



Communist Policy and Tactics 1966 – 1967, 1. hluti

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, MAY 1966

SUMMARY

The mounting campaign in China against intellectuals and bourgeois elements culminated in the replacement of a top party official, P'eng Chen. The full significance of these developments is not yet clear but P'eng Chen's removal is probably part of a power struggle within the party leadership. There has been no indication that Chinese attacks on revisionists within the party ranks are connected with the dispute with the Soviet Union or that Chinese foreign policy has been affected. (Paragraphs 1-3.)

Ceausescu's speech of 7 May and Press reports about Rumanian dissatisfaction with Warsaw Pact arrangements suggest that there may be serious disagreements about the relationship between the Soviet Union and other members of the pact. The Rumanians may have wanted to pre-empt Soviet proposals to strengthen the pact's central organisation. A high-level meeting of the pact will probably be held in Bucharest in July. (Paragraphs 4-6.)

During his visit to the UAR Kosygin probably tried to bring about greater unity among the "progressive" Arab States. Support for the UAR is a key element in Soviet policy in the Middle East but there is caution about incurring excessive financial commitments or taking undue risks of exacerbating relations with the West. (Paragraphs 7-8.)

The Soviet Komsomol Congress mirrored the Party Congress and did not tackle controversial problems. A Central Committee Plenum adopted an ambitious programme of land improvement. There were further pointers to Brezhnev's pre-eminence in the Soviet leadership. (Paragraphs 9-11.)

Castro chose to inflame relations with the United States over incidents at the Guantanamo base. His motives were probably internal but he may also have wished to put pressure on the Soviet Union. The Soviet reaction was cautious. (Paragraphs 12-13.)

China—Internal

The steadily mounting attacks on Chinese intellectuals were given the stamp during the month of an official campaign against revisionism in general. This campaign focused on Peking, covering both Peking University and the Peking Municipal Party Committee, and culminated with the announcement on 3 June that Li Hsüeh-Feng, a senior but relatively little known party official, had taken over as First Secretary of the Peking Municipal Committee. He thus replaced P'eng Chen, the Mayor of Peking and No. 6 in the Politburo. It must be assumed that P'eng Chen has lost all his positions of influence, though this has not been announced, nor indeed has he been specifically named at all. The President of Peking University and a number of his senior associates have been deprived of their positions.

2. The campaign against the intellectuals was linked in Chinese propaganda with previous anti-Rightist campaigns, notably the campaign after the "Hundred Flowers" in 1957 and the campaign in 1959 in which the Minister of Defence P'eng Teh-huai fell. The campaign probably reflected a genuine fear by the

CONFIDENTIAL

leadership for the political purity of the coming generation and the future of the revolution. It has now been revealed that the decision to act against certain intellectuals notably Teng T'o, a former editor of the *People's Daily*, and Wu Han, a Vice-Mayor of Peking, was taken by Mao Tse-tung himself at a meeting of the Central Committee in September 1965.

3. Many questions remain to be answered, notably those concerning the connection between P'eng Chen and the campaigns against the intellectuals and revisionism, the involvement of the army in recent developments, the possibility of further changes in the leadership and the relationship of these events to possible differences on domestic or foreign policies. The situation is still obscure and the following comments on these points are therefore tentative:

- (a) P'eng Chen who, unlike most of his colleagues, has genuine working class origins, has always been regarded as an impeccable "hard-liner", in favour of the Great Leap Forward and opposed to Soviet "revisionism". He has been closely connected with certain Asian Communist parties, including the Indonesian Communist Party, and he may have lost ground because of the latter's collapse. It would appear unlikely that he was a Right-wing "revisionist" in the normal sense, and his fall is, therefore, more likely to be the result of a power struggle.
- (b) It is significant that the *Liberation Daily*, the organ of the armed services, has taken the lead in attacking revisionism when the task would normally have fallen to the party organ, the *People's Daily*. It is reasonable to assume that in any anti-revisionist struggle, the army was squared in advance, possibly at the meeting in January of the People's Liberation Army Work Committee. The Minister of Defence, Lin Piao, has again emerged as a pillar of orthodoxy; but the position of the Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ch'ing, who has not appeared in public for some time, remains in doubt.
- (c) There is good evidence to suggest that Mao Tse-tung, who reappeared for the first time since last November on 11 May to receive the Albanian Communist Party delegation, is ill and not exercising effective leadership of the party. This may have accelerated a struggle for power which resulted in the ousting of P'eng Chen. There is no firm evidence that the positions of the heir apparent, Liu Shao-ch'i, or of the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, are affected nor of the present relative standing of Lin Piao or Teng Hsiao-P'ing, the Nos. 4 and 5 in the Politburo. (The last has been heavily backed by some commentators because of his position as General Secretary of the Party and his past connections with the official who has replaced P'eng Chen.) This tends to suggest that we have, at any rate, reached the end of a phase, though the recent changes suggest that there will be more to come when Mao dies.
- (d) So far there is no evidence to indicate that the leadership is divided on major questions of policy though recent foreign policy failures (particularly Indonesia), increased tension with the United States, the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union and differences on economic policy connected with the Third Five-year Plan might be involved. There has also been no significant indication that policies are being changed, nor that the activities of "revisionist" elements have shaken the stability and control of the régime.

Soviet/Rumanian relations and the Warsaw Pact

4. The speech of the General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, Ceausescu, on 7 May at the celebration of the 45th anniversary of the party's foundation contained a forthright restatement of Rumanian views on independent national Communism. Ceausescu made an attack on Comintern interference in Rumanian Communist Party affairs after the First World War and on the attitude of the Soviet Government towards Rumania at the beginning of the Second World War. He also declared himself against military *blocs*, and bases in foreign countries, which he described as an anachronism incompatible with national independence and sovereignty. This speech was followed by an unheralded visit from 10-13 May by Brezhnev to Bucharest. The visit was only officially announced after its conclusion and then in terms which did not imply that the Russians and Rumanians had seen eye to eye on matters they had discussed.

5. There have been Press reports of a Rumanian circular note to all Warsaw Pact members suggesting that they are no longer prepared to contribute to the cost of stationing Soviet troops in pact countries; that the command of Warsaw Pact forces should be rotated and that there should be prior consultation of all members before nuclear weapons are to be used. The Rumanians have denied these reports but confirmed that Rumania was consulting other pact members on questions affecting the alliance. All this indicates that there may be serious disagreements within the Warsaw Pact. It has been clear that the pact meeting in January last year failed to produce agreement on some questions. Speeches by Communist leaders last September, when there was a series of top level consultations, suggested that organisational changes with a view to strengthening the pact were being discussed. Brezhnev himself referred to the need to "further improve the organisation of the Warsaw Treaty". It would be natural for any such changes to be considered at a consultative meeting of the pact.

6. It is too early to assess the full significance of the Rumanian moves but they appear to have been designed at the very least to pre-empt Soviet proposals for some form of stronger central organisation within the pact possibly extending to political as well as military matters, and perhaps even to give the Rumanians somewhat greater freedom of manoeuvre within the pact than they enjoy at present. It remains to be seen what will emerge from the top level Warsaw Pact meeting which is expected to be held in July, probably in Bucharest. It seems likely that the Rumanians have decided to assert their views on the pact in the same way as they successfully asserted their views on CMEA two years ago. There is no sign of the Rumanian example being followed by other pact members and it is unlikely to lead to speedy or drastic changes in the pact organisation. But if the Rumanians persist in asserting the views which they have already expressed this will be an important development in Rumanian/Soviet relations and may have significance for the more general pattern of relations in Eastern Europe.

Soviet-UAR Relations

7. Kosygin's visit to the UAR from 10-18 May was conducted without the ebullience and showmanship which characterised Khrushchev's visit in 1964, but although the tone was quiet and businesslike and there were expressions of agreement on a wide range of international questions there is no evidence that any significant results were achieved. Soviet Press comment suggests that one of Kosygin's main objectives was to help bring about greater unity among the "progressive" Arab States, in order to offset any growth in the cohesion and influence of Arab States with closer links with the West. If this policy succeeds it will lead to some sharpening in relations between the so-called "progressive" and "conservative" Arab States with consequent advantages to the Soviet Union among the "progressives", but it is unlikely that the Soviet Government would wish this to lead to an uncontrolled rise in tension or to possible conflict. Kosygin gave a guarded endorsement of UAR policies in the Yemen, but this was not repeated in the joint communiqué on the visit.

8. Soviet policy is apparently designed to retain the maximum influence in the UAR, to give full support to President Nasser and to encourage his anti-imperialist proclivities without however incurring excessive financial commitments or taking undue risks of exacerbating Soviet relations with the West. Hints were dropped by Soviet officials that the increased warmth of their relationship with the UAR did not mean that the Soviet Union would encourage President Nasser to engage in dangerous adventures abroad. It appears from this that the Russians are concerned to avoid anything that might inhibit continued American wheat supplies, which the Soviet Union could not replace. This caution was not, however, shared by President Nasser who associated himself openly with Soviet denunciations of United States policy in Viet-Nam. It remains to be seen whether Soviet interest in promoting co-operation among the "progressive" Arab States will be effective in producing a more cohesive anti-imperialist grouping: the traditional suspicions and rivalries amongst the countries concerned will not be easily overcome.

Soviet Union—Internal

9. The 15th Congress of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) did little more than reflect the 23rd Party Congress which had taken place six weeks before. Like the Party Congress it strove to demonstrate unity and boost morale and

avoided open discussion of controversial problems. Although the usual emphasis was placed on the virtues of ideological orthodoxy, patriotism and respect for the older generations the whole question of the morale of Soviet youth and the role of current literature was treated in a very cursory way. Another crucial problem—the drift of young people from the countryside—was touched on in general terms by Brezhnev and other speakers but no serious measures were proposed for dealing with it.

10. A Central Committee Plenum at the end of May adopted an ambitious programme of land improvement, described by Brezhnev as a task as large as any the party had tackled in agriculture. The programme provides for an increase in the area of irrigated land by 7–8 million hectares and of drained land by 15–16 million hectares, bringing the total of reclaimed land to 37–39 million hectares by 1975. Large-scale measures were also proposed for improving the fertility of land already in use. The main developments are planned for the period after 1970 but 15 milliard roubles have been allocated under the present Five-year Plan.

11. There were further pointers to Brezhnev's pre-eminence in the Soviet leadership during May. The Plenum was told that the Central Committee had begun to discuss the problems of land improvement a year ago "on the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev". Polyansky has special responsibility for agriculture within the Soviet Politburo, but he appears to have taken no part in the discussion at the Plenum: the limelight was on Brezhnev. It was also noticeable that when Brezhnev returned to Moscow from a routine official trip to Vladivostok he was met at the airport by almost the whole Politburo and Secretariat. Kosygin was given a much more modest reception on his return from his visit to the UAR. There is now markedly less emphasis on "collective leadership" at the top level; and Soviet information media no longer give the impression that Brezhnev and Kosygin are a pair of roughly equal leaders heading the party and Government apparatuses respectively: Brezhnev as General Secretary is clearly and decisively at the top of the pyramid, with Kosygin and others in a subordinate position. It is not yet possible to judge how far this represents the actual distribution of power and influence in the Soviet hierarchy, but the indications are that events are again following the traditional Soviet pattern, in which the authority of the General Secretary (or First Secretary) of the Party tends to increase at the expense of other members of the leadership.

Cuba

12. Not satisfied with the quarrels which he has contrived to pick in recent months with the Chinese, Yugoslavs and Chileans, Castro appears to have decided in mid-May that the time had come to raise once again the temperature of his relations with the United States. A number of incidents on the perimeter of the United States naval base at Guantanamo in the east of the island came to a head on 21 May with the death of a Cuban soldier shot by United States guards while attempting to penetrate the base area. The Cuban Government made much of the incident and Raul Castro delivered an inflammatory funeral oration. On 23 May six more Cuban infiltrators were discovered inside the base area. On 27 May the Cuban Government declared a state of alert throughout the island, and the General Staff ordered the armed forces to take all measures necessary in preparation for battle stations at short notice. President Dorticos summoned the heads of all Communist missions on the same day and informed them that the Cuban Government was prepared to receive volunteers from their countries immediately to assist in the defence of Cuba. Castro, for his part, issued two personal statements giving his replies to the version of the incidents issued by the Pentagon and the State Department, in which he excelled himself in the use of violent and insulting language.

13. It is difficult to detect any coherent Cuban policy behind these alarms. Castro and the other Cuban leaders are known to be in an edgy mood; and he was evidently personally stung by the United States version of the incidents. On a more rational plane, he may have decided that an artificially created emergency could serve as an excuse for more stringent measures of internal control and perhaps for a minor purge of malcontents both in the armed forces and in the public administration, following on spy trials and the dismissal of a Vice-Minister for the armed forces in March and the recent purges of the Foreign Service and Ministry for Foreign Trade. He may also wish to dramatize Cuba's position in the

front line of the battle against the United States and to concoct a new justification for the stepping up of aid to national liberation movements throughout Latin America. He is known to be dissatisfied with the extent of Soviet help to "freedom fighters" in Viet-Nam and may have hoped to force them into a more active part in the general anti-imperialist struggle, as well as into more open-handed support for Cuba. If so, he can have received little satisfaction from the cautious Soviet pledges of friendship and support which carefully avoided any mention of the Cuban call for foreign volunteers. Nor has he received much comfort from the Chinese, though, as was to be expected, they have made the most of the Guantanamo incidents in their anti-American propaganda.

CHRONOLOGY

- May
- 1-7 Tito visited the UAR.
 - 4 *Liberation Army Daily* editorial on importance of "class struggle" in China to-day.
 - 5-11 Rumanian delegation in North Viet-Nam.
 - 7 Speech by Ceausescu, General Secretary of Rumanian Communist Party, on the party's 45th anniversary.
 - 9 Third Chinese nuclear test.
 - 9-11 West European Communist Parties Conference in Vienna.
 - 10 Important article in Shanghai newspaper denounces "anti-Socialist" individuals in Peking and also certain Peking newspapers.
 - 10-13 Brezhnev visited Rumania.
 - 10-18 Kosygin visited the UAR.
 - 11 Albanian party/Government delegation left China after being received by Mao.
 - 11-13 Rumanian delegation in Peking.
 - 15 11th anniversary of Warsaw Pact.
 - 16 Attack on individuals and papers connected with Peking intensified in *Red Flag*.
 - 17 Soviet reply to German Note of 25 March.
 - 17-21 Soviet Komsomol Congress.
 - 17-22 Visit of Manescu, Rumanian Foreign Minister, to Prague and Budapest.
 - 19 *Lumea* article: Rumania's first acknowledgment of Warsaw Pact anniversary.
 - 24-31 Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs visited Soviet Union.
 - 25 President of Peking University and other senior members denounced.
 - 25-27 Plenary Session of Soviet Central Committee on land improvement.
 - 30- 23rd Congress of Czechoslovak Communist Party.
- 4 June

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, OCTOBER 1966

SUMMARY

There have been signs of possibly greater flexibility in the Soviet attitude to the West. Chances for a non-proliferation treaty look better. The Russians are now at least willing to be seen to be talking about Viet-Nam, even if there is no sign of a change in their position. Soviet relations with the United States are ambivalent. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

The meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow in mid-October was shrouded in secrecy, but China and Viet-Nam were probably the main subjects of discussion. (Paragraphs 5-8.)

The Soviet leaders have spoken out publicly against China. Rumours of tension on the Sino-Soviet border have probably been exaggerated. (Paragraphs 9-11.)

The cultural revolution in China continues. (Paragraphs 12-15.)

The North Koreans steered a middle course between the Soviet Union and China at their Party Conference. (Paragraphs 16-18.)

The Russians took an unco-operative line with the Indonesians on debt problems. (Paragraph 19.)

Difficulties for West European Communist Parties. (Paragraphs 20-21.)

Soviet internal: the price reform and the harvest. (Paragraphs 22-23.)

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

For some time there has been little movement in Soviet relations with the West. The Russians have sought to distinguish their relations with the United States from their relations with some other countries of the Western Alliance. As far as the latter are concerned, they have indicated a preference for pursuing discussion of European problems within a strictly European context, although there has been little evidence that their position on the main problems of European security has altered. As to the United States, the Russians have taken the line that they would like better relations, but that the war in Viet-Nam is an obstacle. In practice, however, the Russians have been careful to keep their lines open to Washington and the "freeze" of which Mr. Brezhnev spoke over a year ago has never extended to the minutiae of Soviet-American bilateral relations.

(a) *Non-proliferation treaty*

2. There are now signs, however, that the Russians are seeking greater flexibility in their relations with the West. As long ago as August Mr. Kosygin had made it clear that Viet-Nam should not be an obstacle to agreement on non-proliferation and comprehensive test ban treaties. The talks Mr. Gromyko had in the United States (where he was leading the Soviet delegation to the United Nations General Assembly) with President Johnson, Mr. Rusk and the Foreign Secretary suggested that the possibilities of reaching agreement anyway on a non-proliferation treaty were indeed considerably brighter. Furthermore Mr. Gromyko's public optimism on this score in New York was authoritatively echoed by Mr. Brezhnev in a speech in mid-October in which he welcomed "certain advances" that had recently been made towards settling the question of proliferation.

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Viet-Nam

3. Although it would be natural to suppose that Soviet and East European influence may have increased in North Viet-Nam, and although the Russians have been somewhat inconsistent in their public support for the North Viet-Nameese points for a settlement of the struggle, discussions with Mr. Gromyko in New York produced no sign of any change in the Soviet attitude. The Foreign Secretary's proposals for joint action by himself and Mr. Gromyko to reconvene the Geneva Conference immediately, made originally at the Labour Party Conference and repeated in the General Assembly, evoked a negative response and some time later were strongly attacked in an article in *Izvestiya*. Nevertheless, Mr. Gromyko has invited the Foreign Secretary to Moscow for two days in the latter part of November when they can informally continue the discussions they had in New York, and Viet-Nam will clearly be one of the subjects on the agenda. This willingness to discuss the subject, and to be seen to be discussing it, is itself an advance on the Soviet position in the summer.

(c) Soviet-United States relations

4. A similar ambivalence was to be seen in Soviet relations with the United States. It was hardly surprising that, on the eve of a gathering of Communist leaders in Moscow where Viet-Nam must have figured prominently on the agenda, Mr. Brezhnev should have responded negatively to President Johnson's speech of 7 October on improving United States relations with Eastern Europe. In a speech of 15 October Mr. Brezhnev spoke of the "strange but persistent delusion" of the American leadership that their relations with the Soviet Union and her allies could develop in spite of the situation in Viet-Nam. But the force of this was inevitably blunted when less than three weeks later a Soviet-United States Civil Air Agreement was signed which had been in cold storage since 1961.

MOSCOW MEETING OF COMMUNIST LEADERS

5. The series of bilateral meetings of Communist leaders which took place in September culminated in the meeting in Moscow from 17 to 22 October of the First Secretaries of the Communist Parties, the Prime Ministers and the Defence Ministers of all the Warsaw Pact countries (Albania excepted) together with Tsedenbal, the First Secretary of the Mongolian Communist Party, and the Army Minister from Mongolia, and President Dorticos and Defence Minister Raul Castro from Cuba. This followed immediately after a full-scale visit to the Soviet Union by the Polish party and Government leaders, Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz, who may possibly have initially had reservations about the idea of such a gathering. Although the Polish party Press had at the end of September come out with a condemnation of China, long standing Polish Reluctance to take any action which might make reconciliation in the Sino-Soviet dispute more difficult probably dies hard.

6. Virtually no hard information has emerged about the meeting. It ended with a brief, uninformative communiqué which perpetuated the formal Soviet explanation for the meeting—that the participants had "studied the achievements of Soviet science and technology, including the latest models of weapons for land and air forces". A large number of Soviet military figures were stated to have taken part. To add verisimilitude, those attending were taken to the Cosmodrome at Baikonvr, like President de Gaulle before them. The Russians also sought to emphasise the informality of the meetings and talks. For all that, there can be little doubt that the main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the situation in Viet-Nam and China.

7. In so far as China is concerned, the absence of a communiqué is not surprising: indeed it probably made easier the attendance of several delegations, including the Rumanian and Cuban. Whether the absence of any comment on Viet-Nam signifies disagreement, or simply a wish not to publicise decisions taken, is not clear. Although the participants have all declared their determination to assist North Viet-Nam, differences on what form or degree such assistance should take may make it difficult for them to commit themselves publicly to a specific plan of common action. Few of them favour escalation, and it may therefore have proved difficult to find a form of words which, after the Bucharest Declaration on Viet-Nam committing the Warsaw Pact members to increase their aid and to send volunteers should these be requested by Hanoi, would not have seemed anti-climactic.

CONFIDENTIAL

8. The fact remains, however, that similar publicised gatherings of Communist leaders in the past (as opposed to unpublicised meetings that are believed to have taken place from time to time) have ended in some statement of substance. That the Russians were at least able to convene such a meeting (which whatever its purpose would be widely assumed to be about Viet-Nam and China) was itself an indication of the degree of concern that events in China now arouse in the Communist movement, and a cause for Soviet gratification. The meeting may also have provided a useful opportunity for discussing the co-ordination of military assistance to North Viet-Nam, particularly questions of transport which have been complicated by the Chinese attitude. But there has been no indication that the Russians and their allies see any easy way of overcoming the general difficulties raised for them by the related problems of Viet-Nam and China.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

9. In mid-October, in speeches made in connection with the visit of the Polish leaders, both Kosygin and Brezhnev finally came out with a public verdict on events in China. Kosygin stated that the events of the cultural revolution proved that the Chinese were moving further along the road to a split, inflicting serious damage on the struggle for Socialism and rendering a great service to "imperialism". Brezhnev repeated the accusation, and made it clear that Chinese policy on Viet-Nam, their policy towards other Socialist countries, their anti-Soviet policy, their "splitting actions" in the world Communist movement and events in China itself, "all this has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism or with a socialist policy". Soviet Press comment throughout the month, which only began to tail off in volume towards the end, was devoted to the elaboration of these themes.

10. Mutual recriminations continued, with the Chinese making particular play of Mr. Gromyko's talks in the United States as indicative of a United States-Soviet plot; they were categorised by the Chinese as "an Eastern Munich". Surprisingly, however, the Chinese have as yet made no comment at all on the Communist summit meeting in Moscow, in contrast, for instance to the attacks they made on the meeting of Communist Parties in Moscow in March 1965. On this occasion, of course, the Russians gave them no peg on which to hang such attacks since the meeting ostensibly had nothing to do with unity or Viet-Nam, but this has not previously deterred the Chinese from exposing the "true" purpose of Soviet activities.

11. The mutual expulsion of each other's students led to altercation in the Chinese and Soviet Press and an exchange of diplomatic notes. At a meeting in connection with the return of the Chinese students to Peking a Chinese Vice-Minister of higher education made a pointed reference to the recovery of territory lost under the unequal treaties. There have been a growing number of rumours of increasing tension on the Sino-Soviet border, which have been fed in particular by a speech by the Vladivostok Party Secretary calling for heightened vigilance on the border, and also by an all-union meeting in Moscow of Komsomol workers from border regions which was addressed by the Head of the Committee of State Security (KGB), Semichastny. There is no evidence that either the Chinese or the Russians anticipate serious trouble on their border at the moment.

INTERNAL EVENTS IN CHINA: THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

12. Red Guard activities have continued in Peking throughout the month punctuated by mass rallies. These have been attended by Mao in person together with the rest of the top leadership in the order which has become familiar since mid-August. In Peking at least there has been no recurrence of the violence which marked Red Guard activities in late August. The Red Guards appear to be generally orderly, very provincial and dazed by the unaccustomed sights of Peking. Their energies and criticisms have been directed mainly against the party apparatus. A number of regional bureaux and provincial committees have been singled out for attack, particularly those in the North-West. Presumably these are the areas where resistance to the purge has been strongest and is still continuing.

13. One of the unresolved puzzles of the past few weeks has been the sustained criticism of certain party officials who nevertheless continue to remain at their posts. An outstanding example is the Peking Party Secretary, Li Hsueh-feng, who replaced P'eng Chen in June. Li has been the object of a continuous

poster campaign lasting several weeks which, by its nature, can only have been officially inspired. Despite this, he continued to appear in a prominent position among the top leadership at all the mass rallies in Peking during October.

14. Isolated poster attacks on leading figures (those on the Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi for example) can probably be explained as ranging shots or the product of overzealous Red Guards. The same explanation cannot however cover the case of Li Hsueh-feng. One possible explanation is that the attack on Li is the prelude to an attack on more important figures, for example Liu Shao-ch'i and possibly also Teng Hsiao-p'ing. A number of posters have associated the party apparatus, and Liu Shao-ch'i himself, with the failures of the work teams which were sent to the universities and schools in the early days of the campaign and which are now being blamed for bureaucratic handling of the students and intolerable complacency. It now looks as though that stage of the campaign was managed by the regular party apparatus in the normal way but, when they failed to carry out a thorough enough purge, Mao decided to shake up the party itself by using a new weapon, the Red Guards. Since the Red Guard campaign started there appears to have been tenacious resistance from the entrenched party bureaucrats who both dislike the methods which are being used and fear for their own jobs. This resistance is continuing.

15. There are signs that what Mao and the Cultural Revolution Group now wish to do is find some permanent organisational form which will safeguard the party from the twin evils of bureaucracy and revisionism in the future. There have been rumours of projected reforms of the party and State Constitutions. It is not yet clear what will emerge but something is in the wind. Whatever form Mao finds for using "the masses" as a check on the party and State machinery, it is hard to see how he can prevent the new organisation from suffering in its turn from the failings of the present system.

NORTH KOREAN PARTY CONFERENCE

16. A conference of the North Korean Workers' Party took place from 5-12 October. The main feature was a long report by the party's First Secretary, Kim Il-sung, which clearly set out North Korea's attitude to the Sino-Soviet quarrel and the whole question of relations in the Communist movement. Both protagonists of the quarrel were criticised: the Russians for the inadequacy of their struggle against imperialism (particularly the doctrine of peaceful co-existence and a tendency to go along with alleged Western efforts to ease the situation in Europe in order to concentrate on Asia); the Chinese for shouting against United States imperialism while causing difficulties for the anti-imperialist forces in uniting to take practical measures, and for making polemics over the Viet-Nam issue at a time when the Viet-Nameese were being attacked.

17. While recognising that Sino-Soviet differences had reached a point where they could hardly be settled, Kim insisted that the Socialist camp could not be replaced by any community of a different character and that Communists must work to restore unity. As a first step towards this, he proposed that Communist countries should jointly and immediately despatch volunteers to Viet-Nam. He also called on the disputants to stop arguing at a time when they should be assisting North Viet-Nam. The frustration of small Communist Parties at the present situation was well illustrated by Kim's strong insistence on the principle of the independence of parties and in almost all matters he advocated a middle way between the Soviet and Chinese courses. On these matters the views of the North Korean and Cuban parties are very similar.

18. On internal matters, Kim's report was dominated by the economic difficulties created by the need to improve the country's defences, which was the reason given for the postponement by three years of the completion of the Seven-year Plan for economic development. He also devoted considerable space to the question of reunification with South Korea, setting out at some length how a revolutionary liberation movement should be developed there. The conference endorsed some party organisational changes, which seem to have the effect of consolidating an in-group around Kim Il-sung in the form of the re-instituted Secretariat within an enlarged Political Committee. Out of 14 new appointees to this committee, five are generals or have posts in the Defence Ministry.

SOVIET-INDONESIAN RELATIONS

19. Relations with Indonesia since the abortive *coup* of September 1965 have been a cause of embarrassment to the Russians, who have had to balance their fraternal indignation at the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party against the need not to drive the present Indonesian Government from a non-aligned position. They are understood, however, to have been unforthcoming to the Indonesian delegation, led by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Malik, which visited Moscow in October seeking help primarily over the question of Indonesian debts. It may be that the Russians calculate that, as Indonesia's largest creditor and supplier of arms, they can now afford to exercise pressure to counter the anti-Communist attitude of the present Indonesian Government. The Russians seem certain to wish to treat the problem of Indonesian indebtedness as a bilateral issue. They have refused to join the meeting of Western creditors, who are due to meet again in Paris in December. At the same time, they will probably wish to play for time on the debts issue until the result of the Western negotiations with the Indonesians are clearer.

COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

20. The two major Western European Communist Parties, in France and Italy, have suffered setbacks. In France M. Mitterand's *Fédération de la Gauche* finally decided against any privileged association with the Communists in the forthcoming legislative elections, and will fight with its own programme and candidates, although it also stated that on the second ballot it would stand down in favour of whichever candidate had the best chance of beating the Government-supported candidates: in some cases this is likely to be a Communist. The French Communist Party have declared that they will continue to work for the unity of the Left. It was of some interest also that the Belgian Communist Party weekly *Drapeau Rouge* carried a special supplement in October reporting a Central Committee meeting held some time in September, which had devoted itself to the party's shortcomings, and in particular its pusillanimity about trying to promote a front between Socialists and Communists.

21. The Italian Communist Party's (PCI) difficulties are more serious. The party's organisation in Calabria and the South generally is in disarray, and the PCI's lack of success in improving living conditions has led to some support for the militant Chinese line. At a congress in Leghorn from 14-16 October a rival pro-Chinese "Italian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)" was established. Although unlikely to be much of a threat to the PCI it is another rallying point for the discontented. To these internal difficulties must be added the party's relative failure in the local elections in June, and the foundering of its hopes to re-establish a political alliance with Nenni's Socialist Party (PSI) and other Left-wing groups. The final seal was set on this when the PSI was formally reunified with the Social Democrat Party at the end of October.

SOVIET INTERNAL

(a) *The price reform*

22. In two articles published during October the Chairman of the Committee on Prices attached to Gosplan (the State planning organisation), Sitnin, revealed that a number of decisions have already been taken. Coal prices are to be raised by about 75 per cent, those of gas by 55 per cent, crude oil prices will more than double, metals are to be raised by about 35 per cent. Wholesale prices for heavy industry in general will go up by 11-12 per cent, with effect from 1 July, 1967. The prices for light industry should become effective by the beginning of 1967. The increases are not to be passed on to the consumer. Sitnin made clear that no departure from centralised price-fixing is envisaged and that any increase in flexibility which might lay the economy open to the influence of market forces will be minimal. This could discourage technical innovation and widen the differences in economic structure between the Soviet Union and most of the East European countries.

(b) *The harvest*

23. Although full statistics are not yet available, this year's grain harvest had been hailed by Brezhnev as a record, and on the basis of present claims could amount to as much as 45 million tons more than in 1965. This very favourable result is

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, SEPTEMBER 1966

SUMMARY

Developments in China: the Red Guards; the increasing role of the army; the leadership; the economy. (Paragraphs 1-9.)

Increasingly polemical criticism by the Soviet and other Communist parties. One of their main charges is that the Cultural Revolution in China is also attacking orthodox elements in the Chinese Communist Party itself. (Paragraphs 10-13.)

A series of high level meetings among Communist leaders suggested the Russians were preparing to concert further action. (Paragraph 14.)

Criticism of China has concentrated on the damage their stand causes to the struggle in Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 15-16.)

Eastern Europe: major reorganisation of the Yugoslav Communist Party; Warsaw Pact exercise in Czechoslovakia. (Paragraphs 17-20.)

Afro-Asian Writers' Meeting in Baku has widened the Sino-Soviet split in this movement. (Paragraph 21.)

Soviet internal: conflicting ideas on the economic reforms; increased influence of Brezhnev confirmed by appointment of one of his protégés as Minister for Preservation of Public Order. (Paragraphs 22-23.)

CHINA

Developments in China have continued to hold the centre of the Communist stage. Ideological motives evidently ranked high with the instigators of the Cultural Revolution. These included intentions to purify society and eradicate bourgeois remnants, to "blood" the rising generation in the spirit of revolution, and to combat "revisionist" ideas. There were also elements of radical fanaticism and xenophobia. It is clear that a power struggle of some sort has been going on, although the precise issues and personalities involved are by no means clear. Mao and a group probably led by Lin Piao have come out on top. Mao may well have used the army in an attempt to ensure the succession and also to bypass elements in the party which had reservations about his policies. The Russians appear to have been alarmed by the course of events and concerned for the future of the Chinese party and revolution.

(a) *The Red Guards*

2. While approving the activities of the Red Guards, Chinese party leaders have latterly emphasised the need for discipline, restraint and the correct direction of criticism: against "those within the party . . . who have taken the capitalist road". By the middle of the month, it was apparent that the leadership was worried that the Cultural Revolution might have an adverse effect on production. In a speech by Chou En-lai on 15 September, the Red Guards were told not to interfere in factories or communes and to help with the autumn harvest. The present trend is towards channelling energy generated by the Cultural Revolution towards production.

3. Although the situation in China is now calmer, the Cultural Revolution is far from over. Speeches at the National Day celebrations on 1 October stressed

that opposition continues, although this is characterised as being confined to a "small handful". Purges of provincial party officials will probably continue but on a lesser scale than before.

4. The motives behind the unleashing of the Red Guards and their future remain obscure. The presence of Mao and Lin Piao wearing Red Guard armbands at the rally in Peking on 18 August at which the Red Guards originally appeared was clearly meant to set on them the seal of top-level approval. Their unhindered attacks on the civilian population, the dispersal of ginger groups from Peking to other cities and into the country, and the return to order in the cities before the National Day celebrations also suggest preplanned measures. Nevertheless adequate preparation to control the Guards had not been taken; the absence of direction was particularly evident in the provinces where rival groups all claiming to be true revolutionaries clashed in many places. Part of the difficulty was probably that the normal party apparatus could not be used for such direction since the party machinery was itself under attack.

5. The campaign was probably designed to provide an emotional stimulus for the young at a time when the traditional party authority was being challenged, and as a means of giving the young generation a sense of participation in revolutionary activity. Mao has frequently expressed his fears about the degeneration of Chinese youth and the need to train reliable heirs to the Yen-an generation. It was noteworthy that the Communist Youth League apparently played no significant part in recent events, and the Red Guards appear to have closer links with the army than with the ordinary party apparatus. There has been speculation that the Red Guards might become a permanent replacement or addition to the Militia, but there have not yet been any official moves in this direction.

(b) *The People's Liberation Army (PLA)*

6. This liaison of the army with the Red Guards, the emergence of the *Liberation Army Daily* as a major political commentator, and the description of the army as the best example of an organisation that has effectively applied the Thought of Mao raise questions about the future relationship between the army and the party. During the past 18 months army personnel have been placed in important positions to "stiffen" industry and agriculture. Army representation in the reshuffled top leadership has doubled: it now amounts to 6 out of 21 in the Politburo. It remains to be seen whether the party will succeed permanently in its objective of keeping the army firmly under its control, or whether the army will emerge as an independent force in Chinese internal politics able to contest the power of the party machine. Another factor to be taken into account is the persistence of "professional" attitudes in the army. These were of course violently attacked earlier this year, and the emergence of Lin Piao suggests that for the moment "politics are in command". The Chief of Staff, Lo Jui-ching, was presumably the latest and most prominent victim of the campaign against such attitudes and they may still exist at middle and junior levels.

(c) *The leadership*

7. It seems certain that within the Chinese leadership there must have been personal rivalries and differences of opinion on both internal policies and external relations. But the recent upheaval has not revealed any clear pattern of alignments. A new order of seniority for what is probably the reshuffled Politburo has now been repeated sufficiently frequently to give it the appearance of permanence. The top ten are as follows, of whom the first seven are probably the Standing Committee:

1. Mao Tse-tung
2. Lin Piao
3. Chou En-lai
4. T'ao Chu
5. Ch'en Po-ta
6. Teng Hsiao-ping
7. K'ang Sheng
8. Liu Shao-ch'i
9. Chu Te
10. Li Fu-ch'un

Lin Piao is clearly apart from all the others and heir apparent to Mao, Chou En-lai has however formed part of a leading triumvirate, though in a junior position. Some reservations must continue about Lin Piao's health, and about his personal power if the mantle of Mao is removed.

8. Three personalities who came into prominence during the Cultural Revolution and advanced spectacularly in seniority seem likely to stay at the centre of power. These are T'ao Chu (formerly the party leader in South China), Ch'en Po-ta (editor of the *Red Flag* and at one time speech writer for Mao) and K'ang Sheng (an important party theorist and possibly a former Head of the Secret Police). The Party Secretary, Teng Hsiao-ping, remains as No. 6 but has apparently lost ground to these three. He has played remarkably little public part in recent events. Liu Shao-ch'i remains as Head of State and No. 8 in the party heirarchy but seems to be little involved in directing affairs.

(d) *The economy*

9. Speeches at the National Day celebrations were optimistic about the economy but revealed no hard facts. There is still no information about the Third Five-year Plan said to have been launched this year. This optimism may be ill-founded. The weather has not been good and it is estimated that the harvest is likely to be no better than last year and may have been worse. Last year, it was estimated that it did not exceed that of 1957. Industry has shown steady improvement. The Cultural Revolution must nevertheless have had some adverse effect on the economy. The reorganisation of higher education will moreover interfere with the training of technologists and scientists who are already in short supply.

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO EVENTS IN CHINA

10. Following the Soviet Central Committee Statement of 31 August, there was no further official Soviet comment on the events in China during the month. Nevertheless the Soviet Press published a flow of articles on Chinese affairs which fell into three categories: factual accounts by Soviet correspondents of the course of events which contained a significant degree of polemical criticism; signed feature articles on ideological matters which drew attention to Chinese errors; and the reproduction of critical foreign Communist comment.

11. Initially the Soviet Press accounts confined themselves to descriptions of the excesses of the Red Guards, their extra-judicial status, popular resistance, the cult of Mao and the anti-Soviet aspects of the Cultural Revolution. In the middle of the month, however, Soviet reports began to stress that the Red Guards were directed against the established Communist Party, and to imply that the authorities who had directed them were unable to control them effectively. The impression left on the reader was that Marxism-Leninism had been abandoned, and that the party organisation in China was at the mercy of bands of young hooligans.

12. The leading role in the chorus of condemnation of events was still, however, left to other Communist parties. The East Europeans, with the exception of the Rumanians who have so far refrained from any comment, have all come out with official condemnation. The Poles made no substantial editorial comment before 29 September. The harshest East European condemnation was that contained in the Politburo report presented to a Plenum of the East German SED by *Mittag* on 17 September. This traced China's present condition to "the attempt by a group of Chinese leaders to solve the complex problems of transition from capitalism to Socialism in China in complete disregard of the objective laws of Socialist construction". Inevitably, it went on, the internal and external failures of these policies led to conflicts within the party, even the central party leadership. These conflicts appeared first in the army, but after the critics had been silenced, the army leadership assumed a leading role in the "cultural revolution". The Politburo report concluded by pointing out that "the Chinese leaders are not succeeding in giving effect to their line with the help of the organisations of the party. On the contrary the repressive measures are evidently directed primarily against the lowest party cadres which are loyal to Socialism. The adventurist course is altogether directed against the party and its leading role."

13. With the exception of the Spanish and Slovak Communist Press, no other party has produced such an analysis of what lies behind the Cultural Revolution. An overwhelming number of parties have, however, commented on the damage events in China do to the cause of Communism, with particular emphasis on Viet-Nam. The Chinese are isolated as never before. It is of interest that the Albanians, while maintaining their attacks on revisionism and general support of China, have made no comment on the Red Guards.

HIGH-LEVEL COMMUNIST MEETINGS

14. The reproduction of all these criticisms of China in a regular place each day in *Pravda* strongly suggested that the Russians were preparing to concert further action. During September a series of top level meetings took place: Ulbricht visited Moscow from 10-11 September (having made an unexplained visit to Minsk at the end of August when he may well have met Soviet leaders); Brezhnev himself visited Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary accompanied only by Andropov, the Soviet Party Secretary responsible for intra-bloc relations; Novotny visited Bulgaria. It was also announced that Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz were to visit Moscow early in October. Although the question of Federal German relations with the East European countries may well have been an important item on the agenda of Ulbricht's talks, and although Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia which had been planned and announced in advance was probably designed in part to enable him to study at first hand the changes that have been taking place there, there are reliable reports that China and the situation in Viet-Nam were subjects which loomed large in all the talks. The Russians may well have encouraged a line of harsher criticism against the Chinese, and even have again raised the possibility of holding an international Communist conference which, whatever its theme, would have the effect of demonstrating Chinese isolation. The Russian rallying cry for unity in the provision of aid to Viet-Nam must now be more likely to attract support than it was at the turn of the year. It seems likely, however, that the misgivings of a number of other parties would remain, and it was perhaps significant that Kim Il-Sung, the North Korean Workers' Party Chairman whose party has firmly taken its distance from Peking recently, stated at his party's conference early in October that there could be no question of "expelling" any party from the world Communist movement. The Russians will certainly be wary of alienating those who have recently shown an inclination to leave the Chinese fold.

VIET-NAM

15. An important feature of pro-Soviet Communist criticism of China has been that Chinese hostility to co-operation with the Soviet Union, and the undignified and un-Marxist-Leninist aspect of internal events there have significantly helped the "imperialists" in Viet-Nam. The Russians even found an opportunity of teasing the Chinese for collusion with the United States in the remarks (subsequently said to have been misinterpreted) made by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, to some Japanese parliamentarians to the effect that China did not exclude the idea of negotiations with the United States for a settlement on Viet-Nam, and was maintaining contact with the United States Government. The capital made by the Russians out of this reference to the regular meetings of the Chinese and United States Ambassadors in Warsaw caused the Chinese to publish their Ambassador's intransigent opening statement at the meeting which took place on 7 September. At a more practical level, the Russians signed a new agreement on aid to Viet-Nam on 3 October. No details are known, but this was obviously the most important of a series of agreements with East European countries and the Soviet Union negotiated during September by the North Viet-Nameese Deputy Prime Minister, Le Thanh Nghi, who had negotiated a similar series of agreements at the end of 1965.

16. East Europe's preoccupation with the situation in Viet-Nam was indicated by the visit to Hanoi of the Czech Prime Minister, Lenart, from 23-29 September. An important Bulgarian delegation arrived soon afterwards. It was also strongly rumoured that the North Viet-Nameese Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Pham Van Dong and General Giap, secretly visited the Soviet Union in August.

EASTERN EUROPE

(a) Yugoslavia

17. One motive behind the reorganisation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) "from top to bottom" called for by President Tito in a speech on 1 September was probably a determination not to permit a monopoly of power in any sphere of party affairs such as had been enjoyed by Rankovic. A draft decision produced by the Commission set up under Todorovic in July to make proposals for reorganisation was approved by a Central Committee Plenum on 4 October. At the Plenum Rankovic was unanimously expelled from the party, and investigations by Commissions into the misdemeanours of the Security Service, dismissals, and debates on the reorganisation of the Service have continued throughout the Republics.

18. At the 1964 Congress of the LCY a tripartite structure was established for the Central Committee with Kardelj, Vlahovic and Rankovic as Secretaries each in charge of a group of commissions, under the overall control of Tito as Secretary-General. Under the new arrangements, a new 35-member body was set up, the Presidium, with responsibility for general party policy, which it will consider with an elected Executive Committee of 11 members. The role of this Committee (unlike the former Executive Committee which was the equivalent of a "politburo") will be to implement party policy, and its members, who must not be members of the Presidium, are barred from other non-party and non-ideological work. Five commissions whose members will be drawn from outside as well as inside the Central Committee, were also established to consider "topical and significant" problems. The previous posts of Secretary-General and Secretary have been abolished. Tito has been elected President of the LCY and as such will preside over Central Committee and Presidium meetings. Todorovic is Secretary of the Executive Committee.

19. The basic problem for the Yugoslav leaders remains to reconcile economic decentralisation with an effective controlling role for the party. The emphasis of democratisation in the party reforms seems designed to enlist the support and interest of the people in general, and the professional classes in particular, in party affairs. It remains to be seen whether the party's authority can be strengthened by these means without provoking demands for the more far-reaching liberalisation which President Tito has himself publicly rejected.

(b) Warsaw Pact exercises

20. A major Warsaw Pact military exercise under the code name "Vltava" took place in Czechoslovakia from 20-22 September. Elements of the Czech, East German, Hungarian and Soviet Armed Forces took part. This is the first time Hungarian forces have taken part in a Warsaw Pact exercise outside Hungary. It was directed by the Czechoslovak Minister of Defence, presumably as a gesture to East European demands for greater participation in the command structure of the pact. The military aim of the exercise appears to have been to test the capability of selected forces of the four countries to move to the defence of a threatened area and then to co-operate in the halting and subsequent destruction of an aggressor. The exercise was in a nuclear setting from the outset. The amount of publicity it received suggests that, like the "October Storm" manoeuvres of 1965, it served mainly a political purpose. In the wake of the pact's meeting in Warsaw in July it was probably designed to show the pact's military effectiveness, and to give credibility in both Eastern and Western Europe to the claim that as long as NATO's "aggressiveness" continued the Warsaw Pact countries would strengthen their defences.

AFRO-ASIAN WRITERS' MEETING IN BAKU

21. Following the split in the Afro-Asian Writers' movement in June, the Russians contrived that the Enlarged Meeting of the Soviet Liaison Committee for Afro-Asian Writers held in Baku from 30 August to 1 September and attended by 50 foreign guests representing 30 countries, should be followed on 2 September by an unscheduled meeting of Members of the Executive Committee of the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference. This latter meeting decided to hold the Third Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Beirut in February or March 1967. The Baku gathering in general showed that a united front on Viet-Nam is to be given top

priority in the Soviet-controlled part of Afro-Asian movement. The confidence with which the Russians are pressing ahead in the Afro-Asian Writers' organisation after the schism suggests that they may soon try to make further gains in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO). The focus of this may be a Russian attempt to move the venue of the 1967 AAPSO Conference from Peking.

SOVIET UNION INTERNAL

22. Articles in the party Press have tended to display a good deal of conservatism in their emphasis on centralised control in such matters as planning and price-fixing in industry and agriculture. Doubts have been cast on the value of several important economic innovations, while others are evidently being obstructed in practice. Thus, high officials in party and Government have argued against the introduction of Collective Farm Unions on the grounds, for example, that they would unnecessarily duplicate existing production and marketing arrangements and lead to undesirable divergence between collective and State farms. The Ministry of Agriculture probably fears some loss of its own direct control. Warnings have also been published against investment in costly irrigation projects which might not produce a proper return on capital. On the industrial side, there has been a good deal of criticism of the new central authorities for usurping the rights of factory directors and subordinates. Brezhnev and Kosygin have identified themselves respectively with progress in agricultural and industrial reform and both have criticised unnamed officials for lack of enthusiasm and delay. There may be differences of opinion or at least of emphasis amongst the leaders as a result of these difficulties but there has been no sign of conflict. Collective leadership has been reaffirmed in several important articles recently; speculation in the West that this may be directed at members of the Politburo seems to have no foundation.

23. After unusual delay, a Head of the new USSR Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order has at last been appointed in the person of N. A. Shchelokov. Having made his career in Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia, he is evidently a protégé of Brezhnev. The corresponding Ministry of the Russian Republic has been abolished. While its staff has probably been transferred, the fate of its former Minister, who evidently owed his promotion to Shelepin, is unknown. While the ostensible reason for the reorganisation was to combat crime more effectively, its form reflects, and probably enhances, the influence of Brezhnev. Brezhnev also stands to gain credit on account of the excellent harvest this year, especially if local difficulties in its collection can be overcome.

CHRONOLOGY

August

29-31 Ulbricht visited Minsk.

September

- 1 CPSU Central Committee statement on China.
Pravda editorial responded to President Johnson's speech at Idaho Falls.
- 1-7 Shah of Persia visited Bulgaria.
- 2 Bulgarian Central Committee statement on China.
Executive Committee of Afro-Asian Writers meeting in Baku.
- 5 North Viet-Nameese Government/economic delegation led by Vice-Premier and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi arrived in Moscow.
- 7-13 Shah of Persia visited Hungary.
- 7 Statement made by Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw to United States Ambassador at regular meeting published.
- 10-11 Ulbricht visited Moscow.
- 12-16 Czech Party/Government delegation led by Novotny visited Bulgaria.
- 15 Mass rally of Red Guards in Peking addressed by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai.
- 15-17 Plenum of East German SED: Politburo report, critical of China, presented by Mittag.
- 19-21 Brezhnev visited Bulgaria.
- 20-22 Warsaw Pact exercise "Vltava" took place in Czechoslovakia.
- 20-28 President of Somali Republic visited Soviet Union.
- 22-24 Brezhnev visited Yugoslavia.
- 23-29 Prime Minister Lenart of Czechoslovakia visited Hanoi.
- 25-26 Brezhnev visited Hungary.
- 26-
- 3 Oct. Ulbricht visited Yugoslavia.
- 29 Editorial in Polish Party paper *Trybuna Ludu* attacked Chinese.
- 30 Brezhnev and Kosygin saw Lenart on his way back from Hanoi.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, JUNE 1966

SUMMARY

President de Gaulle's visit to the Soviet Union was a personal triumph. The bilateral results looked impressive. The views of the two sides remained apart on international questions, particularly on the holding of a European Security Conference and the question of German reunification. Emphasis in the joint Declaration on the need to create an atmosphere of *détente* in which solutions to problems might be found. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

A series of Ministerial meetings took place preparatory to the Consultative Committee meeting of the Warsaw Pact. The text of a Declaration on European Security was probably discussed. Concessions seem to have been made to the Rumanians. (Paragraphs 5-7.)

The Rumanians refused to allow Chou En-lai to attack the Soviet Union during his visit, but failed to gain any modification of the Chinese attitude on Viet-Nam. Chou also visited Albania and Pakistan. (Paragraphs 8-10.)

Kosygin's visit to Finland was uncontroversial. The Russians do not want to jeopardise the prospects of Communist participation in coalition Governments in Western Europe. (Paragraph 11.)

The East Germans have called off their public exchanges with the Federal German Social Democratic Party but may revert to the idea later. (Paragraph 12.)

Eastern Europe: resignation of Ranković and reform of Yugoslav Security Service; Czech Party Congress underlined two schools of economic thought. (Paragraphs 13-15.)

The Japanese Communist Party can no longer be counted as an uncritical supporter of the Chinese. (Paragraph 16.)

Sino/Soviet rivalry continues to bedevil meetings of front organisations. (Paragraph 17.)

The "cultural revolution" in China has extended to all organisations, but is unlikely to strike any higher victims in the future. Attempts to show that the top leadership is in control and united; possibility of a new leap forward. (Paragraphs 18-21.)

Soviet wheat purchases from Canada; continued tensions in the Soviet cultural sphere. (Paragraphs 22-24.)

PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

President de Gaulle's visit to the Soviet Union from 20 June to 1 July, on which he was accompanied by his foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, was the climax to a year in which the Russians have commented with increasing warmth about Franco/Soviet relations, and the benefits accruing to Europe as a whole from closer contacts and better understanding between these two powers.

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The strenuous tour, which included visits to Kiev, Leningrad, Volgograd and Novosibirsk as well as the exceptional honour of a visit to the cosmodrome at Baikonur in Kazakhstan, was a personal triumph for the President.

2. The bilateral results of the visit look impressive. Technological and space agreements, which have been the subject of negotiation for some time, have been signed; the latter includes a Soviet undertaking in principle to launch a French satellite. It has been agreed in principle to set up a special commission for the better control of economic and scientific relations between the two countries, and the scale of exchanges in these and cultural spheres is to increase. A consular convention is to be negotiated. In addition regular consultation on political matters, bilateral, European and international, is envisaged, and a direct Elysée/Kremlin link for rapid communication is to be set up. Both sides have also agreed to exploit to the full and even extend the commercial possibilities of the 1964 Commercial Treaty.

3. On international matters, the joint Declaration, issued in place of a communiqué, records that both sides agreed that the problems of Europe should be discussed first within European limits, with the aim of creating an atmosphere of *détente* in which solutions to problems might be found. The main subjects of discussion were European security and the German question, and here the views of the two sides remained apart. There was no mention in the Declaration of a conference on European Security, although the Russians have stated on many occasions recently that they would favour one. President de Gaulle is understood to have made it clear that in his view a conference should take place at the end of a process of *détente* and not precede it. He is also reported to have responded to Brezhnev's urging that the DDR be recognised by saying that it was an artificial creation and that the question of recognition did not arise.

4. It remains to be seen whether, in spite of the large gap that apparently still exists between Soviet and French views of what would constitute an acceptable European settlement, the development of bilateral Franco/Soviet relations can become a valid basis for a more far-reaching *détente* between East and West.

RUMANIA AND THE WARSAW PACT

5. Speculation about differences of opinion among Warsaw Pact countries was encouraged by a series of meetings which took place in June, preliminary to the meeting of the Consultative Committee which took place as anticipated in Bucharest from 4-6 July. In early June Defence Ministers met in Moscow; in mid-June the Defence Ministers and senior military leaders of the "Northern tier" countries—the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany—met in Berlin; and it was announced on 18 June that the Foreign Ministers of all member countries (except Albania, and with Poland being represented by a deputy Foreign Minister) had met in Moscow. The Foreign Ministers' meeting is known to have gone on for at least 10 days.

6. There can be little doubt that one of the main topics of discussion was the text of the Declaration on European Security which was issued in Bucharest after the Consultative Committee meeting. Furthermore a comparison of the text of the Declaration with an interview given by the Rumanian Party First Secretary, Ceausescu, to Italian journalists on 9 July and published subsequently in *Scinteia*, shows similarity on a number of points. This suggests that some concessions must have been made to the Rumanian point of view, particularly on the desirability of improving relations between European countries with different social systems and on the possibility of abolishing military alliances. Rumanian views on this last point had been stated starkly and unequivocally by Ceausescu in May on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the party. The formulation was subsequently modified somewhat, possibly as a result of Soviet pressure. In speeches at Pitesti on 10 and 11 June, for instance, Ceausescu stated that it was time to abolish NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but added that "as long as the NATO aggressive *bloc* continues to exist, our country, like other member countries of the Warsaw Pact, will continue its vigilance and will increase its defence capacity".

7. It was noteworthy also that at the Consultative Committee meeting there were a number of bilateral discussions between the Soviet and Rumanian leaders. It seems probable that some compromise was reached, but whether, or in what way, the Rumanians may have modified the resistance they are believed to have put up to

certain Soviet proposals in the military sphere remains unclear. There has been no public indication that the meeting came to any decisions on military matters, and there is no reason to believe that the Rumanians were not able to stand their ground against any Soviet proposals aimed at tighter integration or control there may have been.

CHOU EN-LAI'S TOUR

8. The Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, visited Rumania from 16-24 June. On his way back to China he paid brief visits to Albania (24-28 June) and Pakistan (28-30 June). Rumanian motives in welcoming such a visit at this time are understandable. Their independence was conveniently emphasised on the eve of the Warsaw Pact summit meeting; and they have not abandoned their hopes of acting as a catalyst for united action by the Communist *bloc* over aid to Viet-Nam, as the visit of a Rumanian mission to North Viet-Nam and China in May had shown. Chinese motives are less clear. If, as seems probable, they thought that they could widen the gap between the Rumanians and the Russians, or if they thought they could use the Rumanians to urge the Warsaw Pact to take a tougher line against the West in Europe in order to divert United States resources and attention from Viet-Nam, they left disappointed. The Rumanians stuck firmly to their neutral line in the dispute, censoring Chou's references to revisionism from their Press accounts of one of his speeches, and by all accounts refusing to let him use the final Sino/Rumanian friendship rally as a platform for a strong anti-Soviet attack. But they themselves had no success in attempting to persuade the Chinese to take a more moderate line on Viet-Nam. The Press announcement of the visit which was issued in place of the expected communiqué recorded merely that both sides had had a "beneficial" exchange of views on international questions of common interest and expressed their points of view.

9. That the Chinese had had some hopes of using the Rumanians for their own purposes was strongly suggested by some pointed passages in a speech made by the Albanian Prime Minister, Shehu, at a rally at Durres on 26 June. "It is high time", Shehu said, "that each Marxist-Leninist Party shouldered full responsibility for its attitude before its own people and the international Communist movement." He went on that the Albanians would not be deceived by the flattery of "political acrobats" who, while disguising their revisionism as "neutralism", tried to persuade them to drop open polemics, and sink their differences in order to take joint action against imperialism. This is, of course, precisely the stand on the dispute taken by the Rumanians. What is not clear is why the Chinese should ever have thought that the Rumanians were ready to abandon it.

10. Chou's visit to Pakistan on his way back from Rumania may have been partly dictated by geography. It was, however, also in line with the Chinese policy of actively developing their relations with Pakistan wherever possible. The departure of Mr. Bhutto from the Cabinet, and the departure for the Soviet Union of a Pakistani military delegation headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force on what was described as a "goodwill-cum-educational tour" may have provided the Chinese with additional reasons for giving President Ayub reassurances of their support.

KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO FINLAND

11. The inclusion of representatives of the SKDL (the Finnish Communist electoral front) in the new Finnish Government and the Government's external and internal programmes were welcomed in the Soviet Press as indicative of a healthy evolution in the attitude of the Social Democrats, who had learned that a policy of anti-Communism and hostility towards the Soviet Union led to defeats and isolation. It was to be expected, therefore, that Mr. Kosygin on his visit to Finland from 13-18 June would concentrate on the prospects for Fenno/Soviet relations and avoid controversial questions. Since united fronts of the Left are the pattern which it is now Communist policy to encourage in Western European countries, the Russians will be anxious that the Finnish move in this direction should be a success. Current Soviet policy towards Finland, in whose affairs the Soviet Union has for long taken a close and at times interfering interest, is therefore likely to be to avoid exerting any pressures which might adversely affect the position of the Communists in the Government, at least until their position has become more firmly established.

SPD/SED EXCHANGES

12. As had been widely anticipated, the East German Communist Party (SED) eventually got cold feet at the prospect of a public exchange with the Federal German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and withdrew on 29 June. The ostensible reason for the withdrawal was the introduction in the Bundestag of a safe conduct law which would have guaranteed the East German speakers immunity from arrest while in the Federal Republic. The East Germans affected to regard this as an intolerable assertion of Federal German sovereignty over their territory. A more important reason behind the East German attitude was probably the realisation that their original offer of talks had singularly failed in one of its main purposes of inciting the SPD rank and file against the leadership and in driving a wedge between the SPD and the other political parties. In these circumstances the East German régime probably calculated that what it might gain from the exchanges in the way of recognition would be insufficient to outweigh what it might lose in the way of arousing awkward expectations among the East German population. The East Germans are, however, maintaining that the "dialogue" with the SPD should be continued, and it is possible that they will revert to the idea of meetings when they judge the circumstances to be more propitious.

EASTERN EUROPE

(a) Yugoslavia

13. Events at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Alliance (in particular references to a further "democratisation" of the organisation, whose basic role is to control elections on behalf of the Communist Party), the announcement of a reform of the Security Service (UDBa) and the resignation of Ranković (hitherto regarded as Tito's most likely successor) have prompted speculation about a new liberal turn in Yugoslavia's internal policies. It seems likely that the party's intention is to strengthen itself by breaking up a powerful inner group and projecting a more democratic image to the public. Ranković is known to have opposed the trend towards greater economic and administrative decentralisation on the (probably justified) ground that it would eventually undermine Communist control of the country. But Tito has also expressly repudiated "liberalism" and referred to the need for firmer party control and there is no suggestion that UDBa is being dismantled or that it no longer has a proper function to perform: what has been attacked is its dominating and arbitrary role, and its misuse by a particular section of the party. How successful Tito will be in securing the party's position while maintaining the progress of the economic reforms remains to be seen. The question of the succession to Tito is now obscure. But recent events undoubtedly constitute a victory for the school of thought which favours further economic decentralisation. Its leading representative on the party secretariat is Kardelj, whose position may have been further strengthened by the appointment of an economist (Todorovic) to the secretariat to succeed Ranković. Koča Popović, the former Foreign Secretary, has now taken over his vice-presidential post.

(b) Czech Party Congress

14. The 13th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (31 May-4 June) produced little that was unexpected. The volume of criticism was, however, greater than forecast and the defensiveness of the régime more marked. The main subject for the Congress was the approval of the acceleration of the introduction of the economic reforms. There was some difference of opinion between those representing the powers-that-be, who regard the new system as an extension of the old and those, for the most part not occupying any governmental positions, who reject the old planning methods, claim the new system as unprecedented and are anxious lest the introduction of the reforms by halves brings chaos as in 1958 when similar changes had hastily to be abandoned. The first group deploy more influence in the party and the Government and are likely to be cautious about committing themselves irrevocably to a full measure of a reform until there is further evidence of how the changes are going. But the economic facts of life support the second group (generally regarded as centring around Professor Sik), who are likely to be able to maintain considerable pressure.

15. Some fears were expressed that the new economic system would lead to the reintroduction of a class system, but the party leaders have formally committed themselves to opposing wage egalitarianism. On cultural affairs the Congress

CONFIDENTIAL

followed much the same line as the Soviet Party Congress in April. Guidelines published in March for changes in the system of local government were approved. Changes in the party leadership did not show any shift in the balance of power within the party. A large proportion of the membership of the Central Committee was replaced. Veteran ex-Social Democrat Fierlinger retired from the Presidium. His place is taken by Cernik, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Planning Commission. As one of the party's economic experts who is generally responsible for the success of the reforms, he no doubt inclines to the side of the more cautious. The Congress was otherwise only remarkable for the visit of Brezhnev to Bratislava where he lectured the Slovaks on the evils of nationalism, no doubt on Novotny's behalf and to imply that Slovak aspirations towards autonomy are unlikely to bear fruit.

JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

16. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) can no longer be counted on as an uncritical supporter of the Chinese. The Indonesian *coup* was seen by some JCP members as an example of what could happen if the Chinese line was followed too closely. Probably more important, however, is disagreement over what Communists should do about Viet-Nam. The communiqués issued after talks between a JCP delegation led by its Secretary-General, Miyamoto, and North Korean and North Viet-Nameese leaders in February and March of this year stressed the need for unity of action among Communists in aiding Viet-Nam despite ideological differences. The Miyamoto delegation also had talks in Peking, but these received little or no publicity from the Chinese and resulted in no communiqué. The Japanese were understood to have wanted to send a delegation to the Soviet Party Congress. In June contact between the JCP and the CPSU was re-established when Grishin, the Chairman of the Soviet trade union organisation and candidate member of the Politburo, called at the headquarters of the JCP during his visit to Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese Socialist-controlled trade union organisation (SOHYO). A JCP delegation visited Rumania from 21 May to 15 June after which a communiqué was issued stressing the independence of Communist parties and the need for united action over Viet-Nam. This line does not have the full support of the party, whose leadership itself seems divided. The party organ *Akahata* on 11 May revealed that besides a pro-Soviet faction there now exists an ultra-Left dissident group slavishly adherent to the policies of a foreign party and that both these factions must be resisted.

FRONT ORGANISATIONS

17. At two important meetings of Soviet-controlled front organisations recently—the 7th Jubilee Assembly of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) held in Sofia on 6–17 June and the plenary session of the World Council of Peace (WCP) in Geneva on 13–16 June—the Chinese mounted attacks against the Soviet “revisionists and splittists”, which were even more abusive and disruptive than usual. They accused the Russians of manipulating the organisations for their own purposes (which is, of course, true) and of collaborating with American imperialism in trying to arrange a “peace swindle” on Viet-Nam. Although the Chinese following on such occasions has reached its lowest ebb, with only the Albanians giving 100 per cent support, and with the North Koreans, North Viet-Nameese and Japanese only giving them qualified support, the Russians presumably still feel that to take such drastic action as expelling the Chinese would damage the image of reason and restraint they seek to create in their handling of the Chinese and cast doubts on the sincerity of their expressions of desire for unity. But Chinese provocation reached a new height when the Russians were “expelled” from the Afro/Asian Writers' Bureau at its recent meeting in Peking on the grounds that they had organised a rival meeting in Cairo. The organisers maintain that the Cairo meeting was called to examine the situation created by the unauthorised action of the Bureau's Ceylonese Secretary-General in convening the Peking meeting without reference to other members of the Bureau.

CHINA INTERNAL

18. The Socialist Education Campaign (now metamorphosed into “cultural revolution”) has continued at full strength. The effects of the “revolution” are now being felt in the provinces where there have been meetings and denunciations

in the universities and to a lesser extent amongst provincial newspapers. The campaign has probably extended to all organisations in China and there have been indications that normal business is suffering both because of the time being spent at meetings and due to the uncertainties of cadres about their own personal future.

19. The most notable victim so far named has been Chou Yang, a Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee and for a long time one of the main agents of the party's propaganda effort. Chou has been accused of following an incorrect and revisionist line on literature since the 1930s and is said to have been responsible for "all bad things" in art and literature since 1949. The accusation hardly sticks on one who has always appeared to be a paragon of party virtue and Chou may have suffered either in a power/personality conflict or because he is being held responsible for failures in the Socialist Education Campaign, in the direction of which he played a leading part.

20. Although other prominent personalities may yet be denounced or lose their jobs it is unlikely that this campaign will strike any higher than P'eng Chen. (In fact it is now clear that the Minister of Culture, Lu Ting-yi, has been dismissed from the post of Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee.) Indeed, the fact that the Chinese Press has recently been publishing unusually long lists of dignitaries attending official functions suggests that an effort may be being made to show that the majority of the leadership is sound and in no danger. On 1 July (the 45th Anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party) the *People's Daily* editorial quoted statements in support of Mao's thought by Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping, thus seeking to give the impression that all four remain in control and united.

21. In an editorial on 8 June, the *People's Daily* said that success in the cultural revolution "presages a flying leap in the development of our Socialist revolution and a new great leap forward in Socialist construction". The possibility of a new leap has been mentioned in various terms for more than a year, but there is still no sign of when it might start nor the form it might take; it is unlikely that it will alter the present priority given to agriculture.

SOVIET INTERNAL

(a) *Soviet purchase of wheat from Canada*

22. The Soviet Union has contracted to buy 9 million tons of wheat and flour from Canada over the next three years at a cost of about £260 million. The outlook for this year's harvest in Russia is relatively favourable but the Russians are probably anxious to replenish their reserves, which were seriously depleted by the bad harvests of 1963 and 1965, and to ensure their ability to maintain grain supplies to Eastern Europe and Cuba. The decision to buy for three years ahead is no doubt prompted by increasing competition for the declining world stocks of wheat. The new agreement also reflects Soviet recognition that their large investment programme in agricultural development will not solve the grain problem in the short term.

(b) *The cultural scene*

23. Tensions in the cultural sphere have not eased since the Soviet Party Congress, despite hopeful statements by some writers themselves. Although the public pressure on *Novy Mir* and *Yunost* has subsided since April (the April issue of the latter magazine expressed editorial contrition), the indications are that the more conservative ideologues are still pressing their temporary advantage. An attempt appears to have been made to remove the well-known producer V. Pluchek from the Moscow Theatre of Satire. The initial excuse was provided by anonymous complaints from members of his company but it is clear that ideological considerations played a major part. Among Pluchek's controversial productions of recent years is "Terkin in the Underworld". This play, based on Tvardovsky's verses but now stated to go beyond the latter in its "pessimistic fear of evil", was taken off the boards before the Congress, only to be put on again afterwards.

24. One theme of the Congress has been actively followed up: the dangers of cultural exchanges with the West. At the end of May, P. Demichev, the Central Committee Secretary responsible for ideology, attacked the Western "doctrine" of "bridge-building". A similar warning was issued by Podgorny in his pre-election speech. A few days later, the newspaper *Sovietskaya Kultura*

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condemned a painter, Rabin, for allowing himself to be used as "political goods", presumably because an exhibition of his works has been put on in a London art gallery. The article was no doubt intended as a warning to Rabin or others. It is, however, characteristic of the present confusion in the cultural world that another newspaper had shortly before taken up the cudgels on behalf of a young artist labelled a "bourgeois formalist" by provincial artistic officials.

CHRONOLOGY

May

25- Soviet Parliamentary Delegation, led by Mazurov, visited Pakistan.

6 June

30- XIIIth Congress of Czech Communist Party.

4 June

June

7-11 XVth Congress of Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.
VIth Congress of Yugoslav Socialist Alliance.

12 Soviet Supreme Soviet elections.

13-18 Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, visited Finland.
Hungarian Party First Secretary, Kadar, visited DDR.

13-16 Plenary Session of World Council of Peace in Geneva.

14 North Viet-Nameese Politburo Member and Party Secretary, Le Duc Tho, had talks with Brezhnev and Suslov in Moscow on his return from the Czech Party Congress.

Geneva Disarmament Conference reconvened.

16-24 Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, visited Rumania.

18 Rumanian journal *Scinteia* published interview given by Rumanian Communist Party First Secretary, Ceausescu, to Italian journalists on 9 June.

Announcement that Foreign Ministers of Warsaw Pact countries (less Albania) had been meeting in Moscow.

20- President de Gaulle visited USSR, accompanied by French Foreign
1 July Minister, Couve de Murville.

20 Soviet grain purchase from Canada announced.

Signature in Moscow of Soviet/North Korean economic agreement.

Chinese Foreign Ministry Note to Mongolian Embassy in Peking on alleged violation of Chinese territory and kidnapping of Chinese cowherd.

24-28 Chou En-lai visited Albania.

25 Announcement that Kosygin's visit to Sweden, planned for July, had again been postponed.

Yugoslav/Vatican Protocol signed on normalisation of relations.

25- Pakistani Military Mission visited USSR.

7 July

26- Soviet Parliamentary Delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister and
12 July Politburo Member Polyansky, visited Canada.

28-30 Chou En-lai visited Pakistan.

29 SED called off exchanges with SPD.

30 Soviet Government statement on extension of United States bombing in North Viet-Nam.

Soviet/French declaration published.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, JULY 1966

SUMMARY

The escalation of bombing in North Viet-Nam at the end of June produced predictable responses from the Communists. The North Viet-Nameese reiterated their determination to resist to the end; the Chinese declared themselves no longer bound by the Geneva Agreements and their reaction seemed designed to pose the possibility of their taking action more strongly than before, without commitment to any positive steps. The Russians and their allies issued a collective declaration of willingness to send volunteers at North Viet-Nameese request, and in talks with important visitors to Moscow the Russians underlined the importance of this undertaking. Their attitude is conditioned by their inability to affect events in Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

The Russians can still be provoked to an angry retort by the Chinese. The Soviet Press publishes stories about the apotheosis of Mao. (Paragraphs 5-6.)

The Bucharest Declaration on Europe is meant to be taken as a major statement of Warsaw Pact policy. It contains one or two new ideas and a number of old ones, but is a more forthcoming document than could have been expected from the Russians alone. (Paragraphs 7-9.)

Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow covered Viet-Nam, economic affairs and relations between India and Pakistan. (Paragraphs 10-12.)

Mr. Gromyko's visit to Japan. (Paragraph 13.)

A new pro-Peking Communist group has been formed in France. (Paragraph 14.)

The cultural revolution in China continued unabated. The publicity surrounding Chairman Mao's swim is designed to reassure the Chinese people and the world at large that he is fit and in control. (Paragraphs 15-16.)

New measures against hooliganism in the Soviet Union; the half-yearly plan results. (Paragraphs 17-18.)

VIET-NAM

The United States bombing of oil installations near Hanoi and Haiphong at the end of June led to strong protests by the Soviet, Chinese and other Communist Governments, but has not so far led to any major changes in their known positions on the Viet-Nam war.

2. The North Viet-Nameese responded immediately with a Foreign Ministry statement issued on 30 June condemning the escalation of the war and reiterating North Viet-Nameese determination to resist to the end. Instructions were also issued for the partial evacuation of Hanoi. This attitude was authoritatively reiterated by Ho Chi Minh himself on 17 July in a widely publicised "Appeal to the People", which expressed the conviction that even if the war lasted for a further 20 years or more and Hanoi and other cities were destroyed the

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Viet-Nameese would not be intimidated and that final victory would be theirs. This contradicted rumours that the North Viet-Nameese might be coming round to the idea of some sort of negotiation. At the same time an order for partial mobilisation was promulgated, but it is not clear whether or not fresh reservists have in fact been called up. The North Viet-Nameese Press also conducted a campaign which at one stage looked as though it might be leading to a public trial of United States prisoners of war as "war criminals", but the likelihood of this receded when Ho Chi Minh indicated that these prisoners would be humanely treated. It is possible that the North Viet-Nameese changed their minds as a result of representations that to hold such a trial would be a sure way of further aggravating the situation.

3. The Chinese issued a Government statement on 3 July which stated that China was now further freed from any bonds or restrictions in aiding Viet-Nam and resisting the United States, and rhetorically asked why others should not fight back on the ground since the United States had come from the sea and the sky. Mass rallies in support of Ho Chi Minh's appeal of 17 July were held throughout China. At one rally in Peking, a statement was read out in the name of Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i in which Ho Chi Minh's determination to carry out a protracted war was welcomed. The statement declared that China was no longer bound by the Geneva Agreements since these had been torn to shreds by the United States, and its general wording seemed designed to pose the possibility of action by China more strongly than before, without commitment to any positive steps. A slightly different impression was conveyed by an article in the *People's Daily* of 10 July which conspicuously stressed the need for self-reliance in the context of the Viet-Nam war. The article was isolated from the main stream of Chinese propoganda which carefully followed the two Government statements. It should probably therefore be read in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute and as a warning to the North Viet-Nameese not to be deluded by increased offers of aid by the Soviet Union and her revisionist allies. The Chinese Government statements were not sparing in their criticism of "those monsters who are collaborating with United States imperialism to engineer a 'peace talks' swindle".

4. These "monsters", however, showed themselves no less capable of verbal escalation. On 1 July a Soviet Government statement was issued condemning the bombing in strong terms, and Soviet propoganda harped particularly on President Johnson's personal responsibility for United States policy in Viet-Nam. But the main response of the Soviet Union and her allies was contained in the Declaration on Viet-Nam issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact on 7 July. This contained a collective declaration of willingness to send volunteers to Viet-Nam at the request of the North Viet-Nameese Government (in contrast to earlier isolated offers from individual members of the pact). Increased economic and military assistance was also pledged, and the Russians have since made a statement to the effect that the necessary steps are being taken to implement the pledge. The seriousness with which the Russians want this declaration to be taken has been stressed not only through diplomatic representations in a number of capitals, but also in discussions between the Soviet leadership and visitors to Moscow, including the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi and U Thant. The burden of the Russian message has been that the United States must be persuaded that their present Viet-Nameese policy will lead to disaster and that the situation can only be settled on North Viet-Nameese terms. The Soviet attitude is, one must assume, conditioned by their own inability to affect events in Viet-Nam.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

5. Although in general the Russians are maintaining their public stance of restraint in the face of even the most absurd Chinese charges against them, they can still be provoked to an angry retort. The Chinese accusation that the Russians had been informed in advance of the United States intention to bomb the oil installations near Hanoi and Haiphong in particular seems to have needed them, and a Tass *démenti* was published in *Pravda* on 15 July. Tass suggested that American sources had deliberately spread the story for the Chinese to pick up, and stated that "by producing new slanders against the Soviet Union in unison with the fabrications of American propoganda, Ch'en Yi is helping the American imperialists, who are conducting a bandit war against the

Viet-Nameese people". This theme was more elaborately and authoritatively stated by Kosygin in his address to the Supreme Soviet on 3 August: "Chinese propaganda . . . is increasingly making the CPSU and the Soviet Union the main target of its attacks and, thereby, as is obvious to everybody, is rendering a great service to the American imperialists".

6. Another example of the *tu quoque* approach was the publication in the Soviet Press of a United States account of the regular series of Sino-American ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw, which in its turn provoked an indignant rebuttal in the Chinese Press. Soviet readers are being informed of the current campaign to apotheosise Chairman Mao and his works in China by means of the reprinting, without comment, in Soviet journals of some of the more picturesque examples provided by the Chinese themselves.

WARSAW PACT: BUCHAREST MEETING

7. Apart from the Declaration on Viet-Nam discussed above, the main interest of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee Meeting which took place in Bucharest from 4-6 July centres on the Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe which was published on 8 July. Its length, the manner of its presentation and the diplomatic representations subsequently made in Western capitals to stress its significance, all indicate that it is meant to be taken as a major statement of the policy of the Warsaw Pact. It is unlikely to be quoted by Warsaw Pact Governments in any future bilateral or multilateral discussions on European security.

8. The declaration attacks the United States and Germany on familiar and tendentious lines before putting forward a seven-point programme as a basis for strengthening European security. This contains familiar ideas such as the creation of nuclear-free zones, the denial to the Federal German Republic of access to nuclear weapons, a declaration on the inviolability of European frontiers and the recognition of the DDR. It also proposes, as a half-way measure to the abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, that agreement be reached on the dismantling at least of the military organisations of the two alliances. It contains an endorsement of the idea of increasing contacts and co-operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe and in advocating a European Security Conference the participation of the United States was not specifically excluded. In general, the declaration leaves the impression that it is a more forthcoming document than could have been expected from the Russians alone, and there is evidence that some passages were inserted to satisfy the demands of other members of the pact.

9. It is still not clear how strong is the community of interest among Warsaw Pact members that produced such a compromise. The factual communiqué about the meeting referred to an atmosphere of "complete mutual understanding". This does not imply agreement, still less unanimity. Nor were any decisions announced on the military questions which are believed to have been exercising the pact. The one-day CMEA meeting which followed, and which was the first CMEA "Summit" meeting since July 1963, produced a nondescript communiqué, and gave no indication that any progress was made towards resolving the economic differences and rivalries that beset that organisation. It is likely that some members of the pact genuinely feel that now would be an appropriate time to make some progress on European problems, but it does not seem that there is among them a clear consensus on how far or in what directions.

MRS. GANDHI'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

10. The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, visited the Soviet Union from 12-16 July at the end of a tour which had included visits to the UAR and Yugoslavia. Although the tour was preceded by a broadcast in which Mrs. Gandhi set out some suggestions for solving the Viet-Nam conflict, and to which she referred publicly in the Soviet Union, these were not acceptable to the Russians and no reference was made to them in the Soviet-Indian communiqué.

11. The talks on economic affairs and Indo-Pakistan relations are reported to have gone more satisfactorily from the Indian point of view. The visit had

been preceded by a number of articles in the Soviet Press, implicitly critical of the role of Western, and particularly United States, economic attitudes and advice in Indian economic thought and policy. However, Mrs. Gandhi showed no signs of accepting any Soviet right to define either Socialism or non-alignment and gave a spirited defence of Indian democracy. The Indian Planning and Commerce Ministers visited Moscow shortly before, presumably to explain *inter alia* the reasons behind the devaluation of the rupee, which could be seen basically as a Western-inspired move. Nevertheless, the Russians have taken a generally accommodating line towards India's economic difficulties and have offered some 970 million roubles (the equivalent of nearly £400 million) worth of aid to the Fourth Indian Five-year Plan. A proportion of this figure probably represents sums carried forward from previous programmes.

12. It is understood that Mr. Kosygin ruled out any fresh initiatives at this stage to bring about a further meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan, although he encouraged efforts towards the normalisation of relations between the two countries despite their inability to agree over Kashmir. The Indians were also apparently told that the Soviet Union had not supplied or promised arms to the Pakistan Military Mission which left Moscow on 8 July after a 12-day visit. The Pakistanis, for their part, have declared that they were well satisfied with that visit.

MR. GROMYKO'S VISIT TO JAPAN

13. The recent improvement in Soviet relations with Japan was further marked by the visit Mr. Gromyko paid to Japan from 24-30 July in return for Mr. Shiina's visit to Moscow in January. There was no shift in the Soviet position regarding the Japanese demand for the return of the Southern Kuriles. Nor was any progress made towards the hoped-for relaxation of the strict application of Soviet 12-mile limits in connection with fishing rights, although Japanese fishermen will secure certain benefits as a result of the provisions of the Consular Convention which was signed during the visit. On international matters also the views of the two sides remained far apart, with the Russians taking a markedly more negative line on Viet-Nam than during Mr. Shiina's Moscow visit in January. Nevertheless, agreement was reached on the Soviet proposal that there should be periodic consultations between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. Although there are strong common advantages in the further development of their relations—economic development and a degree of reassurance against China to name but two—the main limiting factor is likely to be Japan's close relationship with the United States, which has been, and will continue to be, the subject of Soviet attack in the Press and elsewhere. The Chinese predictably seized on the visit as an example of "a new counter-revolutionary holy alliance" of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan forming in Asia.

FACTIONALISM IN THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

14. A French Marxist-Leninist Communist Movement, with the declared objective of "reconstituting" a rival Peking-aligned Marxist-Leninist Party to the French Communist Party (FCP), was established at the first Congress of Marxist-Leninists held in Paris on 25-26 June. This Congress drew up the Movement's organisational statutes, firmly based on "democratic centralism", elected a Central Committee and a Politburo and adopted a manifesto. The international section of this is based on the Chinese "general line" formulated in 1963, while its internal section is firmly rooted in the French situation, advocating class struggle and a Communist-dominated popular front. It is highly critical of the FCP for becoming "social democratic" and for its predilection for "electioneering" and unorthodox united front tactics. The only names so far divulged are those of the four party secretaries who form the interim collective leadership, Jacques Jurquet (a party member of 20 years' standing), François Marty (a party member for 39 years), Marc Tiberat and Raymond Casas (who has been expelled from the FCP for pro-Chinese activities). The movement has a monthly journal, *L'Humanité Nouvelle*. The documents of the Congress suggest that the movement may be more soundly based than the average pro-Chinese groups in Western Europe. Its strength is based in the Midi, but it is reportedly recruiting elsewhere, particularly among the young. This development must cause concern to the FCP.

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CHINA: INTERNAL

15. The Cultural Revolution continued unabated throughout July but with no startling new revelations. It is now certain that the former Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, Lu Ting-yi, is in disgrace, but attacks in the Chinese Press have centred on his former subordinate, Chou Yang, and Lu has not been attacked by name. Tao Chu, a Vice-Premier and the party leader in Central South China, has taken over from Lu, and Chen Po-ta, who earlier served as writer for Mao Tse-tung, has emerged at the head of the Central Committee's "Group in Charge of the Cultural Revolution".

16. The fanfare of publicity surrounding Mao Tse-tung's famous Yangtse swim can probably also be seen in the context of the Cultural Revolution. The emphasis on Mao's health and rosy cheeks, supported by a number of suspiciously youthful photographs, suggests that his long absence earlier in the year may have been due to ill health—or at least that it was thought by some to be so, thus making it necessary to reassure the Chinese people and the world at large that Mao is fit and in control. There has, however, been no other evidence to indicate the reasons for Mao's five months' absence up to mid-May.

SOVIET UNION: INTERNAL

Hooliganism

17. The increase in hooliganism in recent years has led the Soviet authorities to take new measures against this form of lawlessness which accounts for a third of all the crimes in the Soviet Union every year. The powers of the militia are to be increased (on-the-spot fines may now be imposed) and the minimum penalties for all forms of hooliganism have been raised. The procedure for dealing with hooligans in the courts is to be speeded up, and drunkenness while committing an act of hooliganism (90 per cent of all offences classed as hooliganism are committed under the influence of drink) will now be considered an aggravating rather than a mitigating circumstance. The Soviet authorities have previously tended to rely on social pressure as much as on legal sanctions in dealing with hooligans. This aspect has also been covered in the new measures, with increased incentives to the public to join in the struggle (citizens who excel in it may receive money prizes from local councils and militia organs) and increased sanctions against the parents of offenders. The creation of a Union-Republican Ministry for the preservation of Public Order is ostensibly designed to improve the efficiency of the militia, but it could have wider significance as a return to a centralised police ministry. The name of the new Minister has not yet been announced.

Half-yearly plan results

18. The most striking feature of the half-yearly plan results of the Soviet economy published in July was the continued poor performance of the construction industry. The targets for investment and commissioning of new plants were purposely set low in the 1966 plan in order to give the industry a breathing space in which to restore order out of the chaos in which it has been operating for years past, but on its performance in the first half of the year it looks as if the industry will fail to reach even these modest targets. In housing construction the record is even more abysmal: although it is planned to build more housing this year than ever before, so far less has been built than this time last year. Otherwise, the performance has been more satisfactory. Industrial output as a whole has grown more rapidly than planned: though still less than in the first six months of 1965, targets were exceeded in the metallurgical, engineering and some consumer durables industries. Against this there has been a slow down in growth rates in the fuel and power structure where a bottleneck has been building up for some time. Growth rates in chemistry have declined, reflecting the lower priority now accorded to the industry. In agriculture, the plan for spring sowings is said to have been overfulfilled but there is naturally no indication at this stage of this year's harvest. A passing reference to the factories which have gone over to the new economic system states that all of them have overfulfilled their increased production plans.

CORRIGENDA

Corrigenda to Communist Policy and Tactics for June 1966:

- (a) In paragraph 6, line 5, "July" should read "June".
 (b) In paragraph 5, it was stated that a meeting of Warsaw Pact Defence Ministers took place "in early June". In fact, reports in the Yugoslav newspaper *Borba* indicated that it took place 27-28 May.

 CHRONOLOGY

25 June- Nepalese Crown Prince visited China; received by Chairman Mao.
 13 July

July

- 1 Soviet Government statement on United States bombing in North Viet-Nam.
 3 Chinese Government issued statement on United States bombing in North Viet-Nam.
 4-6 Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee Meeting in Bucharest.
 7 CMEA "Summit" meeting in Bucharest. Warsaw Pact statement on Viet-Nam published.
 8 Warsaw Pact Declaration on Europe published.
 9 Soviet Foreign Ministry protested in Note to United States Embassy at threat to Soviet merchant ships and seamen created by United States action in Viet-Nam.
 12-16 Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, visited Moscow.
 13-21 Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Peter, visited USSR.
 13 Soviet Government and party statement on the Warsaw Pact Declaration on Europe.
 15 Tass denied that the Soviet Union had received prior notification of United States intention to bomb oil installations near Hanoi and Haiphong.
 16 Chairman Mao swam in Yangtze.
 16-19 Chinese Communist Party delegation, led by Minister of the Chemical Industry and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPC, Kao Yang, visited Rumania.
 17 Ho Chi Minh issued "appeal to the people" on the war in Viet-Nam.
 18-22 Moroccan Foreign Minister visited Moscow.
 22 Statement on Viet-Nam war by Liu Shao-ch'i read at mass Peking rally. Herr Stoltenburg, Scientific Research Minister of the FRG, opened Federal German Architectural Exhibition in Leningrad. He subsequently was received by Soviet Deputy-Premier Kirillin in Moscow.
 22-30 Indian Parliamentary delegation led by the Chairman of the Congress Party, Mr. Kamaraj, visited Soviet Union.
 24 Algerian Minister for Industry and Power visited USSR. *Pravda* published Soviet half-yearly plan results.
 24-30 Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, visited Japan.
 25-27 East German Foreign Minister, Herr Winzer, visited Moscow.
 French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, visited Czechoslovakia.
 25-30 United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, visited Moscow.
 27- Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr. Bazzaz, visited Soviet Union.
 3 Aug.
 28-30 French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, visited Hungary.
 29 Tass statement on the International Court's judgment on South-West Africa.