



Communist Policy and Tactics 1964, 2. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

January 8, 1965.

POLICY AND TACTICS

1964

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modify their own policies as a contribution towards better Sino-Soviet relations.

3. The Soviet approach to the dispute appeared still to be tactical rather than radically new. The Russians wish to bring to an end the public polemic which has proved so damaging to the image of Communism throughout the world and to look as if they are making a sincere effort to engage in further talks with the Chinese. The polemic was muted for a time after Khrushchev's departure, but it never really ceased. The Chinese consistently made clear that opposition to American policy in all its aspects must be the keystone of Communist policy and that the cultivation of good relations with the United States was pure revisionism. On their side the Russians, even in the speeches made while Chou En-lai was in Moscow, reaffirmed their policy of maintaining a measure of detente in their relations with the West. Once Chou En-lai had left Moscow the polemic began once again to increase in stridency, particularly on the Chinese side. Although the Chinese have not yet reverted to personal attacks on the Soviet leaders, the latest issue of the Party magazine "Red Flag" contained an article on the fall of Khrushchev which was in effect a major and slashing indictment of all the policies which the Soviet leaders have said that they intend to continue to pursue. For their part, the Russians have not been above engaging in indirect polemics; the November issue of "Problems of Peace and Socialism" published in Prague contained a number of anti-Chinese articles including the statement made by Professor Bernal in London in October, criticising the explosion of the Chinese atomic bomb. This issue of the periodical had been set up under the editorship of Runyantsev, who has since been appointed Editor of Pravda. But the Russians have so far refrained from replying directly to Chinese polemics in their own Moscow Press, which suggests that they still see advantage in looking as if they wish to keep the temperature down.

4. The explanation of this restraint may be found in the soundings which the Russians have apparently been taking to see whether a basis could be found on which the Chinese would take

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

NOVEMBER 1964

During the month the new Soviet leaders have been mainly concerned with the problem of their relations with the Chinese and with the Chinese and with internal issues. They have launched no major initiatives on the outside world and have reacted predictably to developments in the Congo, in Viet Nam and in response to reports of new discussions among the NATO allies on the creation of a multilateral force.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

2. The visit of Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, to Moscow for the October Revolution celebrations provided an opportunity for discussions on the relationship between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese can hardly have supposed that the departure of Khrushchev would lead to a major reversal in Soviet policies; but they seem to have believed that it might have engendered a state of flux within the Soviet party which would take some time to work itself out and that, rightly handled, this might yield some advantage for China. At no time, however, did the Chinese give any indication that they would be prepared to modify their own policies as a contribution towards better Sino-Soviet relations.

3. The Soviet approach to the dispute appeared still to be tactical rather than radically new. The Russians wish to bring to an end the public polemic which has proved so damaging to the image of Communism throughout the world and to look as if they are making a sincere effort to engage in further talks with the Chinese. The polemic was muted for a time after Khrushchev's departure, but it never really ceased. The Chinese consistently made clear that opposition to American policy in all its aspects must be the keystone of Communist policy and that the cultivation of good relations with the United States was pure revisionism. On their side the Russians, even in the speeches made while Chou En-lai was in Moscow, reaffirmed their policy of maintaining a measure of detente in their relations with the West. Once Chou En-lai had left Moscow the polemic began once again to increase in stridency, particularly on the Chinese side. Although the Chinese have not yet reverted to personal attacks on the Soviet leaders, the latest issue of the Party magazine "Red Flag" contained an article on the fall of Khrushchev which was in effect a major and slashing indictment of all the policies which the Soviet leaders have said that they intend to continue to pursue. For their part, the Russians have not been above engaging in indirect polemics; the November issue of "Problems of Peace and Socialism" published in Prague contained a number of anti-Chinese articles including the statement made by Professor Bernal in London in October, criticising the explosion of the Chinese atomic bomb. This issue of the periodical had been set up under the editorship of Runyantsev, who has since been appointed Editor of Pravda. But the Russians have so far refrained from replying directly to Chinese polemics in their own Moscow Press, which suggests that they still see advantage in looking as if they wish to keep the temperature down.

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part in the meeting to prepare for a World Communist Conference. It seems clear by now that the Russians must have decided to postpone the meeting which had been scheduled for December 15. Such a postponement will have enabled them to claim that they were sincere in trying to get together with the Chinese; it also got them out of an immediate difficulty with friendly parties who opposed the meeting. The indications are, however, that as long as they have no prospects of bringing about some change in Soviet policy the Chinese will persist in their refusal to attend the preparatory meeting. If this is confirmed, the new Russian leaders will be faced with the same dilemma as Khrushchev was; whether to press ahead with a meeting in the Spring and a final rupture in the international Communist movement; or to risk showing weakness by postponing it even further. They can still be certain only of a bare majority of the members of the Preparatory Commission attending.

EASTERN EUROPE

5. The stir which the downfall of Khrushchev caused in Eastern Europe and in non-Bloc Communist parties has begun to subside. Of the non-Bloc parties which sent Delegations to Moscow to seek an explanation none pronounced themselves entirely satisfied, but equally none were prepared to pursue their doubts in public.

6. The Rumanians, however, have continued their ostentatious display of independence, both in the Executive Committee meeting of the International Union of Students in Prague in mid-November, and at the Union's Eighth Congress in Sofia at the end of the month. If the Chinese accounts of these meetings are to be believed, the Rumanians were the authors in Prague of a successful amendment containing a strong defence of national economic sovereignty (the Russians mustered only four supporters against this Rumanian amendment). In Sofia the Rumanians moved an amendment to the rules of procedure designed to make divisions on important problems subject to a two-thirds majority or a unanimous vote which, had it been successful, would have worked to Chinese advantage. If these accounts are true, such behaviour must have caused considerable concern in Moscow.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

7. In a speech at the ceremony of Novotny's re-election as President on November 12, the Chairman of the National Assembly announced that the combination of the posts of President and Party First Secretary had been "amply justified". Speculation, which increased after Khrushchev's fall, that Novotny would lose at least one of these posts was thus disappointed. Speculation on a possible divergence of views between Prague and Moscow, arising from Novotny's absence from the November 7 anniversary celebrations in Moscow has also been silenced by his leadership of a powerful Party-Government delegation on a visit to Moscow from November 30 to December 4. In the speeches made by Brezhnev and Novotny during this visit no signs of differences emerged. Novotny seemed indeed to be playing down the importance of the forthcoming Czech economic reforms, perhaps partly in deference to his hosts.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

8. In the main, the new Soviet leaders have been content to let their relations with other countries take care of themselves while they concentrated on intra-Bloc and internal problems. The keynote speech by Brezhnev made at the October Revolution celebrations reaffirmed the Soviet intention of following a policy of
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"peaceful co-existence" in relations with the West and he was prepared to see the results of the United States elections as a victory for the forces of reason. The new régime has also been at pains to offer assurances all round of the continuity of Soviet policy; Soviet Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs have visited North Africa, India and South East Asia, no doubt for this purpose. Another of their objectives was probably to drum up support for the Soviet contention that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to make any financial contribution to peace-keeping activities by the United Nations of which the Soviet Union disapproved. The Russians have remained unbending on the question of principle on this issue, but were willing to accept a formula which enabled the United Nations General Assembly to begin its deliberations on non-contentious issues on December 1 without an immediate confrontation on this matter.

9. This apparent desire for a quiet life has not however inhibited the Russians from reacting strongly to some developments in the outside world. The United States-Belgian paratroop operation in Stanleyville and other towns in the Northern Congo, designed to rescue European hostages threatened with massacre by the insurgent régime, gave the Russians the pretext for claiming that gross acts of armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo had taken place. Demonstrations by African students outside the Congolese, Belgian and United States and British Embassies in Moscow were also permitted to get out of hand and considerable damage was caused though this did not stop the Chinese from accusing the Russians of obstructing the students. There were similar demonstrations in Prague and Sofia. The Chinese for their part not only matched Soviet propaganda in stridency but greatly outshone the Russians by the size of the demonstrations which they organised; a demonstration by 700,000 people in Peking was attended by Mao Tse-tung himself.

10. Another major preoccupation of Soviet propaganda during November has been the consideration being given by members of the North Atlantic Alliance to the organisation of a multilateral nuclear force. A Tass statement issued on November 15 asserted that the multilateral force would lead to the participation in the nuclear arms race "of those forces (i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany) whose whole policy is based on the maintenance of international tension and the revision by means of force of the position which has been established in the world". The statement repeated the warning, which has featured in earlier statements on the same issue, that the Soviet Union and its allies would take appropriate measures to safeguard their security and the security of their friends and allies if the force came into being. The East European countries have also been active in expressing concern about the consequences which the formation of the force would have for East/West relations and there have been hints from the East European countries themselves that they would reluctantly have to take certain measures, though they have not been specific on what these measures might be.

11. There is no reason to doubt that a serious concern about the force lies behind these statements, but one of the main objects of recent Soviet propaganda seems to have been both to highlight and exploit differences of approach towards the force among the Western Powers.

12. The recall of General Maxwell Taylor, the United States Ambassador in Saigon, for consultations in Washington on how best to prosecute the war in Indo-China led to a further Tass statement.

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Referring implicitly, if not explicitly, to Western Press reports that action against North Viet Nam might be under consideration, the statement said that "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal socialist country and is ready to give it the necessary help". This statement added nothing to earlier Soviet statements and in particular to Khrushchev's remarks on August 8 when he said that "the Soviet Union will be able to defend their homeland and other socialist countries". These statements are in general terms, typical of Soviet pronouncements on situations where a crisis appears to be in the offing. They were designed to register close Soviet interest in developments in Viet Nam and to create a fear of incalculable consequences if any action is taken against North Viet Nam. But they do not commit the Soviet Union to any specific courses of action. The Chinese have taken a stronger line and have said that they will not sit idly by if aggression is committed against their neighbour. But they have carefully avoided giving any specific commitment to intervene. Presumably they intend, while trying to dissuade the Americans from taking action against North Viet Nam, to leave themselves full freedom of manoeuvre in deciding on counter measures. The Chinese have also indirectly accused the Soviet Union of hypocrisy on the Viet Nam issue; in a speech in Hanoi on November 27 Liu Ning-yi, vice-chairman of the China Peace Committee, said that those who talked glibly about supporting the Vietnamese people while at the same time seeking cooperation with the United States could only expose their own hypocrisy.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

13. The second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Party since the dismissal of Khrushchev decided on the reunification of the industrial and agricultural Party organisation, which had been separated by a decision of the Plenum in November 1962. There will in future be a single Party organisation in each Oblast and Rayon. The elections which will be required by the reorganisation are to take place in December. Criticisms had earlier been voiced that the division had been forced through by Khrushchev on his personal authority against opposition. The reunification will mean that half of the present First Secretaries at Oblast level will have to be content with second place. This will give opportunities for the Soviet leaders to seek the selection of their own nominees and thus provide ample room for jockeying for position.

14. The same Plenum elected Shelest, the First Secretary in the Ukraine and Shelepin, already a Member of the Secretariat, to full membership of the Praesidium. Among those elected to full membership of the Central Committee was Semichastny, the head of the K.G.B. Shelepin will now be the youngest member of the Praesidium and his star appears to be rising rapidly. He has in the past been in charge of the K.G.B. These promotions are, however, unlikely in themselves to represent an intention on the part of the new Soviet leaders to increase the rôle which the K.G.B. now plays in Soviet life; to do so could create a threat to their own power. The main sufferer in the changes was Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubei, the former editor of Izvestiya, who was expelled from the Central Committee. Although Epishev, the Head of Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces, was promoted to the Central Committee, the changes did nothing to cast light on the rôle of the Army in the coup. There was no Party advancement for Malinovsky, the Minister of Defence, and the re-appointment of Marshal Zakharov to the post which he had formerly held as Chief of the General Staff, in succession to the late Chief of Staff Biryuzov, who was killed in an air crash in Yugoslavia, suggests

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that the new leadership are not yet ready to pick out a younger and more dynamic military leader who might seek to reshape the Soviet Armed Forces.

15. There will be a third Plenum of the Central Committee immediately before the Session of the Supreme Soviet summoned for December 9. A number of important decisions in the economic field may well emerge from these December meetings when the Budget will also have to be presented. There are already indications that the regional economic councils, also set up by Khrushchev, may be limited or abolished. But there has been no sign so far that the economic priorities, especially those given to chemistry and agriculture will suffer any major change. The rights of the consumer are also still being underlined in the Soviet Union, but whether promises now will have any more result than those of the past remains unclear. Nor has there been any indication that a halt will be called to the discussions in Soviet economic journals on how the Soviet economy ought to be modernised. Arguments by economists in favour of giving more independence to individual enterprises and of recognising profitability as at least one of the major criteria of industrial performance continue to receive publicity.

16. A mounting campaign has developed in the Soviet Union against the veteran biologist Lysenko, now bereft of the powerful support which he received in turn from Stalin and Khrushchev, and against his doctrines in the field of genetics and agricultural production. Articles by scientists have drawn attention to the low international standing of the Soviet Union in the field of genetics and to grave defects in the teaching of biology as a whole in Soviet schools and universities.

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CHRONOLOGY

- November 3 Italian Communist Party Delegation returned from Moscow - still with reservations about ousting of Khrushchev.
- 3-4 Chinese published reactions of French, Italian, Swedish, Dutch, New Zealand and other parties to Khrushchev's ousting.
- 5 Chou En-lai arrived in Moscow at head of Chinese Delegation to attend the Soviet 47th Anniversary celebrations.
- 6 Brezhnev's Eve of Anniversary Report.
- 6 Joint Soviet-Turkish communiqué published at close of Mr. Erkin's visit to Soviet Union.
- 7 47th Anniversary Parade in Red Square.
- 9 Polish author Melchior Wankowicz sentenced to three years imprisonment in Warsaw court for "slandering Poland".
- 12 Special meeting of Czech National Assembly re-elected President Novotny for 5 year term.
- 13 Chou En-lai left Moscow after talks held in "frank and comradely atmosphere".
- 13 Rumyantsev, until now editor of The Problems of Peace and Socialism replaced Satyukov as editor of Pravda.
- 13 Long article in Zeri-i-Popullit attacked Togliatti's memorandum, revisionism and polycentrism.
- 13 Decree issued removing restrictions on size of private agricultural plots in the R.S.F.S.R.
- 14 Series of articles attacking Chinese policies appeared in Problems of Peace and Socialism

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- November 14-17 Executive committee meeting of International Union of Students in Prague.
- 14-18 World Council of Peace meeting in Delhi.
- 14 British Trade Fair in Peking closed.
- 16 New appointments to the Presidium made by Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.
- 20-21 Polish Central Committee meeting.
- 21 Red Flag answered criticism of Problems of Peace and Socialism and published article entitled "Why Khrushchev Fell".
- 22 Chinese C.P. Delegation to Japanese C.P. Convention refused entry into Japan.
- 24 9th Convention of Japanese C.P. opened.
- 25-27 Czech Foreign Minister David in Paris talks with M. Couve de Murville.
- 26 Chinese Government Statement attacked United States/Belgian intervention in the Congo.
- 20-27 Popevic, Yugoslav Foreign Minister, in Paris for talks.
- 27 Hoxha made lengthy speech attacking revisionism and vindicating Stalin.
- 27 Tass statement on Viet Nam.
- 27 Mass rallies staged in Peking against United States-Belgian intervention in Congo.
- 28 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev in Paris for talks.
- 28 Meeting of International Union of Students opened in Sofia.
- 28 Mao Tse-tung issued statement on the Congo situation.
- 30 Novotny went to Moscow.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JANUARY 1964

There have been no new strong trends in Soviet policy during the month. The Soviet Note on the renunciation of the use of force in the settlement of territorial disputes was probably conceived primarily as a means of keeping the political initiative during a period when no major East-West negotiations were in prospect. Otherwise the Russians have been content to take their opportunities as they came. Their treatment of events in East Africa has been muted; they have recognised that they would seriously offend East African leaders by condemning their appeal for British military support. The Chinese have again intensified their challenge to Soviet leadership of the world communist movement and the dispute between the two continues to nourish the trend towards polycentrism and national communism in European Communist parties.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

2. Khrushchev's Note to Heads of State and Prime Ministers proposing an agreement on the repudiation of force in the settlement of territorial disputes marks a new Soviet diplomatic and propaganda initiative, launched with unusual fanfare. But the Russians do not necessarily have any clear-cut plan for its long-term exploitation and their tactics are likely to be adapted in the light of what support they can obtain from governments outside the bloc.
3. The Russians probably do not expect major negotiations with the West in what will be an election year in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The Note may thus have been conceived as a means of keeping the political initiative during this period and impressing the world with the image of the Soviet leaders actively working for peace. Their initiative seems to fall into an already familiar pattern of Soviet operations. They launch general ideas - complete and universal disarmament, the reform of the United Nations - which they know cannot be carried easily or quickly to a conclusion. But the side-effects of these moves may help them to identify possibilities for further initiatives and they can in any case be used to make it appear that the Western powers are responsible for the lack of progress.
4. The Russians have addressed their Note on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes to all governments, many of whom have a close interest in the question of frontiers. The replies could offer pretexts for further Soviet notes. They will hope to receive support from countries which have the most to fear on account of disputed frontiers. But if countries whose friendship they are cultivating have outstanding territorial claims, the Russians can find a reason for stating that their particular claim falls outside the scope of the Note (the Soviet refusal to give any guarantee to Israel is a case in point). The recent attack on the Chinese in the Soviet Press for their failure to publish either the Note itself or foreign reactions to it shows that the Russians are also hoping to use the Note to discredit and isolate the Chinese, whose conduct of their border dispute with India has aroused widespread misgivings in Asia. But apart from tactics or propaganda, the Russians may also see some genuine advantage in avoiding situations into which the larger powers could be drawn.

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5. Meanwhile the Disarmament Conference reassembled at Geneva in a relaxed atmosphere. The Communist representatives, although they had nothing new to offer at the outset, were at pains to present themselves as flexible and anxious for action rather than talk. At the beginning of the second week of the Conference, the Russians tabled a memorandum on measures to decrease international tension. It consisted for the most part of familiar Soviet proposals, such as those for the reduction or withdrawal of foreign troops, the reduction of military budgets, a NATO/Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact, the creation of nuclear-free zones, non-dissemination and measures against surprise attack. The memorandum appears to have been hastily put together as a reply to the message from President Johnson, which was presented to the Conference when it reconvened and which singled out a number of particular areas for further progress. The only one of the proposals in the Soviet memorandum which was in any way remarkable was that for the destruction of bomber aircraft. This proposal is widely recognised as having originated with the Americans, who have been contemplating a "bonfire" of obsolescent Soviet and American medium bombers. The Russians have explained that they mean the destruction of all bomber aircraft by all countries, from which it is clear that their proposal was put forward for propaganda purposes and to over-trump the American scheme.

6. Some clarification has been obtained of the proposals put forward by M. Gomulka in his speech at the end of December. The Poles have said that none of the five points he proposed for negotiation were in fact linked with each other, although they could be negotiated in parallel. (The Russians, on the other hand, have just reiterated at Geneva that they will not consider the establishment of observation posts as an isolated measure). It is clear that the Poles are primarily interested in a freezing of nuclear armaments in Central Europe. However, their ideas are still imprecise and it seems unlikely that they will put forward any such proposals at Geneva in the near future.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

7. There are signs that the Russians are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain their self-imposed ban on polemics in face of continuing Chinese attacks. In a speech during Castro's visit to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev refuted some of the main Chinese criticisms of the Soviet leadership. A recent issue of the international Communist journal emphasised the dangers of Chinese "splitting" activities and an authoritative political text-book, which has just been put on sale in the Soviet Union, contains sharp criticism of Chinese positions. Soviet Central Asian newspapers have also carried reports of increased vigilance and the arrest of infiltrators along the border with China. At the end of the month, a Pravda article accused the Chinese of deliberately misrepresenting the Soviet peaceful initiative on the settlement of frontier disputes and asserted that Chinese talk had long since "sickened every honest-minded person".

8. This Soviet reaction is not surprising given the propaganda pressure which the Chinese have maintained on them. Early in January the communique issued at the end of Chou En-lai's visit to Albania had already restated the Chinese positions in the dispute in uncompromising terms. The tone of propaganda put out by the Chinese and their supporters gives the impression that they are increasingly prepared to contemplate the formal as well as practical division of the World Communist movement. An Indonesian Communist Party resolution called on "Marxist-Leninists" of the world to unite and smash revisionism (i.e. pro-Soviet views), and divided workers' parties into categories according to how far they were controlled by "Marxist-Leninists" or "revisionists". The seventh in the series of Chinese anti-Soviet articles was published

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at the beginning of February. Its timing and highly provocative tone suggest that the Chinese wish to drive the Russians into resuming full-scale polemics and perhaps towards initiatives which would lead to a formal division of the Communist movement. The Chinese make clear their intention to continue the public debate with the Soviet leaders and their support for "true Marxist-Leninist" groups or parties, until they have "buried the revisionists". In face of this latest onslaught, Russian tactics of appearing to seek a compromise must seem increasingly futile.

CASTRO'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

9. During his recent visit to the Soviet Union Castro obtained a useful long-term trade agreement, which provides a guaranteed market for a large proportion of the sugar Cuba expects to produce up to 1970. In return, Castro came rather closer to the Soviet line in international affairs and has gone some way towards endorsing the Soviet point of view in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The final communique laid emphasis on co-existence, Cuban non-intervention in the affairs of other countries and Cuba's readiness "to do everything necessary" to establish good relations with the United States; but these statements were balanced by expressions of support for states seeking to consolidate their independence.

10. It seems probable that, with Russian encouragement, Castro is keeping the door open to the possibility of some kind of understanding with the United States. In the longer term, Cuban relations with the Soviet Union are likely to be subject to the same strains as in the recent past. The extent of Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet Union is in itself a potential irritant; and it will require great flexibility and tolerance on the part of the Soviet leaders to keep Castro for long to his present alignment. Castro has also shown no sign that he is prepared to abandon his messianic role in Latin America. In a television speech on his return to Havana, he argued that the sugar agreement was an encouraging precedent for all under-developed nations and in particular urged the Latin American countries to demand similar advantages in their trade with the United States. We are likely to hear more of this from the Cubans and the Russians both in their propaganda and in future international discussions on commodity prices. Castro also appealed for the setting up of a Latin American common fund to save Panama from being "economically strangled" and offered unilateral help if necessary.

SOVIET AND CHINESE REACTIONS TO RECENT CRISIS

11. The Chinese reacted swiftly and violently to events in Panama, which they saw as the first major armed defiance of the United States on the American mainland and clearly hoped would develop into a first-class crisis with repercussions throughout Latin America. They were the occasion for one of Mao Tse-tung's rare public utterances and for a massive, anti-American propaganda campaign, which continued for some days throughout China. Not to be out-done, the Soviet Press was also quick to exploit Panama (but in a much lower key than the Chinese) and the many other crises which occurred in various parts of the world during the month. The Americans were strongly attacked for their military role in South Vietnam and publicity given to North Vietnamese accusations of American "atrocities". The Soviet Press gave almost daily coverage to the Cyprus crisis and the Russians issued a statement accusing the NATO powers of interfering in the internal affairs of Cyprus in violation of the United Nations Charter. By sending a (surprisingly mild) letter to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Russians have also prepared the way for a subsequent move in the Security Council. Their general aim so far seems to have been to seek the maximum advantage by a show

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of support for the Greek Cypriots without committing themselves to any definite courses of action.

12. Communist reaction to events in East Africa was more cautious. The Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement warning the British Government against intervention in Zanzibar. But comment on developments in the other East African countries has been relatively muted in Moscow and Peking; both the Russians and the Chinese must hesitate to risk damaging their relations with the governments of the three countries concerned by openly attacking their decision to call in British troops.

CHOU EN-LAI'S VISIT TO AFRICA

13. Chou En-lai has continued his tour of Africa; after Albania, he visited Ghana, Mali, Guinea, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The communique at the end of his Ethiopian visit stated that Ethiopia supported the restoration of China's legitimate rights at the United Nations and envisaged the early resumption of normal relations between the two countries; and the Emperor of Ethiopia was invited to visit China after relations had been restored. However Chou-En-lai was later quoted on Mogadishu radio as saying that Ethiopia was controlled by foreigners and that "the foreign hand was pressing down heavily upon her ... but the Ethiopian people will be free". Chou-En-lai has had to drop his plans to visit Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and President Nyerere has had to postpone his visit to China which was to have taken place in February. A notable feature of Chou's tour has been the differences in tone and context of the statements issued during his tour, each of which is tailored to local needs. This attempt to get the best of all African worlds may give rise to doubts in Africa about Chinese sincerity and intentions.

CHINESE MOTIVES IN AGREEING TO FRENCH RECOGNITION

14. In a statement issued on the day following the announcement on recognition, the Chinese made it clear that they expected the French to break off relations with Formosa and that their stand on the "Two Chinas" issue was unchanged. Their willingness to allow this issue to be blurred until French recognition had been accorded probably derived from the advantages they saw in:

- (i) intensifying strains between France and the United States;
- (ii) enhancing Chinese international standing by adding to the list of governments which recognise Peking;
- (iii) emphasising China's capacity to make her own way in the world, regardless of the loss of Soviet support internationally.

VIETNAM

15. The Communists are trying to capitalise on war-weariness and pro-neutralist sentiment in South Vietnam. The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam has made considerable efforts to increase its popular appeal; it has also been reorganised in order to achieve a more flexible direction of the struggle in the South. The main emphasis of Communist propaganda continues to be directed towards neutralisation as a solution for South Vietnam only. Although the hope is also held out of reunification of the South with the North, the conditions under which this could be realised are left vague. The communique on the December Meeting of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party indicated that the Peking and Moscow factions are still disputing

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control of the Party. A delegation led by the Party First Secretary is at present in Moscow after visiting Peking, where it was received by Mao Tse-tung; but little of its purpose has so far become known.

CAMBODIA

16. Both the Soviet and Chinese Governments have taken advantage of Prince Sihanouk's quarrel with the United States to increase their influence. They have supported the holding of a conference on Cambodian neutrality. Although it is questionable how wholeheartedly the Soviet Government want a conference, if they are to stay in Prince Sihanouk's good books they have no alternative but to welcome it. Following the rejection of American economic aid, the Chinese have increased theirs and have sent economic advisers to help in implementing the new Cambodian economic policy of nationalising banking and trade.

EUROPEAN COMMUNIST TRENDS

17. The trend towards greater diversity and "polycentrism" in the world Communist movement has gained strength during the past month. At a press conference in Rome Pajetta, an Italian Communist Party leader, made the first public admission that preparations are under way for a conference of West European Communist Parties. This follows an unpublicised meeting in Stockholm last September attended by representatives of the Italian, French, Swedish, Finnish and West German Communist Parties, at which the possibility of establishing an autonomous grouping of West European Communist Parties was discussed. Among those who attended this meeting was Hermansson, subsequently elected Chairman of the Swedish Communist Party, who is one of the leading European advocates of national Communism.

18. During Togliatti's recent visit to Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Press gave much publicity to the Italian Communist Party view that at this stage a conference of West European Communist Parties would be more effective as a means of promoting Communist unity than any world conference. "Differing roads to Socialism" was one of the keynotes of the communique issued by the Yugoslav and Italian Communist Parties after the talks in Belgrade. It also stated that the recognition of this factor in the Communist movement and of "the process of differentiation" now taking place in the world, which both Parties undertook to study, was in their view the best way of promoting Communism and Communist unity. Although the communique condemned the Chinese, it can have afforded the Russians little comfort. While advocating cooperation and especially bilateral links between Parties, it did not once mention the Soviet Union or the Soviet Communist Party and was in effect a declaration of the independence of individual parties in seeking their own roads to Socialism. The Soviet Press confined itself to reporting Togliatti's arrival and departure and giving a brief summary of passages from the communique endorsing the policy of peaceful co-existence and expressing the two Parties' intention to work for Communist unity.

SOVIET AGRICULTURE

19. Members of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee attending the plenary meeting on agricultural production, due to begin on February 10, will have available the Soviet Central Statistical Office's report on the fulfilment of the 1963 plan. On agriculture it is both secretive and revealing. There is a striking absence of further information about the grain harvest: the report gives no details either of the total grain harvest or

/ of State

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of State wheat procurements - total grain procurements for 1963 were 21% below the 1962 figure. Production of milk and eggs also declined. Output of meat showed an increase caused by the large-scale slaughtering of pigs owing to the shortage of fodder; at the beginning of 1964 there were 40% fewer pigs than a year previously. The statistics thus throw some further light on last year's agricultural set-back and on the exacting problems which will face the forthcoming Plenum.

WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES

17. The first towards greater diversity and "polycentrism" in the world Communist movement was a trend towards the East. At a time when the East was the main focus of Communist Party activity, the first public declaration that internationalism was being followed in a practical manner in the Communist Party. This was done in a speech by the Secretary of the Communist Party at the 1956 Congress of the Communist Party, which the Secretary of the Communist Party was presiding over. It was then that the Secretary of the Communist Party, who is one of the leading figures in the world Communist movement, said:

18. During the last decade, a recent visit to Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Party gave much evidence that the Communist Party view that of this stage a transition to a more advanced Communist Party was necessary. "The Communist Party" was one of the main slogans of the Yugoslav and Italian Communist Parties after the war in Europe. It also stated that the Communist Party of the world was the best of all parties of internationalism and that place in the world, which the Party of internationalism is in their view the best way of protecting Communist Party unity. Although the Communist Party of the world, it has not only the Yugoslav and Italian Communist Parties, but also the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which between the two wars did not even reach the Soviet Union as the Communist Party of the world in which a transition to the Communist Party of the world was necessary. The Communist Party of the world is the best of all parties of internationalism and that place in the world, which the Party of internationalism is in their view the best way of protecting Communist Party unity. Although the Communist Party of the world, it has not only the Yugoslav and Italian Communist Parties, but also the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which between the two wars did not even reach the Soviet Union as the Communist Party of the world in which a transition to the Communist Party of the world was necessary. The Communist Party of the world is the best of all parties of internationalism and that place in the world, which the Party of internationalism is in their view the best way of protecting Communist Party unity.

FOURTH ANNOUNCEMENT

19. - Reports of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee attending the 19th Party Congress in Moscow, 1952, and the 19th Party Congress in Moscow, 1952, will have recalled the Soviet Communist Party's report on the 19th Party Congress. There is a similar situation in the Communist Party of the world. The report gives as details of the Soviet Communist Party's

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CHRONOLOGY

December 31 - Chou En-lai visited Albania.
January 9

January

- 2 Khrushchev sent note to Heads of State and Prime Ministers proposing an agreement on the repudiation of force in the settlement of frontier disputes.
- 2 - 5 Khrushchev visited Poland.
- 3 - 6 Congress of the Swedish Communist Party.
- 4 - 11 Italian Communist Party Delegation led by Luigi Longo visited Algeria.
- 6 Opening in Moscow of Soviet/United States Cultural Talks.
- 9 New China News Agency announced decision by a dissident Brussels Provincial Committee on December 22 to create a new Communist Party of Belgium, led by Jacques Grippa.
- 9 - 11 Chou En-lai visited Tunisia.
- 11 - 16 Chou En-lai visited Ghana.
- 11 - 12 Visit to Moscow by the East German Premier, Ulbricht.
- 12 Statement by Mao Tse-tung marked opening of a Chinese anti-American propaganda campaign in support of Panama.
- 13 - 23 Castro visited U.S.S.R. Communiqué was published on January 23.
- 14 Pravda and Izvestiya published articles refuting C.I.A. claims about the rate of growth of the Soviet economy.
- 15 Ulbricht wrote to Dr. Erhard proposing a comprehensive renunciation of nuclear weapons. (His letter was returned unopened.)
- 15 - 21 Italian Communist Party Delegation led by Palmiro Togliatti visited Yugoslavia.
- 16 - 21 Chou En-lai visited Mali.
- 16 Unita published report of Italian Communist Party Leaders' press conference (including a statement by Pajetta).
- 16 Yugoslav Government protested against attacks on the Yugoslav régime made by Chou En-lai during his Albanian visit.
- 17 China recognised new government of Zanzibar.

January

- 17 Abderrachi Gherab, member of the Central Committee of the Algerian F.L.N., arrived in Peking.
- 18 Soviet Union recognised new government of Zanzibar.
- 19 - 21 Conference, organised by Premalal Kumarasiri, purporting to be the VII Congress of the Ceylon Communist Party; it elected its own Central Committee on January 24.
- 20 Publication of Communiqué on 9th Session of the North-Vietnamese Workers' Party which was held in December.
- 21 Signing of a long-term trade agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
- 21 - 27 Chou En-lai visited Guinea.
- 22 - 30 The Mayor of Moscow, Mr. Promyslov, visited Britain as a guest of the London County Council.
- 23 Opening in Moscow of Sino-Soviet Talks on exchange of goods in 1964.
- 26 Publication of Soviet Foreign Ministry statement warning against Western intervention in Zanzibar.
- 27 Announcement by France and China of agreement to establish diplomatic relations at Ambassador level.
- 27 - 30 Chou En-lai visited the Sudan.
- 28 Delegation of North-Vietnamese Workers' Party Central Committee arrived in Peking on the way to Moscow.
- 28 Soviet delegate tabled memorandum at Geneva on measures to decrease international tension. It included proposals on the destruction of bomber aircraft.
- 30 Soviet statement on Cyprus issued by Tass.
- 30 Russian fighters shot down a USAF jet trainer over East Germany.
- 30 Publication in Pravda of an article entitled "Why Mislead The Public?", accusing China of distorting Khrushchev's message on the peaceful settlement of frontier disputes.

January 30 - Chou En-lai visited Ethiopia.
February 1

(1681/64)

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HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister of Iceland.

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

April 3, 1964

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POLICY AND TACTICS

APRIL 1964.

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the meetings on collateral
have tended to concentrate

on advocating the reduction of military budgets.
In the discussions on general and complete disarmament,
they have been expounding the revised version of their
proposal for the retention of the nuclear umbrella until
the end of the disarmament process put forward by
Gromyko at the General Assembly, without modifying their
positions in regard to the major obstacles to progress
in disarmament. In a Press interview at the beginning
of March, Gromyko showed that he did not wish to leave
Mr. Butler's address at Geneva unanswered and tried to
shift the blame for lack of progress in the disarmament
talks on to the West. He again invited the Western
powers to pursue a policy of disarmament "by mutual
example" and criticised the United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic for increasing their military budgets
instead of reducing them. There has so far been little
attempt at Geneva or elsewhere to exploit Khrushchev's
Note on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.

COMMUNIST TACTICS AT THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

3. Gromyko also referred to the forthcoming United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, due to begin
in Geneva on March 23, and said that it symbolised
the need to divert expenditure from the arms race to
economic and cultural development. But the Communist
delegates at the conference may have to be more cautious
than they might otherwise wish for fear of being drawn
into specific obligations to the developing countries.
The Communist position is in any case open to criticism

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

FEBRUARY 1964.

During the month the Communist countries have been mainly preoccupied with the Sino-Soviet dispute and with internal economic matters. Delegations from a number of influential Communist parties have visited Moscow for consultations, possibly as the prelude to a new Soviet move in the dispute. The Rumanians, who have not been to Moscow, have sent a high level team to Peking. Any hope they may have of mediating in the dispute is unlikely to be realised; the Chinese have made clear their intention to persist in the quarrel. The recognition of economic failures is leading East European countries to seek unorthodox solutions to their problems. In the Soviet Union the recent Central Committee Plenum showed that agriculture remains the Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

2. The atmosphere at the Geneva Disarmament Conference has continued to be relaxed, apart from occasional Communist attacks on Bonn and the NATO Multilateral Force. At the meetings on collateral measures, the Russians have tended to concentrate on advocating the reduction of military budgets. In the discussions on general and complete disarmament, they have been expounding the revised version of their proposal for the retention of the nuclear umbrella until the end of the disarmament process put forward by Gromyko at the General Assembly, without modifying their positions in regard to the major obstacles to progress in disarmament. In a Press interview at the beginning of March, Gromyko showed that he did not wish to leave Mr. Butler's address at Geneva unanswered and tried to shift the blame for lack of progress in the disarmament talks on to the West. He again invited the Western powers to pursue a policy of disarmament "by mutual example" and criticised the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic for increasing their military budgets instead of reducing them. There has so far been little attempt at Geneva or elsewhere to exploit Khrushchev's Note on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.

COMMUNIST TACTICS AT THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
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from these countries, because of the relatively meagre scale of their aid and also of their commodity imports from them. Moderation on policy issues need not exclude sharp attacks on the developed countries and the Communist representatives may well encourage the principal suppliers of commodities to the Western countries to seek more long-term commodity agreements on the lines of the recent Cuban-Soviet sugar deal.

CYPRUS

4. Since Khrushchev addressed his offensively phrased message to the Prime Minister on Cyprus, the Soviet Press has continued to give prominent and hostile coverage to British and American policies there. At the United Nations and elsewhere, Soviet tactics in February were entirely opportunist and designed to exacerbate the difficulties between the NATO powers. While putting themselves forward as the champions of the Greek Cypriot case, the Russians called for the abrogation of the 1960 agreements and the withdrawal of foreign troops, without making any suggestion on further action to keep the peace. The visit to Cyprus of a Soviet delegation led by the head of the administration of Aeroflot appeared to be time to give the Soviet Union an opportunity to demonstrate Russian interest in Cyprus at a critical phase in the discussions. It has resulted in an agreement to establish a direct air link between Moscow and Nicosia.

THE CONGO

5. In the Congo too, the Russians appear to be fishing in troubled waters. They did not break off diplomatic relations with the Congolese Government last November when the staff of the Soviet Embassy were expelled from Leopoldville. But the Soviet Press and radio are now openly supporting the revolt against the Central Government in Kwilu province led by Pierre Mulele, whose followers they describe as "freedom fighters ... continuing the struggle for the genuine liberation of their country from the colonialists". Mulele, a former close collaborator with both Lumumba and Gizenga and in close touch with the subversive "government-in-exile" in Brazzaville (with which the Soviet Embassy in Leopoldville were previously in contact), has visited both Moscow and Peking; he is believed to have received instruction in guerilla warfare from the Chinese, who are giving him propaganda support and possibly some material aid. The Russians probably calculate that they cannot allow the Chinese to be the only public supporters of this latest "national liberation movement". The Chinese have established diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville); and the establishment of a mission there would, of course, provide them with the means of keeping in touch with the left-wing opposition in Brazzaville.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

6. Reports are circulating among Communist parties of a letter sent last November by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to the Chinese, which included a proposal for negotiations on border problems. In an

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interview at the end of January, Chou En-lai told an American journalist that agreement had been reached to negotiate with the Russians on boundary questions and it appears that these negotiations have already begun in Peking. The Russians have lately shown increased sensitiveness about their border with China, particularly in Kazkhstan, and both Moscow and Peking may be anxious to avoid a recurrence of border incidents such as took place in 1962. The purpose of the talks is probably to minimise such incidents, rather than to arrive at a definitive demarcation treaty. No Chinese reply to Khrushchev's circular note on the peaceful settlement of frontier disputes has yet been made public.

7. While both sides may be willing to make such adjustments in inter-state relations and retain certain links (a new round of Sino-Soviet trade talks began in January and agreement has also been reached on a programme of cultural exchanges during 1964), there is no sign of any reconciliation of Party differences. The Chinese are continuing their polemical attacks on the Soviet leaders and are openly giving support to dissident Communist parties and factions. North Vietnamese, New Zealand and Japanese Communist Party leaders (all of whom support the Chinese) have recently been in Peking. There are also indications of new moves on the Russian side. Delegates from a number of influential Communist parties have been visiting Moscow (but notably not the Rumanians - see paragraph 8 below). It also seems probable that Sino-Soviet relations were discussed on the last day of the recent Soviet Central Committee Plenum, which had been enlarged to include senior officials responsible for ideological and propaganda work. Subsequently there were unconfirmed reports that the Central Committee had approved the reopening of polemics against the Chinese on a wide scale in the near future. The Soviet Ambassador in Peking, who had been in Moscow for the Plenum, returned to Peking on February 14 and left again for Moscow a week later. It has been suggested that he brought some form of communication from the Russians, which the Chinese rejected, and that this accounted for his sudden journey back to Moscow.

8. A high-level Rumanian Party delegation led by Maurer, the Prime Minister, arrived in Peking at the beginning of March for discussions with a Chinese delegation led by Liu Shao-chi. The visit is ostensibly at the invitation of the Chinese but it seems likely that it was a Rumanian initiative, made without prior consultation with the Russians. The discussions are said to be about relations between the two parties and countries and "particularly regarding problems of the unity of the Socialist camp and the International Communist and Workers' Movement."

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This implies that Rumania hopes to mediate in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. There has been little comment from the Russian side but the indications are that they do not look with favour on the visit; they cannot expect Rumanian mediation to succeed and may well have doubts about Rumanian motives in going to Peking. In the past, Rumania has used the dispute to strengthen her hand in getting her own way on economic questions in C.M.E.A. But it is hard to see what Rumanian national interest will be served on this occasion. Her trade with the Soviet Union accounts for 40% of all her external trade, whereas her trade with China is very small. Relations between Yugoslavia and Rumania, which have improved lately, would hardly be helped if Rumania drew nearer to Peking. A possible explanation of Rumanian behaviour is that they have grown over-confident of their ability to get away with actions which the Russians may not like, are asserting their independence (perhaps for internal reasons) and have an inflated sense of the part they might play in mediating in the quarrel. The Chinese will be able to make valuable propaganda capital out of the visit and Soviet reaction, or the absence of it, will be an interesting pointer to the state of the game in the competition between the Russians and Chinese for the support of the Communist parties of the world.

VIETNAM

9. A delegation from the North Vietnamese Workers' Party visited Moscow in early February and stopped off in Peking for two days on the way back to Hanoi. It seems likely that one of the issues in their talks with a Soviet Communist Party delegation headed by Suslov was the Sino-Soviet dispute. The wording of the communiqué issued after the talks does not indicate that the Russians obtained any satisfaction from the North Vietnamese over this. The talks were also almost certainly concerned with the extent of North Vietnamese support for Vietcong activities in South Vietnam. The communiqué included an expression of firm Russian support for the "just struggle of the Vietnamese people in South Vietnam".

10. TASS issued a statement on February 25 calling for American withdrawal and a strict observance of the 1954 Geneva agreements. The statement constituted no more than the minimum response to recent reports in the Western Press of the possibility of some extension of United States operations in South Vietnam, including direct action against North Vietnam. It ended with a cautiously phrased warning that "the Soviet people could not remain indifferent" to developments in South Vietnam and would render "the necessary assistance and support" to the South Vietnamese national liberation struggle. The statement offered possible clues on Soviet ideas for a way out of the present situation. It said that the question of a peaceful settlement in South Vietnam "had matured" and was waiting for a solution. It also expressly supported an earlier statement by the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, which called for a settlement on the basis of the peace, independence and

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/neutrality

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neutrality of South Vietnam. This could conceivably be a hint that the Russians would move quickly to propose a conference on the neutralisation of South Vietnam, if the going became too hot.

CHOU EN-LAI'S TOUR OF SOUTH ASIA

11. Following his tour of Africa Chou En-lai, accompanied by the Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, has visited a number of Asian countries - Burma, Pakistan, and Ceylon. As in the case of his African tour, his general aim has probably been to increase China's contacts and influence and he is likely to have laid particular stress on gaining support for a second Afro-Asian conference and also on seeking backing for China's point of view on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

12. To judge from the communiques issued in Rangoon and Karachi, results so far have been mixed from a Chinese point of view. The Burmese Government showed no interest in convening a second Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, but the Pakistani President has endorsed the idea. The Chinese have laid great stress on their wish to negotiate a settlement of their border dispute with India "on the basis of the Colombo Conference proposals". It is not clear whether this represents any modification of the Chinese position; but it would seem to indicate China's concern to demonstrate her reasonableness in advance of a new Afro-Asian Conference, at which India would inevitably be present and where discussion of the border dispute might otherwise prove embarrassing to China.

BERLIN

13. The Federal Government and the West Berlin Senate have announced their rejection of the East German proposal for an Easter pass arrangement for West Berliners on the same basis as the Christmas one. Since the conclusion of the original Christmas arrangement, the East Germans have tried to make political capital by portraying it as the first direct agreement between East Germany and West Berlin. They have had the dual aim of enhancing their own status and of sowing dissension between West Berlin and the Federal Government. Discussions about the possibility of future pass agreements between the West Berlin and East German representatives have now been suspended until after Easter. The East German authorities may see advantages in this situation: they are spared the influx of West Berliners bringing dangerous information and the breath of freedom and at the same time can accuse the Federal Government of keeping the Wall closed when the East were ready to open it.

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ECONOMIC TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE

14. Hungary and Bulgaria have followed the Czech precedent by concluding agreements with the Soviet Union to establish inter-governmental Commissions for Economic and Technical Cooperation; Bulgaria has also obtained a new long-term credit of 300 million roubles. Although not contrary to C.M.E.A doctrine, these bilateral arrangements probably reflect last year's set-back to C.M.E.A integration. Economic failures have also led East European countries to introduce measures of a kind unusual in Communist states. Outstanding among these have been the announcement of a Hungarian tax on industrial capital and a Czech programme which includes the reduction of planning staff, differential State Bank interest rates to favour productive enterprises and the use of price policy as a means of influencing supply and demand. East Germany is pledged to follow the Hungarian example and Bulgaria the Czech. It would be premature to read too much into these measures, but they represent a movement which is potentially important and they are accompanied by discussion of economic problems which in some cases represents distinctly unorthodox thinking.

EAST GERMANY

15. The plenary meeting of the East German Communist Party (S.E.D.) revealed differences of opinion within the Party and in the industrial administration on certain questions of economic policy. Ulbricht himself charted the course ahead in a long speech favouring the rapid expansion of the petro-chemical industry, which seems to have been a disputed issue. He and his supporting team appeared to dominate the field and his political authority remains unchallenged, but the doubt, confusion and friction shown at the Plenum do not augur well for the swift growth of the economy.

16. The importance to the Communist bloc of the East German chemical industry was underlined in a recent announcement by the Chairman of the permanent commission for the industry that East Germany would deliver to the Soviet Union "about 200 installations for bulk chemical enterprises by 1970". The rapidly expanding East German chemical industry is already large by any standards, second only to that of the Soviet Union among Communist countries; it is an important producer of nitro-fertilisers, particularly potash of which East Germany is the principal supplier to the countries of Eastern Europe. The petro-chemical industry is to be expanded with Soviet aid; the Soviet Union and East Germany will thus help each other considerably in developing their respective chemical industries. East German exports of fertilisers are likely to be of particular value to the bloc over the next few years in their efforts to surmount their agricultural difficulties.

SOVIET AGRICULTURE

17. Two months after it had adopted a massive programme for the expansion of the chemical industry, the Soviet Central Committee met again to consider measures for the intensive development of agriculture. Khrushchev was the only Party leader to address the Plenum; while he was at pains to defend his past policies, his approach was sober and he warned his listeners of the "great and hard task" ahead. It is now being impressed on the Soviet public that the problem is one of great complexity.

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/The poor

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The poor harvest in 1963 and the continued failures in the "Virgin Lands" areas have led to a switch in emphasis from extending the acreage under cultivation to more intensive exploitation of the better areas already under cultivation. Higher yields are to be sought through a greater use of chemical fertilisers, more irrigation and more effective mechanisation. Khrushchev also repeated the theme that there was much to be learned from the West.

18. Khrushchev's speech revealed his exasperation with the inertia and conservatism of the traditionalists and the difficulty of pushing through the necessary innovations. It also seemed to show that behind the scenes there has been, and may still be, disagreement about the use of resources. Khrushchev asserted that "chemicalisation" was not a "passing fashion" and tried to show that there had been no retreat from the policy of developing heavy industry; but he also criticised those in industries such as steel who were resisting new and progressive developments. Subsequently, Pravda has published a detailed theoretical justification of Khrushchev's claim that the priority development of the chemical industry is not at variance with the canons of Marxist economic doctrine and that heavy industry and the production of consumer goods are complementary rather than alternatives. We are likely to hear more of this long-standing Soviet controversy.

19. After the Plenum, the Presidium of the Central Committee called another meeting at which Khrushchev outlined practical ways to implement the decree. He concentrated on the need to give better pay in return for higher output to workers engaged in production. Since it is apparently intended to widen differentials without any increase in total costs, this suggests that some workers will receive less than they are getting now and it remains to be seen how successfully the proposed measures will be applied. Most of the remedies suggested are medium or long-term and there is little chance that a sizeable increase in the supply of fertilisers for the main grain crops will become available before 1967 at the earliest. Agriculture remains the most vulnerable sector of the Soviet economy; and Khrushchev is not out of the wood yet.

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CHRONOLOGY

January 30 -
February 18

Mongolian Communist Party delegation visited the Soviet Union.

31
February 10

Delegation to the North Vietnamese Workers' Party Central Committee in Moscow.

February

1 - 4

Chou En-lai visited Somalia.

2

V. Wilcox, Chairman of New Zealand Communist Party, arrived in Peking.

3

Soviet-Yugoslav Cultural Agreement signed in Moscow.

3

First volume of anti-Chinese articles culled from the Soviet Press published in Peking. People's Daily replied to Soviet attacks on the Chinese Press for its attitude to Khrushchev's Note on border disputes.

3 - 7

Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party (S.E.D.)

3

Perez, Secretary of the Uruguayan Communist Party, arrived in Moscow.

4

Pro-Peking faction gained control in the West Bengal branch of the Indian Communist Party.

4

Red Flag and People's Daily published the seventh in the series of articles replying to the C.P.S.U. open letter of July 14, 1963.

5

Soviet trade delegation went to North Korea.

4 - 11

Valentina Tereshkova visited Britain.

7

Khrushchev sent a message on Cyprus to the Prime Minister and other Western leaders.

/ 7 - 10

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February

- 7 - 10 Prestes, the General Secretary of the (pro-Soviet) Brazilian Communist Party, visited Moscow and was seen by Khrushchev.
- 10 - 15 Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to discuss agriculture.
- 10 Khrushchev sent message to Haile Selassie and the Prime Minister of Somalia on their border dispute.
- 11 - 13 North Vietnamese Workers' Party delegation stop off in Peking on their way home from Moscow.
- 13 TASS statement on East Africa. Anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.
- 14 Khrushchev's speech to the Central Committee. Moscow evening paper announced the reinforcement of the Plenum by responsible Party officials in the ideological and propaganda fields.
- 14 - 18 Chou En-lai visited Burma.
- 17 - 19 Bulgarian Government and Party delegation, led by Zhivkov, visited Moscow.
- 17 - 20 Luigi Longo of the Italian Communist Party visited Moscow.
- 18 Brazzaville established diplomatic relations with Peking (announced February 22).
- 18 - 26 Chou En-lai visited Pakistan.
- 19 Hungarian Communist Party delegation, led by Kallai, arrived in Moscow.
- 19 Observer article in People's Daily on Sino-American relations.
- 20 Albania seized Soviet Embassy buildings in Tirana.
- 21 Soviet-Bulgarian communiqué announced the establishment of an Inter-Governmental Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation.
- 22 Soviet-American Cultural Agreement for 1964-65 signed in Moscow.

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- February 22 Soviet Army Day: main speech by Malinovsky.
- 23 Izvestiya article in support of Mulele's guerilla movement in the Congo.
- 24 Delegation of Supreme Soviet, led by Podgorny, arrived in Paris for ten day visit.
- 24 Soviet Parliamentary delegation arrived in India.
- 24 - 25 Pravda publishes articles by Arzumanyan on "Current problems of the development of our economy".
- 25 - 29 Sino-Soviet talks on cultural relations result in agreement on a programme of cultural exchanges for 1964.
- 26 Chou En-lai arrived in Ceylon.
- 26 TASS statement on Vietnam.
- 27 Announcement in Bucharest that a Rumanian Communist Party delegation led by Maurer, the Prime Minister, would visit Peking in early March.
- 28 Delegation from the Japanese Communist Party arrived in Moscow; it will also visit Peking.
- 28 Khrushchev outlined practical measures for implementing the decree on agriculture to a meeting convoked by the Presidium of the Soviet Central Committee.
- 29 TASS reports signing in Nicosia of an agreement to establish a direct Moscow-Nicosia air link.

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HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY

His Excellency,
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

May 4, 1964.

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POLICY AND TACTICS

1964

developments in the Sino-Soviet resumed public attacks on the conference of Communist parties. widespread repercussions both

early in the month that the Russians and more critical attitude towards being portrayed in Soviet propaganda as a singularly hard American line against struggling to achieve a further détente. It developed very far and has not the case of the American RB-66 crew from reports that they might be put on to avoid the exacerbation of Sovietist Germans may well have hoped to from the continued detention of the

prisoners, but the Russians insisted on handling the matter themselves. In speeches in Hungary Krushchev has contrasted the good sense of a number of Western leaders with the brainlessness of the Chinese.

3. The TASS statement at the beginning of March on Germany was harsh in tone and described the Federal Republic as the most "aggressive and adventurous" state in Europe. Soviet propaganda has been strongly anti-German for a long time and there is no reason to conclude that the statement marked the beginning of a new phase in Soviet policy. It reflected the Soviet realization that basic Federal policies are not likely to be altered as a result of Dr. Erhard's accession to the Chancellorship; this does not however mean that the Russians would not welcome some improvement in bilateral relations with the Federal Republic. But the Soviet leaders are at present in no mood to change their broad policy towards Germany. The Russians also see a need to bolster up East Germany; a prominent feature of the TASS statement was the strong invitation to uncommitted countries to recognise East Germany.

4. There have also been several Soviet initiatives apparently designed to improve Soviet bilateral contacts with West European countries. During his visit to France, Podgorny expressed appreciation of the realistic approach of French leaders to world problems and Adzhubei has subsequently commented in a similar vein. Kosygin, at the end of a ten-day visit to Italy, said that there were real prospects for the further expansion of relations between the two countries. Gromyko visited Sweden and Finland; in an address on Soviet foreign policy while in Finland he took the opportunity to praise President Kekkonen's policy towards the Soviet Union, emphasised Soviet sensitiveness to developments in the Nordic countries and expressed renewed support for the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

MARCH 1964

There have been major developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Russians have resumed public attacks on the Chinese and have called for a conference of Communist parties. The dispute continues to have widespread repercussions both within and outside the Bloc.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

2. There were indications early in the month that the Russians were beginning to adopt a new and more critical attitude towards President Johnson, who was being portrayed in Soviet propaganda as the supporter of an increasingly hard American line against which Soviet policy was struggling to achieve a further détente. However, this attitude was not developed very far and has not been maintained. The release of the American RB-66 crew from East Germany, after initial reports that they might be put on trial, was clearly designed to avoid the exacerbation of Soviet-American relations. The East Germans may well have hoped to derive political advantage from the continued detention of the prisoners, but the Russians insisted on handling the matter themselves. In speeches in Hungary Khrushchev has contrasted the good sense of a number of Western leaders with the brainlessness of the Chinese.

3. The TASS statement at the beginning of March on Germany was harsh in tone and described the Federal Republic as the most "aggressive and adventurous" state in Europe. Soviet propaganda has been strongly anti-German for a long time and there is no reason to conclude that the statement marked the beginning of a new phase in Soviet policy. It reflected the Soviet realization that basic Federal policies are not likely to be altered as a result of Dr. Erhard's accession to the Chancellorship; this does not however mean that the Russians would not welcome some improvement in bilateral relations with the Federal Republic. But the Soviet leaders are at present in no mood to change their broad policy towards Germany. The Russians also see a need to bolster up East Germany; a prominent feature of the TASS statement was the strong invitation to uncommitted countries to recognise East Germany.

4. There have also been several Soviet initiatives apparently designed to improve Soviet bilateral contacts with West European countries. During his visit to France, Podgorny expressed appreciation of the realistic approach of French leaders to world problems and Adzhubei has subsequently commented in a similar vein. Kosygin, at the end of a ten-day visit to Italy, said that there were real prospects for the further expansion of relations between the two countries. Gromyko visited Sweden and Finland; in an address on Soviet foreign policy while in Finland he took the opportunity to praise President Kekkonen's policy towards the Soviet Union, emphasised Soviet sensitiveness to developments in the Nordic countries and expressed renewed support for the proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

5. The Rumanian intervention in the Sino-Soviet dispute did not result in any modification of Chinese tactics. Immediately after the departure of the Rumanian delegation from Peking the Chinese resumed the publication of attacks on Soviet leadership, which reached a crescendo at the end of March with the appearance of the eighth instalment of the Chinese reply to the Soviet open letter of July 14, 1963. The seventh article had already set out the theoretical justification for pursuing the dispute to the point of splitting the Communist movement, if the Russians refused to accept Chinese terms of unity. The eighth concentrated on the necessity for violent revolution, appealed to Communists to "repudiate and liquidate Khrushchev's revisionism" and also called for an amendment of the 1957 and 1960 statements of the world Communist parties.

6. After five months of considerable restraint in face of continuing Chinese attacks, the Russians have resumed the polemic against the Chinese by publishing Suslov's report on the dispute to the Soviet Central Committee meeting in February. This coincided with violent attacks on the Chinese by Khrushchev in speeches in Hungary.

7. From what the Russians have said, it seems clear that they concluded early this year that further silence in the face of continuing Chinese attacks would not only be ineffective but would encourage the Chinese in disrupting the international Communist movement. After discussing Suslov's report on the dispute, the Soviet Central Committee formally approved a decision to expose Chinese divisive activities and this was followed by a series of Party meetings throughout the Soviet Union to condemn the Chinese line. The Russians then consulted other Communist parties and, in response to a request from the Rumanians, deferred publication of anti-Chinese material while the Rumanians made another effort to bring polemics to a stop. At the end of February, the Chinese themselves proposed a programme of consultations with the Russians, beginning with bilateral talks in October and leading up to a world conference of Communist parties. The timing and conditions proposed by the Chinese were unacceptable to the Russians who wrote a letter to the Chinese on March 7, again calling for an end to polemics and suggesting bilateral talks in May to be followed by a meeting of members of the Preparatory Committee for the 1960 Conference of Communist Parties in June or July and a Conference of "all fraternal Parties" in the autumn. This letter does not appear to have evoked any positive response from the Chinese.

8. The Russians now seem likely to :

- (i) wage an all-out propaganda campaign at home and abroad against the Chinese leadership and their policies:

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- (ii) use the differences with the Chinese to reaffirm the unity of the Soviet people behind the party leadership and especially in support of Khrushchev personally:
- (iii) attempt to align bloc policies more closely. Khrushchev had already suggested that new organisational forms should be devised to co-ordinate foreign policy among the C.M.E.A. and Warsaw pact countries:
- (iv) urge on other parties the need to summon a conference of Communist Parties to resist the further disintegration of the Communist movement and to restate its general line, in the light of developments since 1960 (particularly to expose Chinese views and divisive activities and to set out the revised Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia). But the Russians could, of course, still withdraw the proposal for a conference if they find that an awkward number of parties are against it.

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE DISPUTE IN EUROPE AND ASIA

(i) Eastern Europe

9. The Soviet decision to resume anti-Chinese polemics appears to have been co-ordinated with the Hungarians and some other East European parties. The Hungarian Central Committee resolution supporting the Soviet line was published simultaneously with Suslov's report and the Hungarians condemned Chinese attempts to set members of C.M.E.A. against each other in even stronger terms than the Russians. The Bulgarians, East Germans and Czechs were also quick to follow the Soviet lead in publicly attacking the Chinese. The Poles hesitated for some days before publishing their views and appear to have reservations about holding a Conference of Communist parties. The proposed conference seems almost certain to be one of the main topics of discussion during Gomulka's forthcoming visit to Moscow. The Rumanians have not so far either printed Suslov's report or commented on it and show signs that they may not be disposed to fall into line quickly. Gheorghiu-Dej aroused speculation about a possible new Rumanian initiative by receiving the Soviet Ambassador and the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires separately on the same day at the end of March. The Rumanian Central Committee is due to meet in the middle of April to hear a report from the Rumanian Delegation to Peking.

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(ii) Western European Communist Parties

10. The Soviet Press at the end of March reproduced statements from French and Dutch Communist leaders calling for a World Conference of Communist parties. But the Russians omitted to publish a passage in Togliatti's speech to the recent Italian Communist Party Conference in which he reiterated his earlier doubts concerning a conference, because it would deepen the split, and advocated instead meetings between regional groups of parties facing similar problems.

(iii) Asia

11. The Sino-Soviet dispute is causing internal stresses in both the North Korean and the North Vietnamese Communist parties. Articles appearing in the Press in the two countries make it clear that elements exist within both Parties who doubt the wisdom of alignment with the Chinese. Lately pro-Chinese Asian parties have been stressing the special relevance of Chinese revolutionary experience (particularly of reliance on the peasantry) for the contemporary world and emphasising that the storm-centre of revolution has shifted away from Europe (and by implication from the Soviet Union) to other areas of the world. The North Vietnamese Party leader in a recently published statement said that if Russia's revolutionary tactics were the model for all Communists, Chinese tactics are now the model for Communists in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The relevance of Soviet revolutionary experience is likely to be increasingly called in question as the Sino-Soviet split widens.

SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

12. The Russians seem to realise that they have little room for manoeuvre in South-East Asia. They have been losing influence there, particularly in Indonesia. In consequence, they have not been able to do much more than protect their stake in the area as best they can. Faced by a complex series of problems, they find it difficult to pursue a coherent policy. If they press too hard, they run the risk of provoking United States intervention or promoting the victory of pro-Chinese parties; if they are too cautious, they become vulnerable to Chinese charges of softness and again risk the loss of what influence they still retain.

13. In Laos the Russians wish to preserve the Geneva agreements and continue to support Prince Souvanna Phouma. Consequently they have agreed after much hesitation to a joint message from the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to the Prime Minister of Laos calling on the three party leaders in the Coalition Government to work together to normalise the situation in the country and to hold an early meeting to solve their differences. It is clear, however, from Soviet opposition to action by the International Control Commission except in a form approved by the Pathet Lao that

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even if, on occasions, they privately disapprove of Pathet Lao policy and may try to get them to change their attitude they will not go openly against the Pathet Lao once the latter have made their position clear. Their hesitation and delay in dealing with the question of the joint message suggests that they realise the need to tread delicately in Laos, in view of their waning influence in Hanoi and their reluctance to participate in any initiative which could subsequently be used against them by the Chinese.

14. On the Indonesian campaign against Malaysia Soviet propaganda has been unusually reticent. This may be partly because the Russians think it tactically wiser not to identify themselves too closely with Indonesia's campaign against another Asian state and may have doubts about Sukarno's reliability. They welcome the damage which he does to Western interests. But the major consideration for them is the very heavy investment they have made in Indonesia, which they do not wish to lose. This requires them to service their investment with assistance to the Indonesian armed forces in their policy of confrontation against Malaysia; some further destroyers and minesweepers from old Russian stock are due to arrive shortly in Indonesia. The Russians realise that failure on their part to support Sukarno's policy of confrontation would play into the hands of the Indonesian Communist Party and the Chinese, because it would once again give the latter grounds for claiming that the Russians are backward in supporting "anti-Colonial" movements.

AFRICA

15. The recent meeting of the Council of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation was the scene of quarrels between the Soviet and Chinese delegations even more bitter than at last year's conferences in Moshi and Nicosia. In Algiers both sides seem to have overplayed their hands and unnecessarily prolonged the meeting. In a Press interview in Paris on his way back from Algiers to Moscow, the chief Soviet delegate was reported as stating that Chinese racialism and chauvinism did not differ from Nazism. The Chinese delegate's speech included an attack on the United Nations as being manipulated by American imperialism. Even if at the end of the Algiers meeting the balance of advantage rested with the Russians, it was a Pyrrhic victory and the conduct of both sides caused African delegates to show their distaste for Communist quarrels and for the lack of any real Communist interest in regional questions, except in the context of Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence. At one point the Algerian chairman was obliged to call the rival delegates to order and ask them to show respect for the peoples of Africa and Asia.

16. Zanzibar. Although Sheikh Mohamed Babu, the Zanzibar Foreign Minister, has publicly stated that the aim of the present government is to establish a socialist and not a Communist state, the Communist countries are making a determined attempt to increase their influence there.

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Communist states were quick to recognise the new régime; China, the Soviet Union and East Germany have already opened Embassies, while Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania are negotiating diplomatic and trade agreements. The East Germans, having thus set up their first Embassy in Africa, are sending in both diplomatic and technical personnel. They and the Russians have offered extensive aid and negotiated the purchase of Zanzibar cloves; the Chinese have also granted Zanzibar a loan. But the most significant move was the delivery of a batch of Soviet arms towards the end of March.

THE YEMEN

17. President Sallal of the Yemen has been visiting Moscow, accompanied by a delegation which included the Foreign and Finance Ministers, the Minister of Defence and other senior military officers. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of the talks referred to further economic and technical assistance, the granting of a long-term credit and prolonging the period of repayment of earlier credits. Additional Soviet military aid and help in training the Yemeni army also seem likely to have been discussed. In addition to their extensive logistic support for the Egyptian military campaign in the Yemen, the Russians have been strengthening their own independent position in the country through aid projects and the presence of their technical and military experts.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES

18. President Ben Bella's visit to Yugoslavia in the first half of March and the recent journey by an important Yugoslav delegation to Mali, Guinea and Ghana have emphasised Yugoslavia's special role in the uncommitted countries devoting themselves to economic development on "socialist" principles but not wishing to be too closely involved with Moscow or Peking. The Yugoslavs were at pains to underline the importance they attached to Ben Bella and his party: speeches made during the visit emphasised the historic similarity of the Partisan movement and the F.L.N. struggle, the two countries' common task of Socialist construction, their agreement on opposition to colonialism and support for the Titoist policy of "non-alignment and active coexistence". A Joint Declaration was issued by the two sides and it was announced that a mixed committee for economic co-operation would be set up. The Yugoslavs are no doubt hoping to reap dividends for the attention they are paying to the uncommitted countries at the conference of non-aligned countries due to take place in Cairo in October.

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SOVIET ATTITUDE TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING
EXPENDITURE

19. There has so far been no official Soviet reaction to the Anglo-American approach concerning the settlement of arrears of United Nations peace-keeping expenditure. But the Soviet Mission to the United Nations have issued a statement declaring that if any form of pressure were to be exercised to force the Soviet Union to pay its peace-keeping arrears, which were denounced as "illegal" and incurred in "flagrant violation of the charter", or to restrict Soviet rights in the General Assembly under Article 19, the Soviet Union might be obliged to reconsider its attitude towards United Nations activities. The same theme has been taken up in strong terms in the Soviet Press. Recent articles seem designed to underline the strength of Soviet determination not to pay their arrears, the importance they attach to retaining control of peace-keeping operations in the Security Council and their refusal to have anything to do with operations undertaken without Soviet approval.

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CHRONOLOGY

- February 29 - Japanese Communist Party delegation
March 12 visited Moscow.
- February 29 Sino-Soviet Cultural Co-operation
Agreement for 1964 signed in Moscow.
- March
- 2 Signature of Soviet-North Vietnam trade
protocol for 1964.
- 2 - 11 Rumanian delegation led by Maurer
visited China.
- 2 - 11 Soviet delegation led by Andropov
visited Hungary.
- 2 Podgorny received by President de Gaulle.
- 4 - 7 Malik, the Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister, visited Ethiopia.
- 5 Sino-Albanian Agricultural Co-operation
Agreement signed in Peking.
- 5 - 13 Ben Bella visited Yugoslavia.
- 6 Bulgarian-West German trade agreement
signed in Bonn.
- 7 TASS statement on Germany.
- 7 Publication of Khrushchev's speech to
the meeting on agriculture, convened by
the Soviet Party Presidium on
February 28.
- 7 - 10 Malik visited Somalia.
- 8 Sino-Pakistan Aviation Protocol signed
in Peking.
- 9 - 14 Bulgarian Party and Government delegation
led by Zhivkov visited Hungary.
- 10 - 13 Mikoyan visited East Berlin (for
Grotewohl's birthday celebrations).
- 10 Khrushchev received Araouzos, Acting
Foreign Minister of Cyprus, in Gagra.

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March

- 12-14 Roumanian delegation visited North Korea.
- 12-15 Italian Communist Party Conference in Naples.
- 13 The Chinese resumed broadcasts in Russian of their February 4 article "The leaders of the C.P.S.U. are the greatest splitters of all time". They also resumed publication of speeches and resolutions by pro-Chinese communists criticising the C.P.S.U. leadership.
- 13 Publication of Le Duan's speech on revisionism, delivered in December to the North Vietnamese Central Committee Plenum.
- 13 Japanese Communist Party delegation, led by Hakamada, arrived in Peking.
- 13-14 Central Committee Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party.
- 14-16 Roumanian delegation stopped in Gagra on the way home from China and North Korea for talks with Khurshchev, Mikoyan and other Soviet leaders.
- 16 Soviet Union and Congo (Brazzaville) established diplomatic relations.
- 16 Cambodian Military delegation arrived in Peking.
- 16-24 President Sallal and a large Yemeni delegation visited Moscow.
- 16-23 Czech Communist Party delegation visited Vienna for discussions with the Austrian Communist Party.
- 17 15th anniversary of Soviet/North Korean Agreement on Economic and Cultural Co-operation.
- 17-21 Gromyko visited Sweden.
- 17-27 Kosygin visited Italy.
- 18 3rd anniversary of the Soviet Economic Aid Agreement with the Mali Republic.
- 18 Executive Committee meeting of W.F.T.U. opened in Sofia.
- 20 Patolichev, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, went to Geneva for the opening of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- 20 Soviet press announced that Khrushchev would visit the U.A.R. in May in connexion with the completion of the first stage of the Aswan Dam.
- 21 Soviet/Yemeni Treaty of Friendship signed in Moscow.
- 21 Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee.
- 21-26 Gromyko visited Finland.

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March

- 22-27 Meeting of the Afro/Asian People's Solidarity Organisation in Algiers.
- 23 Release of the text of the Soviet Government and Party directive "on cases of gross violation and distortion in the practice of planning in collective and state farm production."
- 25 Delegation of Chinese trade experts left Moscow for Peking. (A Soviet trade delegation went to Peking on March 28 "to continue talks on the exchange of goods between China and the Soviet Union in 1964". The talks began on January 20).
- 26 Georghiu-Dej, the Roumanian leader, received the Soviet Ambassador and the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires.
- 28 Soviet Press published Tass report on the release of the crew of the American RB-66 in East Germany.
- 28 N.C.N.A. reported the establishment on March 24 of a new, pro-Chinese Australian Communist Party.
- 30 Adzhubei arrived in Paris.
- 31 8th Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers opened in Budapest.
- 31 The People's Daily and Red Flag published the eighth article in the series replying to the C.P.S.U. open letter of July 14, 1963.
- 31 Soviet Government and Party delegation led by Khrushchev arrived in Budapest.

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