



# Communist Policy and Tactics 1965, 1. hluti

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Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

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Einkaskjalasafn nr. 360  
Stjórnámálamaðurinn  
Askja 2-39, Örk 3

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POLICY AND TACTICS

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

rch. 1965

SUMMARY

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

HER MAJESTY'S ~~AMBASSADOR~~.

His Excellency  
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,  
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

REYKJAVIK.

3 May, 1965.

London showed that the situation  
developments on Soviet policies have made  
difficult to progress on any front in  
the West at the moment (paragraph 1).

Policy by the South Vietnam National  
Front was clearly designed (with Peking's  
support) to precipitate a Korean-type war in  
which the powers appear adamantly against any  
settlement (paragraphs 2 - 4).

Policy of Communist parties in Moscow  
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relentless struggle in the  
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proposals on disarmament suggests  
that negotiation (paragraph 7).

M.E.A. shortcomings in a Soviet  
proposed remedy is greater co-operation  
within the bloc rather than with countries outside  
(paragraph 8).

Rumanian policy is unlikely to change under the new  
leadership (paragraph 9).

Increased self-confidence in the D.D.R. (paragraph 10).

The Soviet Central Committee Plenum produced new plans  
for agriculture which could produce better results in a few  
years. Ilichev removed (paragraphs 11 and 12).

MR. GROMYKO'S VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. The discussions during Mr. Gromyko's visit to London  
in mid-March demonstrated the difficulty of making progress  
with the Russians on any major problem at this time. On  
Vietnam there was polite but complete refusal to co-operate  
in promoting a negotiated settlement. Discussions on the  
United Nations revealed no advance on earlier Soviet  
positions. On disarmament Mr. Gromyko showed less than  
enthusiasm for the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and  
brought with him no constructive ideas on how progress  
might be made on the substance of the issues. Nor had he  
anything substantially new to say on questions of European  
Security and Germany. The visit was a reflection of the  
attitude of the Soviet Government to present world develop-  
ments. As a result of the crisis in Vietnam, relations  
between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United  
States and its allies on the other have deteriorated. In  
addition the Russians have their own difficulties in the  
renewed deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. In face of  
these difficulties the Russians are moving cautiously.  
They see no reason to expose themselves to further attack  
/from

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

March, 1965

SUMMARY

Gromyko's visit to London showed that the situation in Vietnam and Chinese attacks on Soviet policies have made it difficult for the Russians to progress on any front in their relations with the West at the moment (paragraph 1).

A statement of policy by the South Vietnam National Liberation Front was probably designed (with Peking's agreement) to raise the spectre of a Korean-type war in Vietnam. The Communist powers appear adamantly against any form of negotiated settlement (paragraphs 2 - 4).

The 1 March meeting of Communist parties in Moscow brought no comfort to the Russians and the strong Chinese response to it promises a relentless struggle in the future. Cuba is dissatisfied with both sides (paragraphs 5 and 6).

A Soviet procedural proposal on disarmament suggests interest in debate rather than negotiation (paragraph 7).

Frank criticism of C.M.E.A. shortcomings in a Soviet journal: the proposed remedy is greater co-operation within the bloc rather than with countries outside (paragraph 8).

Rumanian policy is unlikely to change under the new leadership (paragraph 9).

Increased self-confidence in the D.D.R. (paragraph 10).

The Soviet Central Committee Plenum produced new plans for agriculture which could produce better results in a few years. Ilichev removed (paragraphs 11 and 12).

MR. GROMYKO'S VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. The discussions during Mr. Gromyko's visit to London in mid-March demonstrated the difficulty of making progress with the Russians on any major problem at this time. On Vietnam there was polite but complete refusal to co-operate in promoting a negotiated settlement. Discussions on the United Nations revealed no advance on earlier Soviet positions. On disarmament Mr. Gromyko showed less than enthusiasm for the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and brought with him no constructive ideas on how progress might be made on the substance of the issues. Nor had he anything substantially new to say on questions of European Security and Germany. The visit was a reflection of the attitude of the Soviet Government to present world developments. As a result of the crisis in Vietnam, relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other have deteriorated. In addition the Russians have their own difficulties in the renewed deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. In face of these difficulties the Russians are moving cautiously. They see no reason to expose themselves to further attack  
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from Peking by appearing to seek progress in their relations with the West and are probably in any case sceptical of the possibility of such progress in present circumstances.

VIETNAM

2. The most striking move by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong during the month was the statement of policy issued on 22 March by the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (the political arm of the Vietcong, directed from Hanoi). This expressed Vietcong determination to carry through the war with a view to reunifying Vietnam, and asserted that all negotiations were useless unless United States forces and equipment were withdrawn, and if the Liberation Front did not "have a decisive voice". The statement declared the readiness of the N.L.F. to receive arms from abroad. It added that if United States combat troops continued to be committed to South Vietnam and the United States continued to attack the North, it would "call on the peoples of various countries to send youth and army men to South Vietnam" to join in the fight. It also threatened to call on South Vietnamese, resident in the North, for the same purpose. The swiftness of the response from Peking and Pyongyang suggested that the operation had been carefully orchestrated in advance. Both offered arms, and men if they were called for. Hanoi declared that Southerners resident in the North were also ready to respond to the call if required. The aim of the operation was probably two-fold: to blur the fact that infiltration from the North has been going on for years and to bring public opinion to bear on the United States Administration by raising the spectre of a Korean-type war.

3. There have been no indications of change in Soviet policy on the Vietnam crisis. Soviet statements continue to assert that, to quote Brezhnev, "the Soviet Union is already taking the necessary measures to help with the strengthening of the defence capability of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (i.e. North Vietnam). Communist diplomats have been reported in the Western press as saying that Soviet military aid will include surface-to-air missiles. The Russians have been telling journalists in Moscow and elsewhere, however, that Soviet military aid is being held up on the Chinese border and that the Chinese are making difficulties over transit. If the Chinese were to hold up military aid on the provision of which the Russians and North Vietnamese were agreed they would lay themselves open to damaging criticism. It thus seems likely that more than a simple refusal of transit facilities is at issue. If reports of delays at the Chinese border are true, it may be that the explanation lies in differences either on the conditions on which Soviet military equipment may transit China, or even on the correct strategy to be followed in North Vietnam. There was no positive response in Moscow to the call from the Liberation Front for volunteers, although Brezhnev, in the course of a speech welcoming the two cosmonauts on 23 March, did refer to offers that had been received from Soviet citizens "to take part in the struggle of the Vietnamese people for freedom and independence."

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4. The Chinese for their part have given no indication that they are interested in negotiation. They probably calculate that South Vietnam will crack before the North and consequently persist in their hard line. Equally there has been no sign of any move from Moscow directed towards a political solution. During his visit to London Mr. Gromyko remained intransigent in the face of suggestions that, as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom should rise above partisan attitudes and co-operate in constructive measures aimed at a peaceful settlement: the Soviet proposal made on 24 March in Moscow for a joint message from the Co-Chairmen laying all the blame for the present situation on the United States was wholly propagandistic. In this the Russians may be reflecting the intransigence of their allies and their own inability to influence events; but the result is the same.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

5. The reaction of the Chinese to the meeting of the nineteen Communist Parties in Moscow on 1 - 4 March marked the failure of the Soviet hopes that they might be able to limit the consequences of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese chose to make the holding of the meeting an issue of confidence. In their condemnation of it they said bluntly that the Russians had now cast in their lot with the United States, and were "sham revolutionaries". They gave notice that they would make an even greater effort than in the past to split parties owing allegiance to the Soviet Union. The meeting can thus have brought little comfort to the Russians. It has triggered off an open declaration of political warfare by the Chinese; and it failed to produce any coherent line of future policy among Soviet supporters. The prospect of a relentless struggle with the Chinese combined with indiscipline in the ranks of what remains of the Soviet camp must be a sobering one for the C.P.S.U.

CUBA

6. The Cuban attitude on the situation in the Communist camp provides a good example. In a speech on foreign affairs on 13 March, Castro argued forcibly that the divisions in the Socialist camp encourage the imperialists, thus endorsing in essence the Soviet thesis on Chinese behaviour in the dispute. On the other hand he implicitly criticised the Soviet Union for its opportunistic behaviour in 1962 over the withdrawal of missiles, and the statement that Cuba was "in favour of the Socialist camp running the risks that may be necessary for Vietnam" denoted more than a little sympathy with Chinese charges of pusillanimity towards the United States on the part of the Soviet Union.

DISARMAMENT

7. The Russians have proposed that the problem of disarmament should now be taken up in the United Nations Disarmament Commission rather than at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva as the West has been urging. This move had been foreshadowed by Mr. Gromyko's reluctance, during his visit to London, to agree that the  
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Geneva Conference should meet again soon and by his reference to a number of other forums in which disarmament discussions could be pursued. It remains to be seen whether the Russians will agree to the reactivation of the Geneva Conference after the Disarmament Commission session and if so on what terms; but in the meantime their aim is clearly debate rather than negotiation.

C.M.E.A.

8. The most outspoken account of shortcomings within C.M.E.A. yet published under Soviet auspices appeared in an article in the March issue of the Soviet journal International Life. After comparing unfavourably the sharply declining rates of growth for industrial production in C.M.E.A. countries with the lower but more stable rates of growth in Western countries, the authors blame the relatively poor performance of the C.M.E.A. countries on unsatisfactory planning and lack of cooperation among member countries. As remedies they suggest improvements in specialisation and in mass production methods, as well as the setting up of joint enterprises. Trade with capitalist countries comes under some criticism, and the implication of the article is that there must be continued effort to improve economic self-sufficiency in the bloc rather than the international division of labour across the borders of the C.M.E.A. area. The increased interest shown recently by various East European countries in developing economic relations with Western countries suggests that this Soviet appeal for greater concentration on economic cooperation within C.M.E.A. may not be particularly welcome.

RUMANIA

9. The death of the Rumanian President, Gheorghiu-Dej, left vacant the posts of First Party Secretary and Head of State. The former post has now been filled by Nicolai Ceausescu, who is the youngest member of the Politburo and has been closely associated with the movement for Rumanian economic independence. Chivu Stoica has been appointed Head of State, an appointment which will presumably be particularly welcome to the old guard, while Maurer remains Prime Minister. The importance of Rumania to the protagonists in the Sino-Soviet dispute was underlined by the eulogies for the dead leader put out in both Moscow and Peking and the presence at his funeral of Mikoyan and Chou En-lai. Ceausescu's prompt reaffirmation of adherence to the line set out in the Rumanian Party Declaration of April 1964 can have given little pleasure to the Russians.

THE D.D.R.

10. The confusion caused in Arab/Israeli/Western relations by Ulbricht's visit to the United Arab Republic probably exceeded his most optimistic expectations of what such a visit might achieve. It remains to be seen, however, what practical results, in terms of recognition of the D.D.R., will emerge. The episode will certainly serve to increase the new self-confidence, of which signs have appeared in the D.D.R., both internally and in its international relations, since the fall of Khrushchev. It was noteworthy that the Leipzig Fair, larger than ever before, was handled comparatively soberly and with a minimum of political fuss.

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SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS:  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING

11. The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. produced no fireworks, anyway to external appearances. Its proceedings were businesslike, and conducted without the fire (or smoke) of many similar sessions in Khrushchev's time. This is in consonance with the new style in Moscow. The new proposals which the session approved on agriculture were overdue. In his report to the Plenum, Brezhnev was frank in admitting that since 1959 agriculture in the Soviet Union had been marking time and plans had remained unfulfilled. The new proposals show recognition of a need long ignored in the U.S.S.R., the need to put more money into agriculture if a high rate of growth is to be achieved. The farms will receive more, directly as a result of increases in prices paid for agricultural produce and livestock, and indirectly through increased investment in buildings and machinery. (The increase in investment is not as astronomical as some reports have made out; investment is scheduled to rise at approximately 15 per cent per year, compared with the 10 per cent annual increase of recent years). The farms will also welcome the reduction and fixing of the level of compulsory agricultural deliveries. If well administered, these changes may show an improvement in Soviet farming but the results will not be visible for a few years. The cost of the new programme will fall on the budget, not on retail prices, but no indication has yet been given of where in the budget compensatory changes will be made. As the National Income grows, the new commitments may in fact entail only a marginal ~~division~~ *diversion* of budgetary allocation from other sectors.

12. The Plenum also discussed the results of the 1 March meeting of Communist Parties on the basis of an as yet unpublished report by Suslov; but the resolution on the subject was uninformative. Some changes in appointments were made but the political significance of these, if any, is obscure. One change which will no doubt be welcome to Soviet intellectuals is the removal of Ilichev from the Secretariat where he was closely involved in providing the ideological justification for Khrushchev's erratic policy on culture. It remains to be seen whether the policy itself will be any more liberal than in the past.

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CHRONOLOGY

- February 28-10  
March
- Leipzig Fair. Kosygin visited it on 1 March.
- March 1
- Kommunist article on Soviet foreign policy.
- 1 - 5 "Consultative meeting" in Moscow attended by delegations of 19 parties (communiqué published on 10 March).
- 1 Chinese press attack on a book by Ponomarev critical of China.
- 2 - 9 President Ayub Khan in China.
- 2 - 7 Czechoslovak Premier Lenart in India.
- 2 - 8 Yugoslav Vice-President, Rankovic in India.
- 2 Ulbricht returned from United Arab Republic.
- 3 - 20 Australian (pro-Chinese) C.P. delegation in China.
- 3 Zeri i Popullit article on Soviet rôle in South East Asia.
- 4 Peoples Daily attacked continuation of revisionism in the Soviet Union.
- 4 "Consultative Committee" statement on Vietnam.
- 4 Chinese students in Moscow demonstrated violently outside United States Embassy on Vietnam.
- 4 - 21 New Zealand C.P. delegation in China.
- 6 Chinese Ambassador in Moscow protests about handling of Chinese student demonstrators.
- 7 - 10 Lenart in United Arab Republic.
- 10 - 15 Soviet Vice-Premier Polyansky leads delegation to Afghanistan.
- 11 Yugoslav writer Mihajlov arrested for articles in Delo critical of U.S.S.R.
- 12 Chinese Government statement on Vietnam
- 12 Pravda leader on Communist Unity.
- 12 Chinese press publishes reports of ill-treatment of Chinese students in hospital.
- 12 Soviet Government rejected Chinese Note of 6 March about students.

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March 16 Second Chinese Note on suppression of Moscow demonstrators.

16 - 20 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in London.

17 - 19 D.D.R. Foreign Minister Bolz in Warsaw.

18 Zeri i Popullit attack on 1 March meeting.

18 - 19 During a flight in a two-man spacecraft Soviet cosmonaut Leonov "walked" in space.

19 - 20 Raul Castro in Moscow.

19 Rumanian President Gheorghiu-Dej died.

19 N.C.N.A. attacked the 1 March meeting.

22 South Vietnam Liberation Front statement of policy and threat to call for volunteers.

22 - 25 Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi in Afghanistan.

23 - 25 Raul Castro in Hungary.

23 Editorial attack on 1 March meeting published by Peoples Daily and Red Flag.

22 - 25 Chen Yi in Afghanistan.

Brezhnev refers to Soviet "volunteers" for Vietnam in speech welcoming cosmonauts in Moscow.

Soviet Note on forthcoming Bundestag meeting in Berlin delivered to United States, British and French Ambassadors in Moscow.

24 Zorin's appointment as new Soviet Ambassador in Paris announced.

24 - 26 C.P.S. U. Central Committee meeting on agriculture.

25 Peoples Daily declared China's readiness to send volunteers to South Vietnam.

25 Norwegian reply to Soviet Note of 17 February on Spitzbergen.

25 - 30 Chen Yi in Pakistan.

Raul Castro in Bulgaria.

27 - 30 Chou En-lai in Albania.

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March 27 Cuban Government issues declaration offering arms and men to Vietnam.

March 30 - Chou En-lai in Algeria.  
April 1

March 30 - Chen Yi in Nepal.  
April 3

March 30 Announcement that Chervonenko will be replaced as Soviet Ambassador in Peking (successor not named).

30 Serious explosion in United States Embassy in Saigon.

31 Russians propose reconvening of 114 nation Disarmament Commission at United Nations.

March 31 - D.D.R. Foreign Minister Bolz in  
April 2 Prague.

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POLICY AND TACTICS

JUNE, 1965

SUMMARY

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
OF  
THE  
EMBASSY  
TO  
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

His Excellency  
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,  
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

REYKJAVIK.

25 June, 1965.

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The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference reflected the Sino/  
Soviet quarrel and strong anti-Western feeling (Paragraph 8).

The P.C.I. endorsed foundation of a united left-wing party  
in Italy, and will seek Socialist unification throughout West  
Europe (Paragraphs 9 and 10).

Intense diplomatic activity in East Europe may concern the  
calling of a European Security Conference. Close Rumanian ~~Russian~~ attention to Bulgaria. Certain East European régimes are having  
trouble with their intellectuals (Paragraphs 11-14).

Soviet internal developments: a partial rehabilitation of  
Stalin's military image; publicity campaign for the Security  
organisations; debate on Party/local Government relations with  
far reaching implications (Paragraphs 15-17).

HARSHER SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE WEST

Soviet public statements on the international situation  
have become noticeably harsher in tone, particularly towards the  
United States. For some time such statements had given the  
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Vietnam, American policy towards the Communist world had hardened.  
The situation in the Dominican Republic has now provided fresh  
fuel to the flames of anti-American propaganda, and Soviet  
statements convey a concern that American policy has undergone a  
fundamental change. Thus the speeches made by Brezhnev and the  
Soviet Minister of Defence, Malinovsky on the occasion of the

/V.E. Day

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

MAY, 1965

SUMMARY

Soviet public statements have become harsher in tone towards the West, particularly the United States, and a Tass statement contained a strong attack on President Johnson: it also doubted that there was currently any possibility of agreement on steps to reduce tension. The Russians have put the United Nations Disarmament Commission to purely propagandistic use and have given warning of the seriousness with which they view possible developments. In bilateral matters they have been cautious (Paragraphs 1 and 2).

In Vietnam, the Russians are anxious to give no hostages to Chinese propaganda against them, which has intensified. The Chinese will not cooperate with the Russians until they toe the Chinese line. There are signs that the Russians may be becoming more inclined to counter Chinese polemics (Paragraphs 3-5).

Moscow's caution in dealings with India and Pakistan (Paragraph 6).

China has played down her second atomic test, perhaps because of Afro-Asian sensitivity (Paragraph 7).

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference reflected the Sino/Soviet quarrel and strong anti-Western feeling (Paragraph 8).

The P.C.I. endorsed foundation of a united left-wing party in Italy, and will seek Socialist unification throughout West Europe (Paragraphs 9 and 10).

Intense diplomatic activity in East Europe may concern the calling of a European Security Conference. Close ~~Rumanian~~ <sup>RUSSIAN</sup> attention to Bulgaria. Certain East European régimes are having trouble with their intellectuals (Paragraphs 11-14).

Soviet internal developments: a partial rehabilitation of Stalin's military image; publicity campaign for the Security organisations; debate on Party/local Government relations with far reaching implications (Paragraphs 15-17).

HARSHER SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE WEST

Soviet public statements on the international situation have become noticeably harsher in tone, particularly towards the United States. For some time such statements had given the impression that, in the context of United States actions in Vietnam, American policy towards the Communist world had hardened. The situation in the Dominican Republic has now provided fresh fuel to the flames of anti-American propaganda, and Soviet statements convey a concern that American policy has undergone a fundamental change. Thus the speeches made by Brezhnev and the Soviet Minister of Defence, Malinovsky on the occasion of the

/V.E. Day

V.E. Day anniversary asserted that the United States had donned Hitler's mantle and aspired to world domination. They also took a new line on the dangers of West German "revanchism"; previously Soviet propaganda has held the "revanchistes" to be dangerous because they could pull N.A.T.O. into "aggressive adventures"; but now they are said to be dangerous because they have firm support from the United States. These speeches were followed by a Tass statement commenting on President Johnson's own V.E. Day anniversary address which, according to Tass, was a further indication that "the policy of aggravating the international situation is increasingly taking the upper hand in Washington". The statement was the strongest personal Soviet attack on President Johnson so far and, describing the President's speech as being "imbued with hostility towards the forces of socialism and national liberation" expressed doubt on the possibility of any agreement being reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on means of reducing tension.

2. Soviet officials have let it be known that the Russians have no intention of allowing the situation in North Vietnam to escalate militarily if this can be avoided. Nevertheless the Soviet leaders seem to have decided that the West should be warned of the seriousness with which they view possible developments, and of their determination to take any action necessary for the protection of Soviet prestige and interests. They are also continuing to show no interest in any serious negotiation with the West on major questions; this has been well illustrated by the purely propagandistic use to which the current session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission has been put by the Soviet delegation and their supporters. The Russians have attempted to bog the Commission down in discussion of proposals on which they know there will be no agreement at present or of propaganda items irrelevant to the work of the Commission. In practical bilateral matters, however, the Russians have continued to behave with circumspection. For example, there has been no interference with the Soviet/United States programme of cultural and scientific exchanges, although a number of such exchanges outside the cultural agreement have been cancelled.

#### VIETNAM AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

3. The crux of the matter remains Vietnam, where the Russians are unwilling to give any hostages to Chinese propaganda. Mr. Gromyko showed no sign that he saw any possibility for negotiations when he met Mr. Stewart and Mr. Rusk in Vienna on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. Like the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, the Russians claimed that the temporary cessation of American bombing of North Vietnam in mid-May was designed to mislead world opinion into believing the peaceful intentions of the United States. Soviet military aid has now taken practical form with the arrival in North Vietnam of fighters and, it has been reported, some jet bombers. Some missile equipment is also believed to have arrived at a SAM site near Hanoi. This is clearly meant to give plausibility to Soviet assertions of a determination to support the North Vietnamese to the hilt.

4. For their part, the Chinese have continued to maintain that the Vietnamese are capable of defeating the American "aggressors" by themselves. Their attacks on the Russians over Vietnam have if anything intensified, their main charge being that the Russians

/are

are carefully limiting their aid so as not to prejudice their "criminal objective of Soviet/United States collaboration for the domination of the world". The V.E. Day anniversary provided Chinese propagandists with an occasion for comparisons between Stalin's courage and the defeatism of Khrushchev's successors. The month ended with a long speech by P'eng Chen, a prominent member of the Chinese Politburo, delivered in Djakarta which was a synthesis of all current Chinese accusations against the Russians, whose "ardent flirtation" with United States imperialism was likened to "a pair of lovebirds that even clubbing cannot separate." He denied the legitimacy of the Soviet leaders, asserting that "Khrushchev and his like ..... have usurped the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet State". The utterly uncompromising nature of the Chinese position was also brought out in an interview between Ch'en Yi and the French journalist, K.S. Karol, in which Ch'en Yi justified anti-Soviet polemics as a positive factor in support for the Vietnamese and the anti-imperialist struggle, and made it clear that common action with the Soviet Union to help the Vietnamese was ruled out until the Russians were prepared to toe the Chinese line.

5. There are signs that the Russians may be becoming less willing to continue to turn the other cheek to the relentless Chinese determination to show them in a bad light over Vietnam. Although a reference in Kosygin's speech in Berlin on the V.E. Day anniversary to the C.P.S.U.'s determined fight against "all revisionists and dogmatists under whatever leftist phrases they may attempt to hide" was erased from both Neues Deutschland's and Pravda's reports of the speech, Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny all publicly attacked the view (implicitly attributed to the Chinese) that only a new world war will lead to the solidarity of the world Communist movement. Another oblique counterattack was the publication in Izvestiya of an article praising an early Chinese Marxist ideologue, which could only be interpreted as derogatory to Mao. Most significant perhaps was an article in Pravda commemorating the anniversary of Lenin's "Leftwing Communism - an infantile disease". This contained the now conventional appeal for unity, and the need to concentrate on what unites the Communist movement rather than on what divides it; it sounded hollow in the light of the article's implicit but obvious criticisms of Chinese attitudes.

#### SOVIET RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND PAKISTAN

6. The visits to the Soviet Union in successive months of the President of Pakistan and the Indian Prime Minister have underlined the delicate path the Russians are seeking to tread in their relations with these two important Asian powers. Soviet support for India is essential to her policy of seeking influence in the non-aligned world. But for obvious reasons the Soviet Union does not wish by this policy to encourage Pakistan to seek countervailing support in Peking. The Russians may have been moderately successful in achieving an improvement in Soviet/Pakistani relations as a result of President Ayub Khan's visit. They also took care in the communiqué on Mr. Shastri's visit to omit any direct reference to Indo/Pakistani disputes. The remarks in the communiqué on non-interference and the need to settle all disputes by peaceful means followed the line of an earlier Tass statement on the Rann of Kutch dispute, which observed strict neutrality and advocated in sober terms that both sides should settle their differences by direct talks. The

/Chinese

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Chinese reacted to Mr. Shastri's trip predictably, with an article in The People's Daily accusing the Soviet leaders and "Indian reactionaries" of being "bedfellows in opposing Socialist China".

CHINA'S SECOND ATOMIC TEST

7. The Chinese exploded their second atomic device on 14 May. There was a marked difference between their publicity treatment of this event and that accorded to the explosion of the first atomic device last October. The first test was the subject of a Chinese Government statement, messages of congratulation from the C.C.P. Central Committee and State Council to those concerned, various editorials and a proposal by the Chinese Prime Minister for a summit conference to discuss the banning of nuclear weapons. The second test was simply marked by a New China News Agency press communiqué; no mention was made of the call for a conference and the Chinese press devoted its main efforts to culling favourable statements on the second test from various quarters throughout the world. In fact, favourable comments appear to have been few and far between. The indications are that the Chinese have decided to treat this particular test in a relatively minor key. This may reflect some sensitivity to criticism in the outside world of their first test and a desire not to arouse hostility before the second Afro-Asian Conference.

THE FOURTH AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE

8. The resolutions passed at this Conference, which took place at Winneba near Accra from 10-16 May, were even more extreme in their anti-Western wording than those of previous conferences, and many of them seemed to bear traces of a Chinese hand in the drafting. Although there have been few reliable reports of the Conference's proceedings, it is clear that the Chinese did not have matters all their own way, and that the Sino/Soviet quarrel erupted on a number of occasions. Indeed, the Chinese delegate accused the Russian delegation of being the source of a series of "anti-China activities", and was particularly bitter at Soviet success in having East European observers, including Yugoslavs, admitted. It is also believed that the Soviet delegation was successful in moderating the extreme language of a Chinese resolution on the United Nations. The Chinese, however, were able to have the Malaysian delegation excluded, and Peking was chosen as the venue for the fifth of such conferences in 1967 (although an Afro-Asian/Latin-American conference is to be held in Havana in 1966). The Chinese claimed that attempts to write into the general declaration of the conference phrases suggesting Soviet participation in the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers were defeated. Whatever the truth or otherwise of this assertion there have been recent indications that the Russians will after all seek admission, despite the certainty that it will lead to a polemical confrontation.

THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

9. The Italian Communist Party is continuing to experiment with fairly radical "united front" tactics. Amendola's proposal for a merger of the Socialist and Communist Parties into a united left-wing Party was adopted in a diluted form by the Italian Communist Party as official policy at its Central Committee

/meeting

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meeting at the end of April. As represented by the General Party Secretary, Luigi Longo, the united left-wing Party is now conceived as a grouping of autonomous parties. This project is probably seen by the Communists as a means by which they might play a more effective part in the life of the nation. The first practical move to this end may emerge at a Conference of the Youth Federations of the two socialist Parties and the Communist Party, to be held from 18 June to 20 June, where the "unification of Socialist forces" is to be discussed.

10. The PCI is not allowing the French Communist Party to retain the initiative on the European scene which they temporarily seized by being the first to propose definite dates for a Conference of West European Communist Parties. Longo has broadened the basis of this proposal by stating that he would also like to "call in the forces of the Italian Left and the European Left" to take part in that Conference (reportedly called for the first week of June) and there have been indications that the Italians will propose a further conference for the purpose of discussing "socialist unification".

#### DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN EAST EUROPE

11. There has been an abnormal number of visits between the Foreign Ministers of East European countries over the past two months. The Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, Naszkowski, acting for Rapacki during his illness, visited Moscow and all East European capitals except Sofia between 20 April and mid-May. Reports of his visits made it clear that they were concerned inter alia with questions of "European Security". (It was the Poles who, last December, advocated a European Security Conference, a proposal which was endorsed by the Warsaw Pact powers in January). European security was also stated to be one of the main subjects discussed by the East German Foreign Minister Bolz when he visited Prague at the beginning of April. Other visits were of the Czech and Soviet Foreign Ministers to Budapest in April and May respectively and a stopover in Prague by the Rumanian Foreign Minister in April. All of this activity suggests a desire, at any rate in some quarters in Eastern Europe, to go ahead with a proposal for a European Security Conference. It may also be assumed that one of the subjects discussed has been East German concern lest some of their East European colleagues take a view different from theirs on the way in which a settlement of the German question might be reached and on the status of East Germany in a conference on European security.

#### BULGARIA

12. Bulgaria's particularly close relations with the Soviet Union have been underlined by the prolonged visit of the President Traikov to the Soviet Union after he had attended the V.E. Day Anniversary Celebrations in Moscow, and by the visit to Bulgaria of a C.P.S.U. delegation headed by Suslov. The declared object of Suslov's visit is to study the Bulgarian experience of party political, organisational and economic activity. It seems reasonable to assume in the light of the recent "attempted coup" in Sofia, and the changes which took place within the Bulgarian leadership after Suslov's visit of inspection in 1962, that the Soviet delegation will be taking a particular interest in discovering whether there are difficulties and shortcomings at the higher levels in the Bulgarian Party.

/EAST



EAST EUROPEAN INTELLECTUALS

13. Several of the Communist régimes of Eastern Europe continue to be troubled by the attitude of their intellectuals. In Hungary there is in progress a major ideological review not only of cultural activities but of all aspects of society. Western influences and policies have been harshly criticised, among other things for playing on "remnants of nationalism", and considerable concern has been expressed at the political apathy and pessimism which affects not only writers and artists but the social consciousness of Hungarians in general. The recommendations made for remedial action, however, amount to little more than exhortations to those whose task is to mould opinion to do better. In Poland, where such apathy and pessimism are long established, the discontent of the writers broke out at a recent meeting of the Warsaw branch of the Polish Writers' Union which voted overwhelmingly against the official policy of death penalties for economic crimes, and heard urgent pleas for the relaxation of censorship. In a conciliatory gesture (in marked contrast to the régime's handling of the disaffection last year over the "letter of the 34"), Zenon Kliszko, the Politburo's main ideologist, subsequently told a meeting of another branch of the Writers' Union that ideological criticism rather than administrative regulation was the proper instrument for influencing the form and content of creative art.

14. In Rumania, however, at a meeting between Party leaders and representatives of cultural life, Ceausescu, the Party First Secretary, gave what may prove to be significant stimulus to the gradual and recent cultural thaw by calling for diversity and individualism in literary style and by emphasising the value of direct contacts with writers and artists from "all" countries (although he added a cautionary word on the need to analyse artistic and literary works from a Marxist-Leninist - and by implication a Rumanian nationalist - standpoint).

SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTSTHE 20th ANNIVERSARY OF V.E. DAY

15. The 20th Anniversary of V.E. Day provided a jingoistic field day for Soviet propaganda organisations. Apart from the tougher line taken on the international situation most interest centred on the reference to Stalin in Brezhnev's speech which confirmed the partial rehabilitation at least of Stalin's military reputation. The reference was warmly applauded, as were shots of Stalin during the war which appeared during a new documentary film prepared for the occasion. This, combined with the rehabilitation of Marshal Zhukov signified by the leading place assigned him in the anniversary celebrations, can hardly be explained by the difficulty of celebrating a victory without being able to mention the victors. This in itself would not necessarily be deemed a compelling motive for so symbolic an act by a Party which has for a long time been able to celebrate the Revolution without mentioning many of the leading revolutionaries. The Russian public will probably see the move as a continuation by the new leadership of the policy of modifying certain of Khrushchev's more extreme attitudes. There is as yet no indication that the rehabilitation of Stalin is to go beyond certain narrow limits.

/PUBLICITY

PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN FOR THE K.G.B.

16. The V.E. Day anniversary was fully exploited in the current campaign to create a more favourable and heroic image for the Soviet security organisations (K.G.B., G.R.U., border troops, etc.) and to repair some of the damage done to their popular reputation by exposure of the excesses of the Stalin period. In this campaign the activities of the K.G.B. and its predecessors vis-à-vis the Soviet population are rarely referred to (except to demonstrate the humaneness of individual NKVD/MGB officials); attention has been focussed on the ingenuity and self-sacrificing bravery of Soviet agents abroad (e.g. Sorge) and on counter-intelligence operations in the Soviet Union against the German invader. On 4 May, Sergei Smirnov (who in April had been awarded a Lenin Prize for a book extolling the bravery of frontier troops at the start of the German invasion) introduced on Soviet T.V. a K.G.B. General who recounted some of the wartime exploits of Rudolph Abel, the Soviet spy who had later operated in the United States and who had been hitherto unknown to the Soviet public. It was also revealed that he had been decorated after his return from America in 1962. For an outstanding Soviet agent to be given publicity in the U.S.S.R. during his lifetime is unprecedented. This was followed on 7 May by an article in Pravda by Semichastny, the K.G.B.'s Chairman, describing the successes of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence against the Germans. Although "distortions and mistakes" in the work of the state security organs were admitted, the article's purpose was to show that these "did not change the socialist nature of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence, did not divorce it from the people and the Party". The length and extent of the campaign suggest that just such a divorce from the people has taken place.

PARTY/GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

17. Soviet journals have continued to discuss the problems involved in extending the rights of local government organs (Soviets). An article by the Chief Editor of Soviet State and Law has made a plea (supported, he claimed, by "numerous" contributors and readers) for presenting local electors with a choice of candidates instead of only one for each seat, as is at present the practice. This particular suggestion, though of more than ephemeral interest, appears to have been made in the context of the then forthcoming local elections and has not been followed up. Articles in subsequent issues of Soviet State and Law have however echoed two other important points made by Lepeshkin: first, that control over local industrial establishments - at least, those engaged in producing consumer goods - should be transferred to the Soviets from the Councils of National Economy (whose fate has been debated since the fall of Khrushchev); secondly, that excessive and unwarranted interference by local Party organs in the working of local government should be terminated. The stated aim of these discussions is to secure a precise re-definition of the competence and prerogatives of local government organs whether in the new Soviet Constitution or in revised Statutes on local Soviets: but the issues raised, of the location of the power of supervision of industry and of the boundaries between Party and government spheres of competence, are of much wider significance.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 30 April - 11 May Algerian military delegation led by Minister of Defence, Boumadienne, in Soviet Union.
- 1 May Tass statement announcing Soviet request for Security Council meeting on Dominican Republic.
- 3 N.C.N.A. carries Red Flag editorial on "the Great Victory of Leninism".
- 6-21 Algerian F.L.N. delegation in Soviet Union for talks with C.P.S.U.
- 7 Chinese publish further material on Soviet handling of anti-American demonstrations in Moscow and Leningrad.  
Kosygin speech for V.E. Day anniversary in Berlin.
- 7-19 Bulgarian delegation headed by President Traikov and including Foreign Minister Bashev in Soviet Union.
- 8 V.E. Day anniversary rally in Berlin.  
Podgorny speech in Prague.  
Brezhnev's report on 20th Anniversary of defeat of Fascism.
- 9 V.E. Day anniversary parade and reception in Moscow.  
People's Daily editorial on "Historical Experience of the War against Fascism".
- 10 Tass statement on Rann of Kutch dispute.
- 10-16 Fourth Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference in Winneba (Accra).
- 10-18 Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in Carpathia: meeting of Defence Ministers, Chiefs of Staff etc.
- 10 Red Flag article by Chinese Chief of General Staff, Lo Jui-ching.
- 11-14 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Budapest.
- 11 Western Tripartite Declaration on Germany.
- 12-19 Indian Premier, Shastri, visits Soviet Union.
- 14-17 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna for 10th anniversary of Austrian State Treaty.
- 14 Second Chinese nuclear test.  
Soviet Notes in reply to Western notes on harrassment in Berlin on 7 April delivered in Moscow.
- 15 North Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan welcomed China's second atomic test.  
Kosygin makes speech at Soviet-Indian Friendship rally.

/15 May

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- 15 May Soviet Foreign Ministry make oral statement of Australian Ambassador in Moscow criticising the sending of an Australian contingent to South Viet-Nam.
- 17-22 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits Turkey: communiqué published on 23 May.
- 19-31 C.P.S.U. Secretary, Ponomarev leads C.P.S.U. delegation to Paris.
- 20 Tass statement on President Johnson's V.E. Day anniversary address.  
Soviet-Indian communiqué published in Pravda.
- 21 Soviet Politburo member Podgorny makes speech on foreign affairs in Baku.  
Chinese Communist Party Delegation led by P'eng Chen goes to Djakarta for 45th anniversary celebrations of P.K.I.
- 22 Izvestiya item criticising conduct of Israeli Ambassador in Odessa.
- 23-29 Kadar, First Secretary of Hungarian C.P. leads 3-man delegation to Soviet Union at invitation of C.P.S.U.
- 23 45th Anniversary of foundation of Indonesian Communist Party: Sukarno speech.
- 24 Announcement of abolition of military ranks and insignia in Chinese army.
- 24-25 Meeting of Secretaries-General of Italian and French Communist Parties in Geneva.
- 25 P'eng Chen, Chinese Politburo member, makes speech on "combatting imperialism and modern revisionism" in Djakarta.
- 26 Suslov leads Soviet Party delegation to Bulgaria.
- 27 Pravda publishes article on anniversary of Lenin's "Leftwing Communism - an infantile disorder".  
People's Daily "Observer" article attacks Mr. Shastri's visit to Soviet Union.  
Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio, flies with delegation to Canton.
- 28 N.C.N.A. publishes Ch'en Yi's interview with French journalist, K.S. Karol.
- 30 Norwegian Prime Minister begins visit to Soviet Union.

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FOREIGN POLICY AND TACTICS

15th, 1965

SUMMARY

*With the compliments of*

HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

His Excellency  
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,  
Prime Minister of Iceland.

BRITISH EMBASSY  
REYKJAVIK

27 September, 1965

Relations have become frostier  
Increased commitment of United  
Press attacks have increased in  
on Soviet foreign policy have  
are anxious to keep the lowering  
control (paragraphs 1-2).

Greater flexibility in the North  
Initiation, despite the commitment  
(paragraph 3).

Showing signs of independence in  
(paragraph 4).

Conducting a "good neighbour" policy  
ours. The undeclared aim is to  
countries have with Western  
policy on the Kashmir dispute

China has increased recently, mainly  
Soviet appraisal by Castro of his  
(-8).

Signs of opposition in the Chinese Armed Forces to  
excessive Party control (paragraph 9).

The new Rumanian Constitution: Polish economic reforms  
(paragraphs 10-12).

Radical plan for agricultural reorganisation canvassed  
in Soviet Union. A poor harvest has resulted in large Soviet  
grain purchases in the West. The C.P.S.U. is carrying  
out an extensive review of organisational questions in  
preparation for the 23rd Congress (paragraphs 13-15).

FROSTIER SOVIET/UNITED STATES RELATIONS

President Johnson's announcement on 28 July that the  
number of American troops to be committed in South Vietnam  
would be substantially increased has been the occasion for the  
Russians to introduce a distinctly frostier note into Soviet/  
American relations. Not only have the attacks on the United  
States administration and the President become harsher -  
United States foreign policy is currently described as  
"Johnsonian Globalism" and the bombing of a North Vietnamese  
hydro-electric station and dam was denounced in an  
"Observer" commentary in Pravda as "genocide" and "a crime  
against humanity" - but for the first time bilateral  
exchanges between the two countries, which had previously  
continued normally, have suffered. The riots in Los  
Angeles provided Soviet propagandists with the occasion to  
revert to a technique reminiscent of earlier periods in the  
Cold War - an Open Letter to Pravda signed by twenty-nine  
Soviet scientists and intellectuals (some of them generally  
/associated

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

AUGUST, 1965

SUMMARY

Soviet/United States relations have become frostier since the announcement of an increased commitment of United States troops in Vietnam. Press attacks have increased in harshness, but two statements on Soviet foreign policy have suggested that the Russians are anxious to keep the lowering of the temperature under control (paragraphs 1-2).

There are no signs of greater flexibility in the North Vietnamese attitude to negotiation, despite the commitment of more United States troops (paragraph 3).

North Korea has been showing signs of independence in the Sino-Soviet context (paragraph 4).

The Soviet Union is conducting a "good neighbour" policy towards its Southern neighbours. The undeclared aim is to weaken links some of those countries have with Western alliances. Soviet neutrality on the Kashmir dispute (paragraphs 5-6).

Soviet influence in Cuba has increased recently, mainly as a result of a more realistic appraisal by Castro of his best interests (paragraphs 7-8).

Signs of opposition in the Chinese Armed Forces to excessive Party control (paragraph 9).

The new Rumanian Constitution: Polish economic reforms (paragraphs 10-12).

Radical plan for agricultural reorganisation canvassed in Soviet Union. A poor harvest has resulted in large Soviet grain purchases in the West. The C.P.S.U. is carrying out an extensive review of organisational questions in preparation for the 23rd Congress (paragraphs 13-15).

FROSTIER SOVIET/UNITED STATES RELATIONS

President Johnson's announcement on 28 July that the number of American troops to be committed in South Vietnam would be substantially increased has been the occasion for the Russians to introduce a distinctly frostier note into Soviet/American relations. Not only have the attacks on the United States administration and the President become harsher - United States foreign policy is currently described as "Johnsonian Globalism" and the bombing of a North Vietnamese hydro-electric station and dam was denounced in an "Observer" commentary in Pravda as "genocide" and "a crime against humanity" - but for the first time bilateral exchanges between the two countries, which had previously continued normally, have suffered. The riots in Los Angeles provided Soviet propagandists with the occasion to revert to a technique reminiscent of earlier periods in the Cold War - an Open Letter to Pravda signed by twenty-nine Soviet scientists and intellectuals (some of them generally /associated

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associated with the liberal wing of the Soviet cultural spectrum) and couched in absurdly tendentious terms. Soviet press treatment of the successful United States "Gemini 5" space flight was perhaps less generous than on previous occasions, by suggesting that the flight's technical hitches showed that the United States authorities were sacrificing safety considerations in order to overhaul the Russians, and that the United States space programme has primarily military aims.

2. Despite all this, however, two important statements of Soviet foreign policy - a Pravda editorial of 8 August and the leader of the twelfth issue of Kommunist - were devoted to showing that the policy of peaceful coexistence is in these days the only alternative to thermonuclear war, that it does not involve the abandonment of the struggle against imperialism and that it "makes it possible to preserve peace in the conditions of national liberation and social revolutions inexorably developing all over the planet". This may be cold comfort to the West, but it significantly contains no hint of concession to Chinese points of view. The Russians still appear anxious to keep the lowering of the temperature under strict control.

VIETNAM

3. In Vietnam itself interest focussed on the course of the ground war as United States troops became more actively involved. There were signs of demoralisation among the Viet Cong, but the lack of serious response to the probes for a possible mission by President Nkrumah, and the strong North Vietnamese and South Vietnam National Liberation Front denials of press reports which had suggested that Lord Brockway had been told by the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow that Hanoi would not insist on the withdrawal of all United States troops before negotiations for a peace settlement could begin, gave little cause for hope that the North Vietnamese mood was becoming more flexible.

NORTH KOREA

4. North Korea has recently shown signs of seeking a more independent position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. On a visit to Indonesia earlier this year, the Prime Minister, Kim Il-sung had stressed his country's attempt to solve its problems of revolution and construction independently and relying on its own efforts, and had by clear implication been critical of both the Soviet Union and China as "big power chauvinists". Six months after Kosygin's visit to Pyongyang, the Twentieth Anniversary of the foundation of the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" on 17 August has now provided some evidence of an improvement in Soviet-North Korean relations. Whilst due allowance must be made for the special nature of the occasion, the tone of messages and of speeches in Moscow and North Korea and the despatch to Pyongyang of a delegation headed by Shelepin is in notable contrast to the celebrations in 1964, when there was only one small meeting in Moscow with no texts reproduced. Chinese celebration of the occasion was in a relatively low key and the Chinese delegation to Pyongyang was led only by Wu Hsin-yu, Deputy Secretary-General of the National People's Congress. All this, and in particular remarks  
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made by the North Korean Ambassador in Moscow to the effect that the Soviet people were "paving the way to Communism", appears to amount to a marked gesture of Korean goodwill towards the U.S.S.R. and of independence vis-à-vis the Chinese Communist Party.

#### RUSSIA'S "GOOD NEIGHBOUR" POLICY

5. The visits to the Soviet Union during August of the King of Afghanistan (3 - 16 August) and of the Prime Minister of Turkey (9 - 16 August), in conjunction with the earlier visits of the Shah of Iran (June/July) and President Ayub of Pakistan (April) were quoted in a Pravda editorial as demonstrations of the Soviet Union's policy of good neighbourliness towards the countries on her Southern borders. The paradigm of good neighbourliness was clearly Afghanistan - "in forty-six years", according to Pravda, "Soviet-Afghan relations have not been overcast for a single day", and it was emphasised that the disparity of the two countries' political and social systems had not been any obstacle. The article made it clear that the reason for this was that Afghanistan "does not belong to any aggressive bloc ... does not permit the use of its territory for action against the Soviet Union". By the same token Iran was praised for not permitting foreign missile bases to be built on its territory. Apart from the natural desire to "ensure tranquillity" on their Southern borders, a main aim of this Soviet policy is to weaken the links of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey with Western treaty organisations, and the Turkish and Iranian visits were sugared with attractive offers of Soviet aid. The Russians, however, were scrupulous in seeking to avoid the appearance of wanting to detach Turkey, Iran or Pakistan from any of their Western alliances, and in the case of Turkey went out of the way to emphasise that Soviet/Turkish relations must not develop and grow stronger to the detriment of the two countries' friendship with other countries.

6. Such a formula is, of course, designed as much to reassure third countries about Soviet intentions towards them as to convince the neighbours themselves that no seduction is intended. There have, for instance, been signs of disillusionment in the Cyprus Government about the continuing Soviet efforts to develop closer relations with Turkey. Similarly in the context of Soviet/Pakistani relations, while the Russians have made no comment on the recrudescence of the Kashmir dispute beyond repeating the plea issued over the Rann of Kutch that disputes should be settled by negotiation rather than force, they have felt constrained to add in self-justification that good-neighbourliness with Pakistan "does not contradict our friendship with any third country" (i.e. India).

#### IMPROVED SOVIET/CUBAN RELATIONS

7. It is clear that in recent months Soviet influence in Cuba has considerably increased. Press articles and indoctrination favourable to the Soviet Union have been stepped up. Western diplomats have heard from various technicians that the Russians have become more insistent that their aid should be used in what they consider the most effective way. The Soviet Embassy in Havana have recently  
/been



been saying that relations with Cuba are now very satisfactory, whereas a year ago they were prepared to admit that all was not well. In many ways the Cuban line on foreign policy has seemed to follow the Russian more closely than before. A notable indicator is the Cuban Government's decision not to bring Joaquim Ordoqui to public trial and the gradual return to favour of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (both of them Moscow-orientated Communists): these have for some time been regarded as Russian objectives in Cuba.

8. While Cuba's economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union gives the latter obvious levers for exerting influence, the present shift in Cuban attitude seems due not so much to Soviet cracking of the whip as to a more sober assessment by Castro of where his interests lie. Resentment of Chinese opposition to the 1 March meeting in Moscow and Chinese "factional" activities in Cuba itself have led to a distinct cooling in Cuba's relations with China. Last November's conference of Latin American Communist Parties failed to produce the expected endorsement of Castro's leadership and policies, and he appears to have been personally shaken by Ben Bella's fall. Resentful as Castro is of any outside interference or advice on how to run Cuba's affairs, he seems to have decided that this is not the moment to spit on faithful friends.

#### THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES

9. Following the abolition of conventional rank structure in the Chinese armed forces earlier this year, an important article on military affairs by Ho Lung, one of the Chinese Communist Party's main military leaders in the struggle for power before 1949, appeared in Chinese newspapers on 1 August (Chinese Armed Forces Day). The theme of this article was the importance of safeguarding the "democratic" traditions of the Chinese armed forces. The article was significant not so much for its emphasis on "the absolute leadership by the Party over the army" - this was only to be expected - as for the clear indications that "bourgeois" military thinkers within the Chinese armed forces had opposed Party control over the armed services in the past and were possibly still doing so (reference was made to the need to "knock down again and again" the influence of bourgeois thinking on military affairs). The Chinese Communist Party is clearly not satisfied that the Chinese armed forces are as firmly under Party control as they should be. In particular, the Party appears somewhat apprehensive about the existence of professionally-minded officers within the armed forces who would like to see the People's Liberation Army more independent and better able to turn itself into an up-to-date armed service. But, as military technology and strategy in China become more complicated, it will probably become correspondingly difficult for the Party to maintain a policy of detailed control over the armed forces without running the risk of increasing dissatisfaction within them.

/EASTERN

EASTERN EUROPEa) The New Rumanian Constitution

10. The Rumanian Grand National Assembly on 21 August adopted the new Constitution, which was published in draft on 29 June. Rumania is now, like Czechoslovakia, a "Socialist Republic", and so claims to have reached the same stage of political development as the Soviet Union. The new Constitution follows the nationalist line of recent Rumanian policy by omitting completely any reference to the Soviet Union, in contrast to the 1952 Constitution, which among other things expressed Rumanian indebtedness to the Soviet Union for her "liberation by the glorious Soviet Army" and for the guarantee of her independence and sovereignty, and defined Rumania's foreign policy as being one of friendship and alliance with the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the bloc. Although some articles of the new Constitution prima facie afford increased protection to the rights of the individual (most noteworthy perhaps is an apparent 'habeas corpus' clause), the emphasis on the Party's leading rôle in every sphere of activity suggests that controls are unlikely to be relaxed to any significant extent.

b) Polish Economic Reforms

11. Reports which have now been received of the 4th Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party (which was held in Warsaw on 27 and 28 July) indicate that the Polish régime has at last decided to take some preliminary but important steps towards improving and rationalising the central planning system and the management of industry. At the Plenum, which was called to discuss a Politburo report on "Directions of changes in the planning system and the management of the national economy in the years 1966 - 1970", the Chairman of the Planning Commission, Jędrychowski was at pains to emphasise the experimental and tentative nature of the changes being mooted. This note of caution was no doubt aimed both at curbing excessive enthusiasm on the part of those who might think that the report answered their complaints that Poland had so far failed to adopt reforms on Czechoslovak lines, and to silence opposition from the dogmatist economic faction, led by Gede, Szyr and Tokarski.

12. Changes envisaged in the report are to take place over a period of three years. The most important (and certainly the most ambitious) of these is the introduction of profitability as the main criterion for the activities of apparently all industrial enterprises. An attempt has also been made to introduce greater price flexibility by the adoption of a three-tiered price system, under which there are to be three prices for every product: a high price when the product is new and modern, a basic price during the period of full production and a clearance price. Although this represents a step forward (in that it is likely to benefit efficient enterprises and penalise inefficient ones); the system will clearly be very difficult to administer, and is, no doubt by design, too artificial to permit the genuinely free dependence of market prices on supply and demand. It is difficult to see how the continued emphasis on planning and fixed prices (e.g. in the building industry) can be reconciled with profitability.

/SOVIET

SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTSa) Agricultural Organisation

13. The most radical of the suggestions for improving Soviet farming that have been canvassed since the Central Committee Plenum held in March is one which advocates the allocation, under long-term contract, of parcels of land to small "links" or "teams" of no more than 6 - 12 workers each. One recent article elaborating this proposal (in Komsomolskaya Pravda of 7 August) has been interpreted by some Western commentators as virtually implying a return to private ownership. In fact, the author is careful to speak only of "legal tenure" of the land and it is clear that no question of a transfer of ownership is involved. The claim is made, however, that this method of cultivation would result in more care and pride being taken in the working of the land and in the handling of machinery and, consequently, in greatly improved production. It might also, it is argued, halt the flight from the land (particularly of the young), which is a grave problem given the under-mechanised state of Soviet agriculture. Brezhnev made no mention of the scheme in his report on agriculture at the March Plenum, but it appears that limited experiments have been conducted in Kazakhstan and Moldavia. The idea, moreover, is not a complete innovation. The "link" was a recognised unit in farming during the war and immediate post-war years; but its chief advocate, A.A. Andreev (then the Party supervisor of agriculture) was sharply criticised in 1950 and, during the Khrushchev period, the "brigade" (of a hundred or more members) became the normal working unit.

b) Soviet Harvest Prospects

14. Drought in Siberia and Kazakhstan and a wet summer in European Russia are likely to result in a harvest considerably below average, although present indications are that it may not be as bad as in 1963. The purchase of 5 million tons of wheat from Canada, 1 million tons from Argentina and 600,000 tons from France brings Soviet purchases for the crop year 1965-66 (beginning 1 July) to well over 7 million tons. The substantial price increases for meat and dairy produce introduced with other agricultural reforms in March, by encouraging farmers to use grain for cattle feed rather than to deliver surplus to target to the state, may increase the difficulty of fulfilling the State procurement plan. Should the harvest of spring wheat prove less than in 1963, further grain purchases from abroad may be necessary. The Russians would presumably have to turn to either the French or the Americans, but would be reluctant to turn to the latter. The cost of the seven million tons already ordered is about £200 million, which will presumably be met partly by the sale of gold in the West, as was the cost of foreign procurement in 1963/64. This makes it likely that the squeeze on Soviet imports of other plant and equipment from the West will be maintained or even intensified. Such imports, although relatively small in relation to her total needs, are important for the development of vital sectors of the Soviet economy.

/ c)

c) Party Review

15. In preparation for its XXIIIrd Congress, the C.P.S.U. appears to be carrying out an extensive review of organisational questions. The need to improve the conduct of work, the "style" of leadership, the training of Party officials, the promotion system and the quality of the rank-and-file membership has been the subject of a Central Committee seminar for regional officials (held at the end of June but only reported in detail last month), a Central Committee decree, an article in Kommunist by the Belorussian Party First Secretary and two leading articles in Pravda. Of most interest among these topics is the question of Party membership. This, according to Pravda of 11 August, now amounts to over twelve million and has risen by more than two million since the last Party Congress in October, 1961, (and a recent survey showed a marked increase in 1964 as compared even with the high average annual intake for the period 1961-64). The Party Central Committee now appears to be seriously concerned that indiscriminate admissions may lead to a dissipation of its authority and has sternly censured "the obsession with numerical growth" displayed by many regional Party organisations. The point is made in a decree, specifically addressed to the Kharkov organisation but evidently intended for wider consumption, that "even individual cases of admission into the C.P.S.U. of persons unworthy of the name of Communist do harm to the Party, clutter its ranks, lower the authority and weaken the fighting capacity of Party organisations". This "purification" campaign, apart from its stated aims, may perhaps be associated with concurrent appeals for increased discipline and improved political education. It is of interest, too, that it has been vigorously prosecuted in the Party organisations of the Soviet armed forces.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 28 July President Johnson's statement announcing plans for strengthening United States forces in Vietnam.
- 1 - 6 August Indonesian Communist Party delegation led by Aidit arrives in Peking.
- 2 Statement issued by North Vietnamese Government protesting against the despatch of additional United States forces to Vietnam.
- 3 - 16 Official visit of King of Afghanistan to Soviet Union.
- 3 South Vietnamese National Liberation Front statement protesting against United States reinforcements to South Vietnam.
- 6 Protocol signed in Moscow extending Soviet/Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 24 June, 1931.
- 7 Tass statement criticising United States decision to strengthen forces in South Vietnam published.
- People's Daily editorial condemning President Johnson's statement on Vietnam of 28 July.
- 8 Pravda editorial on "The Noble Aims of Soviet Foreign Policy".
- 9 - 16 Official visit of Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Urgüplü.
- 12 - 16 Soviet/Bulgarian economic talks held in Moscow.
- 12 - 19 Soviet delegation led by Shelepin in North Korea for 20th Anniversary of liberation of Korea.
- 14 Meeting between Bulgarian Party First Secretary Zhivkov and Rumanian leaders at Varna.
- 14 - 28 Delegation of North Vietnamese National Assembly visited Soviet Union.
- 15 - 22 Chinese delegation led by Chen Yi visited Indonesia for 20th Anniversary of the establishment of the Indonesian Republic.
- 16 - 21 Soviet delegation led by Mazurov in Indonesia for 20th Anniversary celebrations.
- 16 Aidit expressed approval of Sino-Soviet polemics at press conference in Djakarta.
- Publication of Soviet/Turkish communiqué.

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- 17 August            Shelepin speech at Hamhung, North Korea.  
Meeting between Brezhnev, Suslov and Ponomarev and Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party Longo.
- 17 - 25            Official visit of President of Congo (Brazzaville) to Soviet Union.
- 17                Lord Brockway saw South Vietnamese N.L.F. representative in Moscow.
- 18                Shelepin met Kim Il-sung.
- 19                Lord Brockway saw North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow.
- 21                New Rumanian Constitution adopted.
- 21 - 24            Mazurov in India on way back from Indonesia to Moscow.
- 21                Open Letter from twenty-nine leading Soviet intellectuals to President Johnson about Los Angeles riots published in Pravda.  
Meeting between Brezhnev, Suslov and Ponomarev and Secretary-General of the French Communist Party, Waldeck Rochet.
- 23                Meeting between Brezhnev, Suslov and Ulbricht in Moscow.  
Decision by Chinese State Council to set up "autonomous region of Tibet".
- 24                Pravda "Observer" article on Kashmir.
- 25                North Vietnam Communist Party delegation led by Le Duc Tho arrived in Paris.
- 26                North Vietnamese Parliamentary delegation received by Kosygin.
- 27 - 31            Official visit of President Nasser to Moscow.
- 27                North Vietnamese Parliamentary delegation received by Brezhnev.  
Meeting between Brezhnev and First Secretary of the West German Communist Party, Reimann.
- 30                People's Daily reprinted Akahata article of 14 August on the Khrushchev revisionist theory on war and peace.
- 31                Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Zimyanin, handed Aide Mémoire to Japanese Chargé d'Affaires protesting against use of Japan by United States for operations against Vietnam.