



Communist Policy and Tactics 1964, 1. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

August 25, 1964.

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AND TACTICS

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Soviet policy which emerged from its visit to Moscow was the apparent desire to engage from the Laotian situation. Khrushchev has publicly admitted growing centrifugal trends in Eastern Europe. He is not prepared to go ahead with holding a world conference of Communist parties; they will not attend.

Butler's meetings with the Russians were friendly, the Russians showed no reservations on international questions. The impression gained in recent weeks on most major issues such as the status of Germany and European security was that the Russians also showed however that there

will be difficulties ahead on Laos and United Nations peace-keeping.

3. Earlier in the month the Russians had sent another Note to the N.A.T.O. Powers on the Multilateral Force (M.L.F.), suggesting that its formation would have dangerous implications for countries outside N.A.T.O. and referring to the Soviet wish for an agreement on non-dissemination and for atom-free zones. They followed this up with a Tass statement towards the end of July attacking the recently revised agreement between N.A.T.O. countries for cooperation over information on nuclear matters, which was described as the latest in a series of concessions to West German militarism and as constituting a defiance of the United Nations resolution on non-dissemination. The statement referred to "the need for drafting without delay an agreement which would help to remove this danger." In their talks with Mr. Butler the Russians made it clear that they regarded a non-dissemination agreement and the Multilateral Force as incompatible.

4. Khrushchev has expressed interest in a meeting with Dr. Erhard. While Soviet propaganda attacks against the Federal Republic continue and a visit by Khrushchev to Bonn might well arouse misgivings in some quarters in Eastern Europe, the Russians are interested in keeping open their lines of discussion with Western statesmen and Khrushchev would probably welcome the opportunity to form his own estimate of Dr. Erhard.

5. The Soviet government have shown concern over the nomination of Senator Goldwater and the Republican Party programme, but have at the same time taken the line that his nomination has not brought him significantly nearer to the White House and that there will be a Democratic victory in November. Khrushchev expressed his disquiet in a recent speech in Poland and used the nomination to lend force to an appeal for greater bloc unity in the face of allegedly increasing Western efforts to exploit nationalism and economic contacts for the purpose of dividing the Socialist countries.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JULY 1964

The only new trend in Soviet policy which emerged from the Secretary of State's visit to Moscow was the apparent Soviet determination to disengage from the Laotian situation. Within the bloc, Khrushchev has publicly admitted growing Soviet concern at the centrifugal trends in Eastern Europe. The Russians seem determined to go ahead with holding a preparatory meeting for a world conference of Communist parties; the Chinese have said that they will not attend.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

2. Although the tone of Mr. Butler's meetings with the Soviet leaders in Moscow was friendly, the Russians showed no willingness to make concessions on international questions. The discussions confirmed the impression gained in recent months that Soviet policy on most major issues such as disarmament and the problems of Germany and European security is at present static; they also showed however that there will be difficulties ahead on Laos and United Nations peace-keeping.
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6. A Rumanian Delegation led by Maurer, the Prime Minister, went to Moscow early in July. The visit appears to have been a Rumanian initiative; its aim was probably to clarify Rumania's position and to repair relations with Moscow. While still willing to cooperate with the Russians and other Communist countries on basic international issues, the Rumanians are likely to have expressed a wish for closer economic ties with the West and to have reiterated their views on the need to avoid a final breach with the Chinese. The non-committal phrasing of the final communique suggests that the Rumanians successfully maintained their position. Podgorny's sudden journey to Rumania later in the month is also an indication that differences remain unresolved. While the Rumanians have apparently not moderated their determination to pursue an independent policy, especially in economic matters, the Russians continue to maintain a conciliatory public attitude. But they can hardly have welcomed the recent signature by the Rumanians of a Scientific and Technical Protocol with China (although a routine annual event, it included a provision for expansion, especially in the field of petro-chemicals, which contrasts with the general reduction in Chinese exchanges with other bloc countries); or the unprecedented coverage given by the Rumanian press to the visit to France by Maurer and a strong delegation at the end of the month.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

7. The Russians have published the text of a letter sent to the Chinese Central Committee in the middle of June, in reply to a Chinese letter of May 7 suggesting that four or five years might be needed to prepare for a World Conference of Communist Parties. The Soviet letter rejected the Chinese arguments for delay; it also reaffirmed the Soviet view that a World Communist conference should not be put off for long and that agreement should be reached at once on the convening of a preparatory meeting attended by the representatives of the twenty-six parties on the Drafting Commission of the 1960 Communist Conference.

8. The Russians cannot have expected a favourable reply to their letter, which contained proposals already rejected by the Chinese and also turned down the Chinese suggestion that pro-Chinese Communist splinter groups should be represented at the conference. The letter seemed primarily intended to convince the Soviet Union's supporters of the need to go ahead with preparations for a Conference and also to put the blame on the Chinese if they refused to participate. While admitting that the Conference might not reach agreement, it rejected the Chinese contention that failure to do so would lead to a split in the Communist movement and denied the right of any party to hinder the convocation of a meeting. There are unconfirmed reports that the Russians are about to summon a preparatory meeting in Moscow and that Podgorny's sudden visit to Bucharest at the end of the month was made in order to persuade the Rumanians to attend it.

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9. The Chinese reply released at the end of July made it clear that they were in no mood to consider any compromise. They accused the Russians of preparing to call a world Communist meeting "arbitrarily, unilaterally and illegally" and dismissed Soviet assertions that they would use it to try to formulate common positions as "pure fraud". They stated categorically that they would never take part in any international meeting, or any preparatory meeting for it, called for the purpose of splitting the international Communist movement: if the Russians nonetheless disregarded this solemn warning, an open split would be inevitable. The Chinese appear to accept that the Russians are likely to go ahead without them ("you cannot dismount from the tiger you are riding"), but express confidence that the Russians will come the worse out of it. In the coming weeks, the Chinese are likely to try to increase Soviet difficulties with their more hesitant supporters by stressing the catastrophic consequences for Communist unity of calling a world meeting. It is also still open to them to make mischief by renewing their offer of bilateral Sino-Soviet talks early next year. While the Russians are unlikely to submit to Chinese obstructive tactics, they may find it difficult to avoid delays imposed by other Communist parties anxious to avoid a formal breach. Further progress towards a world meeting could therefore be slower than the Russians at present appear to envisage.

10. The bitter polemics continue and both the Chinese and the Russians are making increasingly damaging attacks on each other's aid programmes to developing countries, apparently without regard to the unfavourable picture this presents of the progress of Communist aid. Recent Chinese allegations concerning the motives underlying Soviet aid to Afro-Asian countries made at the Asian Economic Seminar in Pyongyang have drawn a strong Soviet retort. The Soviet Government newspaper has published a detailed criticism of Chinese aid, attacking not only its modest scale and low technical level (which it compared with the much larger and more sophisticated efforts of the C.M.E.A. countries) but also the failure to complete projects on time and to implement long-standing credits. The article also drew attention to an alleged five-fold increase in Chinese trade with Malaysia last year and contrasted this with Chinese propaganda claims of friendship and help for Indonesia.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

11. In the competition for the allegiance of individual Communist parties the Russians are repaying the Chinese in their own coin by encouraging the emergence of splinter groups in pro-Chinese parties. They have for some time been giving publicity to the views of dissident members of the Japanese Communist Party. They have now published the texts of two Soviet letters to the Japanese Communist Party. One of these, sent in April shortly after an abortive visit to the Soviet Union by a Japanese Communist Party delegation which had threatened to break off relations with the Soviet Communist Party, called for an end to attacks on Soviet policy and set out at length Soviet views on subjects in dispute, particularly the Test Ban Treaty. The main Soviet
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aim in releasing these letters was probably to rally support among Japanese rank-and-file Communists for the pro-Soviet splinter group which has recently emerged. These tactics have drawn from the Chinese the accusation that the Russians are intensifying disruptive activities within fraternal Communist Parties. On their side the Chinese have achieved a success in the formation in India of a rival pro-Chinese Communist Party, thus formally dividing the only major pro-Soviet party in Asia.

BURMA

12. Mikoyan spent two days in Burma at the beginning of the month, on his way back from Indonesia to the Soviet Union. He probably hoped to strengthen the Soviet position in Burma and check the expansion of Chinese influence at Soviet expense; he may also have attempted to enlist Burmese support against Chinese efforts to exclude the Soviet Union from the next Afro-Asian Conference. A few days after Mikoyan's departure the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, accompanied by the Chinese Foreign Minister paid a surprise visit to Rangoon. Chou En-lai had been to Burma less than six months before, but the Chinese were probably concerned to seek reassurances about Burmese foreign policy and, in particular, ensure that Mikoyan had achieved nothing to their disadvantage.

LAOS

13. A second Polish attempt to arrange consultations outside Laos between the three Laotian factions, with the assistance of representatives of the Co-Chairmen and the three International Control Commission Powers, was rejected by the Chinese, North Viet-Nameese and Pathet Lao. The most they would accept was talks between the Laotian factions to discuss the composition of the Laotian delegation to a full Fourteen-Power Conference. After this further failure, the Poles informed the Co-Chairmen that they could no longer pursue their mediatory efforts.

14. The Russians, who had earlier supported the Polish compromise proposal, issued a statement on the eve of Mr. Butler's departure for Moscow putting forward the obviously unacceptable proposition of an immediate Fourteen-Power Conference without prior conditions and reinforced this by a threat to abandon the Co-Chairmanship. In the subsequent talks in Moscow they would not budge from this position. It would appear that they have decided to extricate themselves from involvement in a situation in which they no longer have any real control.

THE UNITED NATIONS

15. In early July the Russians circulated a memorandum on United Nations Peace-Keeping operations. Its main purposes were probably to improve the Soviet tactical position when the United Nations considers in the Autumn the application of Article 19 of the United Nations Charter (under which the Russians are liable to lose their voting rights for being more than two years in arrears in payment of their dues for earlier peace-keeping operations); and to get their own ideas on the record before too much support had been gathered for procedures for future peace-keeping
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operations unacceptable to them. The memorandum restated the Soviet view that all United Nations peace-keeping functions must be under the exclusive control of the Security Council and expressed Soviet willingness to pay a fair share of the expenses of a peace-keeping force set up on the lines of the Soviet proposal. But it made no mention of payment of arrears for past peace-keeping operations and the Soviet Government remains adamant in its refusal to consider payments for operations it has not approved. While emphasizing the important role of the United Nations in peace-keeping the memorandum suggests that insufficient attention has been paid to non-military measures such as economic sanctions. The Russians probably hope to impress Afro-Asian opinion by these proposals and, by threatening to leave the United Nations if the issue is forced, to build up pressure among United Nations members in favour of a non-enforcement of Article 19.

CHANGES IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

16. Brezhnev has been succeeded as President of the Soviet Union by Mikoyan; Mikoyan at the same time gave up his post as First Deputy Prime Minister. The importance of this move is that Brezhnev, freed from the ceremonial duties of Head of State, will now be able to concentrate on his work as a Secretary of the Party Central Committee. He became a Secretary in 1956, gave up the post in 1960 when he was appointed President, but resumed it again in June 1963 when it was clear that Kozlov would not recover from his illness. Since then Brezhnev has done less of the formal work of a President and appears to have concentrated increasingly on Party duties. In contrast to Khrushchev's designation of Kozlov in 1961 as his successor, the present change probably does not formally mark Brezhnev as heir apparent, although he is strongly in the running. Like Podgorny, who at present seems to be the other most likely contender, he will have a full-time opportunity to strengthen his position within the Party. Brezhnev, aged 57, is in good health and is thought to be in general agreement with most of Khrushchev's policies.

17. Mikoyan's elevation will not necessarily affect his influence. In giving up the post of First Deputy Prime Minister, he will probably have less immediate control over those aspects of the economy which he formerly directed, but he may be expected to continue to have considerable influence over general economic policy. In recent years he has been used as a special envoy on difficult missions to countries such as Cuba, Guinea and Indonesia. He is now nearly 69 and was out of action for several months last year because of illness. But, if his health permits, his considerable diplomatic skill may be well employed in undertaking more state visits.

SOVIET ECONOMIC TRENDS

18. At the recent session of the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev placed great emphasis on the need to improve the lot of the Soviet consumer. While applauding the fact that the Soviet population was now sufficiently sophisticated and prosperous to exercise choice over the quality and style of goods offered in the shops, Khrushchev said this had resulted in a vast accumulation of unsaleable goods. Soviet planners now seem

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to be facing a kind of inflation which does not occur in a market economy: too much money is chasing too few acceptable goods and is not chasing much of what is on sale. Measures adopted during the same session to raise the wages of some 18 million workers in the professions and public services, including teachers, doctors and nurses (whose wages will however continue to be abysmally low compared even with the levels in some of the Communist countries), and also to extend the state-supported pensions scheme to the collective farming community could add to the present repressed inflation; in order to ease the strain on the economy, the first wage increases are not to be made until the Autumn and many will have to wait until late in 1965.

19. Soviet figures for the performance of the economy during the first half of 1964 show that the rate of growth of Soviet industry, which the Soviet authorities originally hoped would be nearly 10% a year over the period 1960-80, continues to decline. The official figure for 1962 was 9.5 per cent; for 1963 it was 8.5 per cent; the results now announced for the first two quarters of 1964 were about 8 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. The expansion of output of chemicals and fertilisers has remained rapid and the claimed investment in the chemical industry was extremely high. But the growth of total investment in the economy continues to slacken and is well below plan, particularly in agriculture.

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CHRONOLOGY

JULY

2. Mikoyan left Djakarta after a 10 day visit. Yugoslav-Polish communique issued at the end of Tito's visit to Poland.
- 2 - 4 Mikoyan visited Burma.
- 4 - 6 Mikoyan visited Afghanistan
- 6 - 14 Dr. Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, visited the Soviet Union.
- 6 - 15 A Rumanian delegation led by Maurer, the Rumanian Prime Minister, visited the Soviet Union.
8. Speech by Khrushchev at a Kremlin reception for military graduates.
- Delivery of Soviet Note on the United Nations Peace-keeping Force.
- Establishment of a rival, pro-Chinese Communist Party of India.
- 9 - 10 Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi visited Burma
- 9 - 16 Subandrio visited the Soviet Union
11. Soviet Note on the Multilateral Force handed to the Western Powers
12. Attack on Chinese aid programmes published in Izvestiya.
- 13 - 15 Session of the Supreme Soviet adopts measures for raising wages of 18 million workers in the professions and public services and for extending pensions scheme to collective farmers.
13. Mao Tse-tung quoted by Japanese News Agency as stating that China supported the Japanese demand for the return of the Kuriles and that the Soviet Union had taken territory from Mongolia and Eastern Europe.
14. The Chinese published the 9th Article in the series replying to the Soviet Open letter of July 14, 1964 under the title: "Khrushchev's phoney Communism and its historical lessons for the world".
15. Mikoyan replaced Brezhnev as President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
- The Russians released the text of their letter of June 15 to the Chinese.
18. The Soviet Government replied to the Western Powers tripartite statement on the Soviet-East German Treaty of June 12.

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His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

October 19, 1964.

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

NOVEMBER 1964

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Communist Conference

2. The Russians continue to meet serious difficulties in their attempt to prepare for a world conference of Communist parties. Only about half of the 26 Parties invited to attend the drafting commission in Moscow in December have formally announced their intention to send delegates. In the memorandum written by Togliatti just before his death and subsequently endorsed by the Italian Communist Party, he agreed that the Italian Communists should go to the preparatory meeting, but he made it clear that this would not commit them to attend the full world conference which the Russians have proposed should be held in the middle of 1965. It seems likely that Togliatti intended using the preparatory meeting either to delay the world conference or to ensure that it would only take place on a basis he could accept.

3. Italian Communist views on the need to avoid a formal split in the Communist movement are also likely to win the support of the other Communist Parties represented on the drafting commission, including the Rumanian, Polish, Cuban and British Communist Parties, none of which has yet replied to the Soviet invitation. Unless the Russians can secure more agreement among their own supporters on the purposes of a world conference, they may eventually be obliged to postpone it. Fears that a break with China might be followed by a Soviet attempt to reimpose some kind of centralised authority on their supporters are widespread in the Communist world and in his memorandum Togliatti expressed Italian Communist opposition to any proposal to recreate a centralised international Communist movement. The Russians seem to have realised rather belatedly the extent to which these fears of a new "Comintern" were damaging their efforts to rally
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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

SEPTEMBER 1964

As the December preparatory meeting for a world Communist conference draws nearer, the dilemmas facing the Soviet leaders become more acute. Unless the Russians can secure wider agreement among their own supporters on the purposes of a world conference, they may eventually be obliged to drop the proposal. The Togliatti memorandum, which has now been published in the Soviet Union and most of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, is another striking demonstration of disagreement within the Communist ranks and contains sharp criticisms of certain aspects of Soviet policy. The Sino-Soviet polemic has shifted onto territorial questions and each side is now attacking the other's past imperialist record. The Soviet response to the Cyprus Government's request for military aid appears to have fallen well short of Cypriot expectations. Shortly after they had vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on Indonesia and Malaysia to respect each other's territorial and political independence, the Russians have called for an international agreement on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

(i) Preparations for a World Communist Conference

2. The Russians continue to meet serious difficulties in their attempt to prepare for a world conference of Communist parties. Only about half of the 26 Parties invited to attend the drafting commission in Moscow in December have formally announced their intention to send delegates. In the memorandum written by Togliatti just before his death and subsequently endorsed by the Italian Communist Party, he agreed that the Italian Communists should go to the preparatory meeting, but he made it clear that this would not commit them to attend the full world conference which the Russians have proposed should be held in the middle of 1965. It seems likely that Togliatti intended using the preparatory meeting either to delay the world conference or to ensure that it would only take place on a basis he could accept.

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Communist parties behind them. On the occasion of the centenary of the First International, Ponomarev declared that there was now "no ground for the existence of a centralised organisation - an International"; but he went on to emphasise the need for Communist solidarity and to defend the decision to call a world conference. The Russians nevertheless continue to advocate "organisational forms" and "principles" for the world Communist movement which could take the form of periodic international meetings of Communist parties, at which majority decisions would be binding.

4. During his visit to Czechoslovakia, Khrushchev accused the Chinese of secretly preparing their own rival conference. The Chinese have themselves since publicly rejected the old type of centralised leadership in the Communist movement as no longer necessary or possible. This suggests that the Chinese will take no formal steps to set up a rival organisation in advance of the meeting of the drafting commission, which might detract from their attempt to pin on the Russians the responsibility for splitting the Communist movement.

(ii) Territorial Claims and Border Tension

5. By publishing a lengthy reply to an interview given by Mao Tse-tung to some Left-wing members of the Japanese Socialist Party who visited Peking in early July, the Russians have again brought territorial questions to the forefront of the dispute. Mao's remarks (of which no official Chinese version has yet appeared) were described by Pravda as "a frankly expansionist programme with far-reaching claims." He was reported as saying that China had not yet requested a settling of the account for the vast area of Soviet territory east of Baikal appropriated by the Russians in the last 100 years; that the Kuriles must be returned to Japan; that the Soviet Union had placed Mongolia under its domination; and as criticising the Russians for absorbing parts of East Germany, Poland, Rumania and Finland and for giving part of East Germany to Poland. The Soviet reply stated that any attempt to revise the treaties and agreements concluded after the Second World War was out of the question. The present border between the Soviet Union and China had developed historically and the treaties on the border could not be disregarded; generations of people had lived and worked on the land and the Soviet Union was the result of voluntary unification.

6. In a subsequent interview with a Japanese Socialist delegation in Moscow, Khrushchev showed how much Mao's allusions to Chinese historic territorial claims on the Soviet Union had got under his skin, drew an analogy between his statements and the **Nazi** doctrine of "Lebensraum" and made it clear that the Soviet borders would be defended "with all the means at our disposal" (his widely misreported reference to new weapons seems to have been directed primarily against the Chinese). Khrushchev's remarks included a thinly-veiled hint that, whereas the Soviet Asian republics had joined the Soviet Union voluntarily, the Chinese minority races were part of China only by right of conquest. In particular, the Kazakhs, Uighurs and Kirgiz might wish to join the Soviet side. Khrushchev seemed to be
/implying

implying that if the Chinese continued to make territorial claims on the Soviet Union, the Russians could retaliate by questioning the Chinese right to much of present Chinese territory. He included Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet and Sinkiang among past Chinese imperial conquests.

7. These remarks are likely to heighten tension in the Sinkiang border area. A local Chinese People's Congress in the Ili region recently adopted a resolution to smash subversion and sabotage activities being undertaken by the Russians in Sinkiang and deputies accused the Soviet Union of conducting hostile propaganda and attempting to poison relations between the various nationalities of the area. There have also been reports of Soviet propaganda broadcasts in Uighur and other local languages to the inhabitants of Sinkiang and of the existence of an Uighur nationalist movement in the Soviet Union under Soviet auspices. The Russians are likely to have increased Chinese suspicions concerning their intentions in the area by the wide publicity they have now given to an article by a defector of Uighur nationality, a former Major-General in the Chinese People's Liberation Army who has taken refuge in the Soviet Union, in which he describes the "unbelievable persecution and repression" to which Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Mongols were being subjected by the Chinese and contrasts this treatment with the prosperity and contentment of Uighurs under Soviet rule.

8. While the situation is likely to remain tense and there may well be more frontier incidents, a military confrontation seems unlikely.

(iii) Eastern Europe

9. The Chinese appear to be making a determined attempt to embarrass the Russians in Eastern Europe. Mao Tse-tung alluded to Soviet post-war territorial annexations in Eastern Europe in his interview with the Japanese Socialists (he is reported to have said of the Russians that they had "detached everything that could be detached"). The Chinese have since welcomed the chance offered by the announcement of Khrushchev's proposed visit to Bonn to include Germany among the subjects of current Sino-Soviet polemics and to counter Soviet allegations concerning Chinese efforts to improve their relations with the Federal Republic. They have quoted Western reports that Khrushchev's decision to go to Bonn was taken during his visit to Czechoslovakia, in the course of a meeting of East European Foreign Ministers at which the East Germans were not represented. The Chinese have also alluded to the possibility of a "dirty political deal" to sell out East Germany to the Federal Republic. This is not the first time that the Chinese have tried to embarrass the Russians over East Germany, but their latest pronouncements are different in kind from earlier and lesser attempts and they are likely to return to the charge when Khrushchev goes to Bonn. The East Germans themselves have rejected Chinese attempts to create differences between East Germany and the Soviet Union; they have also re-affirmed their support for the Russians in the Sino-Soviet dispute
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and for Khrushchev's visit to Bonn. However disturbed the East German leaders may be by this visit, they have little room for manoeuvre and are obliged to endorse Soviet policy. But, as in the case of Soviet territorial acquisitions in Asia, the Chinese have been able to shift the polemic onto ground on which the Soviet Union is vulnerable; the Russians can scarcely relish the prospect of detailed and destructive Chinese criticism of Soviet actions in Eastern Europe since 1945 and particularly of the Soviet failure to sign a separate Peace Treaty with East Germany.

SINO-SOVIET STATE RELATIONS

10. While the polemic has shifted onto new ground and both sides have become less discriminating in their choice of weapons (the Russians have even drawn on a Kuomintang newspaper report to support their allegations that the Chinese are using the illicit opium traffic to finance their anti-Soviet activities), commercial, educational and other exchanges have continued to fall off. Recently released trade statistics show a further decline of about 20% in Sino-Soviet trade in both directions during 1963. Although the Soviet Union is still China's largest single trading partner the level of Sino-Soviet trade in 1963 had dropped to that of 1950, the year following the Communist seizure of power in China. China's exports to the Soviet Union were worth twice as much as her imports and it seems likely that China will have repaid her debts to the Soviet Union by early 1965. The number of Chinese technicians being trained in the Soviet Union has also continued to drop; according to Soviet sources there were 60 Chinese at the Soviet civil nuclear research centre at Dubna at the end of September (a few months ago the figure was 90). The border talks which began in Peking in February are reported to have been suspended in early August. In contrast to the May Day celebrations (which they boycotted), the Russians have, however, sent a delegation to Peking for the celebrations on the 15th anniversary of the Chinese Communist régime; it is headed by Grishin, President of the Soviet Trades Union Central Council and candidate member of the Party Presidium. The Rumanian delegation is led by Maurer, the Prime Minister and second only to Gheorghiu-Dej in the Party hierarchy.

THE MOSCOW YOUTH FORUM

11. At the Second World Youth Forum in Moscow, the Russians once again had to withstand a sustained propaganda attack by the Chinese at an important Communist "Front" meeting. While the Chinese may have scored with their criticisms of the Soviet Union for dominating the "Front" organisations and rigging conference proceedings for their own ends, they may have alienated sympathy by their rude and aggressive behaviour. The Russians were also able to score some points, particularly on the Sino-Indian border dispute and by making further jibes about Macao and Hong Kong. The Chinese were unable to prevent the adoption of the final Declaration which reflected Soviet views; all but five delegations voted for it and the Chinese did /not

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not attract any new supporters. The next clash of this kind seems likely to occur at the end of November at the International Union of Students' Congress in Sofia. The Chinese are likely to be planning an even stronger challenge to the Russians at the Ninth World Youth Festival due to be held in Algiers in August 1965, where it will be more difficult for the Russians to control the proceedings and where a Sino-Soviet dog-fight could prove very damaging to the Communist cause in Africa.

THE UNITED NATIONS

12. The Russians have now formally requested the inclusion of a supplementary item on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly on "Renunciation by States of the use of Force for the settlement of territorial disputes and questions concerning frontiers". This is a further move to exploit the diplomatic and propaganda initiative on this subject launched by Khrushchev at the end of last year and on which little has been heard from the Russians in recent months. The Russians now claim to want an international agreement on the subject.

13. The Russians have still to show how any obligations under such an agreement would differ from those already assumed under the United Nations Charter. Their support for Indonesian attacks on Malaysian territory shows how, if it suits their purpose to back one country against another, they will be able to find a reason for stating that its particular actions fall outside the scope of the proposed agreement. The Russians are, however, aware of the dangers of escalation of local conflicts and, apart from the obvious propaganda motives, may also see some advantage in such an agreement in avoiding situations into which the larger powers could be drawn. Another important reason why the Russians would like an agreement is that they could then use it (as they have previously exploited the Test Ban Treaty) to isolate and discredit the Chinese, whose alleged territorial ambitions against the Soviet Union and their Asian neighbours have featured so largely in Soviet propaganda in recent weeks.

CYPRUS

14. The Russians stated in August that they were willing to enter into negotiations at once on aid to Cyprus. The Cypriot Minister of Commerce and Industry arrived in Moscow in the middle of September and Khrushchev was reported to have assured him that Cypriot requests would be examined carefully with a view to giving Cyprus "disinterested aid in their struggle for freedom and independence." Mr. Kyprianou, the Cypriot Foreign Minister, arrived in Moscow later in the month and shortly afterwards a communiqué was issued which contained a brief and unenlightening reference to an agreement on "practical measures of assistance." It revealed no details of the terms of the agreement; but the Russians have probably been cautious in any political commitments made to the Cyprus Government, even if they have agreed to supply them with some defensive weapons.

/THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

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THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

15. The visit to the Soviet Union by the Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic, Ali Sabri, appears to have been mainly concerned with economic matters. No new aid was offered, but two agreements were signed: one on economic and technical cooperation in the construction of industrial enterprises under the United Arab Republic's second Five Year Plan (for which Khrushchev had offered a credit of £100 million during his visit to the United Arab Republic in May) and the other on aid in bringing new land under cultivation through irrigation. The impression given by the final communiqué is that there may have been some fairly hard bargaining. Soviet support for the Arab position on the Jordan waters was weaker than previous expressions of support for the Arabs against Israel. The second Afro-Asian conference was not mentioned at all (whereas it was referred to in the communiqué issued at the end of President Radhakrishnan's visit); the Indians have already shown their willingness to defend Soviet interests in preparing for the conference, but the Egyptians who have less reason to oppose the Chinese may have been reluctant to commit themselves in advance of the conference. Ali Sabri also appears to have had talks with Khrushchev on relations between the Soviet Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Union. On his return from the United Arab Republic in May Khrushchev stated that the Arab Socialist Union should be "the political organisation of the people" and he may have tried in his talks with Ali Sabri to persuade him of the need to make room for Communists in the Arab Socialist Union (as the F.L.N. has done in Algeria). But the final communiqué made no mention of the subject and it seems likely that any discussion of it was inconclusive.

YUGOSLAVIA

16. Although the practical results of the agreement on the participation by Yugoslavia in a very wide range of CMEA activities seem likely to be largely to Yugoslavia's advantage, the Soviet Union can reasonably congratulate itself on a development which can be quoted as showing the vitality of CMEA and as justifying its claims to be outward-looking. Against the background of growing diversity within the bloc and the continuing East-West détente, the Yugoslavs must have calculated that the economic advantages of participation, particularly in assuring a balanced expansion of their trade with the CMEA countries, outweighed the possible disadvantages vis-à-vis the West and the non-aligned world of associating themselves more closely and openly with the Soviet bloc. In the longer run the introduction of Yugoslav views into CMEA debates and planning could encourage the pragmatic approach to economic matters which has begun to manifest itself in Eastern Europe. It could also strengthen the opposition of individual CMEA members to the supranational principle, which Yugoslavia has very clearly rejected in advance.

/BERLIN PASS ARRANGEMENTS

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BERLIN PASS ARRANGEMENTS

17. After nine months of hard bargaining and concessions by both sides, a protocol was signed which will enable West Berliners to visit their relations in East Berlin during four specified festive periods in the coming twelve months and also for urgent family matters. The East Germans have, predictably, made propaganda out of the conclusion of the pass arrangement between the East German Government and the "separate political entity" of West Berlin, but this has not so far been matched by a corresponding Soviet effort to derive propaganda capital from the agreement. The Russians have, however, played up the approval by the Supreme Soviet of the decree ratifying the Soviet-East German Treaty and Mikoyan's remarks refuting the Chinese suggestion that the Soviet Union might be contemplating improving its relations with the Federal Republic at the expense of East Germany.

18. As in the case of the rather similar arrangement agreed last December for Christmas visits, East German willingness to reach an agreement no doubt owed much to Russian pressure. It is in the Soviet interest to persuade Ulbricht to liberalise his régime as far as possible and to do what he can to soften the harsh and unfavourable image created by the existence of the Berlin Wall and the recurrent shooting incidents which take place there. There have recently been other cautious steps in the direction of liberalisation in East Germany, including the quiet release of a considerable number of political prisoners and the introduction of arrangements to permit old-age pensioners (whose defection would do the East German economy no harm) to visit West Germany and West Berlin. But it seems improbable that the East German authorities will be able in the foreseeable future to allow any substantial degree of liberalisation and the régime seems likely to fall increasingly far behind the other countries of Eastern Europe in political evolution. What is good for them will be too dangerous in East Germany, which seems destined to become both anomalous and a growing political liability as the other bloc countries travel further and faster down their national roads to Communism.

HUNGARY'S AGREEMENT WITH THE VATICAN

19. The agreement signed in Budapest on September 15 between the Hungarian Government and the Vatican (covering the appointment of certain new bishops, the priest's oath of loyalty to the State and the Hungarian Institute in the Vatican) amounts to only a partial settlement of the many questions which have been under discussion for some time. Problems such as the future of Cardinal Mindszenty, restrictions on religious believers and the confiscation of Church lands remain unsolved. Nevertheless the agreement is the first one reached between the Holy See and a Communist Government and both parties to it have indicated that further exchanges of view will take place, with the possibility of reaching wider agreements. Budapest Radio has portrayed the agreement as a further step in the normalisation of Hungary's relations with the West. The suggestion in Togliatti's testament that Communists must think again about the efficacy of "the old atheist propaganda" found an echo in a recent speech by Ulbricht in Berlin and it is possible that the Hungarian agreement may be followed by further limited agreements on Church/State affairs between the Vatican and other Communist governments.

/INDIA

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INDIA

20. An agreement was signed in Moscow in September at the conclusion of a long visit to the Soviet Union by the Indian Minister of Defence which provided for the speeding-up of the production in India of MIG 21 aircraft, the supply of enough MIG 21s to equip three squadrons and of an unspecified number of light tanks. The Indian delegation were also shown a submarine, escort vessels and patrol boats which the Russians were willing to provide, but the position on these was left open. The Chinese have predictably been giving greater prominence in their propoganda to Soviet-Indian collaboration on military matters.

INDONESIA

21. The Russians are anxious to preserve their influence in Indonesia, secured at such a heavy cost in economic and military aid, and to this end they now find themselves increasingly supporting Sukarno and the military leaders in preference to the pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist Party. In bidding for Indonesian sympathies, both Mikoyan and Khrushchev have made intemperate attacks on Malaysia in the past month; the Chinese have also been stepping up their propoganda support for Indonesia. The Soviet delegate at the United Nations vetoed the Security Council resolution calling on Indonesia and Malaysia to refrain from all threat or use of force and to respect each other's territorial and political independence, in spite of the Afro-Asian delegates' votes in favour of the resolution and of the risk of spoiling the ground in advance of the latest Soviet initiative in the United Nations for an international agreement on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. Sukarno, who subsequently invited himself to Moscow at short notice, may have faced the Soviet leaders with new problems. If they do not give him further support in his policy of confrontation, they may risk endangering Sukarno's own position and would certainly lend substance to Chinese charges of Soviet failure to back national liberation movements. But the Russians would be most reluctant to become too closely tied to Sukarno's coat-tails; they are already owed huge sums of money by the Indonesians for past arms purchases and they will be anxious above all to avoid a direct Indonesian appeal for Soviet military intervention. The indications are that the Russians may give further limited military aid and at the same time press on Sukarno the need to act cautiously.

CHINA

22. The campaign against "revisionist" elements in China which got under way in August with the denunciation of a former head of the Higher Party School in the Party's ideological journal, was continued in a subsequent issue of the same paper with an article by a member of the Chinese Party's Central Committee. One of the points he made was the need for continued vigilance to prevent "false Marxist-Leninists" from seizing the leadership. This campaign has aroused speculation about a possible split in the Chinese leadership, but there is no evidence so far that any important Chinese leaders are implicated; nevertheless it indicates concern that heterodox ideas are manifesting themselves in China. The campaign seems likely to gather
/momentum

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momentum and other lesser Party figures are likely to come under criticism. Although the Chinese leaders have in the past proved skilful at maintaining a facade of unity (the dismissal from his post as Minister of Defence of Marshal Peng Teh-huai in 1959 was not revealed until long after it had occurred), it seems unlikely that if there were a fundamental split within the Chinese leadership they would choose to publicise it in this way and so invite the support of the Soviet and many other Communist parties for the dissident leaders.

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CHRONOLOGY

August 27 - Khrushchev visited Czechoslovakia.
September 5

SEPTEMBER

- 1 Bulgarian, Hungarian and Polish Foreign Ministers in Prague..
- 2 Pravda editorial on Mao Tse-tung's interview with the Japanese Socialists.
- 3 Kosygin opened the Russian-built tunnel through the Salang Pass in the Hindu Kush.
Pravda printed an Indian report that Chinese maps showed Everest and parts of Eastern Nepal as part of China.
Pravda publicised pro-Soviet activities in the Japanese C.P.
- 4 Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to Bonn announced.
Soviet-Czech communique declared the convening of an early conference of Communist Parties a "duty".
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary-General of the Democratic Party of Dahomey arrived in the Soviet Union on a visit.
- 4 - 7 A delegation from the Finnish Social-Democratic Union, led by A. Simonen, visited the Soviet Union and saw Brezhnev and Andropov.
- 5 Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the American Communist leader, died in Moscow.
Togliatti's memorandum published in Rinaseita.
- 7 Tito and Gheorghiu-Dej inaugurated work on the Iron Gates Gorge scheme.
Issue of a Joint Communique by the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties following talks by Miyamoto and Aidit in Djakarta..
- 8 People's Daily suggested that the Soviet Union were conspiring to do a deal at the expense of East Germany.
10. Pravda printed Togliatti's memorandum without comment.
11. Pravda published the theses "from the Position of the First International" prepared by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
- 11 - 16 Tito in Hungary.
- 11 - 18 Ulbricht in Bulgaria.

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/11 - 19

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SEPTEMBER

- 11 - 19 President Radhakrishnan of India visited the Soviet Union.
- 13 An article appeared in Izvestiya by Zunun Taipov, a former Major General in the Communist Chinese army now resident in the Soviet Union, accusing the Chinese leaders of oppressing national minorities in Sinkiang.
- Pravda article accusing China of using funds derived from the illegal export of opium to finance her anti-Soviet activities.
- 14 Agreement on technical aid and cooperation between Cuba and Albania signed in Havana.
- Japanese Communist Party delegation led by Miyamoto left Peking.
- Hungarian agreement with the Vatican announced.
- 15 - 23 Ali Sabri visited the Soviet Union.
- Khrushchev's interview with a Japanese Parliamentary delegation.
- 16 - 23 Second World Youth Forum held in Moscow.
- 16 - 21 Norwegian Communist Party leaders visited Rumania.
- 17 Agreement on Yugoslav association with C.M.E.A. concluded in Moscow.
- Haile Selassie arrived in Poland.
- Kjartansson, an Icelandic Communist Party leader and newspaper editor, received in Peking by Liu Shao Ch'i.
- 19 Soviet Delegation headed by V.N. Novikov stop off in Bucharest on the return journey from Sofia to Moscow.
- Ulbricht paid a brief visit to Belgrade.
- 20 Pravda published an article by Professor Liberman of Kharkov on the use of profit as an index of economic efficiency.
- 21 Death of Grotewohl, the East German Prime Minister: he was replaced by Willi Stoph.
- 22 Italian Communist Party leaders Mario Alicata and Arturo Colombi arrive in Bucharest.
- Signature in Moscow of two agreements on economic and technical aid between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.

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SEPTEMBER

- 21 - 26 Novotny in Yugoslavia.
People's Daily rejected Pravda's allegations about China's export of opium.
- 24 Berlin passes agreement signed.
- 25 Soviet-East German Treaty of June 12 ratified in East Berlin.
- 26 - 8 Haile Selassie in Rumania.
- 27 Rumanian delegation led by Maurer, the Prime Minister, left for Peking to attend 15th anniversary celebrations of Chinese Communist regime. They stopped off in Moscow and had discussions with Khrushchev.
- 28 Khrushchev and Ponomarev addressed a meeting in Moscow devoted to the Centenary of the First International.
A Czech Party and Government delegation led by Novotny arrived in Budapest.
- 29 Sukarno arrived in Moscow.

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With the compliments of
HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

July 27, 1964.

POLICY AND TACTICS

JUNE 1964

have been a number of events of Soviet policy towards the West. Mr. Butler paid a long-delayed visit to Moscow. His purpose seems to have been to express concern about the failure to make progress in the talks, and of regard for the situation within the bloc, the Russians have noted the effect of the Sino-Soviet negotiations among the Communist bloc. The signing of a friendship treaty with East Germany and the determination to maintain the status quo in Berlin indicated that the Russians do not favour a change in Germany and Berlin.

DISARMAMENT

The Soviet-United States consular talks of the month were in line with the policy of seeking bilateral agreements. The talks with Mr. Harold Wilson, who was invited, were also consistent with the policy to open their lines of discussion. The Soviet Government invitation to Mr. Butler to visit Moscow at the end of July is a further demonstration of their policy of continuing exchanges with Western Governments.

3. Khrushchev's visits to Denmark, Sweden and Norway were represented by the Russians in the same way. These visits, first proposed in 1956, had been twice postponed. They took place in a fairly temperate atmosphere, partly because the public in the three countries had decided not to show itself unduly impressed, and partly because Khrushchev had apparently decided to put himself across as a sober, well-intentioned neighbour who recognised the importance of the role which the Scandinavian countries play in Europe and world affairs, and who wished to discuss matters on a reasonable basis. He expressed forcibly his views on the need for peace treaties with two German States but said nothing to indicate that new Soviet policies were being considered. He also spoke strongly about United States overflights of Cuba.

MIKOYAN IN INDONESIA

4. The Russians have also been looking to their interests in Asia. After spending two days in New Delhi for talks with the new Indian Government, Mikoyan flew to Indonesia on an official visit and will visit Rangoon and Kabul on his way back. His main object in Indonesia was probably to counter-act increasing Chinese influence there. The P.K.I. has long been in the Chinese camp and partly under its influence. The Indonesian Government has been cooperating closely with the Chinese in the organisation of Afro-Asian front movements and in arranging the second Bandung Conference which the Russians want to attend. Mikoyan's endorsement of the Indonesian Government's attacks on Malaysia and the hints he gave about the possibility of further Soviet military aid were clearly designed to assist the Russians to maintain a position of influence with the Government.

/ DISARMAMENT

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JUNE 1964

During the month there have been a number of events of interest, but no new lines of Soviet policy towards the West have developed. Khrushchev paid a long-delayed visit to Scandinavia, where his main purpose seems to have been to convey the impression of concern about the failure to make progress on major world problems, and of regard for the Scandinavian countries. Within the bloc, the Russians have shown increasing concern about the effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute on inter-State relations among the Communist countries. The signature of a friendship treaty with East Germany confirmed Soviet determination to maintain the division of Germany, but indicated that the Russians do not wish to increase tension over Germany and Berlin.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

2. The signature of the Soviet-United States consular agreement at the beginning of the month was in line with the policy, common to both sides, of seeking bilateral agreements on limited subjects. The talks with Mr. Harold Wilson, who went to Moscow on a Russian invitation, were also consistent with the Soviet policy of keeping open their lines of discussion with Western politicians. The Soviet Government invitation to Mr. Butler to visit Moscow at the end of July is a further demonstration of their policy of continuing exchanges with Western Governments.

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/ DISARMAMENT

DISARMAMENT

5. The reopening of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on June 9 was marked by the attendance of Zorin, a deputy Foreign Minister, as leader of the Soviet Delegation in place of Tsarapkin. In his speeches and in private exchanges, Zorin showed himself moderate and reasonable. The United States and Soviet Co-Chairmen of the Conference were able at last to agree on an agenda for the discussion of preliminary confidence-building measures. The Russians also agreed to examine the technical aspects of the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles in an informal working group, a procedure favoured by the West, although they have attached unacceptable pre-conditions.

6. These signs of comparative Soviet goodwill and moderation gave rise to some optimism about the outlook for the Conference and in particular about the prospects for a further move towards East/West agreement in the disarmament field before the autumn (perhaps on the so-called "bomber bonfire" on which the Russians have been stressing that they are prepared to be flexible). But the evidence is so far insubstantial and it remains to be seen whether the Russians are prepared to do business and what price they would be ready to pay for an agreement acceptable to the West. Khrushchev took his routine pessimistic line about the Conference when he referred to disarmament in his talks in Copenhagen.

7. The Chinese again reminded the world that disarmament agreements which do not include them have small chance of being effective. Ch'en Yi in an interview with the Tokyo Broadcasting System repeated his earlier statement that China must have her own nuclear defence force. He gave no hint of when this would be, but said 'After a series of efforts, I think the day will come when we shall possess our own nuclear weapons.'

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

8. The Russians are paying increased attention to the effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute on state relations and are criticising the Chinese Government directly, as well as the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. A series of articles in Izvestiya examined the stresses which have arisen in inter-state relations. The Chinese were accused of ignoring their obligations under the Sino-Soviet Treaty to exchange information on important international questions and of not consulting other Communist countries even when Chinese actions affected their interests. Ch'en Yi was alleged to have declared that Soviet assurances to defend China against imperialist aggression were of no value. (The Russians are probably distorting his remarks) State relations were also referred to by Khrushchev in a speech at the Soviet-East German Friendship meeting (June 12). He said that the C.P.S.U. believed that ideological differences need not be extended to state relations, but he went on to accuse the Chinese of doing just this.

9. The Izvestiya series has also demonstrated serious concern at obvious resurgence of nationalism within the Communist movement. The concluding article declared that nationalism had now become the main danger for the movement. This was clearly intended not only to admonish the Chinese but also to warn the Rumanians, and any others who might be

/ tempted

tempted to follow in their footsteps. Izvestiya also indicated that the Russians had not been deterred by the unfavourable reception given to Khrushchev's suggestion in April that new organizational methods "were needed to co-ordinate policies among the bloc countries". It suggested specific measures like periodic conferences of ministers of Socialist countries to improve their mutual co-ordination. But there are no indications that the Eastern European countries will show any more enthusiasm for this kind of arrangement than they have in the past.

10. The Chinese for their part harassed their opponents mainly on the Afro-Asian front, and principally at the second Asian Economic Seminar (a Chinese-sponsored front organisation) which met in Pyongyang. The Chinese delegate made the sharpest public attack to date on the motives underlying Soviet aid to Afro-Asian countries, declaring that it was not only not disinterested, but was of a "great-power chauvinistic and national egoist" nature, and was used to interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient countries. Another point the Chinese felt obliged to take up was an accusation in a Tass report that China, while championing the African cause, had increased her trade with South Africa. This the Chinese press dismissed as a lie and intimated that it might well turn the accusation against the Russians.

11. The Russians continued their efforts to promote a world conference of communist parties: both Khrushchev and Podgorny have insisted on the need for taking action against the Chinese, but they have been careful to avoid giving the impression that they are determined to expel the Chinese at all costs. They appear to have secured some success with the Poles, who have now themselves called for the immediate convening of a preparatory conference and seem ready to agree to a world conference even if China and her supporters should boycott it. It is possible that Chinese activities within the Polish party have converted the Poles to the view that a formal division in the movement now may be less dangerous than leaving matters unresolved, although they may of course hope that the preparatory conference will serve as a device for postponing unpleasant decisions. On the other hand the opposition of the Rumanians, the Yugoslavs and the Italian Communists to such a meeting, not to speak of that of the supporters of the Chinese, still remains strong. The North Vietnamese came closer to the Chinese position by denouncing the "revisionists" attempts to convene a conference and thereby bring about an open split in the movement. Many other parties are still refusing to take up any public position one way or the other.

THE SOVIET BLOC

12. EAST GERMANY AND BERLIN.

Ulbricht paid a fortnight's visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of June. On June 12 Khrushchev and Ulbricht signed a Treaty of Friendship, a very long joint communiqué on the visit, and two agreements on economic and technical cooperation. The signature of these documents and the special treatment given to Ulbricht made it clear that the primary object of the visit was to enhance Ulbricht's own position and to strengthen the self-confidence of the East German Communist Party (S.E.D.) and the international status of the D.D.R. The Russians again formally guaranteed the D.D.R. frontiers. Thus they have again

/ served

served notice on the West that they will not contemplate any realistic proposals leading to German reunification. The arrangements made for strengthening economic cooperation are probably of more immediate practical significance; the Russians obviously intend to press on with plans for economic co-ordination with the D.D.R.

13. Khrushchev took pains to give the Western Powers advance notice of the Treaty, presumably with the object of reassuring them that it did not presage further action against their position in Germany and Berlin. The conclusion of the Treaty and the way it was presented seem to confirm that the danger of a separate Peace Treaty or of the Russians handing over to the East Germans their remaining responsibilities including those for Berlin access has receded. It looks as though Khrushchev may be content to leave the German situation as it is for the present, while attempting to strengthen the D.D.R.'s international position in the hope of eventually forcing the Federal Republic into negotiating with it on equal terms.

14. Two exceptionally stiff Notes were delivered to the British, French and United States Embassies in Moscow shortly after the Friendship Treaty was concluded. A Note of June 20 refused to guarantee the flight safety of certain international and charter flights in the Berlin air corridors; and a Note of June 25 protested against the meeting, due in Berlin on July 1, of both Houses of the Federal German Parliament for the purpose of electing the Federal German President. These Notes may be followed by further diplomatic moves or just conceivably by some controlled harassment of Berlin access. But it seems more likely that they were primarily for the record.

RUMANIA

15. Rumanian defiance of the Soviet Union continued during June. Moscow Radio's criticism in its Rumanian service of countries pursuing economic self-sufficiency evoked a mocking retort on the Rumanian home service. This was followed by a full-scale denunciation in the leading Rumanian economic weekly of a theory published in a Soviet academic journal advocating the establishment of supra-national economic complexes, with particular reference to the Lower Danube. This display of independence over external relations was accompanied by announcements that more than 10,000 political prisoners had been released since 1962, that more releases would follow, that wages and salaries would be increased in stages starting in August and that "socialist realism" in the arts was to be applied with a lighter touch. Rumania's policy of increasing contacts with the West was continued by the introduction of measures to improve tourist facilities, including the immediate grant of visas to non-block tourists on request, and by the arrangement of a high level visit to France in July by a delegation headed by the Prime Minister, Maurer.

16. There has been no public reaction from Moscow to Tito's hastily arranged meeting with Gheorghiu-Dej on June 22 following his talks with Khrushchev at Leningrad a fortnight earlier. It seems likely that Tito's main object was to persuade Rumania to tone down her defiance of the Soviet Union.

/ POLISH

POLISH PARTY CONGRESS

17. The 4th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party was devoted to two main themes, the Sino-Soviet dispute and a discussion on Poland's economic situation.

18. As noted above the change in the Polish attitude towards a conference may be connected with Chinese activities in Poland. Kliszko declared that the Chinese had been pursuing disruptive tactics within the Polish party. He said that a number of dogmatists had been attempting to adapt Chinese Marxism to Polish conditions and impose it on the Polish party. These activities had been nipped in the bud. (Since then there has been a case in Hungary of a party member being sentenced for spreading Chinese propaganda in this way.)

19. The rest of the Congress was devoted largely to Poland's economic situation; most of the speakers were more successful in identifying the problems than in providing the solutions to them.

20. The elections to the Central Committee during the Congress produced the same mixture as before. Gomulka's pre-eminence remains unchallenged; fears that the Stalinist wing of the party would make headway have proved unfounded, but equally the progressive elements in the party failed to strengthen their position.

LAOS

21. The Polish Government's initiative for consultations among the three Laotian parties and representatives of the Co-Chairmen and the three International Control Commission powers ran into trouble. The Russians appeared to favour the proposal, but they considered that such a restricted meeting should be regarded as a preliminary to a conference of all fourteen powers concerned with the Laotian settlement. The Chinese, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao opposed the Polish suggestion and when it became clear that in these circumstances the Russians would not maintain their support for it, the Poles withdrew it. They wish, however, to find some way of bringing the three Laotian parties together and it can be assumed that their efforts enjoy Soviet goodwill. The Russians are unable to control the course of events in Laos and since it must be clear to them that the Chinese, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao could create a situation which would be highly dangerous to Soviet interests, Soviet policy is likely to tend towards moderate and makeshift solutions. But whereas they were able to play a leading role in the Geneva settlement of 1962, it becomes increasingly obvious that they cannot call the tune on the Communist side now or in any future meetings.

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH MONGOLIA

22. All the Chinese workmen in Mongolia apart from a few hundred in Ulan Bator itself have now left, according to the Chinese, on the initiative of the Mongolian Government. The Mongolian newspaper Unen recently published a resolution passed by the Mongolian Central Committee last December which fiercely attacked the Chinese leadership for anti-Marxist views and a whole catalogue of other deviations. It further attacked the Chinese Communist Party's chauvinistic attitude towards the minorities under its control - 'particularly Kazakhs, Uighurs and Inner Mongolians'. Notwithstanding this belated outburst the work of demarcating the Sino-Mongolian border continues.

CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES

23. The Chinese continued to woo the Afro-Asians. President Sallal of the Yemen (who had previously visited most of the countries of the Soviet bloc) and Vice-President Kawawa of Tanganyika and Zanzibar paid banquet-studded visits to China during June. The main fruits of Sallal's visit were a ten year friendship treaty with China, couched in vague terms, and agreements to develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries. Kawawa signed an agreement on economic and technical aid; the Chinese no doubt regarded his visit as an occasion to try to recover from the set-back which they suffered in Zanzibar when the union with Tanganyika took place.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

24. A report was published on June 9 of an extended meeting of the Ideological Commission of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, held to appraise the effect of last year's meetings between Party leaders and the writers and artists. This report noted "the creation of a more healthy atmosphere" in the writers' and artists' organisations but warned that it would be premature to consider that "erroneous tendencies" had been completely overcome. A more optimistic survey by the Chief Editor of one of the literary journals, on the anniversary of the June 1963 Plenum on ideological questions, claimed that "all" the young writers criticised a year ago had since produced creditable new work, but charged critics with blowing hot and cold. It is evident that a stalemate continues: the liberal intellectuals are stubbornly refusing to produce the major "patriotic" works for which the Party has called, but at the same time they are displaying extreme caution; for example, the leading journal Novy Mir has so far published none of the work of these writers which it promised for this year.

CHRONOLOGY

- May 29 -
June 13 Ulbricht visited the Soviet Union.
- June
- 1 USSR-United States Consular Agreement signed
 in Moscow.
- 1 - 4 Mr. Harold Wilson visited Moscow.
- 1 - 11 President Sallal of the Yemen visited China.
- 4 Dr. Yusuf, the Afghan Prime Minister returned
 to Kabul after a long stay for medical
 treatment in the USSR.
- 5 - 16 Bulgarian Communist Party delegation led by
 Grigorov visited the Soviet Union.
- 5 - 25 Iraqi military delegation led by Abdul Aref
 (chief of staff, and the President's
 brother) visited the Soviet Union.
- 8 Tito had talks with Khrushchev in Leningrad.
- 9 Chinese Government statement on Laos.
 Sino-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship signed in
 Peking.
- 10 - 19 Kawawa, 2nd Vice-President of Tanzan
 visited China.
- 11 Strafing of the Plain of Jars, Laos.
 p2v planemanned by Chiang Kai-shek's air
 force shot down over North China.
- 12 Soviet Union-East German treaty signed in
 Moscow.
 20th Congress of the Australian Communist
 Party opened.
- 15 - 21 4th Congress of Polish Workers' Party.
- 16 - 21 Khrushchev visited Denmark.
- 16 - 23 2nd Asian Economic Seminar in Pyongyang.
- 18 Bolshoi Ballet expelled from West Germany
 for refusing to appear in West Berlin.
- 20 - 21 Mikoyan visited New Delhi.
- 22 Tito held talks with Gheorghiu-Dej.
 Soviet Note on Pan American flights from
 Berlin to New York.
- 22 -
July 2 Mikoyan visited Indonesia.

June

- 22 - 27 Khrushchev visited Sweden.
- 23 People's Daily denied earlier Tass allegations that China had increased her trade with South Africa.
- 25 Soviet Note attacking proposal to elect West German president in West Berlin.
- 28 Greek-Bulgarian package agreement initialled in Sofia.
- 28 -
July 4 Khrushchev visited Norway.