



Communist Policy and Tactics 1965, 2. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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POLICY AND TACTICS

BERLIN 1962

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

October 17, 1962.

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of the fact that the Soviet commitment to Cuba and the passage
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to the Cubans are defensive in nature. On present evidence it
seems likely that the Soviet intention is to give the Cubans
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stretching out the hand of friendship to the people and
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BERLIN AND GERMANY

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

SEPTEMBER 1962

The Russians have significantly increased their stake in Cuba, and have gone a step further in their reconciliation with Yugoslavia. This latter action has already embroiled them once more with the Chinese. Gromyko has chosen the General Assembly to put forward what could prove to be an important modification of the first part of the draft Soviet disarmament treaty. Soviet intentions on Berlin have not become perceptibly clearer.

CUBA

2. The month has seen three events which have significantly increased the Soviet stake in Cuba: the signature, probably on September 2, of a Soviet-Cuban aid and arms agreement; the issue of the Tass statement of September 11; and the conclusion of an agreement, announced by Castro on September 25, to build a port for the use of the Russian Atlantic fishing fleet in the Bay of Havana.

3. Since their endorsement in April of Castro's denunciation of the Cuban Communist, Escalante, the Russians have continued to demonstrate by their support of Castro that they consider his downfall would involve greater risks for their prestige than the unpredictability of his policies. The collapse of Castro's self-styled Marxist-Leninist régime would be a severe setback to their hopes of penetrating Latin America. It was doubtless this concern, and a wish to make capital out of President Kennedy's request to Congress for stand-by authority to call up 150,000 reservists, which led them to issue the Tass statement of September 11. In suggesting that an attack on Cuba would be "the beginning of the unleashing of war" this statement appeared to go somewhat beyond earlier Soviet pronouncements and in referring to "fraternal" Cuba it used an adjective normally reserved for countries of the bloc. The statement also revealed considerable preoccupation with the position of Soviet merchant ships carrying supplies to Cuba, and awareness of the fact that the Soviet commitment to Cuba and the passage of their ships have made the Russians more vulnerable in an area where it would be very difficult for them to take effective action if challenged.

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the continuing urgency of concluding a peace treaty. The East Germans have mounted a small diplomatic offensive of their own among the other East European countries and some neutral countries, designed presumably to stress their own interest in progress towards a settlement. Ulbricht himself and some of his leading colleagues have visited Roumania, where he received little more than routine support for his political aspirations and (from published reports) no promises of practical assistance over his economic difficulties.

DISARMAMENT

6. It is difficult on the present evidence to assess the significance of the modification to the Soviet proposals for Stage I of their disarmament plan, which was proposed by Gromyko on September 21. The fact that it was made in the course of an abusive speech and in the General Assembly rather than during the disarmament negotiations at Geneva suggest that the Soviet motive is primarily a propaganda one. The Soviet Government may have felt that their position on disarmament needed to be made more attractive, if it was not to come under fire in New York. On the other hand, it is too soon to dismiss the possibility that the Russians may genuinely wish to narrow the wide differences at present separating East and West on the basic issues of disarmament, and that they decided to make their move in the General Assembly rather than at Geneva, with the object of gaining incidentally as much propaganda advantage as possible. Looked at from this point of view, their apparent acceptance of a form of minimum deterrence, i.e. the retention by both sides of the minimum amount of nuclear capability likely to deter the other, could be a hopeful development.

IRAN

7. On September 12, the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran informed the Iranians that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to accept a unilateral Iranian undertaking not to permit the establishment by foreign Governments of missile bases on Iranian soil. Notes were exchanged three days later. This understanding was the result of three years of intermittent negotiations, in which the Russians had always held out for more. In suddenly agreeing to accept a formula first offered by the Iranians in 1960, they may well have judged that there was now good propaganda to be made out of turning the heat off Iran. Pravda has already pointed an alleged contrast between Soviet policy towards Iran and the United States attitude to Cuba and a broadcast to Japan has called on the Japanese Government to follow Iran's example. Pravda suggested that if Iran's example was followed by other countries allied to the United States it could open the way to nuclear free zones in Europe and Asia.

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(a) Sino-Soviet Relations

8. After some weeks of increased sniping from Peking the superficial lull in the Sino-Soviet dispute has come to an abrupt end. The increasing warmth in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, symbolised in the visit of President Brezhnev to Yugoslavia, has incited the Chinese into dissociating themselves dramatically and publicly from the Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia. A bitter attack on Tito's "revisionism" in the Peoples Daily of September 17 was followed on September 27, at the climax of Brezhnev's visit, by a claim in a Chinese Central Committee communiqué that "the reactionaries of various countries which serve imperialism in a less disguised way and

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the modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique, have become more despicable in betraying the cause of Communism and meeting the needs of imperialism". A few days later the Chinese Prime Minister went further in claiming that the "imperialists" and modern revisionists" had attempted to isolate the Chinese and compel them to alter their views. Neither he nor the communiqué gave an inch to the Soviet case. "The Chinese people will never submit to any pressure, much less bargain away principles". (These quotations are from summaries). The Albanians have been making their own contribution to the polemics from the side with attacks on the "Khrushchev Group".

9. The resumption of the public debate between Moscow and Peking has coincided with press reports that the Chinese have asked the Russians to close their remaining consulates in China. Given the state of political relations between the two countries, the explanation attributed to Soviet diplomats that the closures were for reasons of economy sounds remarkably unconvincing.

(b) Chinese Central Committee Meeting

10. The communiqué issued by the Chinese Central Committee on September 27 announced no fundamentally new internal policies but forcefully restated those announced at the National Peoples Congress in April retaining the emphasis on agriculture. It also contained an ominous threat of increased party discipline, in suggesting that a "sharpened struggle" was necessary against "opportunist ideological tendencies" within the Party and announced a decision to strengthen the Party's Control Commission for this purpose. Probably as the result of these inner party differences two members of the Party Secretariat were removed. There were three new appointments to the Secretariat, Lo Jui-ching the present Chief-of-Staff and former Minister of Public Security; Kang Sheng an ideologist who has been a regular member of Chinese delegations to conferences with the Russians on Party differences, including the Moscow Conference of 1960; and Lu Ting-yi, a propagandist.

(c) C.M.E.A. and E.E.C.

11. From the limited accounts so far available, the conference of scholars and ideologists from 23 countries of Europe, Asia and America, which met in Moscow from August 24 to September 3 to discuss the problems of modern capitalism, and in particular to concert common lines of action in face of the challenge of the Common Market seems to have been only a moderate success. "Interesting polemics", which probably cover still unsettled arguments are said to have arisen over the Soviet analyses of the effects of integration on the economic development of Capitalist countries; the Italians appear to have been particularly critical. A writer in "New Times" of September 14 admitted that delegates unanimously censured a dogmatic approach in analysing the causes of the deterioration in the standards of the European working classes under capitalism. It seems clear that the Soviet theses were judged insufficient as a basis for an orthodox Communist interpretation of developments in the capitalist world.

(d) Income Tax in the Soviet Union

12. The scheme to abolish income tax gradually between the years 1960-1965, originally announced by Khrushchev in May 1960, was suspended on September 24. This, coming on the heels of the rise in meat prices on June 1, has symbolic and psychological importance for the Soviet people. It signals a halt, even if a small and temporary one, in the much acclaimed march to

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Communist abundance, and can be taken as a sign that the Soviet economy is under some strain in providing investment funds for the pursuit of all its targets. In attributing the decision to the increase in international tension, the announcement of this measure could also be designed to prepare the people for any raising of the international temperature which may occur in the coming months.

13. The foregoing is intended primarily for your own information. You may however communicate extracts at your discretion to the representatives of friendly governments, and use this material on a non-attributable basis in discussion with trustworthy journalists.

/CHRONOLOGY

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CHRONOLOGY

SEPTEMBER

Sept:

- 2 Soviet-Cuban arms agreement announced.
- 3-7 10th Pugwash Conference in London.
- 4 Soviet Note of Protest on U2 incident of August 30 handed to United States Chargé d'Affaires.
- 6 Khrushchev received Mr. Udall, United States Secretary of the Interior at Gagra.
- 7 Khrushchev received Robert Frost at Gagra.
- 9 Chinese U2 incident.
- Tank Troops Day in the Soviet Union.
- 11 Tass statement on Cuba.
Khrushchev received Dr. Kroll at Gagra.
- 13-15 7th Session of the General Assembly of World Federation of Scientific Workers in Moscow.
- 15 Soviet-Iranian exchange of Notes on rocket bases on Iranian territory.
- 18 Tass Statement on "Paris-Bonn Axis"
Gromyko headed Soviet Delegation at opening of 17th Session of U.N. General Assembly.
- 20 Pravda published summary of Chinese statement on U2 incident.
- 21 Gromyko proposed amendment to State I of Soviet draft Treaty on General and Controlled disarmament.
German news agency reported Chinese request for closure of Soviet consulates in China.
- 24 Supreme Soviet decree postponing abolition of income tax.
- 24 Brezhnev starts ten-day official visit to Yugoslavia.
- 27 Chinese Central Committee statement condemned Tito for revisionism and announced additional party appointments.

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BY HAND

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(1681/65)



With the compliments of
EMBASSY
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

23 August, 1965.

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POLICY AND TACTICS

1965

MARY

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Front organisations continued to suffer from the Sino-Soviet
dispute and the World Peace Congress in Helsinki served only to
discredit the movement. The Russians face a harsh dilemma in
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(paragraphs 9 and 10).

The Rumanian Party Congress took place quietly. National
Communism was extolled; Ceausescu was firmly in the saddle; power
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sensitive to Rumanian cultural influence in Moldavia (paragraphs
11-13).

A plenum of the Soviet Central Committee is to be held on
industry. There have been discussions on employment questions
and reports of a far-reaching economic review by Aganbegyan
(paragraphs 14-16).

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JULY 1965

SUMMARY

There has been no sign of any change in the basic attitudes of the Communist Powers involved in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese showed no inclination to explore moves towards negotiations during the visit of Mr. Davies and maintained the theme of the inevitability of ultimate victory. The Chinese continued propaganda attacks on both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russians hinted in private that the situation would be improved if bombing of the North stopped but did not say that this would lead to negotiations; they continued their efforts to increase their influence in Vietnam and indicated that the Chinese had obstructed their aid. Their reception of Mr. Harriman showed a wish to limit the deterioration in East-West relations and an increasing indifference to Chinese denunciation (paragraphs 1-4).

At the resumed Geneva Conference the Soviet attitude offered little prospect of serious talks on disarmament. Progress is not impossible but Vietnam remains a major obstacle (paragraphs 5 and 6).

Despite a critical Pravda article on Laos the Soviet attitude to Souvanna Phouma has not so far changed. The Russians would like to maintain the status quo whereas the Chinese and Pathet Lao would like the International Control Commission to stop functioning (paragraphs 7 and 8).

Front organisations continued to suffer from the Sino-Soviet dispute and the World Peace Congress in Helsinki served only to discredit the movement. The Russians face a harsh dilemma in coping with Chinese policy towards front organisations (paragraphs 9 and 10).

The Rumanian Party Congress took place quietly. National Communism was extolled; Ceausescu was firmly in the saddle; power may be concentrated in even fewer hands. The Russians are sensitive to Rumanian cultural influence in Moldavia (paragraphs 11-13).

A plenum of the Soviet Central Committee is to be held on industry. There have been discussions on employment questions and reports of a far-reaching economic review by Aganbegyan (paragraphs 14-16).

NO CHANGE IN VIETNAM

There has been no sign of any change in the basic attitudes of the three Communist powers involved in Vietnam. Hopes that the North Vietnamese might be prepared to explore even tentative moves to bring about negotiations were disappointed when Mr. Harold Davies who had been told by North Vietnamese journalists in London that their Government would welcome a visit from him, went to Hanoi but was refused access to North Vietnamese leaders. His discussions were only with officials of the Fatherland Front and an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a personal letter to Pham Van Dong asking for an interview remained unanswered. The Vietnamese officials with whom Mr. Davies had talks were insistent that no alternatives were open to them but slavery or independence and armed struggle. Their general theme of the inevitability of their ultimate victory over the Americans, as they had triumphed over the French, was reiterated by Ho Chi Minh in a statement issued on the eleventh anniversary of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Another proposal to send a peace mission to Hanoi emerged at the Helsinki World Peace Congress, but despite overwhelming support it was killed by the intransigence of Chinese opposition. It is too early to say what will be the result of the North Vietnamese invitation to President Nkrumah of Ghana. A Ghanaian official delegation led by the Ghanaian High Commissioner in London was sent to Hanoi to discuss the message sent to the President by Ho Chi Minh.

2. For their part, the Chinese continued their propaganda barrage against both the United States and the Russians. Reports that the United States Government intended to increase the number of United States troops in Vietnam produced Chinese accusations that President Johnson intended to launch a Korean-style war. In commenting on events such as Tito's visit to Moscow or the postponement of the World Youth Festival the Chinese press was almost equally bitter in its criticism of the Russians. Although they have as yet refrained from commenting directly on Governor Harriman's meetings with Kosygin, the end of his visit to Moscow coincided with the publication of a major Chinese article on "the struggle between the two lines over the question of dealing with United States imperialism", the language of which was as violent as anything that has so far been published, although it contained nothing new in substance. The effusive gratitude for Chinese aid expressed in Peking by a North Vietnamese economic delegation which during June and July visited all Communist capitals save Bucharest, Tirana and Ulan Bator was in marked contrast to their more routine thanks to the Russians in Moscow.

3. Soviet policy remains immobile. Their public statements reiterate that a settlement can only be reached on the basis of the North Vietnamese four points of April. In private they seek to give the impression that the situation would be altered, by implication for the better, if the bombing of the North ceased but they have not indicated in what way negotiations might be brought any closer thereby. They say that the bombing makes negotiations

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impossible; they do not say that if the bombing stopped there would be negotiations. The Russians have continued their efforts to increase their influence in Hanoi and with the Viet Cong. In Moscow the head of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front "mission" has been accorded diplomatic status as "chef de mouvement", and the report of the North Vietnamese economic delegation's Moscow visit stated that an agreement had been signed under which the U.S.S.R. would provide more military aid. Some at least of the SAM sites provided by the Russians near Hanoi are operational and have destroyed United States aircraft. The Russians have also retorted to continuing Chinese expressions of contempt about the extent of Soviet aid to North Vietnam. It was reported by the Mongolian news agency that the Soviet Komsomol leader, Pavlov, stated in Ulan Bator that "people with common borders with Vietnam" had "hindered" the U.S.S.R. from sending military equipment there. Those who talk much would do better to help more, he added. This was the first reference to such Chinese tactics made by the Russians in public.

4. The most significant pointer to the Russian attitude, however, was the fact that Governor Harriman, on an unofficial visit to Moscow, had two long interviews with Kosygin. The mere fact that the Russians are willing to maintain contact with the Americans at a high level in this way is evidence of their wish to limit the extent of the deterioration in East-West relations and also of an increasing indifference to Chinese denunciations.

DISARMAMENT

5. Soviet agreement to the resumption of the Eighteen-nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva, which they had persistently denigrated in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, encouraged some hope that the Russians might be prepared for serious talks on disarmament, particularly on the problem of non-dissemination. Articles in the Soviet press before the conference reopened on 27 July, however, and the initial attitude of the chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin, gave little prospect that such hopes would be justified. The United Kingdom plans for a non-dissemination treaty have been attacked as inconsistent with British support for the creation of a NATO nuclear force, and the situation in Vietnam has been used to cast doubt on the sincerity of the Western desire for disarmament.

6. Various motives for the change of Soviet tactic suggest themselves. The Russians are probably genuinely interested in a non-proliferation agreement provided they can get it on their own terms, but their immediate aim is evidently to use this as a bargaining counter to secure the abandonment of NATO nuclear plans. It might also have seemed to them unwise to resist pressure for the resumption of the Conference after the strong support for this expressed by the non-aligned countries at the Disarmament Commission, particularly when it provides them with a public platform for attacks on the West, especially over Vietnam. The Russians have not as yet closed all doors to progress, but Vietnam remains a major obstacle.

LAOS

7. An article in Pravda of 15 June accusing the United States of stepping up its attacks on the Pathet Lao, denouncing the decision to hold elections without the participation of the Pathet Lao as a violation of the Geneva agreements and alleging that a section of the neutralists had fallen under the control of the "American Secret Service" suggested that the Soviet attitude to Laos (which has for some time been one of letting sleeping dogs lie) might be changing.

/They

They have, however, indicated in private that their attitude to Souvanna Phouma himself (whose desire to visit Moscow was politely resisted on the grounds that there would be too many other top-ranking visitors for him to be given the attention that was his due) has not changed, although no commitment has been made as to what it may be when the election results are known in early August. Furthermore, the Russian views on the future of the International Control Commission differ significantly from those enunciated by the Pathet Lao and supported by the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. While the latter insist that the continuation of the International Control Commission is dependent on certain specified and obviously impossible conditions, the Russians are clearly seeking to postpone a decision.

8. The situation in Vietnam is, of course, basic to Chinese, North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attitudes on Laos. All have an interest in putting an end to bombing attacks on the supply corridor between North and South Vietnam which runs through Laos. A Neo Lao Hak Sat memorandum published on 23 July suggested that the Americans were about to launch a military occupation of Southern Laos comparable to South Vietnam, and they may hope, by using arguments of this sort and warning about the consequences, to persuade Souvanna Phouma to sever his ties with the Americans. The Russians are probably anxious to avoid any further complication of the Indo-Chinese situation, and for this reason would like to prolong the status quo if possible. The Chinese and the Pathet Lao would clearly like to see the International Control Commission cease functioning altogether.

FRONT ORGANISATIONS

9. Front organisations continue to be the victims of the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Following the coup against Ben Bella, the World Youth Festival, planned to take place in Algiers at the end of July, was postponed for a year, with its new venue to be decided at a later date. This was unsuccessfully opposed by the Chinese and their supporters, who, following the postponement of the Afro-Asian Conference, were no doubt anxious to avoid being deprived of another promising platform for anti-Soviet and anti-imperialist phrasemongering. The World Peace Congress in Helsinki, which took place 10-15 July provided them with just such a forum. Indeed, although the final resolutions, and particularly that on Vietnam, probably suited them more than the Russians, they may well have overplayed their hand. Their incorrigibly bellicose attitude has certainly alienated many non-Communist, pacifist individuals and organisations which it is Russian policy to draw into the Peace Movement. An example of this was their opposition to a proposal by an American delegate, Carlton Goodlet that the Congress should send its own peace mission to Vietnam. The Congress as a whole, with its procedural wrangles, rostrum-thumping and walkouts, served only to discredit the movement.

10. Soviet and Chinese policies towards front organisations are diametrically opposed. While the Russians seek to gain non-Communist support for their general propaganda ends by arranging matters so that non-Communists and idealists are not offended, the Chinese seek to separate the revolutionary sheep from the revisionist goats, even if the true nature of front organisations is cruelly exposed in the process. The Russians can ill afford any further demonstrations of disunity and lack of purpose in front organisations. But the alternatives are harsh: to expel the Chinese would be to invite the setting up of rival organisations; to try to allow them to die a natural death would be to invite a Chinese takeover.

/RUMANIAN

RUMANIAN PARTY CONGRESS

11. In contrast to its predecessor in 1960 which was the arena for the first round of open polemics in the Sino/Soviet dispute, the 4th Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party (now renamed the 9th Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party in the interests of historical continuity) was a quiet affair. Rumania's success in persuading the fraternal party delegations present to avoid controversy is evidence of the importance which the Chinese, as well as the Russians, attach to her. Both were represented at a high level (Brezhnev and Teng Hsiao-ping), but the Congress remained undisputatious and concentrated mainly on Rumania itself. Certain features of the self-centred national Communism extolled by the Congress must in fact have been distasteful to both Russia and China. The Russians cannot have liked the deliberate stress which was laid on the continuity of the Party's history in order to hide the fact that the present regime was installed after the war by the Russians; in a five-hour speech Ceausescu mentioned the Soviet Union only once. The Chinese on the other hand will hardly have been encouraged by the Rumanian emphasis on "peaceful co-existence" in foreign affairs and the advocacy of friendly relations with all countries whatever their social system. Some surprise was occasioned at the Congress by Ulbricht's apparent acceptance of the possibility of the establishment of normal relations between Rumania and West Germany, even though this was hedged with a veiled attack on the agreement by some East European countries to the incorporation of "Berlin clauses" in their agreements with the Federal Republic.

12. Despite the lip service paid to collective leadership, Ceausescu showed himself completely in the saddle. Satisfaction was expressed with the development of the economy over the past 6 year plan, and the same recipe of concentration on heavy industry is envisaged for the forthcoming Plan, despite slightly ominous signs of agricultural shortcomings. An organisational change in the higher organs of the Party seems likely to concentrate power in the hands of even fewer people than previously.

13. Although in public the Russians seem prepared to put a brave face on demonstrations of Rumanian independence and anti-Russian feeling, the assiduity with which a campaign is being waged in the Soviet Republic of Moldavia to demonstrate the supposed linguistic and cultural affinities between the Bessarabian and Russian peoples is evidence of Soviet sensitivity to Rumanian cultural influence in Moldavia and of their determination to try to combat it.

SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

14. After a number of indications in recent months that the Party and Government leadership have been conducting a major review of economic administration, planning and industrial performance, Brezhnev announced in Leningrad on 10 July that a Central Committee Plenum will be held on industry at an unspecified date in the future. In the sphere of administration, a decision still has to be taken on the future of the Sovnarkhozes, which has been in doubt for some time. In industrial management, which Khrushchev's successors promised to place on a more "scientific" basis, employment problems have come to the fore, mainly as a result of automation, post-war demographic trends and difficulties connected with the location of industry. In view of denials (since 1930)

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that unemployment exists or could exist in the Soviet Union, Western commentators have noted the assertion made by an economist, E. Manevich, in a recent number of Questions of Economics that an average of 20% of the working-age population throughout the U.S.S.R. "is not participating in the public economy". Subsequent articles and broadcasts have strenuously denied that this is a virtual admission that there is large-scale unemployment - not wholly without justification, since the figure includes those engaged in private farming and housewives. Manevich himself speaks both of an overall "shortage of labour" - in the sense that the needs of Soviet industry for workers with specific skills in specific areas are not being met - and, on the basis of current statistics, of "a certain labour surplus". In the light of his own figures, assurances that this latter category can be absorbed without difficulty by re-deployment and by expansion of industry may be treated with reserve. The reality of the problem is interestingly attested by Manevich's proposal that "... it would be expedient to ensure the material welfare of workers and employees who are released from their jobs due to technical progress, until they find other work".

15. In the context of the future Plenum considerable interest attaches to reports that the Soviet authorities are considering a far-reaching and disquieting review of the economy prepared by a young mathematical economist, Aganbegyan. According to the only account at present available, this review (which is said to have been presented last December to a closed Central Committee meeting) radically criticises the entire Soviet economic performance and asserts, for example that the controversial CIA estimate of Soviet economic growth (presumably the estimate covering 1962-63) was more accurate than official Soviet statistics. It is also reported to have questioned the proportion of Soviet resources devoted to defence, a subject on which there may be differing views in the Soviet leadership.

16. Once stories about Aganbegyan's report had surfaced in the Western press, it was hardly surprising that he should have gone on record with a refutation of the Western interpretation of the views imputed to him. The Plenum is unlikely to grasp the nettle of economic reality as boldly as Aganbegyan seems to have done, but some account may have to be taken of the sort of views which he is believed to have expressed.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 1 July President Tito left Moscow for Belgrade.
- 3 Speech by Brezhnev at Kremlin reception for graduates of military academies.
- Shah of Persia left Soviet Union.
- Publication of TASS statement criticising Japanese/South Korean Treaty.
- 6 - 21 Official visit to Soviet Union by Somali Republic Parliamentary delegation.
- 7 - 31 Indonesian Communist Party Delegation led by Aidit in U.S.S.R.
- 8 - 13 Mr. Harold Davies, M.P. in Hanoi.
- 9 Suslov and Ponomarev held talks with Chilean Communist Party leader, Corvalan.
- 10 - 15 World Peace Congress in Helsinki.
- 10 Brezhnev announced in Leningrad forthcoming CPSU Plenum on industry.
- 11 Kosygin speech in Volgograd.
- 11 - 16 Visit to China by Ugandan Prime Minister, Dr. Obote.
- 12 Soviet Union agreed to resumption of 18-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva.
- 13 Statement published on Soviet talks with North Vietnamese economic delegation.
14. Message of congratulations from Kosygin to Colonel Boumedienne on his appointment as Head of Algerian Government.
- 15 Kosygin received Mr. Harriman.
- World Peace Congress appeal on Vietnam.
- 17 Sino/North Vietnamese communique published in Peking following the visit of economic delegation, led by Le Thanh Nghi.

/Speeches

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- Speeches by Mikoyan, Kosygin and Suslov in Tallin; Riga and Vilnius respectively on 25th Anniversary of incorporation of Baltic States in U.S.S.R.
- 17 - 25 Brezhnev in Rumania for Rumanian Party Congress.
- 19 Article in Pravda attacking Her Majesty's Government's attitude on Vietnam.
- 19 - 24 Rumanian Party Congress in Bucharest.
- 21 Protocol signed in Peking on supplementary trade between U.S.S.R. and China in 1965.
- 21 - 28 Visit to Soviet Union by Ugandan Prime Minister, Dr. Obote.
- 23 N.L.H.S. publish memorandum on United States intervention in Laos.
- British school-teacher, Mr. Gerald Brooke, sentenced in Moscow to five years' deprivation of liberty on charges of anti-Soviet activities.
- 24 July - 1 August General Ne Win visits China.
- 24 Speeches by Podgorny, Kosygin, Shelepin and Kirilenko at presentation of Red Banner to Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific fleets respectively.
- 26 - 30 Guinean President Sekou Toure in U.S.S.R.
- 26 - 30 Ghanaian Delegation led by Kwesi Armah in Hanoi.
- 27 18-Nation Disarmament Conference reconvenes at Geneva.

Publication in Ta Kung Pao of Article on "Struggle between the two lines in dealing with United States imperialism"

President Johnson's press conference on despatch of further troops to Vietnam.

/27 July

1

27 July - 2 August 11th International Conference against Atomic
and Hydrogen Bombs took place in Tokyo.

28 July Ho Chi Minh sees Kwesi Armah.

28 - 31 July Indian Prime Minister, Shastri, visited
Yugoslavia.

30 July People's Daily editorial on "United States
interference in Laos".

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✓ Corrigendum to Communist Policy and Tactics of June 1965:

The first sentence of paragraph 14 should read as follows:

"With State visits to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union during June, Tito has now visited all the East European countries (except Bulgaria) in the last twelve months; he plans to visit Bulgaria in the autumn."/

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BY HAND



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

REYKJAVIK.

14 January, 1966.

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INTERNATIONAL TACTICS, NOVEMBER 1965

SUMMARY

The year was preceded by attacks on the Russians maintained a rigid line on nuclear matters. The Russians attached importance of unity for which they have urged the tougher Soviet line by a major attack in forthright but not surprising. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

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Further decline of PKI fortunes. (Paragraph 14.)

Soviet reaction to IDI by Mr. Smith in Rhodesia. (Paragraph 15.)

Chinese opposition to treaty between Japan and South Korea. Chinese hostility to Japanese Government. (Paragraph 16.)

Slight signs of shift in Soviet policy towards Israel. (Paragraph 17.)

Hungarian economic reforms. (Paragraph 18.)

Chinese front organisations. (Paragraph 19.)

Chinese internal developments. (Paragraph 20.)

EAST/WEST RELATIONS: THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

In the weeks immediately prior to Mr. Stewart's visit the policies of the British Government had been subjected to more than the usual volume of criticism in the Soviet Press and in statements by the Soviet leaders. These attacks were principally directed against British support of the United States in Viet-Nam, nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO and British policy in Rhodesia. During the visit itself the coverage by the Soviet Press was correct but not warm. In the light of the inauspicious preliminaries, and of the attitude of the Soviet leaders on the major international issues as expressed in recent statements, it was not expected that the visit could yield any spectacular results. The talks confirmed that the Russians maintain a rigid attitude on virtually all the principal questions discussed.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, NOVEMBER 1965

SUMMARY

Mr. Stewart's visit to Moscow was preceded by attacks on British policy in the Press and the Russians maintained a rigid attitude on the principal questions discussed during the talks. The main subjects of discussion were a non-proliferation treaty and Germany. Some progress on bilateral matters. The Russians attached emphasis to continuing the exchange of views. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

The Chinese responded to the tougher Soviet line by a major editorial article attacking the new Soviet leaders personally and asserting that the antagonism between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism is irreconcilable. Although they hinted at creating an organisational division, the Chinese are more likely to consolidate splinter parties loyal to them and to continue anti-Soviet polemics. The Russians have responded to this attack in forthright but not abusive terms, reiterating the importance of unity for which they continue to seek widespread endorsement. (Paragraphs 5-10.)

The Soviet balancing act over the Kashmir dispute continues. A meeting in Tashkent to take place in January. (Paragraph 11.)

In South-East Asia there has been no change in the positions of the Communist Powers involved in Viet-Nam. Renewed Pathet Lao activity in Laos. (Paragraphs 12-13.)

Further decline of PKI fortunes. (Paragraph 14.)

Soviet reaction to IDI by Mr. Smith in Rhodesia. (Paragraph 15.)

Chinese opposition to treaty between Japan and South Korea. Chinese hostility to Japanese Government. (Paragraph 16.)

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EAST/WEST RELATIONS: THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

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2. The main subjects discussed were a non-proliferation treaty, with which the Russians associate the question of nuclear arrangements within NATO, and Germany. Mr. Gromyko argued that NATO seemed bent on giving Germany "access" to nuclear weapons in some form or other and that, since in the Soviet view this would be disseminatory, it would rule out a non-proliferation agreement. He appeared to include in his condemnation even proposals which would give non-nuclear members of NATO the right to take part in decisions, but his definition of what he meant by access was not entirely clear. A somewhat different argument was used by Mr. Kosygin who objected that plans for nuclear sharing in NATO would amount to building up the military strength of NATO. The Soviet leaders were apparently not open to the argument that in fact nothing would be done in NATO which would result in dissemination. But although they insisted that NATO decisions on nuclear sharing were crucial to the issue of non-dissemination, they nevertheless agreed that discussions on the text of a possible non-proliferation agreement should proceed, without commitment as to whether other developments would in the event permit the conclusion of an agreement.

3. On all other aspects of disarmament the Russians took a hard negative line. There was no sign of Soviet willingness to discuss a solution to the Viet-Nameese problem and the Russians' disinclination even to discuss the question at any length suggests that they may at present have very little power to influence events there. Despite this rigidity on major international questions, useful exchanges on bilateral matters were possible, and a Consular Convention was signed. Indeed, the Russians view bilateral Anglo-Soviet relations optimistically in contrast to their disapproval of our attitude on international affairs.

4. It is noteworthy that the Russians emphasised the importance which, like us, they attach to continuing an exchange of views. This is registered by the inclusion in the communiqué of a passage recognising the desirability of holding periodical meetings and conversations. The meetings of a United States Senatorial Group led by Senator Mansfield with Messrs. Gromyko and Kosygin in Moscow provided further indication of the Soviet desire to keep their lines open to the West.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

5. The tougher line being taken by the Russians towards the Chinese in public, which began to show itself in October, has developed further. The 7 November celebrations in Moscow, which some observers had thought might be used by the Russians either for talks with other party leaders about further steps to be taken against the Chinese or for the announcement of such steps, in fact passed off quietly. Foreign representation was noticeably sparse and low-level, and the keynote speaker, Polyansky, confined his remarks on Sino-Soviet relations to a reiteration of the position previously enunciated by Brezhnev, *i.e.*, that the Russians had done all they could to improve relations and the matter now depended on the Chinese.

6. The Chinese response, however, which was delivered in an editorial article published in the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* on 11 November, consisted of a direct attack on the present Soviet leaders whose policies were described as more cunning and therefore worse than those of Khrushchev. The article argued that the hallmark of a true Marxist-Leninist was his attitude towards imperialism and particularly the United States and on this it found the Soviet leaders irredeemably wanting, because their actions over the past year, particularly on Viet-Nam, had shown that their line was that of collusion with the United States against world revolution. The article asserted that the antagonism between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism is irreconcilable and that "there is nothing that unites us . . . nothing that is common". From abuse it passed to exhortation, calling on the Soviet people to remove their new leaders, and openly invoking the creation of splinter parties where existing Communist parties have "revisionist" leadership.

7. The article also hinted at the possible creation of a Peking-orientated organisation of Communist parties, but it is hard to see what the Chinese would gain from this, since it would only expose their current weakness. Indeed, the article betrayed an awareness of this weakness (and also possibly differences of opinion in China itself) and referred to "a certain unevenness in the degree of people's understanding of the struggle". Its particularly peevish tone may also be due in part to annoyance that the Russians have stolen the main plank of Chinese

propaganda—opposition to United States imperialism—for a platform which they rightly interpret as designed to isolate them. The most likely Chinese line will be to concentrate on consolidating factional parties loyal to themselves and to continue the polemical battle. They will in particular seize on any possible sign of Soviet willingness to co-operate with the United States: Soviet participation as an observer in the recent meeting in Manila to discuss the establishment of a Development Bank for South-East Asia under ECASE auspices has already been the subject of violent attack.

8. The Chinese onslaught could hardly be ignored by the Russians, and after a preliminary denunciation of the Chinese article by *Pravda's* Peking correspondent, *Pravda* published a front-page editorial on 28 November, which was a full-scale review and condemnation of the current Chinese opposition to unity—the first to appear in print under the new Soviet leaders. Avoiding the specific charges of the Chinese article, it concentrated on the damage done to the common cause of the struggle against imperialism by the Chinese attitude. While recognising that unity is impossible at the moment, it emphasised that the Soviet line is supported by an overwhelming majority of Communist parties and that all attempts to undermine it will inevitably fail.

9. The tone of this Soviet response was forthright, but not abusive. Since the essence of the Soviet line is the paramount importance of unity and condemnation of Chinese "splittism" it remains unlikely that at this stage the CPSU will take the initiative in trying to excommunicate the Chinese, or will substitute polemics for its present measured response. But the attempt to isolate the Chinese will continue. The Russians would no doubt like a massive formal endorsement of their line on unity by a large majority of other parties, and the inter-party consultations of the past few months may have been partly devoted to this end. A number of parties, however, maintain their suspicion of any world meeting, even if its avowed purpose has nothing to do with ostracising the Chinese. Russian hopes ought perhaps to be pitched no higher than seeking more forthright condemnation of the Chinese by their allies and supporters: most of their European allies have already obliged.

10. Although in the long run Sino-Soviet rivalry may incline the Russians to seek accommodation with the West, there is little prospect in the short run that the present aggravation of the dispute will bring the Russians any closer to Western points of view. The main argument between the protagonists at the moment is still on the means by which "imperialism" should be opposed.

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

11. The Soviet Government continue a skilful balancing act in their relations with India and Pakistan. There has been hardly any mention of the dispute between the two countries in the Soviet Press for nearly two months. Soviet arms supplies to India have continued on a considerable scale. This has evoked a wave of pro-Soviet sentiment in India, which pictures the Soviet Union as India's number one friend. Disillusion with Britain and the United States continues to be widespread, and this conveniently serves to obscure the essentially equivocal Soviet attitude on the dispute. The point about military aid has certainly not escaped the Pakistanis. A statement put out by the Soviet Embassy in Karachi in mid-November to demonstrate Soviet impartiality was clearly designed to allay the fears of those who "claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense of the other". The Soviet Government pursued the same objective during the visit to Moscow of the Pakistani Foreign Minister. It is very doubtful whether Mr. Bhutto persuaded the Russians to slow down arms supplies to India or to provide arms to Pakistan: at a Press conference he confined himself to stating that "all imbalances and the consequences of imbalances" had been discussed. His main satisfaction seemed to derive from the prospect that a meeting between President Ayub and Mr. Shastri would take place on Soviet territory probably some time in January. The Indians too have agreed to such a meeting (making it clear that they are prepared only for discussions, not negotiations on Kashmir) and the date has now been fixed for 4 January.

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

(a) Viet-Nam

12. Considerable attention has been paid by the Western Press to the "revelations" in the anti-Soviet Chinese article of 11 November about Soviet attempts earlier in the year to bring about negotiations on Viet-Nam, and to reports that the North Viet-Nameese had been willing to negotiate in 1964 but that the Americans had refused. The positions of the Communist Powers involved, however, remain unchanged. The Soviet Government were totally rigid in their response to Mr. Stewart on this subject during his visit to Moscow. North Viet-Nameese intransigence, which may well have disappointed the Russians, has been shown by increased Viet Cong activity in the South, with substantial reinforcements of North Viet-Nameese regular troops, the reiteration by Ho Chi Minh in two letters clearly designed for publication that his régime stand on their four points, and the statement in a commentary from Hanoi of 25 November that "an American newspaper even fabricated the legend that since autumn last year Hanoi has two or three times proposed negotiations. . . ." Persistent rumours that Pham van Dong paid secret visits to Moscow and Peking in October have not been firmly substantiated, but a North Viet-Nameese economic team, led by the Vice-Premier, Le Thanh Nghi, set off for Peking and Moscow at the end of November, no doubt to discuss further military and other aid. The South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front have meanwhile established permanent offices in Sofia, Budapest, Warsaw and Bucharest following visits to Eastern Europe by two delegations in September and November. As in Moscow, Prague and East Berlin, these offices do not have diplomatic status and are associated with local "solidarity" organisations. But their purpose is to expand and enhance the standing of the Front abroad.

(b) Laos

13. The Soviet desire not to compound their difficulties in South-East Asia had led them until recently to a virtual dissociation from their responsibilities as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Laos, a policy initiated under Khrushchev for rather different reasons. Over the past few months, however, the Russians have shown a disposition to co-operate with us in our capacity as co-Chairman on relatively uncontroversial problems of a practical nature concerning the International Commission in Laos which they seem to want to continue in existence. At the same time they have been trying to maintain correct relations with the Royal Government. The recent reactivation of Pathet Lao activity with North Viet-Nameese support in Central Laos, probably connected with a desire to make the North Viet-Nameese supply route through Laos to South Viet-Nam more secure, has led the Russians to support Pathet Lao complaints about alleged United States air activities in Laos: they proposed to Her Majesty's Government that a patently propagandistic draft message should be sent in the name of the two co-Chairmen condemning alleged United States acts of aggression, and published it in the Soviet Press before we had had time to reply. At the same time they have refused to circulate an ICC report which included mention of the fact that North Viet-Nameese troops had been active in Laos for some time.

INDONESIA

14. The fortunes of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) have continued to decline during the past month. Although President Sukarno has refused to give in to the popular demand that the PKI should be banned, in five out of Indonesia's seventeen military districts, local military commanders have now formally prohibited PKI activity. According to some reports PKI Chairman Aidit has been captured and may have been shot. PKI capacity to initiate guerilla warfare has been seriously impaired by the speed and energy of the army's security operations. Mass resignations by party members have become a daily ritual and it is clear that PKI organisation and communications are in disarray. None the less, it would seem that the army is not anxious to force a showdown with the PKI in two areas of greatest PKI influence: in Central Java and in Central Sumatra. In these areas, both sides seem to have adopted a policy of "wait-and-see", and it is unlikely that the PKI would wish to initiate guerilla action while the army and Sukarno remain theoretically allied, unless the army were to launch an all-out campaign against them. Soviet supplies to Indonesia have not been affected and Moscow is clearly anxious to keep all options open in its relations with Indonesia. Chinese aid and trade, on the other hand, have now virtually ceased.

RHODESIA

15. The Soviet reaction to the illegal declaration of independence in Rhodesia on 11 November was to issue a Government statement a few days later reiterating the points of the Tass statement issued some two weeks before the declaration. Her Majesty's Government were held wholly responsible for the situation and the Soviet Government confirmed that it was ready to co-operate with African countries in rendering the Zimbabwe people all-out support in their struggle for independence. This line has been faithfully followed in the Soviet Press, with the addition that the economic sanctions imposed by Her Majesty's Government will be hopelessly inadequate. There has as yet been no clear indication that any material support has been asked for or given, but it is reasonable to suppose that if the African States decide on military action they will seek at least logistical and material support from the Russians. The latter have probably learnt the lesson of not becoming too deeply embroiled in African politics, but they may find it hard not to make some practical gestures.

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

16. The Chinese have been consistently hostile towards the Government of Mr. Sato, and this hostility has recently been reflected in a sustained campaign against the signing of the treaty between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The theme of the Chinese attack was that the signing of this treaty was a deliberately hostile move, by United States "imperialism" and her "lackeys" in Japan and South Korea, aimed against China. In effect, the Chinese claim, a "North-East Asia Treaty Organisation" aggressive pact against China had been concluded. An almost hysterical note could be detected in some of the Chinese statements, notably in a *People's Daily* editorial of 15 November which said that even if United States imperialism and all its followers invaded China they would get themselves "smashed to smithereens". One reason for the peculiar virulence of this campaign might be that the Chinese believe that the treaty will meet with difficulties. If this were so, then the Chinese would claim that their opposition had been instrumental in thwarting another diabolical design of the imperialists. They may also quite genuinely suspect the motives of the Japanese and Koreans in reaching this agreement. But it was noteworthy that their reaction to the treaty seems to have been much more violent than that of the North Koreans, whom one would have thought were more closely affected by it. Chinese indignation against the Japanese Government contrasts with their continuing efforts to woo as many sections of the Japanese population as possible, notably by entertaining large delegations of visitors, particularly youth and students. The Chinese use these contacts as well as those with Japanese businessmen to try to stir up political ill-will against the Japanese Government.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL

17. In 1948 the Soviet Union supported the establishment of Israel, no doubt seeing advantage in the creation of a focus of tension in the Middle East: since then the Soviet line in the Arab/Israeli dispute has more or less consistently been to support the Arabs, which has won them considerable support in the Middle East generally. It was of some interest, therefore, that the Soviet weekly *New Times*, which has wide foreign dissemination, should have published in its issue of 12 November an article by the Moscow correspondent of the Israeli Communist newspaper *Caspi* critical of some travel reportage by a Soviet author earlier this year. In particular, the Israeli correspondent maintained that Israel had a right to use the Jordan waters, that President Bourguiba's views on the revision of Arab/Israeli relations could not be ignored, that the Arab/Israeli conflict must be settled peacefully and that while it was correct to criticise the policy of force of the Israeli Government, it must not be forgotten that the other side also threatened force. To allow publication of explicit criticism of the propaganda position held until recently by the Soviet Government is a further advance along the line of small developments in Soviet policy towards Israel which have occurred recently, such as a statement by the Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv on the 17th anniversary of the establishment of the State that he hoped for an amicable settlement of the Arab/Israeli dispute, the resumption of Soviet trade with Israel following an agreement in October 1964 on the sale of Orthodox Church property and a recent visit to the Soviet Union of an Israel Communist Party delegation,

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which reported that there were favourable signs for an improvement in Israel-Soviet relations. This change in the Soviet line may be no more than a tactical change corresponding to a general Soviet policy of antagonising as few people as possible on the fringe of the East/West conflict. But it is liable to provoke misgivings in Arab capitals, and if it were developed further would be of considerable significance.

EASTERN EUROPE: HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORMS

18. At its meeting from 18-20 November, an enlarged plenum of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Party expressed approval of a report on the comprehensive review of the economic system. The submission of this report, commissioned by the Central Committee in December 1964, marks the completion of the first stage of a comprehensive programme of reform which is expected to take at least three years to complete. The report will be submitted to party and other organs for country-wide debate and then be resubmitted to the Central Committee next spring for a final resolution. The report is based on the premise that only a comprehensive reform of the whole economic system embracing the price structure, management, wages and salaries, profits and incentives, the system of planning, investment policy and the use of limited competition, can set to rights the country's serious economic difficulties, which at the moment pose the problem not of how to raise the standard of living but of how to prevent a decline. The report stresses that while attention has been paid to measures adopted or planned in other Socialist countries (the proposals for the introduction of three categories of prices closely resemble those adopted in Czechoslovakia and the organisational measures proposed are very similar to the recent Soviet reforms) the correct path was "not to transplant the system of any fraternal country", and in particular, the Yugoslav system of workers' control has been rejected as inappropriate. Opposition to the reforms is likely in the middle political ranks, who will resent the loss of power and patronage involved, and there will also be difficulty in dovetailing the reforms with the new Five-year Plan which will be published in the spring. This and the inherent difficulties of administering a mixed system of planning and profitability may mean that the transitional period will be drawn out, but the reforms in principle represent a genuine step forward in making the Hungarian economy more efficient.

CHINESE FRONT ORGANISATIONS

19. Since 1963 the Chinese have pursued a double policy towards Communist front organisations of disrupting Soviet-centred ones from within, while at the same time building up their own Afro-Asian organisations. Owing to lack of support, particularly from Africa, and to the incompetence of the Indonesians, to whom they mostly entrusted the organisational side, these latter have had little success. Only the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA) has become a really going concern. The others, organised from Indonesia, must now be regarded as victims of recent events there and seem unlikely to be revived unless the Chinese decide to run them from Peking. The disruptive tactics of the Chinese in Soviet front organisations have contributed to the general disillusionment with Chinese policies current in the uncommitted world, and the Chinese can now count only on the Albanians, the North Koreans and the Japanese party for regular support. They are none the less likely to continue to use these meetings as forums for their extreme views, and it is doubtful that they will be expelled as long as the Soviet Union finds it tactically desirable to avoid treating the Chinese as irredeemably lost.

CHINA INTERNAL

20. China is in the throes of preparing for its third Five-year Plan which is due to begin next year. As a result, the amount of coverage given by the Chinese Press to internal matters seems to be increasing. Much publicity is being given to efforts by industrial installations in China to improve and perfect techniques on a basis of "self-reliance". At times, the theme of "self-reliance" has been emphasised to an almost xenophobic extent. For example, on 28 November Shanghai workers were "quoted" as saying that "we must break with unscientific and irrational conventions followed in other countries". Much publicity is also given to progressive units and experiments in China's countryside. At the same time, there is a campaign to improve the quality of management and control at the lower party administrative levels in China. Finally, China has a new hero. This young man, Wang Chieh, like many of his predecessors,

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is both military and dead. He is said to have sacrificed his life in order to save the lives of a militia squad to whom he was demonstrating explosive charges. This theme of self-sacrifice to the uttermost degree will obviously be a key one as China's population is called upon to make even greater efforts during the forthcoming Five-year Plan.

 CHRONOLOGY

November

- 2 Resolution of Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers' meeting postponing Algiers Conference indefinitely.
- 6 Polyansky report at Moscow Revolution anniversary meeting.
- 9-17 Indian Minister of Finance visited USSR.
- 10 *People's Daily* published "anti-Chinese" material by Soviet and other Communist leaders and party Press.
- 11 *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* published article "Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action'".
- 15 *People's Daily* editorial attacked Japanese/South Korean Treaty.
- 15-19 Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz visited Yugoslavia.
- 16 *Pravda* published Soviet Government Statement on Rhodesia.
Pravda published its Peking correspondent's report of the 11 November Chinese editorial.
North Viet-Nameese Government statement on increase in United States military commitment in Viet-Nam.
- 18-20 Plenum of Central Committee of Hungarian Communist Party discussed economic reforms.
- 18 Soviet Foreign Minister saw United States Senatorial group led by Senator Mansfield.
People's Daily published article on Tass corrections to text of Polyansky report.
- 20 *Neues Deutschland* published article on Chinese attacks on Soviet policy in Viet-Nam.
- 22 *Pravda* editorial article condemning ban on Sudanese Communist Party.
- 23-26 Pakistan Foreign Minister, Bhutto, visited Moscow.
- 24 Cuban delegation led by Raul Castro left Moscow for home.
- 27-29 Brezhnev visited DDR.
- 28 *Pravda* editorial "International Duty of all Communists" attacked Chinese.
- 29- Secretary of State visited Moscow.
- 3 Dec.
29 United Nations General Assembly resolution on World Disarmament Conference.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, DECEMBER 1965

SUMMARY

The noticeably harsher Soviet tone towards the West probably did not imply a fundamental change in Soviet policy, but was a response to developments in the Viet-Nameese crisis and to Soviet relations with China. (Paragraph 1.)

The East European countries with the exception of Rumania have echoed Russia's more forthright criticism of China. The Russians and the Chinese continue their polemical war in their own chosen styles. The Chinese have produced a new accusation that if the Russians were serious about Viet-Nam they would have done something to tie down United States troops elsewhere. The Chinese seem to expect a major Soviet offensive against them. (Paragraphs 2-4.)

Possible differences of opinion noted in Hanoi. Important agreements on Soviet economic aid to North Viet-Nam. Possible motives of Shelepin's visit to Hanoi. Evidence of Soviet desire for Communist meeting of some sort on Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 5-8.)

Chinese foreign policy during 1965. (Paragraphs 9-10.)

North Korea seeks more independent line between China and Soviet Union. (Paragraph 11.)

Increased Chinese interest in Thailand. (Paragraph 12.)

Cautious Soviet attitude on Rhodesia. (Paragraph 13.)

Difficulties for Communism in Middle East: Boumedienne's visit to Moscow; banning of Sudanese Communist Party. (Paragraphs 14-15.)

East Europe: developments in East Germany; Bulgarian economic reforms. (Paragraphs 16-18.)

Soviet internal: leadership changes; the Soviet economy. (Paragraphs 19-20.)

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

The harsh tone of Soviet statements about the West, and the United States and West Germany in particular, took a further turn for the worse with the publication of an interview given by Mr. Kosygin to Mr. James Reston of the *New York Times* on 6 December, notable for the vehemence of Kosygin's attack on United States foreign policy. This was followed by a violent denunciation of West German intentions and foreign policy in the statement made by Gromyko before the Supreme Soviet on 9 December. The announcement in the Supreme Soviet that Soviet defence expenditure in the coming year was to increase by 5 per cent because of "the aggravation of the international situation and the increase of the danger of war" was also designed to demonstrate the gravity with which the Russians view the world situation. It is difficult to assess whether this declared increase had any practical or military significance, since the public Soviet defence budget bears little relation to actual Soviet defence expenditure. The propaganda campaign against the United States was further intensified by the organisation of mass-protest meetings and demonstrations throughout the

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Soviet Union, building up to the fifth anniversary on 20 December of the formation of the South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front. It is doubtful, however, whether this tougher Soviet tone should be interpreted as implying a fundamental change in Soviet policy towards the West: even Kosygin's harsh remarks carried the implication that the Russians still think a better relationship with the United States is desirable, and Soviet willingness to continue talking to the West was further demonstrated by the fixing of dates for the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow in February. Coinciding as it did with the visit to Moscow of the North Viet-Nameese Vice-Premier, Le Thanh Nghi, and the build-up for the Tri-Continental Solidarity Conference in Havana, the rougher line is to be seen as a response to developments in the Viet-Nameese crisis and the state of Soviet relations with the Chinese, with which the Soviet attitude towards the West is inextricably entwined.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

2. The criticisms of the Chinese made in the *Pravda* editorial of 28 November were echoed shortly thereafter in the Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Bulgarian Party organs, while East German endorsement of the Soviet line even preceded it. That the form and content of these East European criticisms followed the Soviet line so closely suggested that the recent intensive consultations between the Soviet leaders and their opposite numbers had paid off. The Rumanians, however, in their first, and delayed, public comment on the Sino-Soviet dispute characteristically conveyed the hope that each Socialist country would be allowed to work out its own approach to the dispute and indicated a strong preference for bilateral talks between any leaderships at odds with one another.

3. The Russians and the Chinese meanwhile continued their polemical war in their own chosen styles. The Russians celebrated the fifth anniversary of the 1960 Moscow Meeting of Communist Parties with a carefully drafted *Pravda* editorial, dated 12 December, which emphasised the agreement reached in 1960 on the over-riding need for unity in the World Communist Movement and attacked the Chinese not only for violating this agreed general line, but for working still harder to split the movement. They also published relatively restrained articles justifying their own performance in helping Viet-Nam and critical of Chinese refusal to co-operate. For their part, the Chinese printed the texts of the *Pravda* editorials of 28 November and 12 December, accompanied by vehement reiterations of their own taunting accusations against the Russians. In particular, Soviet allegations that the Chinese had obstructed Soviet arms supplies to Viet-Nam were brought to the fore again, and were vigorously denied by Chen Yi in an interview for the Japanese paper *Akahata* on 30 December. In this he suggested that the Russians did not dare send their supplies by sea, and also voiced a new accusation against the Russians (which is likely to become a standard one) that if their professions of support for Viet-Nam were serious they would have done something to keep United States troops tied down in other parts of the world.

4. With the allegation in a *People's Daily* editorial of 30 December that the Russians were hatching a big plot for a general attack on China and a general split in the Socialist camp, the Chinese appeared to anticipate a major Soviet offensive against them. The prospect as the year ended of the top Soviet leadership devoting a major part of its energies to Asian affairs, with Shelepin preparing to visit Hanoi, Brezhnev to visit Mongolia, and Kosygin to act as host in Tashkent to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, can have brought the Chinese no comfort.

VIET-NAM

5. Although Western observers who have passed through Hanoi recently have suggested that there might be differences of opinion among the Viet-Nameese leaders about what policy should be pursued and that the Chinese line is not unswervingly supported, there has been no public indication of any flexibility in Hanoi's position. Reports claiming that Ho Chi Minh had made certain remarks to the Italian Professor La Pira in November, which were communicated by Signor Fanfani to Washington as a possible peace-feeler, produced firm denials from Hanoi that any peace offer had been made. Initial reactions by the North Viet-Nameese and Chinese to President Johnson's "peace offensive" which began as the year ended have also been predictably negative and hostile. The Soviet Press,

although its comments so far have been few, has taken the line that the United States moves are designed to distract attention from what in effect is a mounting United States military offensive in Indo-China as a whole, and to impress the Congress before a request for an increased budgetary allocation for the war.

6. The Soviet Union's own relations with North Viet-Nam have been advanced by the visit to Moscow by a North Viet-Nameese economic delegation headed by a Vice-Premier Le Thanh Nghi, which culminated in the signature on 21 December of a series of agreements on Soviet economic and technical assistance, probably including agreement on a significant increase in Soviet military supplies, and the announcement of a visit to Hanoi by a Soviet delegation headed by Shelepin, which includes in its number D. F. Ustinov, the Party Secretary concerned with supervision of the arms industry, and the Deputy Chief of Soviet Rocket Forces, General Tolubko.

7. Apart from the obvious public relations benefit to the Soviet Union in such a visit at this time, both in the eyes of the non-aligned countries and as a counter to Chinese accusations of duplicity in Soviet intentions towards the Viet-Nameese, the purpose behind it is probably to sound out to what extent Soviet influence in Hanoi has increased as a result of the new economic agreements, and to gauge whether a further increase could be bought with additional aid. While Shelepin's probe will have to be conducted with great caution, he will probably try to explore North Viet-Nameese thinking on the future conduct of the war, the possibility of a negotiated settlement and the actual terms that might be acceptable to them. He may also seek their views on, and if possible acquiescence to, some sort of Communist meeting on the specific subject of Viet-Nam.

8. Evidence that the Russians would like to hold some such meeting and have made specific proposals about it has been steadily accumulating, although it is still not clear what its nature might be. The Polish party paper *Trybuna Ludu* stated that the Chinese "reject the possibility of holding a meeting between party and Government leaders of the Socialist countries at the highest level", while the Hungarian party paper indicated that a meeting of all Communist parties was contemplated. Confirmation has been provided in the Italian Communist Press that both types of conference have been mooted by the Russians, although they do not make clear whether the proposals are still being pursued. Communist diplomats, however, have tended in conversation to assume that they are. Whatever meeting is contemplated, the attitude of the North Viet-Nameese is clearly crucial. The Albanians have already denounced the idea of a meeting as an attempt to isolate the Chinese, and misgivings on this score are probably shared by a number of Communist parties, including not only the Rumanians but possibly some which stand closer to the Soviet position on relations with China. The Viet-Nameese will certainly be reluctant to adopt an attitude towards a meeting which could be interpreted as a rebuff to the Chinese, and the prospects for it are thus not at the moment encouraging. Nevertheless, success in convening such a meeting could represent for the Russians an important breakthrough in the impasse which the Viet-Nameese situation creates for their conduct of relations with the Chinese. Since the stakes for the Russians are so high, it is reasonable to assume that Shelepin will sound the North Viet-Nameese out. Even if, as seems likely, the North Viet-Nameese response is negative, provided he plays his hand with reasonable skill the Russians need not lose any ground in the attempt.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY DURING 1965

9. We have commented *seriatim* on the series of failures and setbacks suffered by the Chinese throughout 1965—in Indonesia, over Kashmir, over the Afro-Asian Conference, in the field of Sino-Soviet relations, and in their standing in North Korea and even North Viet-Nam. These developments have revealed, and seem indeed to have mainly resulted from an increasingly dogmatic and intransigent approach by the Chinese leaders to foreign problems. Their sense of ideological rectitude largely accounts for this rigidity and over-confidence, resulting in serious miscalculations of the forces and personalities involved, even in those countries of the Third World of which they claim to have special knowledge and with which they share a common outlook. They seem to have over-estimated their appeal to these countries. But their chief miscalculation lay in ignoring the fact that most Asian and African leaders consider that their revolutions lie behind them, and are now mainly preoccupied with the search for internal stability and the pursuit of

their own nationalistic interests. In preaching self-reliance, China overlooked the fact that most emerging countries are well aware that they need aid, and they know that "self-reliance" was something that China was forced to adopt because of her own backwardness and as a face-saver when Soviet aid was withdrawn following the breach between the two Communist Powers. The more responsible Asian and African countries also regard non-alignment as much too important to risk by joining a Chinese-run anti-American campaign.

10. The Chinese leaders have reacted to these setbacks not, as might have been logically expected, by moderating their extreme revolutionary propaganda and adopting a more flexible and pragmatic approach. On the contrary, they have become even more militant, continuing to develop their extreme anti-American and anti-Soviet policies and to exclude any suggestion of possible compromise. They have thus given not the slightest indication that they are prepared to learn from their mistakes in the foreign field as they have done to a considerable extent at home. China is therefore likely to maintain her present attitude in 1966, though on present showing this will harm rather than advance her interests. At the same time, both in her policies towards Viet-Nam and the Indian Sub-Continent, she has carefully refrained from intervening to the extent which would risk a direct military confrontation with the United States.

NORTH KOREA

11. Signs that North Korea is seeking a more independent position in the Sino-Soviet dispute have continued. North Koreans take a line closer to Chinese than Soviet views, but this is not surprising since their main preoccupation is to oppose "United States imperialism", which they maintain still occupies South Korea and maintains a puppet régime there. This was the dominant theme of an important speech by Kim Il-sung on 10 October in which he also had harsh things to say about the "modern revisionists". But within this framework, the North Koreans are not particularly interested, as the Chinese are, in waging a personal vendetta against the Soviet leaders, and they are quite ready to give general support to Soviet ideas, provided these do not directly clash with their major preoccupations or involve them in contradictions with China. Thus in a recent issue of *Nodong Sinmun* the North Koreans were quite prepared, in the space of the same editorial, to adopt essentially Soviet formulations about the current need for unity and solidarity within the Communist movement at the same time as they endorsed Chinese formulations about opposition to United States imperialism. It is too early to say whether this more independent line will lead to a significant worsening of their relations with China. On the whole it would seem pointless for the Chinese to pick a quarrel with the Koreans, since the latter still support China's main foreign policy platform. But in their present mood of defiant self-righteousness, the Chinese might take umbrage, and there have been signs of Chinese anxiety at sympathy for Soviet points of view in North Korea, as in North Viet-Nam.

CHINESE INTEREST IN THAILAND

12. According to NCNA and Peking Radio reports in December the "Thailand Independence Movement" issued a statement on 1 November, the first anniversary of the founding of the movement, saying it was joining the "Thailand Patriotic Front", and would accept the latter's political leadership. This is the latest of a number of developments during the past three months revealing China's increasing interest in Thailand, first noted when the permanent liaison missions of the Thai Independence Movement and the Thai Patriotic Front were established in Peking in March and April 1965 respectively. Peking Press and Radio have given good coverage to the activities of these organisations' representatives in Peking, particularly their invocations to the Thai people to take armed action against the Thai Government, which is represented as wholly subservient to the United States. Strains in Thai/Cambodian relations are used by the Chinese to drive home the same lesson.

RHODESIA

13. Communist handling of the Rhodesian crisis has continued to be cautious. Soviet propaganda, which played up belligerent statements by African leaders and reiterated that Her Majesty's Government are in collusion with the

Smith régime, became more cautious and in a lower key in the latter part of the month. The communiqué issued on the talks the Zambian Ministerial mission had with Soviet leaders was cautious also, and in its terms and in the degree of support offered it did not go beyond the Tass statements of 26 October and 16 November setting out the basic Soviet position. There was no mention of military aid, and Soviet expressions of support were placed firmly in the context of the United Nations and OAU resolutions. The Russians have good reason not to become too closely involved in the crisis and are likely to continue to play their hand cautiously. The Chinese have predictably interpreted Soviet reactions as demonstrative of their willingness to act with United States and British imperialists, and have driven home the moral that the Zimbabwe people and all other African countries must rely on their own struggle to win national independence.

COMMUNISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

14. Events in the course of the month have provided a useful reminder of the difficulties facing not only the Russians, but all propagators of Communism in the Middle East. Boumedienne's visit to Moscow produced no unexpected results but signified an easier relationship between Algeria and the Soviet Union than in the period immediately after Ben Bella's deposition. Although the ideological attitudes of Boumedienne are less sympathetic to Moscow than those of Ben Bella, it is a matter of practical politics for both countries that their State relations should remain cordial. The communiqué issued at the end of the visit was cryptic on the subject of bilateral relations, but otherwise ranged the Algerians solidly on the side of the Soviet Union on all international questions interesting the Third World. Soviet relations with Algeria and the UAR are simplified because the Communist parties in each country have voluntarily liquidated their party organisations, although the announcement by the Egyptian Minister of Justice that the investigation had been completed in the case of 11 persons accused of having formed a clandestine organisation called the Arab Communist Party with the object of conspiring to change the form of Government of the UAR by force, produced a denial by *Pravda* that the accused were Communists and a statement that Egyptian Marxists fully supported Nasser. In the Sudan, however, a Bill was passed on 9 December banning the Communist party and any other organisation professing atheism or Communist principles, following a minor incident in November when a Communist student had made derogatory remarks about the wife of the Prophet Mohammed, sparking off an anti-Communist movement encouraged by Moslem and Right-wing elements. Local and foreign Communists reacted vociferously, blaming "imperialism" for the move. An interesting sidelight—demonstrating the complicating factor of the Sino-Soviet dispute—was a statement alleged to have been issued by the Central Committee of the Sudan Communist Party which suggested that the student in question was a provocateur of a pro-Chinese Communist group expelled from the party in 1964 and, whose object, as agents of the Chinese Communist Party, was to undermine the SCP. The only publicity given to this was in the English-language review of translations from the Soviet Press distributed by *Novosti*, although it had not apparently appeared in the Russian-language Press itself. The Russians have so far taken a cautious line on the new Government of Dr. Bazzaz in Iraq, although the Communist party there is at the moment under some pressure.

15. The essence of the problem for Communists lies in the contrast the Arabs see between the national character of Arab Socialism and the international character of Communism. "The Arab Communist is linked to Communists of other countries. He is an alien, as they are aliens", wrote Salah Bitar, the Syrian Prime Minister in *al-Ba'ath* shortly before he took office. Awareness of this has led to a carefully calculated opportunism in Soviet policy in the Middle East.

EASTERN EUROPE

(a) *Developments in East Germany*

16. Following Brezhnev's sudden visit to East Germany at the end of November, the delayed long-term Soviet/East German Trade Agreement was signed on 3 December. The event was highlighted by the suicide on the same day of Dr. Apel, a Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Planning

Commission. Reports that his death was connected with serious differences of opinion with Ulbricht over the degree of East German economic subservience to Moscow were angrily denied by *Neues Deutschland*. We do not know whether Apel himself had quarrelled with Ulbricht, but the existence of differences in some quarters was revealed in the Politburo report delivered by Honecker to the Plenum of the SED Central Committee later in the month insisted on the need for the closest economic links with the Soviet Union and criticised technocrats and senior State officials who admire the West and press for ever-increasing imports from Western countries. None the less, it is likely that this agreement was a disappointment to Ulbricht. Impressive as it appears on paper with its new target 40 per cent higher than the previous one, it is paradoxically likely to increase East Germany's need for supplies from the West: the Soviet Union will continue to be East Germany's principal source of industrial raw materials, but the position as regards grain is left uncertain, the reduction in supplies of which from the Soviet Union has lately constituted a serious strain on East German currency resources; furthermore, although Soviet supplies of capital equipment are to increase considerably, the Russians are thought to have imposed substantially higher technical specifications for the engineering products they will themselves import, some of which may only be capable of being met with the assistance of East Germany's Western trading partners.

17. The régime has persistently sought to achieve the most intimate technical and economic integration with Russia as the best safeguard against the emotional pull of West Germany. The comprehensive changes announced in the economic sector of the Government are unlikely to affect this. The State Planning Commission is to be reorganised and strengthened, while the National Economic Council has been dissolved and replaced by nine new industrial ministries. Although the general pattern of appointments in the Government and the now smaller Presidium is in favour of technocrats and the younger generation in the party, it was noteworthy that at the Plenum attention should have been drawn to the ideological shortcomings of youth, students and those concerned with information media. The general impression conveyed is that certain party intellectuals have grouped together to give more force to their views, the irrepressibly heretical Professor Havemann prominent among them (who, for his pains, has now been relieved of his post as director of a section of the research section of the Academy of Sciences) and that the régime may now feel that a touch of the brake is necessary after the comparatively relaxed atmosphere of the past year.

(b) Bulgarian economic reform

18. Bulgaria has embarked on the road of economic reform already being trod by the Soviet Union and most of her East European neighbours. At the beginning of December the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party published its theses on a proposed new system of planning and management of the national economy, the pattern of which is broadly similar to that proposed for the Soviet Union. The theses will be submitted to a Plenum of the Central Committee for endorsement in January 1966 and the new system, which the Bulgarians have been experimenting with in so far as it concerns enterprises themselves since April 1964, is meant to operate throughout the entire economy by the beginning of 1967. The more cautious timetable adopted by other socialist countries suggests that the Bulgarians may be over-ambitious, but it is interesting that the Bulgarian régime, long regarded as one of the most rigid, should have been willing to express itself so adventurously.

SOVIET INTERNAL

(a) Leadership changes

19. The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Session of the Supreme Soviet at the beginning of December produced the most significant changes to date in the post-Khrushchev leadership. Mikoyan retired as President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and there is no reason to doubt the official explanation on grounds of age and health. His place has been taken by Podgorny, who, although no official announcement has yet been made, is believed to have given up his functions on the Secretariat. The most interesting changes are those connected with Shelepin, who has lost his post as Deputy Prime Minister and no longer heads the Party State Control Committee. This Committee has been transformed into a

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Committee of People's Control under the former Deputy Chairman, Kovanov, and the reversal of the innovations Khrushchev made in party and Government administration in 1962 has now been completed. The functions of the new Committee are not clear, but it will no longer be empowered to intervene in party matters and this probably represents an overall strengthening of the role of the party. Though Shelepin has lost influence in this respect, it has been strongly rumoured that he has taken over at least some of the Secretariat responsibilities which Podgorny is believed to have held; thus his influence may not in fact be reduced at all. His selection to undertake what must be a very delicate mission to Hanoi is a further sign that his position in the hierarchy is strong. The appointments of Shcherbitsky as a Candidate Member of the Party Presidium, and Kapitonov as a Secretary of the Central Committee represent their restoration to favour after falling foul of Khrushchev. These changes do not seem likely to affect the stability of the Brezhnev-Kosygin combination, nor the practice of collective leadership, although the position of Brezhnev and the primacy of the party seem to have been consolidated.

(b) *The Soviet economy*

20. The Soviet 1959-65 Seven-year Plan ended this month. Although the results have fallen short of its avowed object of enabling the Soviet Union "to overtake, within the historically shortest period of time, the most developed capitalist countries", it has not wholly been a failure: an annual rate of growth of national income (defined in Soviet terms) of 6.5 per cent is not a negligible achievement. The biggest shortfalls have been in the agricultural sector, in parts of the chemical industry (where targets were pitched unrealistically high) and in housing. The planned increase in industrial output is likely to have been exceeded. Little has been heard about the new Five-year Plan due to come into effect on 1 January, 1966, but the usual details of the plan for 1966 were given at the Session of the Supreme Soviet at the beginning of December. Possibly partly in anticipation of dislocation resulting from the newly introduced economic reforms, the Soviet Government seem to be planning for a performance in 1966 which is in some important respects not as good as the claimed achievement in 1965. In industry the emphasis is on a broadened assortment, an improved quality, on the use of technical innovations and on increased labour productivity. But so it has been before, with only partial success. A better deal for the consumers is promised at least on paper. The 5 per cent increase planned in defence expenditure in the open defence vote, which excludes important items of defence expenditure, may be of political rather than economic significance. Despite this increase (after two years with apparent reductions in real terms), declared defence expenditure as a percentage of national income and in real terms is still smaller than it was in 1962. If the trends revealed in the 1966 Plan are continued it would suggest that the Soviet Union is no longer attempting to chase the Western economies as energetically as it did in the past—itself a noteworthy example of the new Soviet pragmatism in economic matters.

CHRONOLOGY

December

- 3 *Trybuna Ludu* published editorial critical of China.
Soviet/East German Trade Agreement signed. Suicide of East German Vice-Premier, Apel.
- 4 Kliszko, Polish Party Secretary, saw Brezhnev, Suslov and Andropov in Moscow.
Publication of thesis on new economic reforms in Bulgaria.
- 5 *Nepszabadsag* published editorial critical of China.
Rabotnichesko Delo published editorial critical of China.
- 6 North Viet-Nameese economic delegation left Peking for Moscow, led by Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi.
Plenum of Central Committee of CPSU.
Kosygin gave interview to *New York Times* Associate Editor, Reston.
- 7-9 Meeting of Supreme Soviet: increase in defence expenditure announced; Gromyko attack on West German foreign policy; announcement of personnel changes in the leadership; Budget report and plan for 1966.
- 7-22 North Viet-Nameese economic delegation in Soviet Union.
- 9 Bill banning Sudanese Communist Party passed in Khartoum.
Pravda announced that Shastri and Ayub Khan agreed to meet in Tashkent on 4 January, 1966.
- 11-14 Hungarian First Secretary, Kadar, in Moscow for secret talks.
- 11-16 Gromyko visited Czechoslovakia.
- 12 *Pravda* editorial on 5th anniversary of 1960 Moscow Conference of 81 Communist parties.
- 13-18 President Boumedienne of Algeria visited Soviet Union.
- 18 *Scinteia* published editorial on situation in the world Communist movement.
- 20-23? President Kekkonen of Finland visited Soviet Union.
- 20 Speech by Chou En-lai on anniversary of formation of National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam.
- 21 *People's Daily* reproduced *Pravda* editorial of 28 November and challenged Soviet leaders to answer Chinese charges publicly.
Agreements on Soviet economic and technical aid to North Viet-Nam signed in Moscow.
- 22-25 Zambian goodwill mission in Moscow.
- 23 *Pravda* announced that Prime Minister will visit USSR, 21-24 February, 1966.
- 23-25 Indian Foreign Minister in Moscow.
- 25 *Pravda* editorial on Viet-Nam, critical of Chinese anti-Soviet accusations.
- 26 *Pravda* editorial on suppression of Communists in Indonesia.
- 27 *People's Daily* editorial on alleged record of Soviet/United States collusion at United Nations session.
- 28 Tass announcement of forthcoming visit by a Soviet delegation headed by Shelepin to Hanoi.
- 30 *People's Daily* editorial, "the leaders of the CPSU are betrayers of the Declaration and the Statement".