attempt by the Soviet Union to fit European developments into an orthodox framework was made in a series of reasoned analyses of the European situation in the Soviet press and in the March issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. These suggested that the fundamental reason for the latest "contradictions" between the aims of United States European policy and those of her Western European partners was the change in the "economic relations" between them - Marxist jargon pointing up the fact that Western Europe's rate of economic growth is now faster than that of the United States itself. The articles also gave an indication of how the Russians intend to try and profit from the present European situation. This was said to provide an opportunity to organise the Western European peoples in a "struggle for a foreign policy which would have genuinely national aims"; there were said to be "new perspectives for strengthening the unity of the working class, which bears all the burden of anti-national policies". The intent to play on divisive nationalisms in Europe could not be more clear.

6. An example of how the Soviet Union would seek to embarrass Western European governments was provided by their treatment of the French miners' strike. Leningrad workers refused to load coal for France and Pravda editorials of March 18 and 20 supported the French Communist Party's thesis that the 'transition to socialism' could be achieved by parliamentary means and the class struggle, as exemplified in the strike. Other motives underlying this very full treatment of the strike probably included a desire to underline Soviet disapproval of French policy as exemplified in the Franco-German Treaty; a wish to counter Chinese charges since Cuba that the Soviet leadership was "capitulationist" (the strike provided the Russians with the ideal opportunity to adopt a tough proletarian posture at which no Marxist-Leninist could cavil); and, to a lesser degree, a desire to show solidarity with the French party who were violently assailed by the Chinese on February 27 and have remained loyal to Moscow throughout the course of the dispute.

NUCLEAR TESTS AND THE GENEVA TALKS

7. The Soviet delegate at Geneva remained obdurate throughout the month. Meanwhile the Soviet government sought to make what propaganda it could out of the French nuclear test in the Sahara. A Tass statement of March 22 on the test omitted to mention that it had been conducted underground,

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and claimed that it and the United States tests in Nevada were "links in one chain" creating new obstacles to the achievement of disarmament and a test ban. A Pravda article of the same date accused the Western powers of using the Geneva talks as a screen for continuing the arms race; in particular to obscure progress on the NATO Nuclear force. There was no hint in any of this that the Soviet Union intended or desired to seek a way out of the present impasse in Geneva.

BERLIN

8. The first in the new series of bilateral exploratory talks on Berlin between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Dobrynin took place in Washington on March 26 and produced nothing new. Whatever the reason which promoted the Russians to take the initiative in late January, it is clear that they are not now expecting quick results.

CUBA

9. By March 15, the Russians had withdrawn about 3,000 of their estimated garrison of 17,000 on the island. Tension in the Caribbean was however increased rather than lessened by a series of hit and run attacks by Cuban exiles culminating in a serious raid on the Soviet freighter Baku near a Cuban port on March 26. This elicited three Soviet notes of protest to the United States Administration, the last of which charged the Americans with connivance at harrassments mounted from United States territory and supported by United States aid. Two American vessels were subjected by the Cubans to mock attacks by MiG fighters in retaliation. Tass reported on March 29 that Khrushchev had said that the Caribbean situation could not be regarded as normal and had repeated the usual assurances of support for Cuba.

THE MIDDLE EAST

10. The Soviet attitude towards the coup in Syria closely resembled the line taken last month towards Iraq. Pravda indignantly reported the arrests of local Communists in both countries; public meetings in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and elsewhere on March 14 protested against the bloodshed in Iraq; but openly hostile criticism of the new régimes was played down. On March 11 Notes were exchanged in Washington between the Soviet Union and Kuwait constituting an agreement to establish diplomatic relations between the countries at Embassy level. The Soviet Ambassador has since told the Kuwaiti Chargé d'Affaires that Kuwait's admission to the United Nations is now a matter of form alone.

11. On this occasion the Russians took the initiative, although previously the Kuwaitis had been making the running about recognition. The Soviet action can be taken as an attempt to recoup their loss of influence in Baghdad, or as a riposte to the new Iraqi régime's repressive measures against local Communists. It is perhaps more likely that the Russians had at last registered the fact that Qasim's policy was opposed by all other Arab states and that he himself was impossible to deal with; they therefore seized the opportunity of the Iraqi coup to change course neatly. They will presumably also try to reinsure in Cairo until they can see their way more clearly in Baghdad.

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SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

12. On the boundary issue the Chinese have continued to stress their own reasonablemess, claiming that they have made concession after concession with no response from the Indian side. On March 2 Peng Chen, the Mayor of Peking, said at a rally for the Pakistan Foreign Minister that "if, owing to the needs of its internal and external policies, the Indian Government is not prepared for the time being to hold negotiations, China is willing to wait with patience". Similarly, the Chinese used the signature of the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement and the announcement that a boundary Treaty is to be negotiated with Afghanistan to stress their contention that it is the Indians alone who refuse to settle their boundary differences with China. Chinese propoganda has also kept up a high rate of anti-Indian fire in other fields.

13. At the end of the month Chinese communications to the Indian Government concentrated more on Indian provocations and less on Chinese patience than at the beginning. A Chinese protest of March 26 alleged repeated Indian violation of Chinese territory and airspace along the China-Sikkim border. All this may be no more than evidence of spring fever; winter is almost over in the border regions and the campaigning season is at hand. Nevertheless, while the uneasy stalemate is likely to continue, there seems no reason to suppose that the Chinese will attack again with the melting of the snows.

SOVIET UNION

(a) Economic Affairs

14. The month was notable for two more major changes in the Soviet economy. On March 14 Pravda announced that the Council of Ministers and Party Presidium had approved the drafting of a plan for 1964-5 and of a new 5-year plan 1966-70. It was already expected that a 5-year plan would follow the present 7-year plan which ends in 1965. But the decision to draw up a plan to cover the last two years of the 7-year plan is an innovation which strongly suggests that a major modification is in store. The second change was the setting up of a Supreme Economic Council to supervise all state organisations - planning, executive and technical - responsible for industry and building. State Committees associated with defence, including nuclear energy and the coordination of scientific research, are to be directly subordinate to this new supreme body, whose head D. Ustinov has been Minister of Defence Industry and of Armaments.

15. These reforms taken with others announced at the same time show that central control over all branches of the industrial economy, including research, is being systematised and strengthened. They suggest sustained emphasis on defence and an attempt to create a stronger means of allocating and using more efficiently an overstretched fund of total resources. As Khrushchev said on February 27, he cannot foresee any change in "the need to spend huge sums on maintaining Soviet military might at the required level."

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(b) Khrushchev and the Intellectuals

16. Khrushchev's confrontation with Soviet writers and artists on March 7 was an event of major importance. In a speech ranging caustically over all fields of Soviet artistic endeavour he reverted constantly to the main ideological premise of his arguments, the impermissibility of coexistence in the field of ideas.

17. This was Khrushchev's first major pronouncement devoted solely to the arts since his address to the third Writers' Congress in May 1959. On that occasion he urged the writers to be their own critics and not to rely so much on the Party for guidance. Now he clearly judges that licence has gone too far: he continuously re-estimated the need for "Party spirit" in the arts, even going so far as to claim that, strictly speaking, there could be no "non-Party" section of society. The keynote of the speech was therefore the reassertion of Party discipline on all sectors of the arts: all those with avant garde tendencies have been put on notice to toe the line.

18. In attacking the use which certain intellectuals have made of their freedom to criticise the Stalinist era, the Party faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it wishes to release among the Soviet people forces of initiative and responsibility necessary to meet the challenges of a more complex, technologically-based society. On the other, there are sacred cows which must be protected at all costs - Marxist-Leninist ideology, the myth of Party purity during the bad times and the non-complicity of the present leaders in Stalin's crimes. The difficulty is to cut back in the artistic sphere without damaging the right kind of development in other fields. It is certain that the Party has the full authority and power to reimpose control and make the majority of intellectuals and artists toe the line in public; the process has already started. But there may well be reluctance to turn the screw too hard, and while this feeling continues there is every chance that the present debate between the Party and the liberal factions among the intellectuals will continue.

19. The present squeeze is mainly of domestic importance and does not appear to be directly connected with Soviet tactics in the Sino-Soviet dispute, except in so far as the dispute overshadows and distorts the whole range of both countries' policies at home and abroad.

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CHRONOLOGY

March

- 1 Dr. Karjalainen, Prime Minister of Finland, left the Soviet Union
- 1 - 4 Laotian delegation, headed by King Savang Vatthana, in Poland
- 2 Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement signed in Peking

Announcement that China and Afghanistan are to negotiate a boundary treaty.

Soviet letter to U Thant requests immediate withdrawal of U.N. forces in the Congo Republic
- 3 - 12 Leipzig Spring Fair
- 4 Red Flag published "More on the differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us".
- 4 - 5 Laotian delegation in Moscow
- 5 10th Anniversary of Stalin's death
- 6 Soviet-Cuban Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Co-operation for 1963 signed in Moscow
- 6 - 10 Mr. Gromyko visited Denmark
- 6 - 10 Laotian delegation on State visit to Chinese People's Republic
- 7 Rally held in Peking to celebrate the Third Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference

Meeting of Soviet Party and Government leaders with the intellectuals; Mr. Ilyichev spoke

Mr. Adzhubei met Pope John XXIII
- 8 Meeting with the intellectuals; Mr. Khrushchev spoke
- 9 Secretary-General of Chinese C.P., Teng Hsiao-p'ing, received the Soviet Ambassador in Peking and handed over reply to C.P.S.U. letter of February 21
- 11-20 Soviet-U.S. talks in Rome on peaceful uses of outer space; agreement on exchange of meteorological data.
- 11 Soviet Union and Kuwait exchanged Notes on establishment of diplomatic relations
- 13 Joint Meeting of Soviet Council of Ministers and Central Committee of C.P.S.U. to approve economic planning and organisational changes
- 14 Changes announced. Supreme Council of National Economy established

Public demonstrations in Soviet cities against executions of Iraqi communists.

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- 14 Pravda and People's Daily published exchange of
Letters between Chinese and Soviet Parties
- 21 Le Monde published interview with Dr. Castro
revealing alleged Soviet motives over missiles
in Cuba.
- Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade Lu arrived in
U.K. for goodwill visit
- Cosmos XIII launched
- 22 Tass statement on French nuclear test in Sahara
- 25 Marshal Malinovsky arrived in Djakarta for 10-day
official visit
- Chinese protested about Dalai Lama's activities
in India.
- 26 Rusk-Dobrynin talks in Washington on Germany and
Berlin
- 26-28 U.S.S.R. Writers Union Plenary held in Moscow
- 28 Announcement of appointment of Marshal S. Biryuzov
(formerly C in C of Soviet Rocket Forces) as Chief
of General Staff of the Armed Forces

April

- 2 Soviet Ambassador in Peking saw Chou En-lai and
Teng Hsiao-p'ing and handed over CPSU letter of
March 30.
- 3 Pravda published text of this letter.



His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Ministry of Justice.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.
March 11, 1963.

AND TACTICS

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Peking was in the position of the Bolsheviks in the early days of the Soviet revolution. Such a concept, argued Pravda, could only serve to justify a split in the Communist movement.

3. The next round took place at the East German Party Congress in Berlin in the middle of January. The stage seemed well set for fireworks when Khrushchev, apparently unexpectedly, decided to lead a strong Soviet delegation to the Congress after an equally unexpected visit to Poland for consultation with Gomulka. Whether because appearances were deceptive or because Khrushchev changed his mind, in the event the proceedings belied all speculation about a dramatic new move. Speaking in studiously moderate terms Khrushchev recalled that a certain tolerance had developed towards differences in the Communist movement on internal issues: on foreign policy it was also essential to show "restraint and patience", although he made clear that the Russians could not make concessions on the "fundamental issues of the struggle for peace and socialism." It may be that in doing so he was making the Chinese a genuine offer: but judging by the past history of Chinese intransigence on foreign policy issues he must have doubted that his offer would be acceptable. In any case he took good care in presenting it to ensure that a Chinese refusal would put him in the tactically more defensible position. In his reference to Albania as a socialist country in spite of the misdeeds of the Albanian leaders Khrushchev hinted strongly that he did not intend to advocate further action to isolate Albania from the bloc. He went on to call for an end to public polemics and for a breathing space before any Conference of World Communist Parties (for which the Chinese have appealed) was held, recognising that to hold the conference now could only aggravate the dispute and lead "to the danger of a split".

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICSJANUARY 1963

The month has been marked by further acrimonious exchanges between the Russians and Chinese; and in spite of an appeal by Khrushchev for an end to public polemics, Sino-Soviet relations at the end of the month were no better than when it began. Developments at the East German Party Congress confirmed that on Germany Khrushchev is unlikely either to precipitate a crisis or to make major concessions to achieve a settlement. The propaganda campaign to induce the West to be forthcoming in the resumed test ban talks is well under way: the Russians may now have decided to try seriously for a test-ban agreement as a tangible sign of the success of the policy of "peaceful coexistence". Within the Soviet Union the forces of innovation in intellectual circles have been going ahead too fast for the liking of the Party, and have been significantly rebuffed.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

2. The first ten days of the month saw both the Chinese and Russians seeking the widest possible audience for authoritative pronouncements of their respective positions. The Chinese led with long editorials in the 'Peoples Daily' of December 31, taking strong issue with Sr. Togliatti and the Italian Communist Party, and in the January issue of Red Flag, their party journal. They were answered by the Russians in a Pravda editorial of January 7 which the Russians arranged should appear in all East European Countries the following day. Peking and Moscow radios then vied with each other in the frequency of their broadcasts of these documents. Much of the content was on familiar themes but Pravda took strong exception to the concept advanced in the Peoples Daily editorial of December 15 of an infallible minority in conflict with a misguided majority - with the implication that Peking was in the position of the Bolsheviks in the early days of the Soviet revolution. Such a concept, argued Pravda, could only serve to justify a split in the Communist movement.

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4. The Chinese took little notice of these olive branches. They also took their stand on the need for unity in the Communist movement but made it equally clear that they would not compromise on their principles. Adding thorns to his own olive branch the Chinese delegate insisted that the first move towards reconciliation must come from the Russians since they had started the attacks on Albania in 1961. He added that the Chinese would welcome an end to public discord but wished to see the Russians practice what they preached first. The prospects of a truce were therefore dim at the end of the Congress. They became even more remote after Pravda had reiterated the Soviet position on January 23 and the Peoples Daily had bitterly criticised the hostile reception given to the Chinese delegate when he attacked Yugoslavia in the presence of the Yugoslav delegation, the first such delegation to be invited to a bloc Party Congress for some years. The Peoples Daily made hostility to the policies of Yugoslavia the criterion for acceptance as a good Communist.

5. It is difficult to judge how the dispute will now develop. The focus of debate may turn out to be when and on what terms a conference of World Parties is to be held; we can be certain that Khrushchev for his part will not countenance one until he can be reasonably sure that its outcome can be guaranteed to his liking. If there is further skirmishing about the holding of a Conference, the next phase of the dispute may be marked by a continuation of the present polemical exchanges, with tactical variations on the issues singled out for attention from time to time. There will certainly be intensive lobbying by China and the Soviet Union within the World Communist movement. The recent visit to Hanoi by Andropov, the Soviet expert on relations with Communist Parties in power, is a sign of the importance that the Russians attach to the North Vietnamese not falling into the Chinese camp during this process.

GERMANY AND BERLIN

6. The East German Party Congress produced no surprises on Germany and Berlin. Khrushchev's remarks on this subject on January 16 were restrained. He did not repeat the usual threat to sign a separate Peace Treaty, admitting for the first time in public that the conclusion of such a Treaty was no longer the problem it used to be before the building of the Berlin wall "secured the frontiers of the D.D.R." (i.e. stopped the flow of refugees from East Germany). He came close to suggesting that the existing position suited him well enough for the time being. He also said that he could agree to "stationing foreign troops under the United Nations flag in West Berlin for a certain period of time", without specifying the composition of the force or the time limit. He called once again for a free city of West Berlin without adding the habitual adjective 'demilitarised'. But he made it clear that his long-term aim remained the neutralisation of West Berlin and the legitimisation of the East German regime.

7. This studied vagueness on the details of their proposals for bringing the United Nations flag into West Berlin suggests that the Russians are angling for a Western request for clarification which might open the way to further negotiations. Meanwhile we can expect them not to promote major trouble in Berlin itself or on the access routes.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN PROSPECTS

8. The letters from Khrushchev to President Kennedy of December 19 and January 7 offered the West a verification system based on two to three on-site inspections a year three automatic seismic stations at agreed locations and a nexus of national detection posts. This re-acceptance of the principle of some on-site international inspections within Soviet territory, which followed closely the formal Soviet introduction at Geneva of their proposal on
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automatic seismic stations ("black boxes") makes it seem more likely than at any time in the recent past that the Russians have decided to try seriously for a ban on nuclear testing, although there remains a fairly substantial difference between the Soviet and Western positions.

9. The political advantages which the Russians might see in a "limited agreement" with the West in the reasonably near future are clear. Since the Cuban episode they have laid great stress on the need for the settlement of differences by negotiation and it would be natural for Khrushchev to look round for a tangible sign that his tactic of "compromise based on mutual concessions" is succeeding. They probably expect to derive great propaganda advantage from the conclusion of a test ban agreement, which they would represent as a mainly Soviet contribution to measures of partial disarmament. Moreover with a large-scale series of tests just ended Khrushchev is presumably under less specialist pressure at home to continue testing; and there are obvious advantages to the Soviet Union in agreeing to a test-ban while China is still a non-nuclear power.

10. If these assumptions are broadly correct, the Russians will be particularly concerned first to demonstrate to everybody (and not least to world Communist Parties) that they have squeezed the utmost in concessions from the West before agreement on either a test ban or other "collateral measures" of disarmament is reached. This points to the likelihood of a vocal and intensive propaganda campaign designed to show up Western "bad faith" and "intransigence" (this has already begun) and to an arduous and possibly protracted negotiation when the Geneva Conference resumes on February 12. The suspension of the tripartite exploratory talks in New York at Russian request on January 31 should probably be seen as the end of the first act of this drama.

SOVIET REACTIONS TO EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS

11. Two trends have been discernible in Soviet press comment on the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations and the Franco-German Treaty. On the former, satisfaction that an economic grouping, which had posed a serious challenge to the economic competitiveness of the Soviet bloc, had received a grave setback was unmistakable; this further evidence of the "incurable contradictions" within the imperialist camp was also commented on by the Chinese. A second emotion has however loomed larger: alarm at the development and strengthening of what Moscow interprets as a Paris-Bonn axis. General de Gaulle was said to be deluding himself if he imagined that he would be the dominant partner in such an alliance, which Soviet propaganda has represented as a new way for the Germans to obtain control of nuclear weapons. (Another, according to Moscow, was to have been tacit British assistance to this end in exchange for German help towards a successful conclusion of the Brussels negotiations). The articles convey deep suspicion of the presumed military cooperation which would result from the Treaty and conclude that de Gaulle is playing into the hands of the "Bonn revanchists". The loss of solidarity in NATO "which some people are still trying to depict as one happy family" consequent on the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations and the signature of the Treaty is a common theme in both strands of comment.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

12. The Indians have regained the propaganda initiative by accepting in toto the Colombo Conference proposals for a basis for negotiations; the Chinese wish to represent themselves as having done the same thing but have put forward certain "interpretations" which would bring the proposals into line with their "three-point" proposals of November 21. These were rejected by the Indians at that time. The Chinese have suggested that negotiations should take place and that differences in interpretation should be ironed out by negotiation.

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If, as seems quite possible, the Indians do not agree to negotiate on this basis, the Chinese will argue that Indian intransigence has been clearly demonstrated. In practice, they will have to decide whether to shift their ground and negotiate on the Colombo proposals as they stand, or to accept a possibly protracted delay in negotiations. In the latter case a further display of force in an attempt to bring the Indians into line cannot be ruled out; but the Chinese must be aware that the consequences of a renewal of military action could be considerably more serious than they were in October and November last year.

SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

13. The publication in Pravda on January 20 of a critical statement by the Central Committee of the Soviet Party about the recent banning of the Tunisian Communist Party was followed by an authoritative article four days later entitled "Contrary to the People's interests". This censured the Governments of newly independent countries, particularly those in the Near and Middle East, which have banned the Communist Parties in their territories. The article stopped short of directly attacking the non-aligned leaders but took them to task obliquely for "taking an extremely ambiguous position", i.e. pursuing the incompatible courses of proclaiming a policy of "anti-imperialism" and at the same time putting into effect the imperialist policy of suppressing Communist Parties. While the Soviet Government goes on record with these warnings regularly from time to time, it is a fair assumption that this instalment owes something to Chinese taunts about the degree of Soviet aid extended to uncommitted states who, in Peking's eyes, are not as "progressive" as they ought to be (e.g. India), at the expense of more deserving recipients. Khrushchev himself also showed some impatience, in his speech of January 16, with statesmen of some newly-independent countries "who say they intend to manoeuvre between the two military blocs, thereby mixing up "blocs" and "systems". He claimed that this only confused the newly-free peoples and made it easier for the colonialists to maintain their former positions among them. He showed similar impatience in a speech last spring.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Khrushchev and the Intellectuals

14. The attacks on Stalinism at the 22nd Party Congress encouraged many Soviet writers and artists to believe that the authorities would be more tolerant towards experiment and boldness in the arts. There have indeed been some signs of a more liberal attitude on the part of the authorities over the last year: Ehrenburg's memoirs, containing a humane account of the role played by Soviet intellectuals who suffered in the purges, have been appearing regularly; Evtushenko has had several poems published which attack Stalinism and its present-day adherents. In the visual arts, experiment has been pursued - it is true in a subterranean fashion - by groups of artists, many of them belonging to the younger generation. The same is true of music. Films have appeared in which the presentation of contemporary Soviet society has been realistic and free of the patriotic clichés of the past. More recently, sanction was given at the highest level for the publication of "Ivan Denisovitch", a stark and realistic portrayal of life in a prison camp under Stalin. In the same periodical, a travelogue by the Soviet writer Nekrassov called for a more liberal and sympathetic attitude towards Western literature (e.g. Kafka) and towards foreign films.

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15. In the last few weeks a significant rebuff has been administered by Soviet leaders to these forces of innovation. At the beginning of December, Khrushchev visited an art exhibition in Moscow where a small number of "modernistic" paintings were on display. He delivered a splenetic attack against "abstractionism" and other modernistic tendencies. His visit was followed by the usual spate of articles in the Soviet press parroting his views. Later in the month, the Party leaders met a group of Soviet intellectuals and warned them in unequivocal terms that "formalism" in the arts would not be tolerated. The main speaker on this occasion was Ilichev, the Party watch-dog on matters intellectual and ideological. His speech contained an uncompromising reaffirmation of Party doctrine, the main points being that art always has an ideological and political bias and that peaceful co-existence between "socialist" and "bourgeois" ideologies is impermissible. Khrushchev is also known to have spoken at this meeting and to have denounced abstract painting. There appears to have been a spirited discussion in which various intellectuals defended a more liberal approach to the arts.

16. It is clear that the Party are concerned about the direction in which many intellectuals are at present travelling, moderate and apolitical though this may seem to non-Communist eyes. In particular, they have shown their preoccupation with the recent sharp increase of Western influence on Soviet literary and artistic life and are now calling, in effect, for increased vigilance in cultural contacts with the non-Communist world. On the one hand the Party faces the problem of improving the "image" of the Soviet Union at home and abroad, of encouraging new ideas which can be harnessed to the development of Soviet society - ideas which must be kept, however, within the limits of Communist ideology; and, on the other, of incurring the inevitable risks which such a policy involves i.e. demands for greater independence and freedom on the part of intellectuals. The Party undoubtedly has the authority and power to carry out these ambivalent policies, and periods of comparative relaxation will probably continue to alternate with periods of vigilance and control. But the Party almost certainly consider that further action is now called for and Khrushchev himself revealed during his recent visit to Berlin that a major conference of intellectuals would be held on his return to the Soviet Union.

CONFIDENTIAL
CHRONOLOGY

January

- 1 - 4 Mrs. Bandaranaike discussed Colombo proposals on Sino-Indian dispute with Chinese leaders.
- 3 Khrushchev received new Chinese Ambassador Pan Tzu-li.
- 5 Red Flag editorial "Leninism and modern revisionism"
- 7 Pravda article "Let us strengthen the unity of the Communist movement for the triumph of peace and socialism"
- Joint Soviet-United States letter to U Thant suggesting that the Cuban problems need no longer remain on the Security Council agenda.
- 7 - 11 Yugoslav-East German talks in Berlin on "unsettled questions".
- 8 - 10 Ideological Conference of Mongolian P.R.P. in Ulan Bator: Ilichev represented the Soviet Union.
- 9 - 14 Kuznetsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) visited New York from Cuba: received by President Kennedy and Mr. Rusk.
- 10 - 13 Khrushchev visited Poland on way to S.E.D. Congress. Accompanied by Podgorny.
- 10 Soviet Parliamentary Delegation led by Andropov left for North Vietnam.
- 12 - 18 President Novotny of Czechoslovakia visited Indonesia.
- 13 Cuba and East Germany established diplomatic relations.
- 15 - 21 Sixth S.E.D. Congress in East Berlin.
- 16 - 21 Anglo-Soviet cultural negotiations in London. Agreement 1963-5 signed.
- 17 Chinese protest over Kowloon walled city redevelopment.
- 18 - 23 Novotny visited Cambodia.
- 19 - 29 Rapacki (Foreign Minister of Poland) visited India.
- 21 United Kingdom reply to Chinese note on Kowloon.
- 21 Pravda published Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of letters in which Khrushchev reaccepted the principle of on-site inspection.
- 22 Novotny visited North Vietnam
- 23 United Kingdom and Mongolia established diplomatic relations.
- 25 - 26 Zhivkov (Prime Minister of Bulgaria) visited Belgrade.
- 27 People's Daily editorial "Let us unite on the basis of the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement."
- 28 Soviet-Japanese trade and payments agreement 1963-65 initialled in Moscow.
- 31 Tripartite exploratory talks in New York on banning nuclear tests suspended at Soviet suggestion.