



Communist Policy and Tactics 1965, 4. hluti

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JUNE 1965

SUMMARY

The Commonwealth initiative on Vietnam was swiftly condemned by the Chinese: the North Vietnamese reply was equally negative, but designed to give a less than totally intransigent impression. The Soviet reply disclaimed a rôle in negotiations, but reflected support for negotiations in principle. This view has no doubt been put to the North Vietnamese but is unlikely to be pressed at the moment. The continued cautious Soviet attitude towards the war in Vietnam reflects Soviet concern at potential pressures if the bombing of the North continues. Despite harsh public attacks on the United States, the Russians would probably seek to improve relations with the West if a solution to the Vietnam problem could be found. (paragraphs 1 - 3).

The Russian effort to participate in the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers was strenuously resisted by the Chinese. The Algerian coup prevented the matter being put to the test. The postponement of the Conference against their wishes was a considerable setback to the Chinese, despite their attempts to represent it as a blow against imperialism (paragraphs 4 - 6).

The Algerian coup will increase existing Soviet concern at the varying theories of socialism current in developing countries. Soviet relations with Ben Bella were close, but the Russians have been circumspect in their reactions to his fall (paragraphs 7 and 8).

More robust Russian reaction to Chinese attacks. The Russians will probably continue to avoid polemics, but may be freer in their criticism (paragraph 9).

Successful efforts of the P.K.I. to improve its position with Sukarno. Pressure is now directed at the armed forces, who are the main obstacle to a successful bid for power by the Communists (paragraphs 10 and 11).

The visit of the United Nations Committee of Twenty-four to Africa showed the Russians advocating an important rôle for the United Nations in ridding Africa of "colonialism". Their intentions are unconstructive, anti-Western and anti-Chinese (paragraphs 12 and 13).

Tito's visit to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Kadar's resignation (paragraphs 14 and 15).

Recent developments in Berlin (paragraph 16).

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VIETNAM: COMMUNIST RESPONSES TO THE
COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE

The response of the three Communist powers involved in Vietnam to the proposal emerging from the Commonwealth Conference that they, as well as South Vietnam, the United States and the United Nations Secretary-General, should receive a mission composed of the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Ghana, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago to discuss the possibilities of reaching a settlement of the crisis, throw interesting light on their respective attitudes to the situation there. The Chinese showed their continued lack of interest in negotiations of any kind by a swift condemnation of the initiative in abusive press articles. In their formal reply they alleged that Her Majesty's Government were "actually appropriating the name of the 'Commonwealth' to launch a new 'peace talks' plot, thus rendering another service to the United States aggressors". They are presumably still confident that the Vietcong can win a military victory and that the United States face a humiliating defeat.

2. The North Vietnamese press and radio have been equally abusive in condemning the initiative as a 'hoax'. But in the only reply they have given to the British Consul-General in Hanoi, the régime made no comment on the substance of the Commonwealth proposal, concentrating on procedural niceties regarding the way in which the proposal was addressed to them. The purpose of this curious response was probably to avoid giving to the African and Asian members of the Commonwealth the impression of complete intransigence towards an approach sponsored by the Commonwealth as a whole, but at the same time to make clear that there was no weakening in the North Vietnamese resolve to continue the battle. The Soviet reply disclaimed a rôle in negotiations and, by suggesting that the matter depended on the North Vietnamese, the Vietcong and the Americans, also attempted to disentitle the Chinese from such a rôle. The reply appeared to reflect a Soviet view that there should be negotiations, and they are thus plainly at odds with the Chinese on this issue. It must be assumed that the Russians have spoken directly to the North Vietnamese about the advantages of negotiation. The extent of their influence is uncertain, and it is unlikely that they are willing to press the North Vietnamese unduly in present circumstances. The Russians will no doubt continue their efforts to build up their influence and to reduce that of the Chinese, and any Soviet lead towards reaching a settlement is likely to depend on the outcome of this struggle for influence, and on the development of the military situation in Vietnam.

3. The general Soviet attitude towards the Vietnam war has continued to be cautious. In the course of the month they have provided more aircraft, both fighters and bombers. Their aid has however been limited and the Chinese have persisted in levelling against them the charge that they are failing to come to the aid of a fellow Socialist State under attack. There have been increasing indications that the attitude of the Russians and the East Europeans towards the Vietnam conflict is dominated by concern about the pressures which will be put upon them if the American bombing of the North continues. There have been further harsh public attacks on the United States, with Kosygin equating President Johnson's policies with those of Senator Goldwater. At the same time, Soviet and East European representatives have been letting it be
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known that they believe that it should be possible to find a solution of the Vietnam problem, and that if one can be found the Soviet Union will wish to take up again the search for improved relations with the West.

THE AFRO-ASIAN CONFERENCE

4. Earlier indications that the Russians would press for admission to the Afro-Asian conference due to begin in Algiers at the end of June developed during the month into a carefully orchestrated campaign to this end. Soviet propaganda media assiduously argued the case for Soviet participation on the grounds of geography, the Soviet Union's historical rôle in support of national liberation movements, and the overwhelming need for the unity of all progressive forces at this time in the face of what was presented as an increasingly menacing imperialist counter-attack, symbolised above all by United States action in Vietnam. This press campaign was backed by intensive Soviet diplomatic lobbying with countries due to be represented at the conference. The Chinese were no less assiduous in making known their uncompromising objections to Soviet participation, "for the sole reason that it is not an Afro-Asian country". An "Observer" article in the People's Daily stated that this was a question of principle on which the Chinese would never give ground or compromise.

5. The deposition of Ben Bella on 19 June prevented the matter being put to the test. The importance attached by the Chinese to the Conference as a forum for their anti-imperialist and anti-Soviet campaigns had already been demonstrated by Chou En-lai's visit to Africa earlier in the month. It seems fairly clear that this was designed to be an extensive overseas tour culminating in Chou's arrival in Algiers for the Conference. The failure of invitations to materialise except from Tanzania and Pakistan must have been a considerable disappointment to the Chinese. A far greater set-back, however, was their failure to ensure that the Conference took place as planned despite the Algerian coup. In their overeagerness not to lose the opportunity of what they clearly anticipated would be a major political and propaganda victory, the Chinese overestimated their ability to influence events, and they may well have made a further miscalculation with their hurried recognition of the Boumedienne régime before it was clear what the nature of this régime would be.

6. It is too early to forecast the outcome of these events. The Chinese are now trying to cover up their set-back with the lame assertions that, by frustrating the attempts of imperialism "and its agents" to scuttle the Conference, they administered a "telling blow" against the imperialists, and that by securing the postponement of the Conference they have ensured that it would be a greater success in November, when it is now due to take place. This foreshadows a long drawn out campaign by the Chinese to restore their lost prestige and to mount in November the sort of conference which events and the refusal of a majority of Afro-Asian powers to submit to their baton prevented them from obtaining this month in Algiers.

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THE ALGERIAN COUP AND 'SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM'

7. The Chinese are not alone among Communist powers in having been thrown into confusion by Boumedienne's unexpected coup. In recent months Soviet publicists have devoted much space to surveying points of contact between Marxism, or "scientific Socialism", and the numerous variants of "Socialism" propounded in the developing countries, particularly those of Africa. While continuing to express the belief that the ideas of "revolutionary democrats" in such countries as the United Arab Republic may result in the achievement of a genuinely "Socialist" society, such surveys have revealed increasing anxiety about the possible consequences of the mushroom growth of indigenous interpretations of the "non-capitalist path of development". For example, an article in Questions of Philosophy sharply criticised the "African Socialism" of President Senghor of Senegal and chided the "national bourgeoisie" of India, who "more and more employ the slogan of Socialism directly to deceive the masses ...". The Soviet dilemma was pointed up in an article entitled "The Developing Countries and Socialism" in Pravda of 4 June which on the one hand defended, against "Trotskyist" criticism, the practice of giving compensation to expropriated owners, while on the other hand it warned against the equation of "development" with "Socialism" and the use of Socialist slogans "to cover up what is in essence capitalist development".

8. The Algerian coup may well shake Soviet confidence further. Algeria's "Socialist" development had been authoritatively acknowledged in the recent C.P.S.U. May Day slogans, and although Ben Bella's desire to play a prominent rôle on the Afro-Asian scene meant that he was reluctant to express opinions or take actions likely to offend the Chinese, there was a broad coincidence of Soviet and Algerian aims in Africa. The Soviet Union was seeking to enlarge its influence in Algeria by developing relations between the C.P.S.U. and the F.L.N. and by granting military aid on a large scale, particularly in providing the Algerians with the aircraft and material for a versatile modern tactical air force. Although the Russians eventually followed their East European allies in publishing adverse comments on Ben Bella's overthrow by the French and Italian Communist Parties, they have so far scrupulously avoided direct criticism. Indeed, Mikoyan was careful to state some two weeks after the coup that the Soviet Union were "convinced that the Algerian people, which has chosen socialism, will continue along this road". It was, however, noteworthy that as early as 20 June Moscow radio omitted Algeria from the usual list of countries which "have most resolutely chosen non-capitalist development". One of the results of the Russian post-mortem on the Algerian situation may well be second thoughts about their advocacy of the assimilation of local Communists in national democratic parties in certain countries.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

9. The Chinese discomfiture over the Algiers Conference will no doubt encourage the Russians in their recently more robust reactions to Chinese attacks. The Soviet
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policy since Khrushchev's fall, of restraint and silence in the face of such attacks, may have achieved some results: a provocative editorial in the Chinese press on the occasion of the second anniversary of the magisterial Chinese letter of 14 June, 1963, seemed aimed particularly at anyone who suggested that the struggle against Khrushchev's revisionism and that of his successors should stop half way, and showed concern that such people actually existed. A few days later Pravda published a leader which could be taken as a direct answer to the Chinese editorial, containing the sharpest public criticism of the Chinese to appear in the Soviet press since Khrushchev's fall. The Chinese were taken to task directly for their polemical attempts to discredit certain sections of the Communist movement and "to misrepresent them as class hostile forces", and indirectly for refusing to take joint action over Vietnam. Prominent references to the communiqué of the 1 March Moscow meeting underlined that the Russians are not prepared to make any concession to the Chinese ideological viewpoint, a lesson rubbed home by the apparently very successful visit of Marshal Tito to the Soviet Union at the end of the month. The article was also noteworthy for the obvious way in which statements by other Communist parties and leaders were dragged in to suggest the extent of support for the Russian case. Although the Russians will probably continue to avoid full-scale polemics, they now seem willing to be freer in their criticism of the Chinese; and their decision to lobby hard for admission to the Afro-Asian Conference showed their determination not to leave the stage to the Chinese.

THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (P.K.I.)

10. Since its abortive attempt to seize power in 1948, the P.K.I. has concentrated on attracting a large popular following by posing as a genuine nationalist party. Claiming a membership of more than three million, it is the most powerful political party in Indonesia and the largest non-ruling Communist party in the world. It has been making strenuous efforts recently to improve its position, perhaps because of a realisation that Sukarno's days are, for reasons of health, probably numbered, and that his departure from the political scene will present a crucial opportunity for the assumption of power. The Party's flattery of Sukarno has led him to look tolerantly on its activities, and he has been induced by the P.K.I. to move against a number of its political opponents.

11. P.K.I. pressure is currently directed at the Indonesian Armed Forces, but the party is finding the going rather difficult. Although Sukarno has called for the eradication of "Communist-phobia" in the Armed Forces and for acceptance of the principle of Nasakom (cooperation between Indonesia's nationalist, religious and Communist groups), there is strong evidence that Indonesia's military leaders are, for the most part, resisting these attempts at indoctrination from the top. Infiltration from the bottom possibly accounts for up to thirty per cent P.K.I. sympathisers in certain Army units, particularly in East Java, but the general situation is not favourable to the P.K.I. P.K.I. proposals to arm workers and peasants, allegedly against "Malaysia", show the party's awareness of the need to prepare for possible civil strife after Sukarno's departure. There is a good possibility that the Army leadership would move in quickly on Sukarno's
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death and assume control of Government. P.K.I. tactics are therefore likely to be to secure the succession of a presidential candidate who is sympathetic to the party, such as Dr. Subandrio, Indonesia's Foreign Minister.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN AFRICA

12. The Soviet Union marked the importance which it attached to the recent visit to Africa by the United Nations Committee of Twenty-four by appointing Mr. Malik, a Deputy Foreign Minister, as leader of the Soviet Delegation for part of the time. The Russians lost no opportunity of portraying themselves as advocates of an important United Nations rôle in ridding the continent of "colonialism". In Lusaka they suggested that there should be a Security Council meeting in Africa (meetings of the Council in places other than the seat of the Organisation are provided for in Article 28 of the Charter). They also pressed for formal but undefined relationships between the Organisation for African Unity and the United Nations and, at a lower level, between the African Liberation Committee and the Committee of Twenty-four.

13. The intentions of the Soviet Delegation were wholly unconstructive. They took a strong anti-Western and anti-NATO line, and it must be assumed that their interest is less the genuine strengthening of the United Nations rôle than a desire to foster disagreement between members of the Organisation by portraying themselves as the supporters of Africa and "anti-imperialism". They also no doubt had their eye on gathering support for Soviet participation in the Afro-Asian Conference which was due to take place in Algiers. Their tactics were clearly designed to counter Chinese influence and to pre-empt Chinese bids for the leadership of the uncommitted. The Russians are bent on exploiting while it lasts the advantage which they enjoy from the exclusion of Communist China from the United Nations.

EASTERN EUROPE

a) Visits by President Tito

14. With State visits to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the Soviet Union during June, Tito has now visited all the East European countries since the fall of Khrushchev last October. The visit to Czechoslovakia, following Novotny's visit to Yugoslavia last year, set the seal on the radical improvement in Yugoslav-Czech relations which has taken place since the low point they reached in the aftermath of the 1960 Meeting of the eighty-one parties in Moscow. The East German visit was more controversial. The Yugoslavs seem to have decided that improved economic links with the East Germans would outweigh any angry reprisals the West Germans might take. Tito's personal endorsement of Ulbricht's régime no doubt also sweetened his subsequent welcome in Moscow. It was noteworthy however that in his speeches in East Germany, Tito said no more than the minimum consistent with politeness to his host on contentious issues involving Germany. His visit to the Soviet Union was longer than the other two and more important. He apparently established good personal
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relations with the new Soviet leadership, such as he had had with Khrushchev, an interesting development in the light of his suspicious reaction to Khrushchev's overthrow and Yugoslav dissatisfaction with Brezhnev on his last visit to Belgrade in October 1962. The joint communiqué issued at the close of Tito's visit underlined the closeness of Soviet and Yugoslav views on most international questions. Given the current vehemence of Communist attacks on United States policy in general, the wording of the communiqué was surprisingly mild. From the Yugoslav point of view the visit probably served to give reassurance that little or no change has occurred in the Soviet foreign policy which over the last two or three years they have felt increasingly able to support. They will also have welcomed the opportunity for discussing possible Soviet assistance in coping with their economic problems. For the Russians, any demonstration of Yugoslav support for their views and policies is welcome, in particular because of Yugoslavia's standing in the non-aligned world. They must, however, also reckon with the fact that the similarity of Yugoslav and Soviet views makes the Yugoslav claim to non-alignment harder to sustain. In this connexion, the inclusion by Tito (in a speech at Sverdlovsk) of Yugoslavia in a list of East European "Socialist" allies of the Soviet Union standing side by side with her in their determination "to resist any attempts to endanger peace" was of particular significance.

b) Hungary

15. Kadar's resignation as Prime Minister, while retaining his post as Party First Secretary, brings Hungary into line with all other Communist régimes except Bulgaria, North Korea and Mongolia in having the leading posts in Government and Party separate. Rumours of such a change have been current for nearly two years in Hungary, but the decision to make it was probably postponed to avoid comparison with the separation of functions in the Soviet Union after Khrushchev's fall. It does not seem likely that the change reflects, or will lead to, any weakening of Kadar's position at the head of affairs.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BERLIN SITUATION

16. A number of illegal East German helicopter flights in the Berlin Control Zone took place in the fortnight ending 21 June. At the same time the East Germans have been insisting on the introduction of new tariffs for inter-zonal rail freight traffic and new permits for waterway traffic; they are also making difficulties over the resumption of negotiations for a renewal of the Passes Agreement, and their propaganda campaign against Bonn has been stepped up. All these moves presumably form part of the D.D.R.'s long-standing campaign to assert its sovereignty and its claim to deal on equal terms with Bonn and (separately) with the authorities in West Berlin. The Russians, with no interest at present in a rapprochement with Bonn, appear content to allow Ulbricht to explore the limits of the status quo, and if possible to extend them, so long as this does not lead to a head-on clash with the Allies.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 23 May - 18 June United Nations Committee of Twenty-four visits Africa.
- 26 May - 4 June C.P.S.U. delegation led by Suslov in Bulgaria.
- 31 May - 2 June Plenum of Rumanian Workers' Party.
- 31 May - 9 June Norwegian Prime Minister visited Soviet Union.
- 1 - 3 June Conference of West European Communist Parties in Brussels.
- 2 - 7 2nd Conference of the International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam opened in Hanoi.
- 2 - 8 President Tito visited Czechoslovakia.
- 3 Kosygin received Head of Permanent Mission of National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in Moscow.
- 4 - 8 Chou En-lai in Tanzania.
- 4 - 10 North Vietnamese Government Delegation led by Deputy Premier in Moscow.
- 6 C.P.S.U. Delegation to 45th Anniversary of P.K.I. issued press statement protesting against P'eng Chen's attack on Soviet Union.
- 8 Kosygin received Head of North Vietnamese Government Delegation.
- Soviet Minister to New Zealand conveyed oral protest to New Zealand Prime Minister on proposal to send New Zealand Army artillery battery to South Vietnam.
- 8 - 13 President Tito visited D.D.R.
- Communique on Soviet/Yugoslav Economic cooperation published in Moscow.
- 10 Communique on Brussels Conference of West European Communist Parties published in Soviet press.
- 10 - 18 Swedish Prime Minister visited Soviet Union.
- 12 Pravda article on Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers.
- 14 People's Daily-Red Flag editorial on second anniversary of the C.C.P.'s "Proposal concerning the General Line of the Communist Movement".
- 15 - 19 Hungarian Workers' Party Delegation led by Kallai visited Rumania.
- 16 N.C.N.A. attack on India for support of Soviet admission to Afro-Asian Conference.

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- 17 June Announcement of Commonwealth initiative on Vietnam.
- 18 June - '1 July President Tito visited Soviet Union.
- 18 People's Daily article rejected Soviet claim to participate in Afro-Asian Conference.
- 19 Ben Bella deposed in Algeria.
- Interview with Ho Chi Minh published in Pravda.
- 20 Pravda published editorial article on unity of Communist movement, critical of China.
- 21 June - 3 July Shah of Persia visited Soviet Union.
- 22 Brezhnev and Kosygin received Algerian special representative, Mohamad Ben-Yahya in Moscow.
- 23 Soviet rejection of proposal that Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam should visit Moscow.
- 25 Chinese reject proposal for visit to Peking by Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam.
- 26 Announcement that Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers postponed until 5 November.
- 28 Announcement of Kadar's resignation as Hungarian Premier.
- 29 Kosygin speech to graduates of Lumumba University.
- Joint Soviet/Yugoslav communiqué on President Tito's visit signed.

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BY HAND

POLICY AND TACTICS

1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

OF

EMBASSY

HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

His Excellency

Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

15 June 1965.

Statement is not novel in content,
but the emphasis has changed (Paragraph 8).

The French Communist Party have usurped an Italian C.P.
proposal for a meeting of West European Communist Parties
(Paragraph 9).

The Sino/Soviet dispute continues to bedevil front
organisation meetings (Paragraph 10).

The May Day slogans showed special Soviet interest in
5 countries in Africa (Paragraph 11).

Stalin's military image at least is being partly refurbished.
Trends in culture. Overt signs of differences of strategic
thinking in high places (Paragraphs 12-14).

THE INDOCHINESE SITUATION

The communiqué issued after the visit to Moscow by a
North Vietnamese delegation headed by the First Secretary of
the North Vietnamese Workers' Party, Le Duan, and including
the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister, General Giap,
provided some useful material for the Russians in defending
themselves against Chinese charges of pusillanimity in relation
to Vietnam. The admission by the North Vietnamese that the
"international solidarity and many-sided assistance provided
by the Soviet Union made an important contribution" to the
strengthening of their defences and the expression of their
thanks for such assistance must have been particularly welcome
to the Russians in the light of Chinese innuendoes that their
provision of aid to Hanoi had been reluctant, slow and
ineffective. In return the Russians have endorsed the North
Vietnamese conditions for a settlement in Vietnam and have

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

APRIL, 1965

SUMMARY

The visit of a North Vietnamese delegation to Moscow produced a public expression of thanks for Soviet aid from the North Vietnamese, and an endorsement of North Vietnamese conditions for a settlement as well as the possibility of further aid from the Russians. Chinese intransigence on any moves which could possibly lead to even informal talks culminated in Chinese accusations that the Russians were seeking with the Americans to dominate the world. The Chinese probably reckon that the Vietcong will win without the likelihood of escalation and that they will be able to carry non-aligned opinion with them in opposition to United States "aggression". They are more cautious in deeds than in words (Paragraphs 1-4).

Gromyko's visit to Paris showed that the areas of Franco/Soviet agreement were limited. No new proposals on disarmament etc. (Paragraph 5).

Soviet and East German reaction to the Bundestag meeting in Berlin (Paragraph 6).

Mr. Stewart's visit to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia revealed their continued interest in developing practical contacts with the West. Rumours of an attempted coup in Bulgaria (Paragraph 7).

The new Soviet/Polish treaty is not novel in content, but the emphasis has changed (Paragraph 8).

The French Communist Party have usurped an Italian C.P. proposal for a meeting of West European Communist Parties (Paragraph 9).

The Sino/Soviet dispute continues to bedevil front organisation meetings (Paragraph 10).

The May Day slogans showed special Soviet interest in 5 countries in Africa (Paragraph 11).

Stalin's military image at least is being partly refurbished. Trends in culture. Overt signs of differences of strategic thinking in high places (Paragraphs 12-14).

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The communiqué issued after the visit to Moscow by a North Vietnamese delegation headed by the First Secretary of the North Vietnamese Workers' Party, Le Duan, and including the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister, General Giap, provided some useful material for the Russians in defending themselves against Chinese charges of pusillanimity in relation to Vietnam. The admission by the North Vietnamese that the "international solidarity and many-sided assistance provided by the Soviet Union made an important contribution" to the strengthening of their defences and the expression of their thanks for such assistance must have been particularly welcome to the Russians in the light of Chinese innuendoes that their provision of aid to Hanoi had been reluctant, slow and ineffective. In return the Russians have endorsed the North Vietnamese conditions for a settlement in Vietnam and have

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said that they consider the National Liberation Front (the political arm of the Vietcong) as "the genuine exponent of the will and aspirations of the people of South Vietnam and their only legitimate representative". (The head of the permanent "mission" of the National Liberation Front has since taken up residence in Moscow). The communiqué also suggested that agreement had been reached on the provision of further aid to North Vietnam; it is not clear whether this was to be economic, military or both. The Russians have now declared that there is no obstacle to the transport of military aid to Hanoi, but there is still no evidence that any significant amount has arrived.

2. The Chinese, having published the communiqué without comment, left it to the Albanians in the first instance to counter its effect by a vitriolic article accusing the Russians of sending obsolete, "insignificant and pitiful" arms to Vietnam. Subsequently the Chinese entered the lists with a magisterial editorial in Red Flag, dismissing Soviet aid as "a few high-sounding words" and "some gestures of support ... kept within the bounds of not impairing their line of Soviet-United States co-operation". The Russians were accused of harbouring the "criminal objective of Soviet-United States collaboration in the domination of the world", and suggestions of secret Soviet/American conversations were no doubt intended to sow suspicions in Hanoi.

3. The Chinese have been utterly intransigent on the question of talks on Vietnam: President Johnson's Baltimore speech promising unconditional negotiations was dismissed as a "swindle", the 17-Nation appeal was rejected as being in accordance with the interests of American imperialism. It seems probable that it was the Chinese who were responsible for Prince Sihanouk's second thoughts about the conditions for a conference on Cambodia, fearing that it could provide the occasion for informal soundings on Vietnam. Russian approval for such a conference was been made clear frequently, but they will probably not agree to issue invitations until Prince Sihanouk's position has been clarified.

4. Chinese opposition to any kind of meeting on Vietnam, or the possibility of any North Vietnamese contact with the Americans unless their prior condition of American withdrawal has been met, may stem from lack of confidence about North Vietnamese steadiness under United States attack. The Chinese are probably still convinced that their ideal solution is attainable, i.e. an outright victory for the Vietcong, compelling a United States withdrawal in humiliating circumstances, and without escalation involving themselves. Nevertheless their statements on volunteers and their handling of an incident involving a clash of United States and Chinese aircraft in Chinese territorial airspace early in the month suggest a high degree of practical caution where deeds rather than words are concerned. The Chinese are no doubt looking forward to the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers at the end of June, where they are probably optimistic that they will be able to carry with them a considerable body of non-aligned opinion in opposition to American "aggression". In the intervening period they will probably do all they can to thwart any possible moves aimed at bringing the war to a peaceful settlement.

MR. GROMYKO'S VISIT TO PARIS

5. Mr. Gromyko's visit to Paris from 25-30 April demonstrated,

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as had his visit to London the month before, that the Soviet Union is willing to talk with Western countries, but that there is little prospect of making progress on major problems. The Russians no doubt hoped to find French ideas on a number of issues moving parallel with their own, but the communiqué suggested that the "areas of agreement" were limited. The Russians were disinclined to discuss solutions to the problem of Indo-China, and a disingenuous suggestion by Mr. Gromyko at a press conference that the French position on Germany had moved closer to that of the Soviet Union was firmly rebutted by the French. Nothing concrete seems to have emerged from the discussions on the United Nations. On disarmament, the only new element was Soviet support for the French proposal to examine nuclear disarmament at a conference of the nuclear powers, an idea which President de Gaulle first put forward in July, 1963, but which the Chinese Government themselves rejected last autumn when a suggestion for a discussion between the five powers was made by U Thant. It seems unlikely that the Russians expect this proposal to come to anything in present circumstances. Mr. Gromyko himself at his press conference before he left Paris made it clear that it was up to the French to pursue the proposal if they wanted to. At the United Nations Disarmament Commission the Russians have commended equally the French proposal, the Chinese proposal for a Summit Conference of all countries on the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, and the proposal of the Afro-Asian Cairo Conference for a world disarmament conference.

REACTION TO BUNDESTAG MEETING IN BERLIN

6. There was a strong reaction to the holding of a Bundestag meeting in West Berlin in the first half of the month. Temporary closures of the autobahn were imposed on the pretext of Soviet and East German military manoeuvres, timed to coincide with the meeting, and low-level flights by Soviet aircraft took place over West Berlin while the Bundestag was in session. The Soviet reaction was nevertheless carefully controlled. It was obviously designed as a protest against any attempt to emphasise links between the Federal Republic and W. Berlin and a reminder of the vulnerability of allied access routes to Berlin, rather than as a threat to the allied presence or to the viability of the city.

EASTERN EUROPE

7. The discussions during the visit by the Foreign Secretary to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were not expected to reveal any substantially novel features in Yugoslav or Czech policy, but they confirmed the continuing interest in those countries in developing discreetly their relations with the Western European countries, particularly in practical fields. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe the most dramatic news came out of Bulgaria. From early in April rumours were rife in Sofia about an attempted coup against Zhivkov's regime. Some of these suggested that the plotters had pro-Chinese sympathies. In officially denying such rumours (the spread of which was attributed to Western press agencies), a statement issued by the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency revealed that a member of the Foreign Ministry and the military commandant of Sofia had been arrested for "violating the laws of the country" and

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that a junior Minister and member of the Party Central Committee had committed suicide when his "criminal activities" were discovered. Beyond these, no definite facts are known. Nevertheless the denial itself and subsequent statements protesting perhaps overmuch at the unshakability of Bulgarian friendship for the Soviet Union suggest that there is some fire behind the smoke. It is prima facie unlikely that the dissatisfied elements were pro-Chinese, although plausible enough that the regime should want them to be thought so. It is a matter for speculation whether they were "liberals" seeking greater independence from the Soviet Union, dissatisfied military men with a nationalistic bias, or "Stalinists" alarmed at the few concessions to prevailing trends in Eastern Europe (particularly in the economic sphere) which the regime has felt obliged to make. Whatever the truth, Zhivkov's task in holding the balance between the rival elements in the party cannot have been made easier, and a period of greater vigilance by the Party leadership may be expected.

SOVIET-POLISH TREATY

8. With the exception of a clause testifying to the "inviolability" of the Oder-Neisse frontier (but not mentioning Poland's other frontiers), all of the articles in the new Soviet-Polish Treaty have their counterpart in the earlier, wartime Treaty. The Soviet undertaking to come to Poland's assistance in the event of armed attack adds nothing to Soviet obligations as they exist under the Warsaw Pact treaty; the undertaking of the two countries to consult on international questions is unlikely to lead to any greater degree of consultation than each side already finds necessary or advantageous. A comparison with the similar Soviet/DDR treaty of 1964 shows certain changes of emphasis. In particular, the references to the alleged threat from West Germany are more explicit than they were 15 months ago. C.M.E.A. also receives much more cursory treatment in the Soviet/Polish treaty: this is consistent with the current pragmatic line on that organisation's activities and development.

PREPARATIONS FOR A WEST EUROPEAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE

9. In a resolution of 1 April on the Moscow Consultative Meeting, the French Communist Party announced that it had proposed to the West European Communist Parties a conference to discuss the campaign against the MLF, European security, and Vietnam. The idea of the Conference has been welcomed by the Danish, Finnish and Norwegian Parties. Hitherto the Italian Communist Party has been the main advocate of a West European regional meeting, but the Italian party have always had in mind a far broader agenda than that suggested by the French Party. Discussion of the French agenda could result in a simple endorsement of Soviet foreign policies. The French initiative may, therefore, be a Soviet-inspired move to direct European regionalism into orthodox channels.

FRONT ORGANISATIONS

10. Meetings of two front organisations - the World Federation of Teachers' Unions (F.I.S.E.), in Algiers from 8-16 April and the World Federation of Democratic Youth (W.F.D.Y.) in Accra from 15-20 April - produced further evidence that most delegations to such meetings want to avoid the Sino-Soviet and other disputes, but that the Chinese are

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unrelenting in their insistence on dragging them in. The World Council of Peace (W.C.P.) is also finding these disputes intolerable: a recent article by the Secretary of the British Peace Committee, Colin Sweet, advocated the discussion at the forthcoming World Peace Congress in Helsinki of fundamental structural changes in the W.C.P. in order to "end this string of statements and promulgations and the exhaustive pettyfogging debate on resolutions." The harmful effect of the dispute on front organisations has been underlined by the enforced closure of the offices in New York and Delhi of the offices which the World Federation of Trade Unions maintained for liaison with the United Nations and ECAFE because of the refusal of the Chinese, Albanians, North Vietnamese and North Koreans to pay their dues.

MAY DAY SLOGANS

11. The most significant feature of the slogans produced by the C.P.S.U. for May Day was the new formulation of the slogans for the U.A.R., Algeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, demonstrating the importance which the Soviet Union attaches to relations with these five countries. The U.A.R., whose people were said to be "building an independent, national, democratic State" and to be "fighting for the socialist development of their country", was put on a par with Algeria, whose "socialist" development was also acknowledged. Ghana, Guinea and Mali were put in the category of those building "independent, national, democratic states", but were as yet only "proceeding along the path of social progress". It is noteworthy that the three U.A.R. Communist Groups have now, like the Algerian Communist Party, gone into voluntary liquidation. Members are free to join the ruling parties of their respective countries. The Soviet Union apparently recognises that reliance on local Communist parties would be premature in Arab countries and the merging of Communist Parties with the ruling parties is in line with the current Soviet tactic of blurring the dividing line between Communist Parties and left wing national movements.

SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

12. In the Soviet publicity build-up for the 20th anniversary of the German capitulation in the Second World War there has been a partial modification of the conventional blackening of Stalin. Military leaders have, with reservations, vindicated Stalin's strategy in the closing phase of the war. It is also rumoured in Moscow that Demichev, the new Party supervisor of ideological matters, has exhorted propagandists and newspaper editors to present Stalin's personality and policies in a more sympathetic and positive light. This does not, of course, imply any deviation from the leadership's current policies (although there have been hints of differing views on the degree to which it is permissible to paint Stalin in grey instead of black). The adoption of a somewhat more objective assessment of the past could indeed be seen as according with post-Khrushchev policies.

13. Demichev is also said to have intimated that the Party intends to interfere less in the affairs of Soviet intellectuals. This year's Lenin Prize awards, however, indicate a measure of caution which will give little encouragement to the less conservative elements and suggest that scientific intellectuals may fare rather better from

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non-interference than literary ones. No award was made for literature, while the prize for art went to a notorious trio of political cartoonists who have flourished since the Stalin period. On the other hand, an award in the science list was made to an outstanding group of mathematicians who have consistently advocated the use of progressive scientific techniques in economic planning.

MILITARY DEBATE

14. Among the large number of articles on military themes connected with the Second World War which have been appearing for some months not only in the military, but also in the central press in anticipation of the 20th anniversary of V.E. Day, many have touched on general problems of military strategy in the present day. Certain senior Marshals have contributed to these commentaries, and perhaps the most noteworthy disclosure to date has been the overt confirmation given by Marshal Rotmistrov (Commander of the Soviet armoured forces) of the continuing debate on strategic problems at the highest military level. In an account of a meeting convened in the Pravda Editorial offices, Rotmistrov was said to have "conclusively refuted the views that penetrate into the Press to the effect that allegedly 'the queen of the fields - the land forces - is yielding its crown to rocket weapons'". Since this had been the title of a full-page article by Colonel-General Shtemenko in an earlier Izvestiya supplement, there was no mistaking the identification of conflicting strategic views.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 21 March - 1 April Meeting of Central Committee of the French Communist Party: proposal for meeting of West European Communist Parties.
- 1 - 5 April Soviet Party/Government delegation led by Mikoyan visited Hungary for 20th anniversary of liberation.
- 1 Chou En-lai in Cairo
- 2 Chou En-lai in Pakistan
- 3 - 11 President Ayub Khan visited U.S.S.R.
- 3 Soviet Government proposed to Her Majesty's Government joint action to convene a conference on Cambodia.
- 4 - 9 Soviet Party/Government delegation, led by Brezhnev and including Kosygin, visited Poland and signed new Soviet-Polish Friendship Treaty.
- 4 East Germans began holding up traffic on Berlin autobahn.
- 5 - 8 Soviet and East German forces held exercises west of Berlin.
- 6 Appointment of S. G. Lapin as Soviet Ambassador to China.
- 7 Bundestag meeting in Berlin: air harassment.
- 7 President Johnson made speech on United States policy in Vietnam at Baltimore.
- 8 - 16 World Federation of Teachers' Unions conference in Algiers.
- 8 New Soviet-Polish Friendship Treaty signed in Warsaw.
- 8 North Vietnamese Premier, Pham Van Dong, formulated four conditions for settlement in Vietnam.
- 10 Ho Chi Minh addressed D.R.V. National Assembly.
- 10 - 17 North Vietnamese Party/Government delegation led by Le Duan visited Moscow.
- 11 Chinese and North Vietnamese press castigated President Johnson's Baltimore speech.
- 12 - 23 Mongolian Party/Government delegation, led by Tsendenbal, in Soviet Union.
- 12 Report by Pham Van Dong to D.R.V. National Assembly published.

13 April

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- 13 April Chinese refused to receive Mr. Gordon Walker on his Far Eastern tour.
- 16 Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi arrived in Djakarta for 10th anniversary celebration of Bandung Conference.
- 17 - 21 President Tito in Algiers.
- 17 Reports of alleged anti-Government coup in Bulgaria appeared in Western press.
- 18 Joint Soviet/North Vietnamese communiqué published.
- 18 - 22 North Vietnamese delegation in Peking on their way home from Moscow.
- 18 - 25 Secretary of State visited Yugoslavia (18 - 22 April) and Czechoslovakia (22 - 25 April)
- 19 North Vietnamese rejected 17-nation appeal.
- 19 Kosygin speech at Mongolian Friendship Rally in Moscow.
- 20 Resolution of Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China on Vietnam; mentioned volunteers.
- 20 Zeri i Popullit article attacking Soviet deliveries of "obsolete" arms to Vietnam.
- 21 - 30 Afghan Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammed Yusuf, visited U.S.S.R.
- 22 Chinese attacked 17-nation appeal on Vietnam.
- 22 P. N. Demichev made speech on 95th anniversary of Lenin's birth.
- 22 Central Committee of C.P.S.U. issued May Day slogans.
- 22 Bulgarian Telegraph Agency issued official denial of reported coup.
- 23 South Vietnam National Liberation Front representative, Dang Quang Minh, arrived in Moscow.
- 23 - 24 Italian Communist Party delegation led by Pajetta in Prague en route for Hanoi.
- 24 Publication of Soviet/Mongolian communiqué.
- 25 - 27 Italian Communist Party delegation led by Pajetta in Moscow.
- 25 - 30 Gromyko paid official visit to Paris.
- 26 Her Majesty's Government accepted Soviet proposal on Cambodian conference.

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- 26 April Federenko made polemical speech in United Nations Disarmament Commission.
- 27 - 30 President Tito in Cairo.
- 28 - 30 Italian Communist Party delegation led by Pajetta in Peking.
- 28 Foreword to fifth volume of Khrushchev's works published in Peking attacked Soviet leadership.
- 28 People's Daily issued warning to Thai authorities on aiding United States in Vietnam.
- 29 Sino/Soviet Trade Protocol for 1965 signed in Moscow.
- 29 Chinese press published Akahata article of 13 April on 1 March Moscow meeting.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



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POLICY AND TACTICS

April, 1965

MARY

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF EMBASSY
HER MAJESTY'S ~~AMBASSADOR~~

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

8 April, 1965.

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The Russians continue to cultivate contacts in Africa through party channels and with Latin American Communists (paragraphs 15 - 17).

The main Soviet internal development was the continued retreat of the conservative intellectuals (paragraphs 18 - 20).

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

February, 1965

SUMMARY

Kosygin's visit to Hanoi represented an important change in Russian policy. A possible motive for this was a desire to prevent the Chinese gaining all the fruits of a Vietcong victory, were that to happen, and to avoid Chinese censure in the event of an American attack on North Vietnam in the Russians' absence (paragraphs 1 - 3).

They would have preferred their new policy not to have interfered with Russo-American relations, but unexpected Vietcong activity while Kosygin was in Hanoi and American counter-attacks on the North put them on a spot (paragraphs 4 - 5).

The Vietnamese and Chinese responded with tough talk to the American attacks. The Russians were more circumspect, but Russo-American relations suffered. The unity of the Communist camp was not however strengthened (paragraphs 6 - 10).

Nineteen of the twenty-six parties came to Moscow for the 1 March meeting. It was downgraded. The Chinese, their allies and Rumania stayed away (paragraph 11).

The Chinese are showing an interest in Thailand (paragraph 12).

Ulbricht's visit to the United Arab Republic was a diplomatic success for East Germany (paragraph 14).

The Russians continue to cultivate contacts in Africa through party channels and with Latin American Communists (paragraphs 15 - 17).

The main Soviet internal development was the continued retreat of the conservative intellectuals (paragraphs 18 - 20).

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SOUTH EAST ASIA: A CHANGE IN THE
SOVIET POLICY

When the new Soviet leaders took over they were at pains to emphasize that the main lines of foreign policy would be maintained. The visit of Kosygin to Hanoi at the beginning of February represented an important change. Khrushchev had come to the conclusion in 1964 that it was against the interests of the Soviet Union to be heavily involved in Indo-China. His ability to influence events there was strictly limited and a commitment could seriously prejudice his foreign policy aims elsewhere, particularly his relations with the United States. He therefore decided largely to disengage. On this question at least, his successors have now reversed the line.

2. The reasons for this change of Soviet policy may have been as follows. A continued Soviet failure to support North Vietnam would be used by the Chinese to discredit the efforts which the Russians were making elsewhere to show themselves more active than Khrushchev, and more effective than the Chinese, in supporting revolutionary and national liberation movements. The Russians must have been particularly sensitive to this form of attack at a time when they were having difficulty in rallying support for the meeting of Communist Parties on 1 March.

3. The Russians may also have come to believe that South Vietnam was moving toward collapse and that a Vietcong victory was in prospect. If this analysis were correct the Russians might expect one of two situations to arise, depending upon American reaction. If the Americans were to give up South Vietnam as a bad job and to withdraw there would be a complete victory for the North. It would be a victory to which the Russians had not contributed; it would demonstrate that the Chinese were correct in their view that the "forces of imperialism" would yield if the Communists pressed hard enough, and it would thus demonstrate that the Chinese were right and the Russians were wrong in their analysis of the world struggle. It would also mean that the Chinese would enjoy a dominant position in a territory newly won for Communism, from which they could also hope to expand their influence into neighbouring territories. Alternatively the Americans might decide to carry the war into North Vietnam in the hope of saving the South. In this event the Russians would be open to Chinese attack for betraying the national liberation movement if they failed to support North Vietnam, and they would expose themselves to difficulties and possibly dangers in their relations with the Americans if they were to go to its support.

4. Kosygin's visit shows that the Soviet leaders had decided that the risks of assuming some degree of commitment to North Vietnam were more acceptable than the consequences of continued disengagement. It can reasonably be assumed that they wished to avoid drastic consequences for their relations with the United States (indeed on the eve of Kosygin's departure they went out of their way to emphasize the importance they attached to these relations) and that although they intended to work for the victory of the North and the exclusion of the Americans from the area they would try to prevent an extension and escalation of the war. Kosygin's early statements were consistent with a conclusion that they would advise the Vietcong to make haste slowly and to allow the South to disintegrate without dangerous actions likely to bring on retaliation against /the

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the North. If the Russians were to have any hope that their advice would be heeded it was of course necessary that they should offer North Vietnam substantial material support as a pledge and the composition of Kosygin's delegation was a clear demonstration of the Soviet intention to give defensive aid to North Vietnam.

5. The situation changed dramatically soon after Kosygin's arrival in Hanoi. Vietcong attacks took place against United States installations in South Vietnam and there was a prompt American rejoinder against military objectives in the north. It seems unlikely that the Russians had foreseen this development, which may well have been designed by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong (with or without consultation with the Chinese) to demonstrate to the Russians and the Americans that they were in no mood for compromise. Whatever the reason for the Vietcong initiative the result was to confront the Russians brutally with a situation which they would no doubt have preferred to avoid. Kosygin was on the spot, in two senses, and it might well have seemed to the Russians at this point that it would have been easier to handle the situation if he had been in Moscow rather than in Hanoi.

6. The North Vietnamese response to the American air strikes was to talk tough. They insisted that a settlement could be reached only if all American forces were withdrawn from the south and if the South Vietnamese People's Liberation Front (the political arm of the Vietcong) were taken into the Government in Saigon.

7. The Chinese reaction was violent in expression but cautious in substance. They pledged themselves, as on the occasion of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August, 1964, "not to stand idly by", but they gave no specific commitment about what they would do in any given circumstances. While their attacks on the Americans were on predictable lines their main concern was to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. They demanded that "all other Socialist countries fulfil their unshirkable obligation" with the fairly obvious implication that the Russians would shirk this obligation if they could. They showed no interest in an international conference but took the line that negotiations of any kind were impossible until American forces had withdrawn from the south.

8. The Soviet response seems to show that the Russians have been trying to feel their way cautiously through the difficulties in which they have involved themselves. In their public statements they have been strongly critical of the United States and have called for the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam. They have reaffirmed their intention to help the North Vietnamese defences, although in the joint statement on Kosygin's visit there was a reference to "regular consultations" in the context of defence aid, which suggests that Soviet aid is not unconditional. The Soviet Government may still consider that a political solution would be the best way out of their difficulties but they have taken no initiatives in that direction. They may have decided that the the present stage the conditions for a political solution do not exist; they would clearly not wish to put forward any proposals if they thought that these would be turned down by the North Vietnamese and attacked by the Chinese.

9. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have inevitably been affected. The Soviet Union have stated that these relations, and the policy of peaceful

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co-existence, must be damaged by action of the kind the Americans have taken in Vietnam. The Russians have also attempted to use the situation as an occasion for proclaiming the need for Communist unity. The results of this appeal have not however been impressive. Soviet and Chinese statements on Vietnam show no signs of co-ordination; shortly after Kosygin left Peking and Pyongyang on his way back to Moscow from Hanoi, the Chinese press began to publish severe criticisms of Khrushchevism which were in fact scarcely veiled attacks on the present Soviet leadership.

10. Kosygin's visits, and this new involvement of the Soviet Union in South-East Asian affairs has not therefore resulted in a genuine move towards unity in the Communist camp and the Soviet Union and China are as divided as ever.

THE 1 MARCH MEETING IN MOSCOW

11. Through most of February the outcome of Soviet efforts to hold the 1 March meeting of Communist Parties remained in doubt and the Russians were under pressure until the very last moment to postpone this meeting once again. In the event, the Chinese-dominated group have been joined as absentees only by Rumania, so nineteen out of the twenty-six parties gathered to take part in the meeting. In order to assemble this number, the Russians have been obliged to agree that the meeting should be purely consultative, and that it should not attempt to prepare recommendations or substantial documents. Given the disparate nature of the views of those who were taking part on how to handle divisions within the Communist movement, it seems unlikely that any coherent policy or proposals likely to lead to a wider gathering of Communist Parties will come out of this meeting.

CHINA AND THAILAND

12. Over recent months, the Chinese have shown a revived interest in the affairs of Thailand. In December last year the Chinese published long extracts from a manifesto issued by the "Thailand Independence Movement". More recently, they have published extracts from an appeal issued by a newly-formed "Thailand Patriotic Front". Chinese interest in the affairs of Thailand was further expressed by the Chinese Foreign Minister recently when, in conversation, he claimed that dissatisfaction was growing in Thailand and even suggested that guerilla warfare might break out there this year. There have also been reports that the Chinese are now paying much attention to the training of Thai speakers. The Chinese may calculate that the end is in sight in South Vietnam and that Thailand's position will become more vulnerable. They will wish to profit by this to encourage, as far as they can, anti-American and "neutralist" sentiments in that country and will stimulate any "revolutionary" movement there.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

13. There has still been no change in the substance of the Soviet position on the problem of financing United Nations peace-keeping activities which had deadlocked the General
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Assembly proceedings. They have nevertheless fallen in with the common effort in New York to avoid this issue leading to a confrontation which could have split the United Nations. The attempt by the Albanian delegate at the last moment to force a vote and thus bring the crisis to a head has been widely attributed to Chinese inspiration. This may be so; the Chinese have continued their attacks on the United Nations. They still hope to increase their influence among the Afro-Asian countries by asserting the need for a change in the United Nations to make it more responsive to Afro-Asian opinion. Chinese inspiration does not have to be assumed; there is evidence that the Albanians do not always wait to learn the Peking line before they themselves sound off.

ULBRICHT'S VISIT TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

14. The visit by Ulbricht, the East German leader, to Cairo is the most striking advance which the East Germans have so far made in their efforts, backed by the Russians, to improve the international standing of their régime outside the Soviet Bloc; they must hope that as a result they will achieve greater respectability and wider recognition among the Afro-Asian powers. It seems likely that the visit was urged on Nasser by the Russians when Shelepin, a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party, was in Cairo last December. Shelepin's visit was made at a time when the United Arab Republic were somewhat worried whether the Khrushchev policy of providing large credits and military aid would be continued. A Soviet assurance on this point combined with the offer of major credits from the East Germans would have been a strong inducement to Nasser to receive Ulbricht. The determining factor however was probably his desire to have a showdown with the Federal German Republic over their supply of arms to Israel.

SOVIET INTEREST IN PARTY CONTACTS
IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

15. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is continuing to cultivate direct contacts with certain African countries favouring a one party system on a party as opposed to a Governmental basis. There are long-established links between the C.P.S.U. and the ruling parties of Ghana, Guinea and Mali who in 1961 sent representatives to the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. as observers. In May last year the C.P.S.U. and the F.L.N. in Algeria agreed to exchange party delegations and strengthen inter-party contacts. It is also known that party members from Mali are already being trained at the Higher Party School of the C.P.S.U. in Moscow and the C.P.S.U. has now agreed to build a Higher Party School in Bamako as a gift. The Russians will doubtless use these party links as a means of supplementing and influencing their relations on the Government level.

REGIONALISM

16. The lack of publicity given by either Soviet or Latin American Communist media to the Conference of twenty-two Latin American Communist Parties which is now known to have taken place in Havana last November raises some interesting questions. The first news of it came with the publication
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by Tass on 18 January of the communiqué. Although this was helpful to Soviet points of view on Sino-Soviet matters without specifically taking sides, it amounted to less than wholehearted endorsement for the Soviet position; this and the scant Soviet publicity devoted to it suggest that Albanian accusations that the whole Conference was stage-managed by the Russians may be wide of the mark. The Cubans too have said very little about the Conference. Although the communiqué calls for an intensification of the anti-colonialist struggle in the Caribbean and for "active aid" for freedom fighters in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Haiti, there have been indications that the Conference revealed friction between the Cubans and other Latin American parties. Castro's remark on 2 January that the Cubans would not be told what to do by any other party may well have been aimed not only at the Soviet Union but also at these parties. It is also believed that a delegation sent to China by the Conference to urge the Chinese to take a more conciliatory line was summarily rebuffed.

17. Conferences such as this could set the pattern for the future. The Italian Communist Party is known to favour holding political meetings of all West European Communist Parties, quite apart from the economic meetings of E.E.C. Communist Parties which already take place. The development of the Communist word on broad regional lines may well not suit the Russians, since it would emphasise their loss of control of the Movement, but it is difficult to see what they will be able to do to prevent it. It is a logical consequence of the acceptance of separate roads to Socialism.

SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

18. An authoritative article in Pravda of 21 February by the Chief Editor pointed to continued Party interest in the work of the scientific and cultural intelligentsia. It contained a condemnation of "the 'leader' confident of his own infallibility" who considered himself "the supreme arbiter in all spheres of human activity"; this was probably directed at the erratic course of Soviet policy towards the intellectuals under Khrushchev. The reassertion of party interest in scientific and cultural matters could be regarded as a mixed blessing: but the prescription of "a variety of school and trends, a variety of styles and genres" as the prerequisite for the fruitful development of science, literature and art rather suggests that the Party intends at present to pursue a policy of modified non-interference. This view is supported by the appearance of the first number for this year of the literary journal Novy Mir with works by a number of "liberals" and a statement by the Chief Editor, Tvardovsky, that he would continue to publish authors of his own choice, and also by the removal from office of the conservatives who have in recent years dominated the Leningrad and Moscow Writers' Unions.

19. The campaign against Academician Lysenko and his theories in the fields of biology and agricultural science reached its logical climax with his removal from the post of Director of the Institute of Genetics of the Academy of /Sciences

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Sciences. This was a blow against both the last major stronghold of Stalinism in Soviet science and the "unscientific" ideas which Khrushchev is charged with favouring.

20. Two other changes which took place in February are closely linked with the effacement of Lysenko's influence and, more generally, with the criticism of Khrushchev's policies in agriculture. Olshansky, an uncritical adherent of Lysenko, was replaced as President of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences by P.P. Lobanov, who formerly held this post from 1956 to 1961 (when he was replaced in it by Lysenko himself); and Volovchenko, a working farmer until promoted by Khrushchev in 1963, was replaced as Minister of Agriculture by V.V. Matskevich. The latter had previously been Minister from 1955 to 1960, when he was transferred to an administrative post in the Virgin Lands after being severely criticised by Khrushchev.

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CHRONOLOGY

- January 20 - Soviet delegation led by Shelepin
February 6 visited Mongolia.
- January 25 - C.M.E.A. Council meeting in Prague
February 2
- January 31 Chinese Government protested to
Burundi about the severance of
diplomatic relations.
- February 1 - 4 The Greek Prime Minister visited
Belgrade.
- 2 Guyot and Kanapa of the French C.P.
received by Suslov and Ponomarev.
- 2 Zeri i Popullit explained Albania's
refusal to attend meeting of Warsaw
Pact countries.
- 3 - 9 Cuban delegation led by Ché Guevara
visited China.
- 3 - 8 Italian C.P. delegation visited
Yugoslavia.
- 5 Antara reported reiteration by
Chou En-lai of opposition to 1 March
meeting.
- 5 New Soviet-Japanese Trade Agreement
signed in Moscow.
- 5 - 9 The French Minister of Finance
visited Bucharest to sign Franco-
Rumanian Trade Agreement.
- 6 - 10 Kosygin visited North Vietnam.
- 6 - 15 Yugoslav Foreign Minister visited
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.
- 7 Tass issued a statement calling on
the United States to stop interfering
in the affairs of Laos. The Chinese
published the full text without
comment.
- 7 First American-South Vietnamese
retaliatory attacks against North
Vietnam.
- 9 Chinese Government statement accused
the United States of aggression in
North Vietnam.
- 9 - 16 Moroccan C.P. delegation visited
Peking.

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- February 10 Tass announced the dismissal of Lysenko from his post as Director of the Institute of Genetics.
- 11 The Soviet delegation led by Kosygin was received by Mao Tse-tung in Peking (on the way from Hanoi to Pyongyang).
- 11 - 15 Kosygin visited North Korea.
- 12 - 17 Rapacki visited Brussels.
- 13 Chinese Government statement on Vietnam.
- 14 15th Anniversary of Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.
- 16 Zeri i Popullit attacked the new Soviet leadership by name and the 1 March meeting.
- 16 - 19 Finnish Communist Party have talks in Moscow with CPSU leaders.
- 16 - 21 Stanko Todorov, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister paid an official visit to Great Britain.
- 16 - 23 President Nyerere of Tanzania visited China.
- 17 French Communist Party condemned letter in which a hundred French Communist intellectuals had called for more freedom of discussion.
- 17 Soviet Note to Norway on Spitzbergen.
- 17 At United Nations General Assembly Albanian delegate demanded that immediate vote should be taken on return to normal procedures.
- 18 China and Pakistan signed Agreement for an interest-free loan of \$60 million from China.
- 18 Pro-Chinese splinter group of the Australian Communist Party reaffirmed opposition to 1 March meeting.
- 19 Archbishop Beran of Prague given permission to go to Rome to be enthroned as a Cardinal.
- 21 - 26 President Kekkonen of Finland visited the Soviet Union on way back from India.

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- February 21 A Rumyantsev article on "The Party and the Intelligensia" in Pravda.
- 22 Soviet Note to the United States on harassment of Soviet shipping.
- 24 Communist Party delegations began arriving in Moscow for 1 March meeting.
- 24 Ulbricht arrived in United Arab Republic.
- 25 Peking radio announced publication of third volume of Khrushchev's speeches with preface.
- 25 Chinese attack on Soviet support for United Nations "peace-keeping committee".

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