



Communist Policy and Tactics 1966 – 1967, 2. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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bjarnibenediktsson.is

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H.E.
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson.



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AND TACTICS, APRIL 1966

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, APRIL 1966

SUMMARY

The continued deterioration of Sino/Soviet relations was marked on the Soviet side by demoting China to her alphabetical place among Socialist countries in the May Day slogans. The visit of an Albanian delegation to China was the occasion for violent anti-Soviet comments. The Chinese appear slightly anxious about their isolation, which Liu Shao-ch'i's visits to Asian countries seem partially designed to counteract. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

Mr. Gromyko's visit to Italy passed in a friendly and non-controversial atmosphere. He had an audience with the Pope. The Fiat agreement to produce cars in the Soviet Union is a development of potential significance. (Paragraphs 5-6.)

Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko have refloated the idea of a conference of East European Security, but in the context of a campaign that Europeans can settle European affairs without the United States. (Paragraphs 7-8.)

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May Day has now been moved from the head of the list greeting the Communist countries to its correct place in alphabetical order. The slogan for Albania was moved out of alphabetical order to the end of the list, although still above Yugoslavia. These changes reflect a continuing deterioration in Sino/Soviet relations, and are probably the result of the Chinese and Albanian refusal to attend the Soviet Party Congress. Nevertheless, in an ironic reference to foreign comment on the "Christian tolerance" shown by the Soviet Union in the dispute, Egorychev (Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee) made clear that the CPSU has no intention of moving away from its posture of public restraint. "The highest criterion of the correctness of any policy" he said, "was and remains practical experience". This carried the implication that the Russians were content with the practical results of their current tactics.

2. Not so the Chinese, who left the splinter groups and the Albanians to make the first comment on the Soviet Party Congress, while themselves giving publicity to the National Conference of the Communist Party of New Zealand, which took place from 8-11 April. Since, apart from the Chinese, the only other foreign delegations able to attend were the Belgian and Australian dissidents (although greetings were sent by seven other parties, including the North Koreans and the North Viet-Nameese), the Chinese representative's call for a clear demarcation line between "Marxist-Leninists" and "revisionists" sounded a little hollow.

Albanian visit to China

3. This was, however, a theme that was vociferously taken up in speeches by Chinese leaders during the visit of an Albanian delegation led by the Prime Minister, Shehu. This visit provided both the Chinese and the Albanians with a field-day of mutual adulation and anti-Soviet comment. The Soviet Party Congress was contemptuously dismissed in turn by Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing as a sham in all respects which proved the incorrigibility of the present Soviet leaders. The Chinese now no longer seek to demonstrate that the Russians are accomplices of the United States: they assume it. Teng Hsiao-p'ing described the Soviet Union as "a social pillar" and a "detachment" of imperialism, and ruled out completely the possibility of any discussion about unity.

Chinese visits in Asia

4. Behind defiant Chinese claims that over 90 per cent of the people of the world are with them, a certain anxiety about their isolation is detectable. "We are not afraid of being isolated", said Teng Hsiao-p'ing but the continuation of Liu Shao-ch'i's and Ch'en Yi's Asian visits—to East Pakistan and Burma—was a deliberate political move to counter what they regard as an attempt to encircle them. The Chinese used the visit to East Pakistan more obviously than their earlier visit to West Pakistan to attempt to undermine the Tashkent Agreement. Ch'en Yi left no doubt what he had in mind when he referred in Dacca on 15 April to those who refrained from supporting the victims of aggression but supplied weapons to the aggressor, and to those who supported India's annexation of Kashmir while disguising themselves as an impartial mediator. Throughout this Asian tour the Chinese have sought to demonstrate their strength, their good neighbourliness, and their support for Afro/Asian aspirations. They nevertheless failed to persuade the Afghans or the Burmese to include any direct references to Viet-Nam in the communiqués on the visits. Chinese efforts to prove their respectability and acceptability are likely to continue.

MR. GROMYKO'S VISIT TO ITALY

5. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, made an official visit to Italy from 22-24 April. He stayed on until 27 April privately, during which time he had an audience with the Pope at his own request. It was the first visit to Italy by a Soviet Foreign Minister since the war. The atmosphere was friendly and non-controversial, in keeping with Mr. Brezhnev's description at the Soviet Party Congress of Soviet relations with Italy as having improved, particularly in the economic sphere. The visit also fell into the current Soviet pattern of differentiating in relations with individual NATO countries. Mr. Gromyko's audience with the Pope provided an occasion for the continuation of talks they had had at the United Nations last year.

6. Perhaps the most important development in Soviet/Italian relations took place outside the context of the visit; the signature of the agreement under which Fiat will set up a factory to produce motor cars in the Soviet Union. Its ultimate capacity will be 2,000 cars a day, but this may not be reached until the early 'seventies. Production on a smaller scale should begin in 1968 or 1969. In the light both of Mr. Kosygin's remarks on foreign trade at the Party Congress and of the new emphasis in the Soviet Union on consumer goods, this is a development of considerable potential significance. The conclusion of this agreement with Fiat does not necessarily mean that the Soviet Government may not seek to conclude similar manufacturing agreements with other foreign firms in the same field. Negotiations with the French firm Renault continue, and there could be opportunities for British and Japanese manufacturers.

PROPOSALS FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

7. Both Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko, in their speeches at the Soviet Party Congress, supported the idea of convening an international conference on European Security, and in a Press conference after his audience with the Pope Mr. Gromyko again reverted to the idea. He specifically related it to "the Polish proposal", by which he presumably meant the proposal made by the Polish Foreign Minister at the United Nations in December 1964, which was endorsed in the communiqué issued after the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee meeting in January 1965. Both Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko, however, seemed to conceive such a conference as limited to Europeans, unlike the original Polish proposal which specifically stated that the United States should participate. The floating of this idea once again by the Russians should perhaps therefore be seen in the context of their current propaganda to the effect that Europeans should settle European problems without intrusion by the United States, which was also reflected in a new May Day slogan on European co-operation and security.

8. There have been a number of recent reports to the effect that a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Consultative Committee will take place in Bucharest in the first half of July. This would provide the occasion for a summit meeting of East European and Soviet leaders, at which a wide series of problems, and not only those connected with the Warsaw Pact, could be discussed. It might also provide the occasion for a clarification of Soviet views on a European Security Conference.

SYRIA, COMMUNISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST

9. Initial Soviet reactions to the *coup* which brought Dr. Zu'ayen to power in Syria in February were cautious, but the Russians have now committed themselves precipitously and wholeheartedly to his régime. Given the instability of the Syrian political situation this is perhaps surprising. In the slogans issued by the CPSU Central Committee for May Day, Syria, which had previously been greeted in a generalised slogan for the Arab countries, had earned a new slogan for itself, ranking third of the uncommitted countries behind only the UAR and Algeria. The Russians spared no efforts to make Dr. Zu'ayen's visit to the Soviet Union from 18-23 April a success, and have agreed to give substantial aid in the construction of the Euphrates Dam. Their commitment to supply goods and services on credit to the value of some £50 million is believed to represent the major part of the foreign exchange component of the dam, including preparatory studies over the next two years or so. If the political situation changes radically meanwhile the Russians would be able to withdraw, although they probably calculate that their dam commitment will itself create a continuing Syrian obligation towards them. Meanwhile a Soviet military delegation is reported to have been visiting Damascus.

10. The suddenness of the Soviet *volte-face* poses the question of what price the Syrians have had to pay. Certainly the lot of Syrian Communists appears to have improved under the new régime: a representative of the Syrian Communist Party is in the Government; other Communists have been reinstated in the Administration; and Khaled Bikdash, the most eminent Arab Communist, who has spent the past eight years exiled in the Soviet *bloc*, has almost certainly returned to Damascus. There is no evidence, however, that these developments are the result of Soviet pressure rather than the consequences of Dr. Zu'ayen's need for domestic support from somewhere for his fraction of the Ba'ath Party.

It is unlikely, moreover, that the Russians will push the Communist role in the new régime to the point of upsetting President Nasser, who still remains the lynch-pin of their policy in the Middle East. In his discussions with President Nasser during his visit to the UAR Mr. Kosygin may well represent Soviet/Syrian rapprochement as a useful counter to King Feisal's proposals for an Islamic Summit Meeting, which both the Russians and Egyptians have treated as part of a dangerous "imperialist counter-attack" in the Middle East.

CUBA AND FIDEL CASTRO

11. There has been a further series of intemperate outbursts by Castro and the Cuban Press. Following his generalised attack on member Governments of the Organisation of American States which had criticised the resolutions of the Havana Conference, he turned in particular on the Governments of Uruguay and Chile. His representative at the Soviet Party Congress took a uniquely critical line of the level of Soviet support for Viet-Nam, and in his May Day speech Castro made clear once again his conviction that rich and developed countries of the Socialist camp had a prior duty to help their poorer brethren before devoting themselves to the construction of a Communist society in one country. Shortly thereafter *Granma* launched a lengthy attack on the League of Yugoslav Communists, "which is neither a party nor Communist", in reply to an article in *Politika* critical of Cuban behaviour at the Tricontinental Conference. The key text of the *Granma* editorials was Marx's statement that "violence is the midwife of history".

12. Castro's intemperate speeches, a number of unwise decisions over the past few months and the growing cult of his personality are unlikely to produce any immediate serious threat to his position. Unlike a number of other Left-wing leaders who have fallen recently Castro seems to have control of his armed forces, which enjoy power and authority, and are strongly represented in the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. A continuation of mistakes of foreign policy, and especially in the vital economic field, could none the less lead to a growing alienation between Castro and the other principal figures in the country. Should they reach the conclusion that the régime's stability and the country's economic viability were incompatible with the continuation of Castro's personal conduct of affairs, they might well find support and encouragement from Cuba's Soviet sponsors. In such circumstances even Castro's personal appeal might not prove invulnerable.

CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA

13. Chinese comment on the new régime in Indonesia has now become totally unrestrained. Further indignant Notes protesting against alleged outrages in Indonesia against Chinese nationals and Chinese diplomatic premises have been published in the *People's Daily*, and in a Note dated 16 April the Indonesian Government was accused of "pushing the relations between the two countries to the verge of a complete split". A *People's Daily* editorial the same day stated that the "counter-revolutionary military coup" had been carried out under the direction of United States imperialism and Japanese reactionaries. The *People's Daily* stated in an article on 21 April that the Indonesians, having "taken on the role of an anti-Chinese pawn of United States imperialism", should "have the courage to take the responsibility for rupturing relations between China and Indonesia". The only comfort Chinese propaganda has been able to draw from the Indonesian situation is to use it as a demonstration of the fallacy of revisionist theories about the peaceful transition to Socialism.

SPD/SED EXCHANGES

14. On various occasions during the past two years suggestions have come from both East Germany and the Federal Republic that there should be contacts between the Federal German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the East German Communist Party (SED). The first sign that such suggestions might come to anything was Ulbricht's "open" letter to the delegates to the SPD Congress in February which led to an "open" correspondence between the two parties. The East German Press represented this as the establishment of a dialogue between the two parts of Germany. The discussions which have so far taken place between the two parties have been confined to technicalities about how a planned exchange

of speakers should be conducted. The East Germans have now suggested postponing the exchanges proper until June or July. Ulbricht has gone on holiday, and no further progress can be expected until his return. Furthermore, speeches made by him on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the SED and at a Plenum of the SED's Central Committee have made it clear that the SED has no inclination to find common ground for substantive discussion with the SPD.

15. The SED's motives in proposing such exchanges were no doubt partly to lend support to the two German States thesis, which has been pushed by the East German régime in a variety of recent initiatives. The proposal was also probably designed to sow discord among West German political parties. But from the point of view of the East German régime, these advantages had to be offset against allowing open public discussion in the "DDR" of such questions as the Berlin Wall, travel to the West and democratic elections. The recent *rallantando* in the momentum for actual direct discussions on the part of the SED, and the severe editing of the SPD's latest open letter before publication in *Neues Deutschland* may be indications of increased SED nervousness about the internal difficulties of pursuing the exchanges too far. Public opinion in the Federal Republic seems to be in favour of the talks taking place, if possible. The Federal Government has given its qualified approval, although a number of leading members of the CDU are strongly opposed.

EASTERN EUROPE: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN POLAND

16. In April the Polish Government refused entry to the Pope and virtually all the numerous other pilgrims invited from abroad to the celebrations of the Millennium of Poland's conversion to Christianity. The high point of these celebrations was at the shrine of Czestochowa on 3 May. During the preliminary celebrations which began at Easter, the Government deliberately organised rallies to coincide with those already organised by the Church. The contrast of listlessness and spontaneous enthusiasm at the rival rallies only exposed the State to ridicule and no direct interference was organised for 3 May. The Cardinal and bishops sedulously avoided provocation, whereas some Government speeches were violent. Armed troops were to be seen, but no disorders took place. These clumsy attempts to lessen the impact of the celebrations appear to indicate the régime's nervousness at the prospect of a large-scale demonstration of the continuing influence of the Church. The régime have concentrated in their propaganda on nationalist themes and the one topic certain to arouse popular support, Germany, where their theme has been "We will never forgive."

CHINA INTERNAL: DRIVE AGAINST INTELLECTUALS

17. For some three years now a number of leading Chinese academic figures, notably historians and philosophers, have been under attack for expounding mistaken views in their works. They have nevertheless been able to defend themselves in the intellectual Press, they have not usually lost their posts, and the debate and argument on intellectual matters has been permitted because these are "contradictions among the People" and therefore "non-antagonistic". Now, however, what the Chinese have termed the "Great Debate" on the "Cultural Front" seems to be developing more and more into a campaign against the intellectuals. A leading historian, Wu Han, has been bitterly attacked for writing deliberately anti-party work as long ago as 1961; a prominent playwright, Tien Han, has been harshly criticised on the grounds that he has allegorically compared the party leadership to the oppressive feudal régimes of imperial times; the President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and a Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress, Kuo Mo-jo, on 14 April made an abject self-criticism in which he said that all he had written in the past scores of years "should all be buried" because it has no value. That so notorious a sycophant, who is regarded as a close friend of Mao himself, should be forced to recant before the party cannot fail to cause alarm among Chinese intellectuals. A stern article in the *Liberation Army Daily*, which normally devotes itself to military or political matters but has been playing a leading role in the developing attack on the intellectuals, has made clear that the struggle against recalcitrant intellectuals will now become an "antagonistic" struggle between the "people" and their enemies. At a time when the thought of Mao is being elevated as a

panacea for all China's problems it is understandable that party dogmatists should wish to stifle any other thinking. What is not clear is how far the campaign will go (sections of the Peking party Press have also now come under criticism), or why the army should be taking so prominent a part in a matter not directly their concern. Nor is it clear whether this campaign reflects any deeper dissension within the Chinese Communist Party. On present evidence it looks more like an effort to prevent the development of an undesirable trend than a desperate measure to deal with a present crisis.

CHRONOLOGY

April

- 2 Agreement on establishment of Soviet trade mission in Singapore signed.
- 2-3 Indian Premier, Mrs. Ghandi, stopped over in Moscow on her way home from the United States.
- 4-8 Visit by Liu Shao-ch'i and Ch'en Yi to Afghanistan.
- 4 Signature of new Sino/Soviet Civil Air Transport Agreement after negotiations which began on 27 February.
- 8 23rd Congress of CPSU ended: Central Committee Plenum elected new Politburo.
- 8-11 National Conference of the Communist Party of New Zealand.
- 12-15 North Viet-Nameese delegation to Soviet Party Congress stopped over in Peking *en route* for home.
- 15-17 Visit by Liu Shao-ch'i and Ch'en Yi to East Pakistan.
- 16 Publication in *Pravda* of CPSU slogans for May Day.
- 17-20 Visit by Liu Shao-ch'i and Ch'en Yi to Burma.
- 21 Marshal Malinovsky in speech in Budapest complained of Soviet aid to Viet-Nam.
- 18-23 President Tito visited Rumania.
- 18-25 Visit to Soviet Union of Syrian Prime Minister, Dr. Zu'Ayen.
- 19 Publication of new Chinese regulations governing foreign ships on border rivers.
- 22-24 Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, made official visit to Italy.
- 23-30 Talks in Moscow between the Soviet and Indian Communist parties.
- 26 Albanian party/Government delegation led by Prime Minister, Shehu, arrived in China.
- 27 Mr. Gromyko had audience with the Pope.
- 28 *Kwantung Daily* published "confession" of Kuo Mo-jo made on 14 April.
- 24-30 French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, visited Rumania and Bulgaria.

His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister



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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

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Press was noticeably free of direct attacks on the Russians, the Chinese published
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the Russians had gone too far in their hostility to China and in their alliance with
United States imperialism. They made particular reference to the distribution of an
anti-Chinese document within the Soviet Party and among other Communist
parties. The existence of such a document had been reported by Press correspondents
in Moscow at the end of January and extensive extracts from what purports to be
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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, MARCH 1966

SUMMARY

The Chinese eventually decided not to attend the CPSU Congress in Moscow. Chinese isolation has been highlighted. Delegations from both North Viet-Nam and North Korea went to Moscow. At the Congress itself, the Russians played their differences with the Chinese in a minor key. (Paragraphs 1-3.)

Soviet reactions to President de Gaulle's policy. Moscow Congress reveals conservative Soviet thinking on East-West relations. Lord Chalfont's visit to Moscow. (Paragraphs 4-6.)

Chinese visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan look like a counter-attack to the recent Soviet campaign in Asia. (Paragraph 7.)

Communism in the Third World: Chinese and Russian reticence over the fate of Communists in Indonesia; Russian recognition of new Ghanian régime, despite expulsion of diplomats. (Paragraphs 8-10.)

Eastern Europe: Yugoslav Party Plenum; ministerial changes in Albania. (Paragraphs 11-12.)

Communism in Western Europe: rapprochement between French and Italian Communist parties; Western European Communist regionalism and united front tactics. (Paragraphs 13-15.)

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Zealand parties followed the Chinese lead made this demonstration of China's isolation the more striking. Of the Communist parties represented at the 1961 Congress, those from Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Reunion and Thailand do not appear to have come on this occasion; but the Chinese have not publicised their absence as they have the others, which suggests that their reasons for absence were other than solidarity with the Chinese. The North Viet-Nameese had publicly announced their intention to attend at the time of Shelepin's visit to Hanoi in January. By itself, therefore, their presence in Moscow did not necessarily imply any shift on their part towards Soviet thinking, but the fact that their delegation was led by the Party First Secretary, Le Duan, and that he should have committed himself at the Congress to the struggle for the unity of the Socialist camp, which is currently a Soviet rather than a Chinese slogan, can bring no comfort to the Chinese. Still less so can the North Korean presence in Moscow, with none of North Viet-Nam's extenuating circumstances. It was also noteworthy that the communiqué issued on 21 March after the visit of a Japanese Communist Party delegation to North Korea included a reference to the need for "international united action" to assist the North Viet-Nameese, which is another Soviet slogan. This was probably included at North Korean insistence, and similar sentiments were expressed in Moscow by the North Korean delegate to the Congress.

3. The Soviet tactic at the Congress itself was to play Sino-Soviet differences in a minor key—at least in public—and to give no indication how they intend to play their hand in the future. Although in the context of the struggle for Communist unity, Brezhnev had harsh things to say in his report to the Congress about "nationalism, great-Power chauvinism and hegemonic ambition", in the passage on Sino-Soviet relations he simply said that they remained unsatisfactory, and reiterated Soviet desire to improve them. In supporting the Soviet point of view the East European leaders were only marginally harsher, but Ceausescu of Rumania demonstrated once again his country's special position by refraining from taking sides and urging reconciliation.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

4. The Soviet reaction to President de Gaulle's pronouncements on NATO has been to emphasise the differences among the Western allies. The Russians have also expressed concern about the consolidation of a "Washington-Bonn military axis", but without directly attributing this to President de Gaulle's NATO policy. The remark in Paris by the Soviet Ambassador Zorin to the effect that if NATO lost its aggressive character there would be a corresponding evolution in the organisation of the Warsaw Pact is by itself no departure from traditional Soviet doctrine. The first and only reference to Mr. Zorin's remark in the Soviet Press was the report of the speech to the CPSU Congress by the French delegate.

5. Present Soviet thinking about East-West relations was set out in bleak terms in the passages on international affairs in Brezhnev's report to the Congress. Nothing that he said pointed to new Soviet policies which might aggravate tension, but his analysis was conservative, stereotyped and dogmatic. His attack on Federal German policy was in the traditions of the cold war, as was a similar harsh indictment in Gromyko's speech. The rigidity of Soviet thinking on the German question was shown also in Tass's prompt and hostile response to the Federal German Note on matters concerning disarmament and European Security. Clearly no serious consideration had been given by the Russians to the constructive proposals which were contained in the Federal German Note. Nor did Lord Chalfont's talks in Moscow towards the end of March on certain aspects of disarmament suggest that there is any significant difference between the public and the private positions of the Soviet Union on disarmament and a non-dissemination treaty. Gromyko continued to argue that the stumbling block to such a treaty was the possibility of West German "access" to nuclear weapons.

6. Nevertheless it was encouraging that Gromyko, in his otherwise harsh speech to the Congress, should have firmly restated the Soviet Government's determination to "pose the ripe problems and press for their solution" rather than "to slam the door and waste no time or effort on talks with the Western Powers". The conclusion in Washington of the United States-Soviet Cultural Agreement covering exchanges over the next two years was an indication that at least in the bilateral field the Soviet Government wishes to keep the door open.

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CHINESE POLICY IN ASIA

7. The visit of the Chinese Head of State, Liu Shao-Chi, to Pakistan accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi, was hailed by the *People's Daily* on 27 March as the beginning of a series of "friendship visits" to China's Asian neighbours. In order to avoid flying over Indian territory the visit was divided into two parts, with a short visit to Afghanistan sandwiched in between. This has the air of a Chinese counter-attack to the recent Soviet campaign to reassert influence in Asia, the fruits of which must be seen by the Soviet Government in North Viet-Name and North Korean presence at the Soviet Party Congress in Moscow. At the moment there has been no announcement of visits to any other Asian countries, of which Burma and Nepal are the only others mentioned by name in the *People's Daily* article. The communiqué issued at the end of Liu's visit to West Pakistan was a thin affair. There was no specific reference to Viet-Nam, for which the Chinese apparently pressed strongly, nor of "United States imperialism". The main Chinese purpose in making the visit, besides the general aim of demonstrating that they are still welcome somewhere, was no doubt to disturb the precarious balance in Pakistan's relations with India. But emphasis in the communiqué that friendship between China and Pakistan was not based on expediency but on a solid foundation is an indication of China's sense of isolation and of her desire to overcome it.

COMMUNISM AND THE THIRD WORLD

(a) *Indonesia*

8. Prior to the ban imposed on the PKI on 12 March neither the Chinese nor the Russians had said much about the fate of the Communists in Indonesia. Soviet Press comment on the internal situation in Indonesia has increased since the ban, but its indignation has been limited and cautiously phrased. The only authoritative Soviet comment has been a statement of the CPSU Central Committee on the death sentence passed on the Indonesian Politburo member, Njono in February, which condemned "the continuing anti-Communist terror in Indonesia mounted by the forces of Right-wing reaction" and protested against Njono's sentence; and a passage in Brezhnev's report to the CPSU Congress which demanded that "the criminal butchery of Communists be stopped at once". Chinese comment has not even gone as far as this. On 4 April NCNA published a largely factual account of events, although it referred to the seizure of power by a "Right-wing generals' clique" which had "coerced President Sukarno into appointing a new anti-Communist Cabinet". The Peking Press, however, has mainly confined itself to publishing the series of mounting indignation official Chinese Notes protesting to the Indonesian Government against damage done by Indonesian mobs to Chinese nationals and Chinese diplomatic offices of various kinds throughout the country, and the only editorial comment was concerned with the enforced closure of the NCNA office in Djakarta.

9. Neither the Soviet Union nor China appears to wish to take any step which might suggest that Communist reverses in Indonesia are more than temporary. As long as President Sukarno is still on the scene, the Chinese will probably not give up hope that the wheel of fortune may turn again to make possible the restoration of some degree of cordiality to Sino-Indonesian relations. They will presumably not wish to take any action that might encourage a serious rapprochement between Indonesia and either the Soviet Union or the West. The main Soviet concern at the moment is probably to minimise the extent to which Indonesia turns to the West for assistance in her economic difficulties. Hence, the continuation of Soviet military shipments to Indonesia while the killing of Communists continued.

(b) *Africa*

10. Shortly after they had requested the return of some 900 Soviet technicians and their dependents from Ghana to Moscow, the Ghanaian National Liberation Council declared 23 members of the Soviet Embassy in Accra *persona non grata*. Three Chinese diplomats suffered a similar fate. Nevertheless the Russians opted to salvage what they could from the wreck of the hopes built on their close relationship with Nkrumah by following the example of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in agreeing to recognise the new Government rather than remove their mission from Accra. This was in contrast to the Chinese who, while they

have not taken up a formal position on recognising the new Ghanaian Government, have addressed bitter notes of protest to it: they described it as "the Ghana *coup* authorities". The Russians also suffered in silence and without retaliation the expulsion from Kenya of two diplomats and the local Tass correspondent. What amounted to a justification for Russian restraint was contained in an article in *Izvestiya* which stated that "the policy of non-alignment is based on multilateral diplomatic and economic contacts which enable the young States to free themselves from dependence on former parent countries". The Soviet Union clearly places much value on the mere existence of diplomatic relations with uncommitted countries, even if things are not necessarily going their way.

EASTERN EUROPE

(a) *Yugoslav Party Plenum*

11. The Yugoslav Party Plenum, which was interrupted by a fortnight's recess, revealed substantial differences of view among members of the Central Committee, particularly over the implementation of the economic reforms adopted last year. Tito went so far as to say that "up to the present some members of the League have neglected and even abandoned the decisions of the Eighth Congress", with particular reference to the Congress's recommendations on economic and social reform. The specific vices under attack, which were attributed even to some "leaders" of the party, included nationalism, chauvinism "a class enemy in our midst" and passivity. Although Tito emphasised that there would be no "administrative measures or witch-hunts" the political issues of nationalism, chauvinism and personnel policy are to be tackled at subsequent Plenums. It remains to be seen whether the leadership can push its economic policy through without making an example of someone.

(b) *Ministerial changes in Albania*

12. The political stirring that has been noticed in Albania recently has led to the most extensive reorganisation of the Albanian Government since 1954. The three posts of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers have been abolished; by merging or abolishing certain Ministries their number has been reduced from 19 to 13, and the number of other Ministerial Departments has been reduced. Thus, it is hoped, "an inflated and overloaded Administration" is to be rendered "simple, dynamic and revolutionary", and 50 per cent of the staff of the Central State Administration are to be transferred to "productive work" in the provinces. These changes form part of the current campaign against bureaucracy and are in line with the intensive efforts to increase agricultural and industrial production called for in the new Five-year Plan, as well as with a certain de-centralisation of economic management.

COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

(a) *Rapprochement between French and Italian Communists*

13. At a Central Committee Meeting of the French Communist Party from 11-13 March a Resolution was adopted that appealed for a dialogue with Catholics, declared that philosophical differences should not preclude respect for individual beliefs and asserted that artistic creation could not be conceived without a diversity of trends and without confrontation between these trends. This is a further step on the French Communist Party's road to revisionism, which began with their public protest about the arbitrary manner of Khrushchev's dismissal in October 1964, and one of the main manifestations of which has been the rapprochement between the Italian and French parties. Their long-standing feud was in no small part due to the personal enmity of Thorez and Togliatti dating back to the days of the Communist International. In 1964 the French Communist Party rejected Togliatti's Yalta memorandum as "incomprehensible". Thorez and Togliatti are both now dead, and the resolution just adopted by the French Party is in total harmony with Togliatti's views.

(b) *West European Communist regionalism and united front tactics*

14. One of the consequences of this rapprochement is to make the concept of a regional West European Communist movement more meaningful. The conference of the West European Communist parties in June 1965 failed to make

decisions. The next conference is planned to take place in Vienna in May to discuss "the unity of democratic forces in the struggle against the monopolies, for democracy and social advance". The main subjects this will involve will probably be attitudes to the Common Market and the problems of creating united fronts of the Left as a means of increasing Communist influence by constitutional means.

15. Probably as a result of Italian pressure (it is incidentally noteworthy how many of Togliatti's suggestions on handling the Sino-Soviet dispute and relations within the world Communist movement the new Soviet leadership have adopted), the Soviet Communist Party began once again actively encouraging united front tactics for West European Communist parties early in 1965. Their main preoccupation, however, seems mainly to have been the mobilisation of public opinion against the policies of "Western imperialism", particularly on Viet-Nam and the German question; the Soviet Party Congress has not produced any theoretical reformulation of the tasks and tactics of Communist parties in capitalist countries, which had seemed a possibility after the series of articles in the Soviet Press in 1965 discussing united front tactics in theoretical terms. The aims of the Italian Communist Party, which is seeking to create a united party of the Left in Italy, and of the French Communist Party, which following its support for M. Mitterand in the recent presidential election is now trying to achieve a political alliance with his Federation de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste, are far more sophisticated. Both in their ways are grappling with the problem posed by Togliatti in his Yalta memorandum thus: "the possibility of the conquest of positions of power by the working class within a State that has not changed its character as a bourgeois State, and therefore whether the struggle for a gradual transformation of this nature, from within, is possible".

CHINA INTERNAL: STUDYING MAO'S WORKS

16. Since the beginning of 1966 the Chinese Communist Party has been intensifying a major campaign to promote the study and practical applications of the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, as the latest development of the "Socialist education movement" begun at the end of 1962. The targets are lower- and middle-ranking Communist cadres and the population as a whole. The cadres are accused in particular of complacency, conservatism and undue "professionalism", caused by neglect of the principle of putting politics before all else. Various purposes are intended to be served by the campaign. The primary one is the purification of the leadership; this is of particular importance in the context of the sharpening Sino-Soviet dispute, where the Chinese are vociferously proclaiming their Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in opposition to the revisionist heresies of Moscow. Bound up with this is the need to improve national economic performance—in particular to ensure the success of the Third Five-year Plan—without any concessions to "revisionism". Unlike the Russians, the Chinese have not reached the stage of recognising the economic demands of "life itself" (Khrushchev's phrase), but like the Russians they already are faced with the problem of educating in a Socialist mould a generation whose revolutionary faith has not been tempered by experiences such as the Long March, war or revolution. They thus hope that their economic problems, both in agriculture and industry, can be solved by what is essentially a political campaign. But references to the need to achieve a satisfactory relationship between "politics and production" show that the demands of ideological purity and professional expertise are not easy to resolve.

CHRONOLOGY

March

- 1 Japanese Communist Party delegation arrived in Peking, led by Secretary-General Miyamoto.
- 7 NCNA published *People's Daily* editorial on the inevitability of twists and turns in the course of revolution.
- 11 Resumption and conclusion of Yugoslav Party Plenum (the first half took place 25-26 February).
- 12-13 French Communist Party Plenum.
- 12 Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) banned.
- 14 23 members of Soviet Embassy and three of the Chinese declared *persona non grata* in Accra.
- 17 Reports in Western Press that 25 Soviet intellectuals had addressed a letter to Brezhnev, warning of the dangers of re-assessing history of Stalin period.
New Ghanian Government recognised by Soviet Union.
Ministerial changes announced in Albania.
- 19 Soviet-United States Cultural Agreement signed in Washington.
- 22 Chinese Communist Party rejected Soviet invitation to attend CPSU Congress.
- 24-28 Visit by Lord Chalfont to Moscow.
- 25 Publication of Federal German Note to various Governments on matters concerning disarmament and European Security.
- 26-31 Visit by Liu Shao-Chi and Chen Yi to West Pakistan.
- 26 Plenum of Central Committee of CPSU unanimously approved Report to the Congress.
- 29 23rd Congress of the CPSU began in Moscow. Brezhnev's report.
- 30 *People's Daily* editorial on closure of NCNA office Djakarta.

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THE 23RD CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY,
29 MARCH-8 APRIL

The first Soviet Party Congress since the fall of Khrushchev was a dull affair compared with those which took place under him. It was without colour and without surprises. It provides little insight into the personalities or the leadership of their conception of how Soviet society should develop.

2. Emphasis was given to the need for greater ideology orthodoxy and discipline. This was stated in a conservative and traditionalist way. The unimaginative presentation of old doctrines and current policies gave the impression that the Soviet leaders wish to damp down discussion among the Soviet people. The Congress has produced nothing which requires us to modify the view that in practical matters the new Soviet leaders are cautious experimentalists, but without fire and with only a limited vision.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

(a) *Organisational changes*

3. The main organisational changes are as follows: the Presidium of the CPSU has been renamed the "Politburo", thus returning to the *status quo ante* the 19th Congress in 1952; the restoration of the office of Secretary-General, which was dropped before the 19th Congress; the restoration of Party Conferences, the last of which was held in 1951, and which were formally abolished at the 19th Congress; the abolition of the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR, set up by decree in 1956; and the abolition of the Party Rule that there should be systematic rotation in the composition of leading party organisations and agencies.

4. The purpose of these organisational changes is not clear. It is possible to interpret them merely as a reversion to an earlier tradition, which owes as much to Lenin as to Stalin, and as an indirect criticism of Khrushchev. Some of them may, however, correspond to current needs. The re-introduction of Party Conferences, for instance, was justified by Brezhnev on the grounds that between Congresses the need could arise to discuss important political problems at representative party forums larger than a Central Committee Plenum. Khrushchev met this need by calling plenums in which non-members also took part. He has been criticised for acting unconstitutionally in doing this. Brezhnev is now putting the matter on a regular basis, approved by the Congress; but to mark the distinction from Khrushchev's plenums he is giving it a new name by reviving an old one.

5. The rule that there should be systematic rotation in the membership of party organs was unwelcome to vested interests among party officials at all levels. Its abolition will gratify those interests. But it may also have been necessary in order to avoid the wastage of the very limited number of good people, particularly those whose services are important in the field of economics.

6. Substitution of the titles "Politburo" and "Secretary-General" for "Presidium" and "First Secretary" inevitably conjures up memories of Stalin, though the leadership have been careful to emphasise that the reversion is to a Leninist form. Brezhnev claimed that the name "Politburo" expresses more fully the nature of the work of the supreme political body of our party". Judgment must be reserved on whether the change of nomenclature is anything more than a political

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gesture. If it is, it may mean that the functions of the Politburo and the Secretariat are to become more clearly defined and separated, the formulation of policy falling under the Politburo and the direction of the party machine falling more exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat headed by its Secretary-General. Moreover, while the Congress has given emphasis to the role of the party in determining policy, it may be the intention to introduce a clearer delimitation of party and Government, as the result of which the Government may enjoy greater freedom from party interference in carrying out its executive function. If this is the intention, we can assume that success in carrying it out would be only partial.

(b) Leadership and personnel

7. Brezhnev's assumption of the office of Secretary-General seems to confirm the stability of his position and possibly to give him more exclusive influence over the party machine. The retirement from the Presidium of Mikoyan and Shvernik on grounds of age was expected. Interest has been aroused by the fact that Brezhnev, in announcing the 11 Politburo members, did not list them alphabetically, and this suggests that the order he used reflects their standing. If so, they appear to fall into three groups. In the first are Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov (who was also named second to Brezhnev in the Secretariat); while Shelepin was included in the second group. It would thus seem that Shelepin is holding his political ground, without advancement or demotion. It disposes of rumours current before the Congress that it would show his star to be rising.

8. The new Central Committee has been increased by 20 full members to 195, while candidate membership has increased by 10 to 165. These increases correspond to an increase in total party membership, but not proportionately. Nearly 150 full members of the outgoing Central Committee, including those raised to full membership since 1961, remain in the new body. Khrushchev was dropped from the Central Committee and together with him some others who had been particularly associated with him, including Ilychev, who was his henchman on cultural and ideological matters. An appointment of no importance in itself, but to be taken as a demonstration against Khrushchev and towards healing wounds opened by him, is reinstatement to the Central Committee of Voroshilov who was pilloried as a member of the anti-party group in 1961.

(c) Stalinism and ideology

9. There have been various indications since Khrushchev's fall that the party was undertaking a reassessment of Stalin's role in Soviet history. This led to apprehension, within the Soviet Union and outside, lest there should be a return to some aspects of Stalinism. The issue was dramatised by reports shortly before the Congress that 25 leading Soviet intellectuals had sent a letter to Brezhnev warning against any return to Stalinism.

10. There was, therefore, acute interest in what the Congress would have to say on this subject. It said very little. The only direct reference was by Egorychev, the First Secretary of the Moscow City-Party Committee, who said that attempts to frighten the public by seeking out elements of so-called Stalinism would not succeed; the cult of personality and the violation of Leninist norms of socialist legality would never return. He added, however, that the party "decisively rejects all attempts to cross out the heroic history of our people which under the leadership of the CPSU for almost half a century has moved along a difficult but glorious path of struggles and victories". This seems to be a fair statement of the line which the leadership wishes to maintain; the party and the people are always right, always heroic, even if the leaders have sometimes fallen short. On this occasion the leadership may well have concluded that extended discussion of the subject would have obliged them to take up positions which they prefer to avoid and would have led to unnecessary disputation between the intellectuals on the one hand and the conservative elements of the party on the other. This is an example of the view of the present leadership that this is not the time for debate.

11. Initial reactions from Eastern Europe suggest that some relief is felt there that the Congress has not led to a reassessment favourable to Stalin. It seems doubtful whether, in view of the general ideological tone of the Congress and the prevailing conservatism of most of the speeches, progressive circles in the Soviet Union have found much reassurance.

(d) Culture

12. Brezhnev said that "the party is against administration by edict and arbitrary decisions in matters of art and literature. At the same time we are unswervingly guided by the principles of the party character of art, a class approach in the evaluation of everything that is done in the field of culture". Speakers laid particular stress on the effect of contemporary literature, theatre and films on the outlook of the young, who were presented as being too easily attracted by Western culture. In this context the Minister of Culture, Furtseva, accepted the point made by other speakers that stricter standards should be applied to what was brought into the Soviet Union from foreign countries. The impression given by this part of the discussion is not encouraging. The Soviet rulers are by no means committed to adopting a repressive line and will presumably adopt a policy of tacking to the needs of the moment, pulling back the artists at some periods and giving them a little more freedom at others. This is what Khrushchev did; but the general ideological professions of the present leadership suggest that they will be less well disposed in favour of the progressive writers than Khrushchev was sometimes prepared to be.

(e) The economy

13. Kosygin's report on the new Five-year Plan combined a measure of frankness on some subjects with a notable silence on others. The frankness was applied largely to shortcomings in the fulfilment of the Seven-year Plan now ended; Kosygin implicitly condemned Khrushchev's stewardship in many details and assured the Congress that "the Leninist principles of scientific management of the building of Socialism" have been restored. He made it clear, however, that there would need to be serious efforts if the new plan was to be fulfilled and made no attempt to lull his hearers into believing that the problems had all been solved. For example, he criticised the quality of Soviet production and low technical standards and suggested that the declining rate of increase in labour productivity might be reversed if Soviet scientific and technical achievements were more rapidly assimilated into the production process. He also took out some insurance against possible shortcomings in the achievements of the new plan, as well as explaining defects in past performance, by referring to the economic burden of the increased defence expenditure which had been forced upon the Soviet Union by "imperialist aggression". Since the increase in defence expenditure in the 1966 Budget was only 5 per cent, which was roughly in line with the planned percentage increase in the national income, this explanation does not carry much conviction.

14. On the whole, however, encouraging prospects were held out to the Soviet people: increased growth in the consumption sector, higher wages, a five-day week (but with total hours unchanged) and better services, particularly for the rural population.

15. The omissions from Kosygin's speech and from other speeches in the Congress were, however, striking. There was no serious discussion on the way in which the economic reforms introduced last year were being carried out or of the problems connected with them, in particular price reform, the relation between enterprises and the central planners and the timetable for transferring industry to the new economic system. Thus, the execution of the economic reforms was not subjected to discussion and the Congress decisions contained nothing which might limit Kosygin's freedom of action in carrying out the plan. This is not to say, of course, that he enjoys freedom of action; the absence of discussion may be largely the result of deep differences of opinion.

(f) Agriculture

16. So far as agriculture is concerned, output is to be increased on the basis of more "mechanisation, electrification and chemicalisation", and land-improvement schemes are envisaged for areas with unfavourable climates. More attention is to be paid to regional differences in the planning of agricultural production. The proposal to set up collective farm co-operative bodies at various levels, which was raised at Congresses in 1958 and 1961, has been referred for further consideration to the Central Committee. Consideration was given to bringing the standard of living of the rural worker closer to that of his urban counterpart and it is planned that collective farm workers should receive a guaranteed, regular wage.

(g) Foreign trade

17. Kosygin suggested that the time had come to re-evaluate the role of foreign trade, and that it was wrong to think of it as of secondary importance. His remarks could be taken as preparing the ground for some reform of the foreign trade system, which has featured in the economic reforms of some East European countries. Like the passage in foreign trade in the Five-year Plan Directives, his speech implied some concession to the principle that the international division of labour could benefit the Soviet economy. Kosygin placed particular emphasis on the need to study the import requirements of foreign countries, and on improving the quality of Soviet goods for export. But apart from suggesting that money on research and development could be saved by the purchase of foreign licences, he gave little indication of any specific reforms.

18. Although Kosygin referred to the importance of trade between the Soviet Union and other Communist countries there was only a minimal formal reference in his speech and elsewhere in the Congress to CMEA. This reticence probably reflects Soviet dissatisfaction with the achievements of CMEA and possibly a view that the Council will never come to much.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

19. The conservatism and orthodoxy of the Congress on internal matters was reflected in the handling of international affairs.

(a) The World Communist Movement

20. Only the Communist parties of Albania, Japan, New Zealand, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines joined the Chinese in refusing to send delegations to the Congress. The North Viet-Nameese and North Korean delegations were not only of a high-level (the former led by the First Secretary Le Duan): they also expressed themselves in favour of the struggle for the unity of the Socialist camp and of international united action to assist the North Viet-Nameese, both of which are currently slogans to which the Russians attach importance.

21. The Russians did not spoil this impressive demonstration of Chinese isolation by stirring up any of the latent differences of opinion among various parties on how to handle the Chinese. Brezhnev himself spoke in brief and uncontroversial terms on relations with China, which, he said, were unsatisfactory although the Soviet Union continued to want to overcome differences. He spoke strongly (without naming China) of the dangers of deviationism to the Right or the Left, of "nationalism, Great Power chauvinism and hegemonic ambition", but gave no hint of how these dangers might be overcome. This moderation was in marked contrast to the line which the Soviet Central Committee has taken in recent communications to foreign Communist parties.

22. Brezhnev also reiterated the Soviet intention of continuing to work for unity by all means such as bilateral and multilateral meetings, and a new international conference "when the conditions for it are ripe"; but he made no new proposals. This atmosphere of restraint clearly matched the mood of most of the foreign delegations, and apart from a marginally harsher condemnation of those who disrupted unity by one or two of the East European leaders and representatives of some divided parties, nothing was said to disturb it.

(b) Relations with the West

23. Against a background of traditional Marxist analysis of the mounting contradictions in the capitalist world and increasing imperialist aggression in response to Socialist advance, Brezhnev and other speakers voiced strong criticism of the United States, with particular reference to Viet-Nam. On Viet-Nam, Brezhnev warned that "the aggressors will have to contend with mounting support for Viet-Nam from the USSR and its other Socialist friends and brothers". A special Congress resolution on Viet-Nam served only to repeat Soviet support for a resolution of the situation on the basis of North Viet-Nameese demands. There is no reason to think that General Epishev's remark that "the personnel of whole units are announcing their readiness to go as volunteers to Viet-Nam" indicates any imminent change in Soviet policy on the nature or

extent of their assistance to North Viet-Nameese. The inflammatory speech of the Cuban delegate, implicitly advocating an increased Soviet commitment, found no response among other speakers and was apparently not well received.

24. The Federal German Government were strongly attacked: according to Brezhnev "it is from Western Germany, with its mounting irridentist feeling that the danger of war increasingly comes". The French received a pat on the back for their international policy. An activation of relations with the United Kingdom would, according to Brezhnev, be useful, but whether it would be possible would depend on the development of our policy.

25. There was a repetition of ritual formulae on dismantling foreign bases, general and complete disarmament, non-interference, nuclear-free zones, a German peace settlement, Soviet desire to sign a non-proliferation treaty, &c. Berlin was not mentioned. Reference was made (in the middle of a catalogue of measures which might improve the international situation) to the convening of an international conference on European Security matters, but Soviet support for such an idea is already on record. In general little prospect was offered for the development of areas of international agreement in the immediate future. On the other hand, Gromyko in an otherwise harsh speech, categorically restated the Soviet Government's determination to "pose the ripe problems and press for their solution" rather than "to slam the door and waste no time or effort on talks with the Western Powers".

26. Brezhnev's report to the Congress introduced no new concepts on Soviet relations with the Third World or on support for national liberation movements. But it is worth noting that the final resolution of the Congress reaffirmed that the principle of co-existence did not apply to colonial and neo-colonial situations. Indeed although the general principle of co-existence was endorsed, Brezhnev employed the traditional Marxist language of the struggle between Communism and capitalism and between classes within capitalist societies in calling for support for Soviet policies in the non-Communist world.

ASSESSMENT AND OUTLOOK

27. The Soviet leaders sought to give the impression of steadiness and continuity of policy; of stable, if cautious, progress; of loyalty to the best traditions of Leninism and of substantial agreement within the party itself and within the Communist movement as a whole. To achieve this object they avoided the discussion of controversial issues and rested their positions on safe general ground. This tactic makes it impossible to judge whether the impression is correct or whether it is misleading. There are, however, certain points about the Congress which must give rise to doubt. Declining to discuss problems does not remove them. The large omissions from the economic discussion, particularly the question of price reform which is central to the problem of economic planning, must raise the question whether the leadership has run into difficulties to which it does not yet see the solution. The fact that only four members of the Presidium made speeches (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Shelest) might be represented as evidence that in a collective leadership it is not necessary for everyone to speak; but it must also encourage the suspicion that personal difficulties or conflicts of view led to the exclusion from the stand of some of the other members of the Presidium or alternatively that they deliberately withheld from the discussion.

28. On the interpretation most favourable to the top leadership, they wanted, and have achieved, a pause in a debate which, under Khrushchev, permitted diverse views to be expressed on a number of important internal questions, economic, organisational and cultural. They wanted this pause because they have reached a stage in their economic reforms at which it is important that they have a free hand in dealing firmly with the resistance of vested interests. If they are to adjourn debate in the economic field they must also adjourn it in other fields. For the time being the party and the people must trust the leaders without asking too many questions.

29. This reading of the position may not be entirely beside the mark. But if it is true, the leadership may find themselves caught in a process under which they will feel obliged to continue to try to restrict debate. In the present state of Soviet society this will set up strains and it is also likely in itself to frustrate the economic reforms which must depend on the development of greater initiatives at lower levels.

30. In their relations with China, the Soviet rulers have shown that they wish to continue a policy of public restraint, though they will certainly continue their private efforts to consolidate support behind them. They have emphasised that their influence in the world, both as a force and as an example, depends upon the success of their own economy. This suggests that they may look particularly carefully at the economic consequences for themselves of their international relations, including their relations with the East European countries and the conditions under which they provide aid in the Third World. Concentration on internal development also makes it unlikely that the Russians will depart from their present caution in foreign affairs. But the conservatism shown at the Congress holds out little hope that they will take a more constructive line in the search for areas of international agreement, anyway as long as they are following their present tactics with the Chinese and so long as the war in Viet-Nam continues.

31. The Soviet leadership has made it clear that it is not prepared to discuss the possibility of a change in the international situation (to the convening of an international conference on European security matters, but Soviet support for such a move is already on record in general) until the progress is clear for the development of areas of international agreement in the immediate future. On the other hand, Gromyko in an otherwise harsh speech, categorically stated the Soviet Government's determination to "pose the right problems and press for their solution" rather than "to slam the door and waste no time or effort on talks with the Western Powers".

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His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,



With the compliments of
EMBASSY
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

BRITISH EMBASSY
REYKJAVIK

14 April, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

TACTICS, FEBRUARY 1966

MARY

major international questions during his visit to Moscow, but his reception by the Russians will continue a dialogue with the West.

in the hope of a Russian move until the end of the year. Lord Chalfont's talk with the Soviet Government in Moscow gave no grounds for optimism about Viet-Nam that morale of some of the countries (Paragraphs 2-3.)

interest in a non-proliferation treaty, and a proposal to Geneva Disarmament Conference on nuclear Powers. (Paragraphs 4-5.)

British proposal for conference of the four major powers on Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 6-7.)

Havana Conference, Cuba has been invited to Havana and all Latin American Governments are invited. The Soviet Union strives to reassure Latin American Governments alarmed by Soviet support for Havana resolutions. (Paragraphs 8-9.)

Soviet and Chinese reactions to *coup* in Ghana. (Paragraph 10.)

East Europe: stirrings in Albania; signs of unrest in Hungary; Rumanian Deputy Premier's visit to United Kingdom. (Paragraphs 11-13.)

Soviet internal: the new Five-year Plan; the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel. (Paragraphs 15-17.)

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

The factors which have inhibited any improvement in East-West relations over the past year have been the situation in Viet-Nam and the development of the Sino/Soviet dispute. These considerations no doubt seem particularly pertinent to the Russian leaders as they prepare for the Party Congress. It was thus not to be expected that any real progress would be made on major international topics during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow from 21 to 24 February, and articles generally critical of Her Majesty's Government's policies published in the Soviet Press before the visit underlined that expectations should not be pitched too high. On the other hand the reception accorded Mr. Wilson by the Russians showed that, despite our disagreements, the Russians are anxious to maintain an active dialogue with the West. Although the talking on both sides was blunt there was no atmosphere of hostility. The Russians confirmed their wish to continue political contacts at all levels and there is to be a return visit by Mr. Kosygin.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, FEBRUARY 1966

SUMMARY

No progress was made on major international questions during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow, but his reception by the Russians reflected a desire to continue a dialogue with the West. (Paragraph 1.)

On Viet-Nam there is little hope of a Russian move until the North Viet-Nameese position shifts. Lord Chalfont's talk with the North Viet-Nameese Chargé in Moscow gave no grounds for optimism. Signs in North and South Viet-Nam that morale of some Communists is wavering. (Paragraphs 2-3.)

The Russians still show interest in a non-proliferation treaty, but at a price. Kosygin's proposal to Geneva Disarmament Conference on guarantees to non-nuclear Powers. (Paragraphs 4-5.)

Sino/Soviet relations: Polish proposal for conference of Communist Governments on Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 6-7.)

In the aftermath of the Havana Conference, Cuba has quarrelled with China, Yugoslavia and all Latin American Governments. The Soviet Union strives to reassure Latin American Governments alarmed by Soviet support for Havana resolutions. (Paragraphs 8-9.)

Soviet and Chinese reactions to *coup* in Ghana. (Paragraph 10.)

East Europe: stirrings in Albania; signs of unrest in Hungary; Rumanian Deputy Premier's visit to United Kingdom. (Paragraphs 11-13.)

Soviet internal: the new Five-year Plan; the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel. (Paragraphs 15-17.)

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

The factors which have inhibited any improvement in East-West relations over the past year have been the situation in Viet-Nam and the development of the Sino/Soviet dispute. These considerations no doubt seem particularly pertinent to the Russian leaders as they prepare for the Party Congress. It was thus not to be expected that any real progress would be made on major international topics during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow from 21 to 24 February, and articles generally critical of Her Majesty's Government's policies published in the Soviet Press before the visit underlined that expectations should not be pitched too high. On the other hand the reception accorded Mr. Wilson by the Russians showed that, despite our disagreements, the Russians are anxious to maintain an active dialogue with the West. Although the talking on both sides was blunt there was no atmosphere of hostility. The Russians confirmed their wish to continue political contacts at all levels and there is to be a return visit by Mr. Kosygin.

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VIET-NAM

2. During the visit there was much discussion about Viet-Nam, but the Russians made it perfectly clear that there was no practical action to be taken and that no new initiatives by the co-Chairmen could be expected at this stage. They criticised British support for United States policy in familiar terms. The Russians are presumably still concerned not to give the Chinese ammunition for use against them, although predictably the Chinese represented the Prime Minister's visit as proof that the Russians were selling out to imperialism on Viet-Nam as well as other issues. This Russian attitude is likely to continue at least until there is some sign of a shift in the position of the North Viet-Nameese. Nothing the North Viet-Nameese Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow said to the Minister of State for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont, during a four hour meeting at the time of the Prime Minister's visit nor North Viet-Nameese Press reports of the meeting gave grounds for optimism, nor does it seem likely that any reply there may be to Lord Chalfont's message will be constructive.

3. The most direct evidence to date that there is divided counsel in Hanoi on the prosecution of the struggle was provided by an article in the North Viet-Nameese Party newspaper *Nhan Dan* by Presidium Member Le Duc Tho on 3 and 4 February which referred to "a small number of cadres" with erroneous thoughts and views. Although the occasion for the article was the 36th anniversary of the founding of the North Viet-Nameese Communist Party and there have been exhortations against pacifists in the party Press before, reference to "organisations" as well as to individuals who seem unwilling to continue the battle on South Viet-Nam's behalf suggests differences of a more serious nature. Confusion among certain Communists even in South Viet-Nam on "the role of the political struggle in the new situation" created by the intensified war effort of the Americans was revealed in a broadcast during February over the clandestine "Liberation Radio" of an article from the organ of the South Viet-Nameese Communist Party (the South Viet-Nam People's Revolutionary Party) which controls the South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front. There is no indication in either case, however, that Communist policy has been affected.

NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS

4. In the complex of discussions revolving around the questions of a non-proliferation treaty, disarmament and European security the Russians came up with no new thoughts. In continuing to argue that there was no prospect of a non-proliferation treaty while NATO contemplated any arrangements which would bring the Federal Republic of Germany into closer association with nuclear weapons, they said that in their view closer association included the consultative arrangements under discussion in the McNamara Committee, which Mr. Gromyko described as "political proliferation". Nevertheless they insisted on their desire to find a basis for concluding a non-proliferation treaty. A theme which emerged clearly on the Russian side was the outdatedness and irrelevance of the post-war Western alliances. Discussion on an extended test ban treaty and on a freeze or reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles soon ran into the well-known Soviet refusal to contemplate international inspection.

5. Otherwise the Soviet Government continued to seek to give the impression publicly of flexibility in the search for solutions to these problems. The Soviet Press gave prominence to the proposals made by the East German régime at the end of January for safeguarding security in Europe. The proposal contained three suggestions, none of them new; arms restrictions in Europe and a ban on the holding of nuclear weapons in any form by any European country not now in possession of them; respect for existing frontiers and renunciation of claims to revision of frontiers; and the normalisation of relations between all European States and the two German States. This initiative was timed to coincide with the re-opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva to which the proposals were communicated. It was to that Conference also that Kosygin sent a message on 16 February expressing the Soviet Government's willingness to insert in a draft non-proliferation treaty an article on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States adhering to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons on their territory. This proposal addresses itself to the desire of non-nuclear countries for some assurances of their safety if they sign a non-proliferation treaty. As such it will need careful study.

SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

6. The 16th anniversary of the signature of the Sino/Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (14 February) was celebrated on both sides with a bare minimum of attention. The Chinese Press led up to it with a major attack in *Red Flag* on 11 February. Basing itself on two recent Soviet books on United States foreign policy, which had already attracted Chinese fire, the article trotted out all the current themes of Chinese anti-Soviet polemics. The Russians themselves have continued to exercise public restraint, but marked the anniversary with an article in *Pravda* which drew an obvious parallel between the current Chinese leadership and Kuomintang reactionaries who had opposed Sino-Soviet friendship in the 'twenties.

7. The Albanian Press published in mid-February the abusive Albanian rejection of a Polish proposal dated 5 January for a conference of Warsaw Pact countries and the Socialist countries of Asia to discuss Viet-Nam. The Chinese also have refused to attend. Since the Polish Press had publicly criticised the Chinese early in December for refusing to contemplate just such a conference, and since the Albanian party newspaper had at the end of the same month denounced a similar idea, imputed to the Russians, as "a devilish trick", it is unlikely that the Polish proposal was made in the expectation of any other result than a categorical rejection by these two Governments. The explanation may be that they wanted a formal rejection of a formal proposal, for possible use in evidence against China. Even if the Russians indict the Chinese at the Party Congress in harsher terms than they have done so far under the new leadership, they are still likely to do so in a spirit of sorrow rather than anger. The continuation of this attitude of restraint might be complicated if the Chinese, as has been reported, plan to send a delegation.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRICONTINENTAL CONFERENCE

(a) Cuba

8. Within a month of the end of the Tricontinental Conference in Havana the Cubans had crossed swords violently with the Chinese, the Yugoslavs and all the Latin American member States of the OAS, who had condemned the resolutions of the conference both in the OAS and in a communication to the President of the Security Council. The attack on the Chinese, which was the culmination of the series of public Sino/Cuban exchanges about Chinese unwillingness or inability to supply Cuba with as much rice or to take as much Cuban sugar in 1966 as in 1965, took the form of a reply by Castro in *Granma* on 6 February to the statement of a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade official. In it Castro accused the Chinese Government of carrying out a "criminal act of economic aggression against our country" and of flagrantly violating the rules governing the conduct of Socialist and even non-Socialist States by increasing the massive distribution of propaganda material in Cuba and attempts to subvert members of the Cuban Army and Administration. The nub of the issue between Cuba and China is Castro's doctrine that Communist Governments "in the firing line" have a right to call on other Communist Governments for aid, which the latter are in duty bound to supply. The outburst against the Yugoslavs in an editorial in *Granma* accused them of having sided with reactionary Latin American Governments against revolutionary movements in most Latin American countries, and by referring to the "so-called" League of Yugoslav Communists seemed to question the right of the Yugoslav party to be considered Communist at all. Castro no doubt considers that both Yugoslav and Chinese activities work in their different ways against his role as mentor of Latin American revolutionary movements. The paradoxical consequence, however, is to increase his moral and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. A protocol governing Soviet/Cuban trade in 1966 and including the grant of a Soviet credit for \$91 million was signed on 12 February. Yet in the last analysis it is probably this dependence on the Soviet Union that really frustrates Castro.

(b) The Soviet Union

9. The unpredictability of Castro is but one of the difficulties facing Soviet policy-makers on Latin America, who have the task of avoiding a major confrontation with the United States while trying not to provide justification for charges by the Chinese and others that they have lost their revolutionary *élan*.

This dilemma has been aggravated by the reactions of most Latin American Governments to the resolutions of the Havana Conference. The official representatives of 18 Latin American States signed a letter to the President of the Security Council maintaining that the Havana Conference's resolutions violated the 1965 non-intervention Declaration of the General Assembly. The Soviet reply reiterated Soviet support for the principle of non-intervention and a continuing desire for friendly relations, but questioned the motives of those making the complaint and asserted that the Security Council had no competence to question the views on vital problems expressed by "representatives of public opinion". In a Soviet reply to a Uruguayan request for clarification of Soviet policy, the Russians made even more explicit their claim that the Soviet delegation to the Havana Conference had been representative of "social organisations" in the Soviet Union and not the Soviet Government. The Russians are likely therefore to take good account of their relations with Latin American Governments in deciding how far they will co-operate in fulfilling the Havana resolutions.

REACTIONS TO THE COUP IN GHANA

10. News of the military *coup* against him in Ghana reached Nkrumah shortly after his arrival in Peking *en route* for a "peace mission" to Hanoi. Although it was both a surprise and embarrassment to Nkrumah's Chinese hosts, the Chinese Press made no reference to it until well after his departure. Since then the Chinese have linked the *coup* directly to "British and American imperialists", and the Chinese Press has sought to reassure its readers, who must have been perplexed by the continual series of setbacks over the last year to Chinese aims and the sudden departure from the political scene of those they were trained to regard as favourites, by reference to the teaching of Mao on the inevitable "twists and turns" on the revolutionary path. The Russians also have been perplexed and frustrated by events in Ghana, which the considerable body of Soviet advisers and technicians have been forced to quit. Although the Soviet Press has implied that imperialist machinations were behind the overthrow of Nkrumah, the Soviet Government has so far refrained from giving an official view. While the *coup* in Ghana is distinguished by Soviet propagandists from other recent *coups* in francophone African States and in Nigeria on the grounds that the latter sought only to change Governments, while the former sought to change the régime, the general Soviet line has been that military *coups* in Africa succeed relatively easily because the wide masses, even in the most progressive States, have not been sufficiently drawn into political affairs and are not yet aware of the tangible fruits of national independence.

EASTERN EUROPE

(a) Albania

11. Stories of shake-ups in the Albanian Communist Party, Albanian dissatisfaction with Chinese economic aid and a desire on the part of Albania to improve relations with other East European countries have been circulating in journalistic and diplomatic circles during the month. There is a lack of substantial information, but it appears to be true that the Albanians are seeking to mend their fences with Yugoslavia in a small way; recent trade talks are reported to have led to agreement to increase economic exchanges and Radio Tirana has apparently been striking a more moderate note towards the Yugoslavs. Albania's relations with Poland also took a brief turn for the better with the signature of a trade agreement and the elevation of the Polish Chargé d'Affaires in Tirana to the status of Ambassador. The Albanians, however, demonstrated their continued ideological fidelity to Peking by publishing their offensive reply to the Polish invitation to a conference of Warsaw Pact and Asian Socialist countries on Viet-Nam, and the pro-Chinese activities of their Ambassador in Warsaw led to a request for his removal shortly afterwards, a measure which was promptly reciprocated by the Albanians. Since the Albanians have also made minor gestures to improve their relations with other Western countries, notably Italy, France, Austria and Turkey, it is a reasonable assumption that they do indeed wish to limit their total economic dependence on China. But they seem to be reassuring the Chinese that their desire for diversification is limited to economic matters by extending their imitation of Chinese theory and practice to domestic affairs. Thus ranks have recently been

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abolished in the Albanian Armed Forces and the primacy of the political commissars restored on the Chinese model, and a number of leading party and Government officials have been posted to new jobs outside Tirana, perhaps to renew their contact with the people. Decentralisation of the economy and "other commonsense measures" have been advocated in the party Press.

(b) *Hungary*

12. An article in the Hungarian Party daily, *Nepszabadsag* on 19 February, occasioned by the approach of the third anniversary of the major amnesty of March 1963 and the end of the probationary period during which the suspended terms of imprisonment could be reimposed on any amnestied persons who transgressed afresh, reported a number of arrests. It gave examples illustrating the "undeniable fact that a stratum exists—although relatively small—which opposes our system", and mentioned, without citing any dates, that sentences had been reimposed on certain members of the "conspiratorial Regnum Marianum circle", that five named and other former "counter-revolutionaries" had been rearrested and that proceedings had been instituted against others for open "agitation against the people's democratic régime". Details of the sentences on the first group, all of whom were priests, had in fact been published in July 1965. Although no specific reference was made to the recent unrest in Hungary over price increases, the warning that humanism should not be confused with weakness or lack of firmness was clearly not aimed solely at potential recidivists.

(c) *Mr. Birladeanu's visit to the United Kingdom*

13. The Rumanian First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Birladeanu, visited the United Kingdom from 2-9 February, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Trade and a Deputy Foreign Minister. His main purpose was to secure support for his thesis that Anglo/Rumanian trade and technical and scientific co-operation should be expanded, although major international issues were discussed as well. The level of the visit was an indication of the importance that Rumanians attach to relations with the West and their determination not to let Viet-Nam affect the development of their independent line and the pursuit of a policy of developing contacts with all countries regardless of their social systems.

CHINA INTERNAL: DROUGHT

14. Serious drought conditions in North China have been reported by China's provincial Press and radio since November 1965. *Peking Daily* of 11 November, 1965, was already complaining that "some comrades still do not understand properly the seriousness of the current drought" and according to the *People's Daily* of 16 November in the Provinces of Nepal, Honan, Shansi and Shantung the "calamity was unprecedented in the past century" while the situation in Yu Haien in Shansi Province was already "appalling". By mid-February 1966 rivers and reservoirs around Peking were dry and the Peking Municipal People's Council had called a meeting to discuss emergency measures and appealed for extra efforts to combat the drought. Another meeting called in early February by the Ministry of Agriculture urged that because of the seriousness of the threat to the winter wheat crop attention should be paid to the cultivation of "coarse grain" (maize, millet, sorghum, beans and sweet potatoes) on the grounds that these crops are highly resistant to both arid and flood conditions. Some snow and rain fell over parts of North China in the second half of February, but so far as is known this was too slight to have much effect. If the situation does not improve rapidly the effect of the drought on the winter wheat crop may indeed be calamitous and China's Third Five-year Plan will start off badly.

SOVIET INTERNAL

(a) *The new Five-year Plan*

15. A Plenum of the Soviet Party Central Committee has approved draft directives of the 23rd Congress for the 1966-70 Five-year Plan. In general the plan is more sober in tone and less ambitious in its targets than its predecessors. The directives make no claims about overtaking the United States and it appears that the present leadership are not going to resurrect this embarrassing pursuit. They

will presumably have taken into account the probability that the dislocation resulting from the transition to new methods in the Soviet economy will last for most of the plan period.

16. The target growth rates for national income and industrial production are close to those achieved during the recently concluded Seven-year Plan period, and should be attainable. The specific 1970 targets for producer and consumer goods show a sharp reduction from the figures announced at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. Although heavy industry will continue to grow faster than light industry, the gap between the rates of growth is much less than hitherto and thus represents a shift in favour of the consumer. A large increase is planned in the construction of housing space, and special emphasis is laid on improving conditions for the rural population, whose income is planned to rise somewhat faster than that of the urban population. The plans for agriculture, though modest by comparison with Khrushchev's promises, still seem optimistic in the light of past performance.

(b) The trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel

17. On 14 February the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel were convicted of a criminal charge under the law which prohibits anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation and sentenced to 7 and 5 years respectively in strict régime corrective labour camps. The most noticeable feature of the trial was the refusal of both defendants to admit their guilt. Though it was theoretically open, only a limited public and no foreign correspondents were admitted to the trial and the Soviet Press reports were heavily slanted. The case and sentences were publicly criticised in the West, notably by prominent members of the British, French, Italian, and Scandinavian Communist Parties. In the Soviet Union itself legal opinion showed signs of disquiet at the way the Press campaign prejudged the issue and although many Soviet intellectuals are likely to regard the actions of the two writers as unpatriotic, it is thought that several influential writers were ready to come to their defence. There have even been rumours that the party authorities themselves criticised the handling of the case. There was thus not surprisingly an anxious note of self-justification in the attempts in the Soviet Press to reassure public opinion that the trial was an isolated case and that there is no intention of suppressing fair criticism aimed at improving Soviet society. It is still true that in cultural matters generally there is no sign of a harsher policy. Nevertheless, the hand of the KGB is to be seen in this case, as it is in the attempts to manipulate the plight of the imprisoned British schoolteacher, Mr. Brooke, to secure the release from a British prison of the Krogers, convicted for spying 1961. In these cases the KGB seem to have seriously miscalculated the reactions of foreign opinion or—which would be more sinister—to have been allowed to discount them.

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CHRONOLOGY

February

- 1-10 Afghan Prime Minister, Maiwandwal visited the Soviet Union.
- 2 *Pravda* published Podgorny's reply to Ho Chi Minh's message.
People's Daily "Observer" article "With whom are the United States engaged in united action?"
- 3 Luna 9 made soft landing on the moon.
- 6 Castro attack on China published in *Granma*.
- 11 *Red Flag* article on "Soviet/United States collaboration".
Soviet-Cuban Trade Protocol for 1966 signed in Havana.
- 13 *Zeri i Popullit* published Albanian rejection of Polish proposal dated 5 January for a conference of Warsaw Pact and Asian Socialist countries on Viet-Nam.
- 14 16th Anniversary of Sino/Soviet Friendship Treaty.
Soviet writers Sinyavsky and Daniel sentenced in Moscow.
- 16 Kosygin sent message to Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva with proposal on guarantee to non-nuclear Powers.
Soviet Note to the United States about bomber flights over third countries with nuclear bombs.
- 19 Soviet Central Committee Plenum approved the Directives of the 1966-70 Five-year Plan.
- 21-24 Visit to Moscow by Prime Minister, accompanied by the Minister of Technology, Mr. Cousins and the Minister of State for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont.
- 24 Soviet Central Committee statement on death sentence on Indonesian Communist Party leader, Njono.
Coup against Nkrumah in Ghana.
- 26 Articles in Soviet Press on 70th Anniversary of birth of Zhdanov.