



# Communist Policy and Tactics 1966 – 1967, 3. hluti

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Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

## Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, AUGUST 1966

SUMMARY

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party attempted to lay down clearer guidelines for the conduct of the Cultural Revolution. The length of the meeting suggested there may have been disagreements. Mao was credited with responsibility for all major decisions over the last four years, and these were endorsed. Possibility of a new leap forward. Emphasis on the armed forces as a model for society. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

The Red Guards' main task is the eradication of bourgeois and pro-foreign tendencies. Attempts have been made to restrain their excesses. Considerable confusion in the country about their role. (Paragraphs 5-7.)

The most important changes in the hitherto stable leadership have been the emergence of Lin Piao as No. 2 and probably heir-apparent, and the demotion of Liu Shao-ch'i. (Paragraphs 8-10.)

Mao seems determined that economic development in China shall not lead to revolutionary degeneration as in Russia. The succession to him may not be as smooth a process as seemed likely earlier. (Paragraph 11.)

The Plenum communiqué authoritatively confirmed Chinese refusal to join in "united action" with revisionists. Abuses against Soviet Embassy in Peking. The Soviet response does not suggest any change in the Soviet line. Other Communist reactions have been more critical, emphasising that the Chinese are further splitting the bloc and playing into the hands of imperialists. (Paragraphs 12-14.)

The North Koreans have given a further demonstration of their independence by publishing an article supporting efforts by the Japanese Communist Party to resist Chinese bullying. (Paragraphs 15-16.)

One of the main problems facing CMEA is a conflict of interest about the pricing of Soviet raw materials on the one hand and East European industrial products on the other. (Paragraph 17.)

Uneventful session of Supreme Soviet. Relatively mild speech by Mr. Kosygin. (Paragraphs 18-20.)

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Developments in the Cultural Revolution in China have dominated the Communist scene during the month. The most significant events were the lengthy Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (the first to be held for four years), the emergence of the Red Guards and indications of changes in the hitherto stable leadership hierarchy.

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(a) *The Central Committee Plenum*

2. The Plenum took place from 1–12 August. Two unusual features were that no list of names was published of those attending, and that the meeting was among the longest for some time. In fact the attendance seems to have been expanded to include, in particular, groups connected with the Cultural Revolution. In the light of subsequent changes in the hierarchy the length of the meeting suggests that there may have been some disagreement at least about the correct line on the Cultural Revolution, and possibly on economic affairs and on foreign policy as well.

3. The session published two important documents: a Decision on the Cultural Revolution on 8 August, and a communiqué on 13 August. The Decision emphasised that the targets of the present campaign were political as well as cultural, the main target being “those within the party who are in power and are taking the capitalist road”. There was no indication who these might be, or how high their position. Although a tough and uncompromising document, it also appeared to be an attempt to bring order to a confused situation and lay down clearer guidelines for the conduct of the campaign. In particular it emphasised the importance of persuasion rather than force and gave specific assurances of protection to scientists and technicians. The Cultural Revolution was to be institutionalised by setting up permanent Cultural Revolution teams, committees and congresses.

4. The communiqué dealt with both domestic and external policy. There was no evidence of any new lines of policy and the objective seems to have been rather to give blanket approval to all that Mao and the Politbureau had done over the last four years. Great emphasis was given to the part personally played by Mao in all important decisions over this period. The only other leader mentioned was the Minister of Defence, Lin Piao. The communiqué also referred to a “new all-round leap forward emerging”. This and other references to the economic situation may be setting the stage for a new economic drive later this year but it is unlikely that the new “leap” will follow the disastrous lines of the last one. On the scanty evidence available it is more likely to be a drive for increased industrial production and a tightening up of the commune system, coupled with increased emphasis on the new Chinese all-round man—the worker/peasant/soldier. This concept had received particular prominence in Mao’s instruction on the tasks of the armed forces and people, which was published on Army Day, 1 August. In this, new emphasis was placed on the role of the armed forces as “a great school” and as the model for the organisation of society.

(b) *Red Guards*

5. After the Plenum the Cultural Revolution entered a new and more dramatic phase with the appearance of the Red Guards. Their first appearance was on 18 August, when large numbers were reported as attending a rally in Peking connected with the Cultural Revolution held in the presence of Chairman Mao. At the rally Mao, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai all appeared wearing Red Guard arm bands. From 20 August groups of Red Guards rampaged throughout Peking. Essentially their activities are directed against fellow Chinese, and in particular to the eradication of bourgeois and foreign influences. A good deal of latent xenophobia, however, has come to the surface. There have been isolated cases of molestation of Soviet and East German diplomats and Roman Catholic nuns have been expelled. At first the Red Guards’ activities were confined to the relatively harmless replacement of street and shop signs. Later however their search for evidence of “bourgeois tendencies” took on a more ugly air, when houses were ransacked and people beaten up in the streets. Following the appearance of Red Guards in Peking similar groups appeared throughout all the major cities of China, but not so far in the countryside.

6. Some of the more extreme actions of the Red Guards were clearly contrary to the spirit and letter of the Decision on 8 August. At first the *People’s Daily* and other papers gave official approval to their activities, but on 28 August a further editorial appeared in the *People’s Daily* which was clearly intended to bring the Guards to order and impose greater restraint and discipline. This message was reinforced by a rally on 31 August again attended personally by Mao. Once more the Red Guards were told that persuasion was superior to force and that they should emulate the strict discipline of the People’s Liberation Army.

Since these calls for restraint there have been fewer reports of excesses by the Red Guards, although the situation was still confused by the end of the month.

7. The unleashing of the Red Guards bore the hallmarks of Mao's personal intervention. It undoubtedly was authorised by the group in charge of the Cultural Revolution, but apparently without proper warning, guidance or preparation at lower levels. There has been a good deal of evidence both to suggest that there has been disagreement within the party about the Red Guards and a great deal of confusion throughout China about the part they were intended to play. One Party Secretary in Shantung even went to the extent of calling out bands of workers to oppose the Guards. The Government Press has itself found it necessary to refer to "bad elements" infiltrating the Guards.

*(c) The leadership*

8. The published lists of leaders present at the rallies of 18 and 31 August suggested that changes have been made in the composition of the Politbureau and its Standing Committee. Most notable was the fact that the Minister of Defence, Lin Piao, appeared as No. 2 in the place normally occupied by the Chairman of the Republic, Liu Shao-Ch'i (who dropped to No. 8). Lin Piao's name has been given increasing prominence over the last year, but this is the first occasion for some months when he has appeared in public and the first for many years when he has made a speech. At the rally and in subsequent reporting Lin was treated to all intents and purposes as Mao's heir apparent, and now seems a likely candidate to succeed Mao at least as Chairman of the Party. The uncertain factor about Lin Piao is his health. His rare appearances in public over the last few years lend credence to the theory that he has been seriously ill, but at the rally of 18 August photographs showed him looking fit enough and certainly a great deal fitter than Mao himself.

9. The extent or reasons for Liu Shao-ch'i's apparent demotion remain a mystery. Although he had appeared less than usual during the past few months his position at least in July seemed to be assured. Now even his future as Chairman of the Republic is in doubt, although he has certainly not yet lost this position. Possibly Liu was opposed to an extreme form of Cultural Revolution and is suffering for it.

10. Chou En-lai retained his position at No. 3 and was the only other leader besides Mao and Lin Piao to be given great publicity at the rally. The significance of a number of other changes is not yet clear. One surprise was that Ch'en Yun, an economist who is thought to have lost favour in opposing the Great Leap Forward and who has not appeared in public since August 1962, reappeared at the rally. Mao's wife has received the position of Second-in-Command of the Cultural Revolution Group.

11. It is obviously premature to attempt to draw conclusions from a process which may well take some time to work itself out. It seems clear, however, that one of the main influences of the Cultural Revolution is Mao's determination that the process of economic development in China should not lead to the degeneration of revolutionary spirit which, he maintains, has taken place in the Soviet Union. In his attempt to restore a radical, almost fanatical, revolutionism the influence of his own revolutionary past is apparent. From outside, however, it is hard to see that this has much relevance to the real problems of the rapid economic development of China. These upheavals also raise the question whether the succession to Mao will be as smooth a process as had seemed probable before the recent shake-up in the leadership.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

12. Recent events in China have impinged on Sino-Soviet relations in three ways: the communiqué of the Chinese Central Committee Plenum placed an authoritative (and abusive) seal on the policy of relentless intransigence against revisionism and in particular on the impossibility of having "united action" with revisionists; on 22 August the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires was prevented by Red Guards from leaving in his car for the airport to bid farewell to the Zambian Vice-President; and the Chinese arranged a 30-hour anti-revisionist demonstration outside the Soviet Embassy on 29-30 August. The Soviet reaction to these events suggests that the Russians are not going to be provoked into any significant

change in their current line towards the Chinese. The most recent authoritative expression of this line was contained in Mr. Kosygin's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 3 August. He spoke in severer terms than hitherto of Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union and the services these rendered imperialism, but he repeated that the Soviet Government would continue to seek to restore friendly relations and unity.

13. The activities of the Red Guards have been factually reported in the Soviet Press, but in a tone that is at once mocking and critical. The Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a Note of protest to the Chinese about the "acts of hooliganism" on 22 August, and the Plenum communiqué was reported as containing "a number of rude and slanderous attacks on the CPSU". The main Soviet response, however, was contained in a CPSU Central Committee statement published on 31 August, which spoke of the Chinese leadership "provoking a sharp deterioration" of Sino-Soviet relations, and of the Chinese leadership's actions and statements constituting a "new and serious step". Nevertheless it ended with a declaration in favour of unity and strengthening friendship with the Chinese Communists and people.

14. Other Communist parties' reactions to developments in China seem to have taken their cue from the Soviet reaction as to timing, but in content they have generally been more critical. The East Europeans only commented officially after the publication of the Soviet Central Committee statement, although the East Germans protested in a Note about their diplomats being attacked and "exposed to excesses" in China. A feature common to much of the criticism was the point made by the Cuban Party organ *Granma*: "The Chinese are making themselves a laughing stock before the whole world. And to reach this conclusion it is not necessary to read the works of Mao." The line is also being taken that the Chinese are splitting the Communist *bloc* even further and are thus benefiting only imperialism.

#### THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE NORTH KOREAN AND JAPANESE PARTIES

15. From the Chinese point of view the most damaging reaction to their whole range of recent policies has been an article in the North Korean Party newspaper *Nodong Sinmun* on 12 August. This was both an assertion of independence and a message of support for the Japanese Communist Party which has recently been drifting away from its former allegiance to China. North Korean determination to maintain her independence *vis-à-vis* the Chinese is not new, but there had not previously been so trenchant a statement of it. The Chinese attitude to the Viet-Nam war and her refusal to contemplate any co-operation with the Soviet Union or other parties seems to be the main cause of North Korean dissatisfaction. The reiteration of this Chinese policy in the communiqué of the Central Committee Plenum, published two days after the North Korean article, will have brought the North Koreans no comfort. They have made it clear, however, that they remain opposed to revisionism, believing that this opposition can continue at the same time as anti-imperialist joint action. It was none the less noteworthy that they sent an unambiguously friendly acknowledgment to the Soviet message of greetings on the 21st Anniversary of their Liberation from Japan.

16. The article has been welcomed by the Japanese Communist Party, who have continued to assert their own independent line. Their insistence on seating a representative of the Soviet-dominated WFDY at the Gensuyiko Conference on banning nuclear weapons in Tokyo early in August led to a walk-out by delegates from 16 countries, who proceeded to Peking. As the Gensuyiko Conference and delegates to it have in recent years been Peking-orientated this was not surprising, although the JCP seem to have been taken aback by the strength of pro-Chinese feeling. But their handling of the conference was taken as further evidence of a strengthening of the leadership of the Party's Secretary-General, Miyamoto.

#### CMEA

17. The communiqué of the CMEA Council meeting in Bucharest in July gave no indication that progress had been made towards resolving the economic differences and rivalries that beset the organisation. The Soviet and East European Press have published articles which indicate that one of the most pressing

problems is the divergence of interest between the Soviet Union and its East European allies in the pricing of fuel and raw materials on the one hand and of industrial goods on the other. A revision of prices for a number of categories of intra-CMEA trade came into effect on 1 January of this year, based on the average of world prices for the period 1960-65. Subsequent articles in the Soviet Press have argued that the Soviet Union is at a disadvantage in being the main supplier of raw materials to CMEA member countries, which involves heavy investment mainly for the benefit of others. The Soviet Union would like higher prices for its raw materials and lower prices (and better quality) for East European machinery. The East European Governments for their part are anxious to ensure that since they maintain a high proportion of their trade with the Soviet Union, it should be on terms as advantageous as possible. There is unlikely to be any easy solution to the problem. Soviet pressure is bound to tell if it is consistently maintained; but it could result in increasing still further the interest of East Europeans in trade with the West.

#### SOVIET UNION: SUPREME SOVIET SESSION

18. The first session of the newly elected Supreme Soviet was brief and uneventful. There had been strong rumours beforehand that changes would be made in the Government. In the event the Government was reappointed exactly as before and there was no announcement even of the names of the heads of the new central ministries for the Preservation of Public Order and Education. This failure to announce new appointments, together with the long delay in producing the final version of the Five-year Plan, which has still not appeared, may indicate the existence of tensions in the leadership.

19. An organisational development of potential significance at the session was the increase in the number of Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet (following a suggestion by Brezhnev at the 23rd Party Congress) from four to nine for each of the two Chambers. These commissions have virtually no political influence but they will give a large number of Deputies a greater sense of participation in the affairs of Government and in the long term could come to play a more important role.

20. The remarks on foreign affairs in Mr. Kosygin's speech were noteworthy chiefly for the relative moderation of his tone in discussing relations with the West. He refrained from the usual abuse of West Germany and although he attacked the United States in customary terms over Viet-Nam, he foresaw the possibility of an improvement in Soviet-American relations if certain "healthy tendencies" in Washington were to prevail over the present "aggressive mood". (A *Pravda* editorial on 1 September, responding to President Johnson's speech at Idaho Falls, made the same point that Soviet-American relations could improve, but it insisted in harsh language that "United States aggression" in Viet-Nam must cease, and rejected President Johnson's suggestion that the Viet-Nam situation should not prevent the search for improved relations in other areas.) On home affairs, Mr. Kosygin reiterated the Government's determination to overcome obstacles to the implementation of the economic reforms. He held out a less sombre prospect for Soviet consumers than had been the case in a number of the pre-election speeches of other Soviet leaders.

#### ERRATUM

In the July issue of *Communist Policy and Tactics* the word "unlikely" in line 7 of paragraph 7 should have read "likely".

## CHRONOLOGY

- August
- 1 Plenum of Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow.  
Mao's Army Day instructions on the tasks of the armed forces and people published.
  - 1-12 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP in Peking.
  - 2-3 First session of the newly elected Supreme Soviet in Moscow.
  - 5-9 Conference of the Japan Council against atomic and hydrogen bombs (Gensuyiko) in Tokyo.
  - 8 Chinese Decision on Cultural Revolution published.
  - 12 North Korean party newspaper, *Nodong Sinmun*, published article critical of China.
  - 13 Communiqué of the Chinese Plenum published.
  - 18 Rally in Peking: first appearance of Red Guards.  
Brezhnev and Ponomarev met Italian Communist Party leaders in Moscow.
  - 18-22 Zambian goodwill mission, headed by Vice-President Kamanga, visited China.
  - 22 Soviet Chargé d'Affaires molested in Peking.
  - 22-25 Zambian goodwill mission, headed by Vice-President Kamanga, visited Moscow.
  - 24 Tass published statement denying rumours of Soviet interest in dismemberment of Nigeria.
  - 25-
  - 2 Sept. President Kekkonen of Finland spent his holiday in Soviet Union.
  - 26 Soviet Foreign Ministry sent protest Note to Chinese about incident on 22 August.
  - 29-30 Demonstration outside Soviet Embassy in Peking.
  - 30-
  - 4 Sept. Meeting of Soviet Committee for relations with writers of Asia and Africa held in Baku.
  - 31 Rally in Peking: restraint urged on Red Guards.

## ERRATUM



His Excellency  
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,  
Prime Minister

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
OF  
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
REYKJAVIK.

13 March, 1967

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TACTICS, DECEMBER 1966

MARY

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... 1-6.)

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... Communist parties have continued.

... ion from WFTU Council Meeting.

... the French Communist Party and  
... (Paragraphs 14-15.)

... The plan and budget for 1967.  
... Year Plan. Brezhnev's 60th birthday.

... Poland. Continuing trouble with intellectuals and the Church.  
... (Paragraphs 19-20.)

... Yugoslavia. Resignation of Slovene Government. Release of  
... Djilas. (Paragraphs 21-23.)

... China. The Cultural Revolution revives. Signs that it may  
... affect the economy. Riots in Macao. (Paragraphs 24-29.)

THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

In the closing weeks of 1966 the principal international preoccupation of the Soviet leaders was clearly events in China and their repercussions on the World Communist Movement. Although the month of December saw a number of high-level contacts with Western statesmen, and concern at what might happen in China may have contributed to their desire to keep their lines open towards the Western Powers, Soviet public attitudes on the major international issues displayed no signs of compromise. Certainly the passages on Viet-Nam and Germany in the resolution on foreign policy published on 13 December after the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee were in this vein.

2. It was Brezhnev who delivered the report to the Plenum. This has not been published but its title "The International Policy of the USSR and the Struggle for the Unity of the World Communist Movement" and the summary contained in the resolution indicated its main themes. A division of responsibility appears to have become established within the Soviet leadership by which Brezhnev assumes charge of International Communist relations while Kosygin and his deputies in the Government pursue more formal international contacts, especially with the West. This division is not a rigid one (Brezhnev for example has been invited to Paris, Cairo and Morocco) and it does not mean that policy is likely to be less co-ordinated than in the past.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, DECEMBER 1966

SUMMARY

Soviet foreign policy. Despite a willingness to continue contacts with the West, there was no sign of compromise on major issues, including Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 1-6.)

Criticism of China has sharpened and Soviet efforts to convene a conference of Communist parties have continued. (Paragraphs 7-12.)

Expulsion of Chinese delegation from WFTU Council Meeting. (Paragraph 13.)

Electoral Agreement between the French Communist Party and the Fédération de la Gauche. (Paragraphs 14-15.)

Soviet Union internal events. The plan and budget for 1967. Delay in production of the Five-year Plan. Brezhnev's 60th birthday. (Paragraphs 16-18.)

Poland. Continuing trouble with intellectuals and the Church. (Paragraphs 19-20.)

Yugoslavia. Resignation of Slovene Government. Release of Djilas. (Paragraphs 21-23.)

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3. Kosygin's visit to France produced no evidence of policy changes on the Soviet side and no formal agreement on political questions between the two countries. The arrangements discussed for technological co-operation could constitute an important development in bilateral relations. It was agreed that the exchanges with France would be continued by visits to Paris by Brezhnev and Podgorny and to Moscow by M. Pompidou at dates to be fixed later.

4. Kosygin's visit to Turkey, the first by a Soviet Prime Minister, produced no surprises. As in the case of the French visit the Russians were careful to maintain that the visit did not betoken hostility to any third party and there was no suggestion that Turkey should forsake her membership of NATO.

5. Although there has been no hint of a change in Soviet policy on Germany, Russian comment on the CSU-SPD coalition was at first relatively restrained. In particular, it noted that the foreign policy statements by the new German Chancellor and Foreign Minister contained some forthcoming sections on such points as the validity of the Munich Treaty. However, a strongly worded editorial in *Izvestiya* on 26 December claimed that the Federal Government was playing a double game, and singled out Herr Brandt as a subscriber to the doctrine of the "threat from the East". This hostility may be partly explained by the fact that the article dealt with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the Russians no doubt also have to take into account the attitude of Ulbricht who has been unremitting in his attacks on the new Government. There were attacks in the Soviet Press on the decision at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in mid-December to set up a nuclear planning body, but this does not seem to have inhibited Soviet readiness to work towards a non-proliferation agreement.

#### VIET-NAM

6. Communist reactions to American bombing of targets in the Hanoi vicinity were strongly worded and on predictable lines. There were official statements by most Communist Governments. The British initiative at the end of December for a meeting between the three parties to the Viet-Nam war was promptly criticised by the Soviet Press and radio. Suggestions by the Soviet and East European Governments that Hanoi should devote more efforts to its propaganda towards the outside world may have led to the decision by the North Viet-Nameese Government to allow more journalists and others from the West to visit Hanoi.

#### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

7. The major part of the resolution of the Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU dealt with relations with China. It was the first official pronouncement on the subject since the Central Committee statement of 31 August and followed the line taken in the *Pravda* editorial of 27 November in blaming "Mao Tse-tung and his group" for the anti-Soviet policy which was said to have entered a "new and dangerous stage". The resolution expressed determination to "expose" the views of the Chinese leaders and to intensify the struggle in defence of Marxism-Leninism and the general line of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow meetings.

8. The resolution endorsed the proposal for an international conference of Communist parties. However it stipulated that such a conference "must be well prepared in the course of mutual consultations among the parties". This suggests that the CPSU are taking a realistic view of the known opposition to a conference and leaving themselves a number of options if they cannot attract enough support. Obviously they would like to see a full-scale international conference, with only China and Albania absent; but in view of the opposition of a number of other important parties, including the Rumanian and Yugoslav, two alternative types of meeting could be called:

- (a) a consultative conference restricted as to participants and agenda;
- (b) a regional conference of European parties only, possibly accompanied by regional conferences in other areas.

9. The proposals for a conference were discussed during Tito's unofficial visit to Rumania from 1-3 December. The communiqué issued after the visit did not refer to the subject directly but it is reported that both Rumanian and Yugoslavia would probably reject a meeting at which China would be excommunicated or at

which Viet-Nam would be discussed in the absence of China or North Viet-Nam, although they might agree to a conference at which views only were expressed and no decision taken. The latter solution would hardly satisfy the Russians, who have made it clear publicly that they wish any conference to discuss questions of substance in order to "map out collectively the general line for the future". They would therefore be reluctant to fall back on the idea of a restricted consultative conference.

10. The third possibility, regional conferences, would not meet all the wishes of the CPSU, but might be presented as part of the preparation for a major conference. There have been further reports of plans for a conference of East and West European Communist parties to discuss European security and co-ordination of aid to Viet-Nam, although there is no firm indication as to when or where it would take place. Tito has definitely stated that Yugoslavia would oppose such a conference, and Rumania is also understood to be against it, but many other European Communist parties may regard it as the best way of deferring a decision on an international conference in 1967.

11. The Soviet and East European Press have continued to pay increased attention to developments in China and to exploit the theme that the Mao/Lin leadership has virtually forsaken Communism. This probably explains the Chinese demand for the expulsion of three Soviet correspondents from Peking on 16 December. This was denounced by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs as "an unprecedented act in relations between Soviet countries". Another incident was the expulsion on 28 December from the Chinese port of Dairen of a Soviet ship which was said by the Chinese to have infringed harbour regulations. An article in the Soviet Army paper *Red Star* emphasised the Soviet view that the influence of the army in China had increased having been purged and made the main instrument of Mao's ambition. The article contained a passage which indirectly implied that China might not help the Soviet Union in a war against the United States, but it contained nothing to justify the suggestion in some Western Press comment that it amounted to a warning against a possible Chinese attack on the Soviet Union.

12. The Chinese have left it to the Albanians to make the running in propaganda against the suggestion for an international conference, contenting themselves with reproducing Albanian articles. An editorial in the Albanian paper *Zeri i Popullit* on 29 December made a detailed defence of the Chinese "cultural revolution" and the activities of the Red Guards. This was the first evidence of wholehearted Albanian support for recent events in China.

#### WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU)

13. The General Council of WFTU at its 16th session in Sofia (6-9 December) voted by an overwhelming majority to expel the Chinese delegation from the meeting, though not from WFTU itself. Reports on the voting vary. New China News Agency of 10 December which gave the fullest account, states that eight delegations (of North Korea, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam Liberation Front, Ceylon, Indonesia, Japan, Cuba and Rumania) voted against and that others, such as Venezuela, abstained. The Chinese described the incident as "the biggest anti-Chinese scandal, unparalleled in the history of WFTU" and a statement by their Trade Union Federation (30 December) accused the WFTU of aiming to exclude them from the General Council; the statement threatened Chinese withdrawal from the WFTU unless the latter revoked the expulsion and admitted its mistakes at the next Congress (which, however, is not due until 1969). The Albanians alleged that China's expulsion at the Sofia meeting was "a prelude to the performance" the Soviet leaders may be expected to give at the proposed international Communist meeting. The Rumanian delegate underlined Rumania's neutrality in the dispute by protesting against WFTU's decision. This is the first occasion on which the Chinese have been expelled from a Communist Front meeting.

#### THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

14. The French Communist Party has reached an electoral agreement with the *Fédération de la Gauche* (Socialists, Radicals and Left-wing political clubs), led by M. Mitterand. The agreement was made possible because the Communists dropped their previous insistence on a joint programme and joint candidates in

the first round of the legislative election due to take place in March. The agreement provides for a reciprocal withdrawal in the second round in favour of the Left-wing candidate best placed to secure the maximum of votes, though each case is to be examined separately after the first round. The *Fédération de la Gauche* has reserved the right to support Republican candidates opposed to "personal rule", *i.e.*, those of the Centre-Left, which is the third principal contestant against the Gaullists' candidate. The *Fédération* thus retains considerable freedom of action. In addition, the agreement carries a statement on general principles which includes no real concessions by either side and acknowledges the existence of important differences, particularly on foreign policy.

15. What matters for the Communists, however, is not the content of the agreement but the agreement itself. For them it is an important step towards the party's return to the mainstream of French political life and they no doubt hope that it lays the foundation for continuing co-operation which, if enhanced, after the departure of General de Gaulle, might lead to eventual participation in a Government of the Left.

#### USSR INTERNAL

16. The Soviet plan and Budget for 1967, adopted at the December session of the Supreme Soviet, provide for a further advance in the consumer sector with the emphasis on consumer goods rather than services. The figures for investment, however, show that despite talk of narrowing the gap between the growth-rates of capital and consumer goods, the traditional priority of heavy industry continues to be maintained. Industrial output was claimed to have considerably exceeded the 1966 plan and is scheduled to grow at a slightly more modest rate in 1967. The defence allocation is up by over 8 per cent to a record figure of 14.5 milliard roubles. Soviet Budget figures do not indicate total expenditure on defence. The significance of the announced increase lies in the fact that the Government have chosen to show publicly that they believe the international situation requires a moderate increase in their armed strength.

17. Although the second year of the five has already begun the final version of the Five-year Plan has yet to be delivered. Only one vague, inconspicuous reference to the plan was made at the session of the Supreme Soviet. There are probably several reasons for the delay. The Russians have hinted at the complications created by the transition to the new economic system. There are also signs of continuing competition for basic resources. Congresses of Collective Farmers and of Writers announced for 1966 have also been postponed; the latter is now to take place on 22 May. In the first case this is probably due to disagreements at influential levels of the party over the degree of autonomy to be given to the farmers. There may also be disagreements over cultural policy in the aftermath of the Sinyarsky-Daniel trial.

18. Brezhnev's 60th birthday was prominently celebrated on 19 December when *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* carried large front-page photographs of him together with a joint congratulatory message from the Party Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers and greetings from East European leaders and Western Communist parties. At a ceremony in the Kremlin, Brezhnev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the USSR's highest award. The tributes were less fulsome and elaborate than for Khrushchev's 70th birthday two years ago, which may be only a reflection of the change of style in Moscow. There was sufficient fuss over Brezhnev's birthday to create the impression that he is now definitely the first among the Soviet leaders rather than one of a collection of near equals.

#### POLAND

19. Twenty-one writers, all members of the party, signed a letter at the beginning of December protesting at interference with intellectual freedom marked by the expulsion from the party of Leszek Kolakowski. This had been the result of a lecture Kolakowski gave at Warsaw University, criticising the failure of the régime to fulfil its promises of 1956. Although a high-level Party Commission tried to persuade the signatories individually to withdraw their names, they refused and at least six of them handed in their party cards. It is believed that disciplinary action has been taken against some of the others. The

dispute has been treated so far strictly as an internal party affair. The Rector of Warsaw University is reported as saying that, as far as he and the university were concerned, the incident of Kolakowski's lecture could now be regarded as closed. In view of the furore in 1964 over the letter from 34 writers, the party is perhaps unwilling to promote another well-publicised trial of strength with the intellectual community.

20. After a short lull there have been further signs of the uneasy state of Church/State relations, this time on the issue of the Catholic seminaries. When the Church refused to allow State inspectors to attend periods when religious subjects were taught, the Government ordered the immediate closure of four seminaries on the ostensible grounds of non-payment of taxes; this pretext was later changed to contravention of the education laws. The Church then issued an extraordinary Episcopal Letter calling on the faithful to unite and defeat this threat. The position remains unresolved and there is the possibility of another dispute between Cardinal Wyszynski and Mr. Gomulka.

#### YUGOSLAVIA

##### *Government crisis in Slovenia*

21. The resignation of J. Smole, Prime Minister of Slovenia, and his Government on 7 December was without precedent in post-war Yugoslavia or any other country of Eastern Europe. The basis of the dispute seems to lie in the determination of Smole (a former Governor of the Yugoslav National Bank) to carry out the Federal Government's policy of introducing economies in public spending and reducing the tax burden on industry. The Bill the rejection of which prompted Smole's resignation would have reduced the contributions of enterprises to Health Insurance and was defeated through the opposition of workers' representatives in the Social and Health Chamber of the Republican Parliament, although it is said to have been supported by the Workers' Councils in the enterprises themselves. An amended Bill has now been passed and the resignations were withdrawn on 29 December.

22. The crisis is a further illustration of the growing effectiveness of Yugoslav parliamentary institutions and perhaps also of weakness on the part of the Communist Party in Slovenia, which was evidently not in a position to prevent the dispute becoming public in the first place and whose immediate response after the event was feeble. The difficulty of pushing through economic reforms which are detrimental to particular vested interests has also been clearly demonstrated. But Smole's action was not disowned either by the Federal Government or by the local party and Socialist Alliance Organisations. The affair should be seen as a public manifestation of a difference of opinion within the party rather than a reflection of any fundamental trend towards political dissidence or opposition in the Slovenian Parliament or elsewhere.

23. The decision to release Djilas on New Year's Eve after a total of nine years' imprisonment was perhaps a logical outcome of the dropping three weeks previously of all criminal charges against ex-Vice-President Ranković and his associates, though official Yugoslav thinking seeks to establish a distinction between political dissidents of the "Left" and "Right" on the grounds that the latter have been subsidised by foreign countries through having their works published abroad. It remains to be seen whether this distinction will still be maintained against Mihajlov and his associates (criminal charges against three of whom have now been withdrawn).

#### CHINA

##### *Internal*

24. After a period of relative quiet the Cultural Revolution came to life again during December. Poster attacks naming Liu Shao-ch'i (Chairman of the Republic) and Teng Hsiao-p'ing (General Secretary of the Party) have been intensified. P'eng Chen, the former Mayor of Peking, and a number of his associates have been "arrested" by Red Guards and publicly arraigned at a rally in Peking. There have been reports that other opponents of Maoist policies, such as P'eng Te-huai (who was dismissed from the post of Minister of Defence in 1959), have also been arrested. Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, has been playing an increasingly prominent role as an interpreter of Mao's thought and policy. A new element in the campaign

which emerged in December was the increasing association of workers with the movement. Groups of workers took part in demonstrations in Peking and the Cultural Revolution is being extended in industry and the countryside.

25. A major problem facing the Chinese leadership is what to do with the students. The schools are closed until late summer; the students have already tasted blood and they may well have been suffering from the frustration of watching the Cultural Revolution apparently running into the sands. The Chinese leadership also appear to be faced with a great deal of contrived confusion organised by those who are trying to safeguard their own positions by adding to the general chaos. Faced with these problems, the leadership is to some extent obliged to keep up a head of steam on the movement in order to control it.

26. Previously a conscious effort was made to limit the effects of the Cultural Revolution to the non-productive sectors of the economy but this is no longer to be so. Even if the Chinese leadership makes great efforts to exercise strict control over the campaign, it is hard to see how it can fail to have a disruptive effect. It will be interesting to watch the attitude of the group of "administrators" such as Chou En-lai who, in the earlier days of the Cultural Revolution, were emphasising the need to prevent the movement from getting out of control and affecting industrial production.

27. The Chinese Press has produced a number of round-up articles describing achievements in the economy. These have claimed that industrial production has increased by over 20 per cent and that the harvest was the best in China's history. Such claims are difficult to accept. We believe that agriculture has done none too well in 1966 and that the grain harvest was probably in the region of 180 million tons (compared with 185 million tons in 1957 and a somewhat similar figure in 1965).

#### *Macao*

28. The riots in Macao provided a good opportunity for the Chinese to demonstrate their ability to influence events there. It is unlikely that the disturbances were provoked by the Chinese as part of a deliberate policy directed towards taking over Macao but, once the crisis had occurred, the Chinese gave full support to a series of humiliating demands made by the Left wing in Macao. They also included some demands of their own; notably that the Portuguese should hand over seven KMT agents arrested in 1963 and prevent in future any Nationalist activities in Macao.

29. There were no corresponding disturbances in Hong Kong although the Left-wing Press there predictably gave full support to their compatriots in Macao. Possibly to show that Macao was not alone in its revolutionary fervour, the Left-wing Press also started a campaign against the presence in Hong Kong of American warships. This in turn produced an echo in Peking where the New China News Agency published a similar attack on the use of Hong Kong as an "American war base".

## CHRONOLOGY

*November*

- 28- Hungarian Party Congress.
- 3 Dec.

*December*

- 1-9 Kosygin's visit to France.
- 1-3 Tito's unofficial visit to Rumania.
- 5-9 Visit of Rumanian President to Ethiopia.
- 5 Visit of Bulgarian Communist Party First Secretary, Zhivkov, to Yugoslavia.
- 6-9 WFTU Council Meeting in Sofia.
- 6-11 Visit of Czech Foreign Minister to Canada.
- 7 Meeting of Nordic Communist Parties in Stockholm.
- 8-10 20th Session of Council for Mutual Economic Aid, Sofia.
- 12-13 Plenary Meeting of Central Committee of CPSU.
- 13 Foreign Policy Resolution of CPSU Plenum.
- 15 Meeting of Supreme Soviet.
- 15-16 Plenary Meeting of Central Committee of East German SED.
- 16 Chinese order for expulsion of three Soviet journalists.
- 19 Brezhnev's 60th Birthday.
- 19-20 Plenary meeting of Central Committee of Czech CP.
- 20-27 Kosygin's visit to Turkey.
- 21-23 Rumanian CP Central Committee Plenary Meeting.
- 28 Fifth Chinese Nuclear Test.  
Expulsion by Chinese of Soviet ship.
- 31 Release of Djilas.



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His Excellency  
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,  
Prime Minister.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
OF  
EMBASSY  
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
REYKJAVIK.

5 January, 1967

TACTICS, NOVEMBER 1966

MARY

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Party Congresses in Albania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Hungarian electoral reform. (Paragraphs 19-22.)

China: Red Guards going home; attacks on leaders. (Paragraphs 23-27.)

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The Russians appear to be making a major effort to muster support for the convening of a world conference of Communist parties. At the Bulgarian Party Congress in mid-November, Todor Zhivkov proposed that a meeting should be held and declared that the necessary conditions for one were ripening. Brezhnev gave cautious, but unmistakable, support. It was clear, however, that some parties remained unenthusiastic or positively hostile. Despite this, at the end of the month Kadar reverted to the proposal at the Hungarian Party Congress and Brezhnev again supported it. A count of reactions at the end of November showed 47 parties as having expressed at least qualified support for a conference and 15 as having remained non-committal or actively opposed.

2. Opposition to a conference is largely based on the assumption that it would be directed against the Chinese, and on the argument that it could only serve further to damage the prospects of unity in the World Communist Movement. Some attempt has been made to answer these fears. It is being argued, in favour of a conference, that it is important to bring up to date the 1960 Statement of Communist Parties, to which the Chinese subscribed. At the Hungarian Congress, Kadar's speech implied that a conference might be held, attended only by those who felt the need for it, even if a number of important parties were absent. This was presumably intended to suggest that there would be no attacks on those who

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, NOVEMBER 1966

SUMMARY

The CPSU have started canvassing support for a world Communist conference. Many parties still oppose this but the Russians seem to have calculated that another attempt is worth while. Sino-Soviet polemics have sharpened on both sides. (Paragraphs 1-8.)

Soviet contacts with the West and with European neutrals continued. Progress possible on non-proliferation, but less flexibility on other issues. (Paragraphs 9-10.)

The Soviet attitude to Germany was cautious. (Paragraphs 11-12.)

The Soviet line on Viet-Nam was unchanged but propaganda against the United States was relatively restrained. (Paragraphs 13-15.)

Soviet and East European interest in the Middle East. (Paragraphs 16-17.)

Soviet internal: Stalin's image. (Paragraph 18.)

Party Congresses in Albania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Hungarian electoral reform. (Paragraphs 19-22.)

China: Red Guards going home; attacks on leaders. (Paragraphs 23-27.)

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did not attend. An editorial in *Pravda* of 27 November, just before the Hungarian Congress, should also probably be seen in the context of this discussion. This editorial contained the most comprehensive and outspoken public Soviet attack on Chinese policies since the fall of Khrushchev. It focused criticism on Mao himself "and his entourage" and developed the thesis already implicit in Soviet reporting of the "Cultural Revolution" that certain of the Chinese leaders have abandoned true Communist principles and have attacked the many elements in the Chinese Communist Party which remained loyal to orthodox Leninism. Although the editorial did not refer, in terms, to a world conference, it may have been intended to answer some of the doubts felt about a conference, by making it clear that the Soviet Union had no intention of attacking the Chinese Communist Party. At Budapest, Brezhnev declared that the conference would not be designed to excommunicate the Chinese.

3. It is difficult to see why the Soviet leaders should have decided to mount this campaign for a conference, especially since there is little evidence that it is any more popular among members of the Communist movement now than it has been in the past. The Chinese continue to discredit themselves and thus to increase their own isolation. Parties previously heavily inclined towards China, notably the North Viet-Nameese, the North Koreans and the Japanese Party, have been moving, if not into the Soviet camp—at least towards a more non-committed position. This is a gain which the Russians would surely wish to preserve; faced with pressure to choose between China and the Soviet Union the parties concerned might swing back towards Peking. Despite any disclaimers the Russians may make of an intention to use the world conference to their own advantage and to discredit the Chinese, it is clear that the Sino-Soviet dispute would be at the heart of the conference. Many parties which incline strongly towards the Russians remain reluctant to have the lines drawn at a formal meeting, since they fear that this would reverse the trend towards somewhat looser relationships with the Soviet Union and re-establish Moscow as the centre and arbiter of ideological truth and world Communist policy. This factor remains as before. On the present count, seven ruling Communist parties (China, Albania, Rumania, North Viet-Nam, North Korea, Cuba and Yugoslavia) would stay away from the conference. Other ruling parties, including several in Europe, and a large number of non-ruling parties, are far from enthusiastic.

4. It would be surprising if the Russians had miscalculated the probable reaction of other parties. It is possible that as relations between the Soviet Union and China have deteriorated, and on a calculation that a struggle for power within China will develop, the Russians felt that it was time to make another attempt to rally the parties. They may have reckoned that this open discussion of the idea of a meeting would in itself do something to crystallise world Communist opinion against China, and possibly serve as an encouragement to those in China who are presumed to be opposed to Mao and faithful to what the Russians regard as orthodox Leninism. It is also possible that the Russians discounted the damage to their own authority which might result from another unsuccessful attempt to get a world meeting, and reckoned that if they came up against strong opposition they would be able to keep the idea of a conference in play while postponing the point of actual decision. They may also have had in mind, as a fall back position, a conference on a regional basis; there have been rumours of a meeting of European Communist parties.

5. Another element may well be that with the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution coming next year, the Soviet leaders feel a particular need for an up-to-date document setting the international Communist line. They did of course commit themselves to eventually holding a conference at the preparatory meeting in 1965. They may calculate that unless a conference is held fairly soon, their own standing and authority as leaders of the World Communist Movement may be eroded.

6. All of this adds up to saying that the arguments for and against a new attempt at a world conference must have seemed strong and that to an outside observer it may well seem doubtful whether the Russians have made the right choice in deciding to make the attempt.

7. A new occasion for Soviet criticism of events in China was provided by the early return to Moscow of the "friendship" delegation which had been sent

to China by the Soviet Union in connection with the October Revolution celebrations. There were accusations that both sides had used the visit to attack each other's policies. A noticeable development in November was the increase in the attacks by East European countries on China and *vice versa*. Criticism in Zhivkov's report at the Bulgarian Party Congress was one example; another was the exchange of notes between Hungary and China about the Hungarian expulsion of Chinese students as a reprisal for the Chinese stopping courses for all foreign students.

8. The Albanian Party Congress took place from 1-8 November. It had been preceded by speculation that the Chinese would take the opportunity to set up their own "International". Despite vague references to the idea in Hoxha's speech, this did not materialise. There is no evidence that this is current Chinese policy and the attendance of representatives of the North Viet-Nameese, North Korean and Rumanian parties in Tirana (although a minor success for Albanian prestige) probably inhibited further discussions of this theme. The Congress was largely used for attacks on the Soviet Union in standard terms.

#### EAST/WEST RELATIONS

9. Although the dispute with China and relations with the other Communist parties were the principal international preoccupations of the Soviet leaders during November, they continue to keep open and to extend their lines of communication with the West. During the month the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Norway visited Moscow. Mr. Voronov, a member of the Politburo, was chosen to lead the parliamentary delegation which spent over two weeks in the United Kingdom. It was announced that Mr. Kosygin, whose programme for December includes visits to France and Turkey, was to pay his official visit to London at the beginning of February. The prospects of concluding an agreement on non-proliferation appeared to be reasonably good. Agreement was all but concluded on the treaty for the banning of nuclear weapons in outer space. In general the increased flexibility in Soviet positions which was noted in October was sustained but it was not extended, and in other issues no progress was made. The Soviet refusal, during the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow, to take part in a meeting of scientists to discuss means of identifying underground explosions suggested that the Russians were not so interested as had been hoped in proceeding to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

10. The Soviet leaders have also been pursuing their relations with neutral European countries. Visits were exchanged with Finland. The new Social Democrat Prime Minister, Mr. Paasio, visited Moscow from 15-19 November, and the value that the Soviet Union attaches to Communist participation in the Finnish Government was further underlined by the visit to Finland earlier in the month, of an unexpectedly high-powered Soviet Communist Party delegation led by Mr. Suslov, a senior Politburo member. From both visits it appears that the Soviet Government has reconciled itself to the Finnish Social Democrat Party which returned to lead the present Coalition Government in May 1966 after eight years out of power. President Podgorny's visit to Austria does not seem to have been an unqualified success. He made clear Soviet hostility to Austrian association with the EEC and the Russians have attempted to reinforce their representations on this by offering prospects of greater trade opportunities.

#### SOVIET ATTITUDE TO GERMANY

11. The general trend of Soviet Press comment on the political situation in Germany during the month was cautious. On the CDU/SPD coalition the line was that the Opposition to the Government by the Social Democrats had previously been "a matter of form", but that there were elements in the SPD anxious to change the policies of the previous Administration. Comment on the Hesse and Bavarian election results took the predictable line that the NPD successes were eloquent proof of increased "revanchist" tendencies in the Federal Republic. But this theme was not played up as much as might have been expected. That the Russians are ready to probe possibilities of better relations with Federal Germany was suggested by the private meetings which took place before the formation of the new Government in Bonn between Herr Brandt and the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin, though these were probably a source of some embarrassment to

the East German régime. The caution in Soviet comment on German matters is likely to continue at least until they have been able to evaluate the attitude of individual German leaders and of the new Government as a whole.

12. The situation is further complicated by the conflict of interest among the Soviet Union's East European allies on improving relations with the Federal Republic. It is probable that this was one of the subjects discussed at the meeting of Communist leaders in Moscow in October, but there is still a wide gap between the views represented on the one hand by the Poles, who are reported to have been pressing their allies not to establish further links with West Germany without a firm German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, and on the other by the Rumanians who would like to establish full diplomatic relations.

#### VIET-NAM AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES

13. The Soviet Press has continued to reiterate support for North Viet-Nam's Four and the National Liberation Front's Five Points. Both in private and in public the Soviet leaders have continued to emphasise the need for the United States to end the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a precondition for progress. This has also been pressed by East European countries although none of them has been prepared to give any guarantee that an end to the bombing would in fact lead to any change in Hanoi's position.

14. This public criticism of the United States has not however prevented an agreement for the raising of the status of Missions to Embassy rank being reached at the end of November, between the United States and Hungary and Bulgaria.

15. Soviet comment on the United States elections were relatively restrained although Democrat losses were described as showing public lack of confidence in the Great Society. Although some publicity maintained that the results represented popular opposition to the Viet-Nameese war, in conversations the Russians have not taken this line.

#### SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH MIDDLE EAST

16. A delegation led by Field-Marshal Amer, the First Vice-President of the UAR, visited the Soviet Union from 22-27 November. The importance of the visit was stressed by the inclusion in the delegation of the Ministers of Planning and Defence and by the Navy and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief. (Amer is himself the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.) Although this suggests that military matters loomed large on the agenda, there are indications that one of Amer's prime concerns was to discuss the possibility of the Soviet Union providing the UAR with wheat if the United States refuses to resume the supply of American wheat on PL 480 terms. This year's excellent grain harvest would make this possible. But although the Soviet Government might be prepared at least to make some deliveries to make it easier for Nasser to take a tough line with the United States they could have no wish to take over the whole responsibility. They need to build up their own reserves.

17. The visit of the Syrian Prime Minister and delegation to Prague at the end of November carried the refurbishing and expansion of Syria's relations with the Soviet bloc a stage further. On their side the Czechs, possibly at the instance of the Russians, have been showing a renewed interest in the "revolutionary" Arab States, the UAR and Iraq, which it has recently been Soviet policy to bring together. The Czechs may give assistance in the form of arms and aid for the Euphrates Dam. Although no formal communiqué was issued the Syrian Prime Minister in an interview subscribed to the general "anti-imperialist" line on the international scene; the Czechs endorsed extreme Syrian views of Middle East issues.

#### SOVIET INTERNAL

18. There is further evidence of a cautious effort partially to refurbish Stalin's reputation as a political and military leader. The published text of a speech by Brezhnev in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, on 1 November noted the applause which greeted his reference to Stalin's early revolutionary activity in Tbilisi; and articles in the central Press have brought out Stalin's contribution to the Revolution, and his closeness to Lenin. An extract from a 1928 book by Theodore Dreiser, published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, depicted Stalin as a revolutionary idealist

concerned about humanity and the individual. Yet other articles gave Stalin full credit for the decision to hold a military parade in Red Square on 7 November, 1941, when Moscow was threatened by the advancing German Army. The parade, and Stalin's speech were described by Marshal Budenny (*Izvestiya*) as a "turning point in the psychological attitude of the masses". These favourable references to Stalin (which though still limited contrasted with the official silence of the past 10 years) indicate how the Soviet leaders, or a section of them, think they can most effectively strike a better balance about the past. Concentration on the positive features of Stalin's rule, which spanned over half of the entire period of Soviet history, may also be thought a necessary preparation for next year's 50th anniversary celebrations: Khrushchev is likely to remain unmentionable; and the Soviet leaders may have felt that it would be too unpalatable to present a picture of 50 glorious years in which the Soviet Union had suffered execrable leadership in all but the first seven and the last two.

## EAST EUROPE INTERNAL

*Albania*

19. At the 5th Albanian Workers' Party Congress it was claimed that the new Five-year Plan would transform Albania, with Chinese aid, into an industrialised country. The need for self-sufficiency and reliance on Albania's own resources, a theme borrowed from China, was stressed by several speakers. In the political field, although the Albanians avoided too whole-hearted commendation of events in China, their promotion of an "ideological and cultural revolution" showed some wish to emulate Chinese methods or some need to show loyalty.

*Bulgaria*

20. In his report to the Ninth Bulgarian Communist Party Congress Todor Zhivkov claimed that by 1970 Bulgaria would have become an economically developed, industrial nation. He criticised planners who still used old methods; a transformation of the work of the central planning authorities is to be initiated. The National Assembly is to exercise more control over legislation, as are the regional councils, and it was stated that a new Constitution would be drawn up in line with these changes. The newly elected and enlarged Politburo maintained a balance of the older and younger generations. The most important change involved the former head of the Party Commission on Ideological and Cultural Questions, Mitko Grigorov, who was not re-elected to the Council of Ministers in March. His departure from both Politburo and Secretariat remains unexplained. Todor Zhivkov was re-elected and thus continues in the dual role of First Secretary and Prime Minister.

*Hungary*

21. On 11 November the Hungarian National Assembly passed a new electoral law. The main innovations will be the replacement of large county-size constituencies, electing a number of deputies on block lists, by smaller constituencies represented by single members; the broadening of the preliminary nomination meetings so that voters may have a choice of candidates; and provision of practical means for the recall of unsatisfactory members. Since the nomination procedures will continue to be administered by the Patriotic People's Front, there is unlikely to be any loosening of party control. The new law appears to be a genuine, if cautious, attempt to increase public interest and participation in the working of Parliament.

22. The same concern for stimulating wider participation in public life and interest in the economic reforms was evident at the Ninth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party. No significant changes in the leadership were announced at the Congress. Discussion centred on how the party should fulfil its new general supervisory role over the economy, without reverting to the kind of detailed interference by the central authorities which the reforms are designed to reduce. A clear conflict appeared between the drive for economic efficiency and the need to maintain the status of the party.

## CHINA INTERNAL

23. With the eighth mass rally of Red Guards on 25-26 November, described as the last of the year, the Cultural Revolution appears to be coming

to the end of a stage, although the campaign as a whole is far from over. This has both practical and political causes. Peking in winter must have daunted many Red Guards from South China. Over 11 million Red Guards who have visited Peking since August have also created problems of accommodation and feeding. From now until next spring free travel will be in one direction only: homewards. Large numbers have already left Peking and it is likely that demonstrations and poster war will now diminish.

24. Politically the situation has also cooled. During November there were no new important political announcements and for the past few weeks the *People's Daily* has been empty of anything significant. The reason for this is not yet clear. Those directing the Cultural Revolution may well have under-estimated the influence of those whose main interest is the efficiency of the State and party machinery. There may be now a stalemate in the leadership between the "moderates" and "extremists" resulting in an agreement that for the present attention must be focused on affairs of State.

25. Alternatively we may now be witnessing the conclusion of that stage in the Cultural Revolution during which the emphasis has been on widespread criticism of "bourgeois" personalities and features of society. This stage, which has broadly coincided with the most intensive Red Guard activity, can be seen as a sequel to the first period, during which the "real enemies", the chief critics of Mao in the party, were removed. There will probably now be a period during which the leadership will evaluate the criticism before proceeding to concrete reforms. It is impossible to forecast what form these changes will take; they may involve alterations in the party machinery, to prevent a recurrence of the sort of "revisionist" failings which have alarmed Mao. Or reform may mean more simply a closer check on personalities in the party, to ensure that leaders at all levels maintain their "correct" outlook.

26. The Red Guards have been told that "revolutionary activities" will start again in the spring and posters have quoted Chou En-lai as saying that schools will remain closed until the late summer. These activities may well take a somewhat different form. Preparations are already in train for a campaign next year of symbolic "Long Marches", involving groups of Red Guards marching throughout the countryside, spreading propaganda. Trial marches have already taken place. This will provide fewer opportunities for the students to take part in mass demonstrations and poster attacks on leading party and Government officials but its effect on the countryside and the peasants remains to be seen.

27. Nominally the hierarchy remains as before but there are still some unsolved mysteries. Posters attacking by name Liu Shao-chi' and Teng Hsiao-ping have increased in number and this may be a preparation for their formal replacement as Chairman of the State and Party Secretary respectively. Both have however continued to appear in their usual places at mass rallies, although neither has been carrying out any official functions. Possibly it has been agreed that they should not be removed completely from the higher party organs. The other puzzle is Li Hsüeh-feng, First Secretary of the Peking Party, who has shown remarkable powers of survival under sustained poster attacks. Although he failed to appear at the most recent mass rally, he had attended all previous ones before 12 November. It may only be possible to tell what final readjustments have been made in the leadership if a Party or National Congress is held. There continue to be rumours that one or other is in the offing but neither has been officially announced.

## CHRONOLOGY

31 Oct.- Visit of Soviet party delegation led by Suslov and Ponamarev to Finland.  
4 Nov.

*November*

- 1-7 Albanian party Congress
- 3 6th Mass Rally in Peking.
- 5-9 Canadian Secretary of External Affairs visited Poland.
- 7 October Revolution Anniversary.
- 9-13 Canadian Secretary of External Affairs visited USSR.
- 10 7th Mass Rally in Peking.
- 14-17 Meeting of representatives of Warsaw Pact Armies in Budapest.
- 14-21 Soviet President Podgorny's visit to Austria.
- 14-18 Bulgarian party Congress.
- 14-25 Visit of United Kingdom Secretary of State for Education and Science to USSR.
- 14-25 Visit of Finnish Prime Minister to USSR.
- 15-29 Visit to United Kingdom of Soviet parliamentary delegation.
- 18-23 President Novotny's goodwill visit to India.
- 22-27 First Vice-President of UAR visited USSR.
- 22-25 Informal visit of United Kingdom Foreign Secretary to USSR.
- 25-26 8th Mass Rally in Peking.
- 27 *Pravda* editorial "On the Events in China".
- 28 Nov. Hungarian party Congress.
- 3 Dec.
- 29 United States Legations in Bulgaria and Hungary raised to Embassies.

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**COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, JANUARY 1966**

**SUMMARY**

Reassertion of Soviet activity in Asia: the Tashkent meeting; Shelepin's visit to Hanoi; Brezhnev's visit to Mongolia; Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to Moscow. (Paragraphs 1-6.)

Sino-Soviet relations: impending Soviet attack? (Paragraphs 7-8.)

The Tri-Continental Conference in Havana. The Chinese do better than the Russians, and Castro may be the most satisfied of all. (Paragraphs 9-11.)

Eastern Europe: Church-State relations in Poland. (Paragraphs 12-13.)

Communism in Western Europe: the Italian and Finnish Communist Parties Congresses. (Paragraphs 14-16.)

Chinese economic prospects. Political primacy in military affairs. (Paragraphs 17-18.)

Soviet Union internal. The trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel. A commission for collective farms. (Paragraphs 19-20.)

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**THE SOVIET UNION AND ASIA**

The beginning of 1966 found the Soviet Union involved in a number of diplomatic and party activities in Asia, which, although their timing may have been coincidental rather than deliberate, amounted to an impressive demonstration of Soviet determination to reassert their influence in that continent. How far it was consciously an attempt to encircle China, as the Chinese themselves have maintained, only time will tell. Russian interest and influence in Asia has historical and geo-political roots that owe nothing to Communism. Her intention to get off the hook of South-East Asian affairs in the later years of Khrushchev's reign was a temporary phenomenon, brought on mainly by Khrushchev's awareness of the limitations of his ability to influence events there and his fear that a heavy commitment in the area might prejudice his foreign policy aims elsewhere. The reversal of this policy by his successors was marked by Kosygin's visit to the Far East in February 1965. The summer of 1965 saw the implementation of a conscious Soviet "good neighbour" policy towards her southern neighbours. The Soviet role in bringing India and Pakistan together at the Tashkent Conference can be seen partly as a continuation of that policy, partly as designed to increase her status in the Afro-Asian movement, and partly as a response to the increase in China's disruptive influence in the sub-continent. Other Soviet activities in Asia during the month—Shelepin's visit to Hanoi, Brezhnev's to Mongolia, and the visit to Moscow of the Japanese Foreign Minister—can all be related in one way or other to the continuation of a policy of greater involvement in Asia and to the increasing bitterness of the Soviet dispute with China.

**THE TASHKENT MEETING**

2. The signature of the Indo-Pakistani Declaration in Tashkent on 10 January brought to a successful conclusion the conference held under Soviet auspices, the outcome of which had hung in the balance until the last moment.

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That both sides should agree to withdraw their troops within a specified time limit to positions held prior to the serious outbreak of hostilities in August and should pledge themselves to restore normal peaceful relations and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples was in no small part due to the patient diplomacy of the Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, and his Foreign Minister, Gromyko. The main Soviet motives in seeking to bring the two sides together were threefold: Soviet interests were threatened by two major Powers feuding on her southern border; the continuation of the conflict could only serve to drive Pakistan even closer to the Chinese, whose influence there the Russians were already striving to counteract by their "good neighbour" policy; and the Soviet Union's image as a peacemaker and as a world Power exercising a constructive influence would be enhanced if the meeting succeeded and she would get some credit for trying even if it failed. The successful pursuit of Soviet self-interest in this case has broadly coincided with Western interests that peace and an atmosphere of co-operation should be restored to the sub-continent. Inevitably, however, Soviet propaganda has sought to exploit the situation. Apart from an understandable measure of self-congratulation, emphasis has been laid on the Soviet Union as a Socialist as well as an Asiatic Power co-operating disinterestedly in finding a solution for conflicts left behind by the British colonialists. The settlement (minimal as it is) has been held up as a model for others in future: new initiatives by the Soviet Government and new invitations to mediate are to be expected. The Tashkent meeting has also been cited by the Russians as a contribution to the unity of the forces opposed to imperialism and as an example of Soviet support to the national liberation movement. The Chinese, in so far as they gave any publicity to the meeting at all, viewed it as "crude pressure" on Pakistan, the continuation of Soviet support for "Indian reactionaries" and an exercise in pushing the line of "peaceful co-existence" in order to blunt the struggle against imperialism in Asia and Africa.

#### VIET-NAM

3. The communiqué issued at the conclusion of Shelepin's visit to Hanoi did not suggest any shift in the essential positions of either side. References to the talks having taken place "in an atmosphere of fraternal mutual understanding", to mere "discussion" of matters of mutual concern and to the "exchange of views" on the escalation of the war by the United States are not, in Communist jargon, indicative of any meeting of minds. A new aid agreement was signed, and the Viet-Nameese expressed gratitude for the "great and valuable" Soviet assistance and for their "powerful" support for the Viet-Nameese liberation struggle. But in their speeches and in the Press the Viet-Nameese were careful to balance such expressions of gratitude to the Russians with acknowledgement to the Chinese for their encouragement and assistance. The inclusion in the communiqué of a reference to the Viet-Nameese acceptance of an invitation to send a party delegation to the Soviet Party Congress (which would normally be a matter of routine and hardly merit attention) suggests that the Russians may have had difficulty in persuading the Viet-Nameese to commit themselves and wanted to make the commitment irreversible. The Russians no doubt regard the task of increasing their influence in Hanoi as a long-term one. To a certain extent the continuation of the war may serve this end, since it is likely to increase Hanoi's dependence on them. Unlike the North Viet-Nameese and Chinese, however, the Russians were slow to commit themselves against the United States' "peace initiative", or to condemn the bombing pause as a fraud. Apart from a sceptical comment by Brezhnev in Mongolia, their first authoritative comment on these subjects was in the Soviet Government statement issued the day after the United States had resumed the bombing. Despite the generally pessimistic impression left by Kosygin after his meetings with Vice-President Humphrey and Dean Rusk in Delhi on the occasion of the funeral of Premier Shastri, Russian interest in negotiations has probably not diminished.

4. Nothing on the other hand has occurred to indicate that the Chinese and North Viet-Nameese are any more inclined to contemplate a negotiated settlement. The Chinese Press sought to show that Shelepin's visit was in some way connected with the United States peace initiatives, which they wholeheartedly condemned. The letter dated 24 January addressed by Ho Chi Minh in essentially similar

terms to a number of Heads of State in Communist, neutralist and Western countries alike was designed in part to give an impression of reasonableness and to counter any favourable effect United States initiatives may have had generally. But its terms for a negotiated settlement remained as unacceptable as before, and it insisted in forthright terms that the United States must recognise the South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front as the "sole, genuine representative of the people of South Viet-Nam and engage in negotiations with it".

#### BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO MONGOLIA

5. The ostensible reason for the week-long visit to Mongolia (12-17 January) of a high-powered Soviet delegation led by Brezhnev and including the First Deputy Prime Minister and Presidium member Mazurov, the Party Secretary responsible for intra-*bloc* relations Andropov, the Foreign Minister Gromyko, and the Defence Minister Marshal Malinovsky, was the renewal of the Soviet/Mongolian Friendship Treaty for a further 20 years. But the size and weight of the delegation and the importance given to the visit in the Soviet Press can be seen as a firm warning to China that Mongolia is in the Soviet sphere of influence and will stay there. The wording of the treaty was in no way unusual. It included a defence clause—a feature common to the Friendship Treaties the Soviet Union has with her other allies. In the Mongolian case this provided for mutual assistance in ensuring each country's defence capacity and for the taking of all necessary measures, including military ones, in order to ensure the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries. But an article discussing the treaty by Marshal Rokossovsky in *Izvestiya* on 26 January underlined the obvious point that this clause meant a Soviet guarantee to Mongolia against the only possible threat—China—by harping on the historical aid given by the Soviet Union to the Mongolian Communist Party against "Chinese militarists".

#### SOVIET/JAPANESE RELATIONS

6. The visit to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shiina, from 16-22 January was the first such visit by a Japanese Foreign Minister for 10 years and was the culmination of a year in which Soviet/Japanese relations have developed considerably. The Soviet attitude towards Japan has become much more friendly and there has been a marked increase in bilateral contacts, particularly commercial ones, despite the continuing obstacles of a territorial dispute over Soviet occupation of certain northern islands, the Japanese/United States Security Treaty and the recent treaty between Japan and South Korea about which the Russians have been conducting a hostile propaganda campaign. Little progress seems to have been made on the territorial question, but the Russians did not apparently press their objections to the closeness of Japanese relations with the United States. In practical terms the visit produced a new five-year trade agreement, which envisages a trade turnover between the two countries of more than 2,000 million roubles over the next five years, and which, according to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, does not exhaust the possibilities of further development. Further commercial talks are to be held between the two sides in Tokyo, at which possibilities of Japanese participation in the economic development of Siberia may be explored. Press reports of massive exploitation of the area with Japanese capital are grossly exaggerated, but there is probably scope for some sort of mutually advantageous co-operation. The other practical result of the visit was a Soviet/Japanese Air Agreement providing for commercial overflights of Siberia between Tokyo and Moscow in Soviet aircraft leased from Aeroflot and run jointly with them by Japanese Airlines. The Japanese have not managed to obtain from the Russians any specific commitment on when they may be allowed to use their own aircraft for such flights. The Chinese reaction to the visit was to represent it as one more link in the chain of Soviet/United States encirclement.

#### SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

7. The Chinese reaction to the manifestations of Soviet activity in Asia discussed above was summed up in an "Observer" article in the *People's Daily* of 2 February, entitled "who is the Soviet leadership taking united action with?" Basing itself on some remarks of Vice-President Humphrey on television about his

meeting in Delhi with Kosygin, it argued that the Soviet Union was collaborating with the United States in a policy of encircling China. It repeated the charge that the Soviet policy of "appeasement" in Europe enabled the United States to transfer troops to South-East Asia, which Shelepin had indirectly answered in Hanoi by pointing out the deep Soviet engagement in Europe and emphasising the dangers of the European situation. Earlier in January the Chinese had reverted to the contentious question of delays in the transit of Soviet supplies to Viet-Nam by revealing in their Press that they had made three attempts to deliver memoranda to the Russians refuting Soviet allegations on the subject, all of which the Russians had rejected. This, the Chinese said, inevitably led to a worsening of State relations. It is worth noting incidentally that the Chinese have increased the Russian broadcasts in their winter schedules from 63 to 105 hours a week.

8. Chinese fears of a forthcoming offensive against them were given substance by reports from Moscow at the end of the month that a document prepared by the Central Committee of the CPSU on Sino/Soviet relations was being circulated to and discussed by local party organisations in the Soviet Union in anticipation of the Party Congress. According to these reports the Russians are now preparing to argue that the Chinese have extended the dispute from the ideological to the national level, and that their activities constitute a political threat to world Communism, more dangerous than earlier deviations such as Trotskyism. Since the reports have clearly been deliberately leaked by the Russians their general gist is probably accurate. This would mean that the Russians are hoping to provide a more persuasive argument than either the call for unity or the needs of Viet-Nam to rally the overwhelming majority of Communist parties behind them. Nevertheless, their whole approach to the problem of Sino/Soviet relations since the fall of Khrushchev suggests that even now they will act with restraint and caution; they will be most reluctant to seem to be responsible for closing the door to possibilities of eventual reconciliation.

#### THE TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE IN HAVANA

9. The Tri-Continental Conference which took place in Havana from 4-15 January, while being no substitute for the postponed Afro-Asian Conference planned for Algiers since its delegates were mainly non-governmental, presented a major occasion for a confrontation of the Soviet and Chinese points of view. In contrast to the general trend throughout the past few months, the Chinese seem to have fared rather better than the Russians. The resolutions passed by the conference tended to reflect Chinese rather than Soviet influence, notably in the pitch of the attacks on the designated main enemy, the United States. But the principal Chinese achievement was to thwart, at least for the time being, a Soviet attempt to establish a permanent tri-continental organisation in Cairo, which the Russians doubtless hoped would absorb or replace the existing Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation there, and would be more amenable to their views through the injection of a basically pro-Soviet Latin American element. The Chinese succeeded in playing on Castro's emotions and ambitions to gain support for the establishment of a temporary tri-continental organisation in Havana. The Russians have lost a trick, but not the game. They won some credit for their avoidance of polemics and succeeded in having a resolution on "peaceful co-existence" passed against Chinese opposition. Their failure over organisational questions was due to ineffective, and perhaps complacent, leadership.

10. Castro may well be the person most satisfied with the conference's outcome. Besides the temporary tri-continental secretariat, Havana is to be the permanent home of a Latin American Solidarity Organisation with the stated aim of providing maximum support for national liberation movements and waging a campaign against United States imperialism, and of a committee for assistance and aid to the movement of national liberation, composed like the tri-continental secretariat of members from each continent. In his bellicose closing speech, Castro called for a widespread second front against the United States in Latin America to relieve pressure on Viet-Nam. Although this seemed to represent a departure from the closer Cuban co-operation with Soviet policy in Latin America over the past year, his criticism of Chinese commercial policy towards Cuba in his opening speech showed that a display of independence did not imply any move towards China.

11. Whether some of the ardour and enthusiasm for the anti-imperialist fight survives outside the emotional atmosphere of the conference remains to be seen, but the resolutions may result in some improvement in the organisational and financial mechanics for agitation and subversion, particularly in Latin America.

#### EASTERN EUROPE: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN POLAND

12. The withholding of Cardinal Wyszynski's passport on the eve of his departure to attend the celebration in Rome on 13 January of the millenium of Christianity in Poland was the first occasion on which his freedom to visit Rome had been restricted since his release from house arrest in 1956. This move followed the violent campaign belatedly initiated by the Polish Party Press against the exchange of letters between the Polish and German bishops, which contained expressions of mutual forgiveness for the past wrongs which each country had inflicted on the other. One of the régime's motives in launching this campaign, and in withholding the Cardinal's passport, may have been to impede a visit by Pope Paul to Poland's millenium celebrations in May which has been the subject of widespread rumours. The travel ban may also affect the Cardinal's plans to visit the United States in the autumn.

13. The Press campaign attacking the messages concentrated largely on the tone of what the Polish bishops had said about the German question, and on their daring to ask the Germans, of all people, for forgiveness. Gomulka's subsequent personal intervention in the dispute, however, was to attack the bishops for their bourgeois language, and their apparent identification of Poland with the West. He admitted that the bishops probably did not want to give away the western territories to Germany and that the majority of Poles were believers; but he added that although the State and party make no difficulties about religious freedom they would vigorously fight any political activity directed against the interests of the Polish people, and that was why Cardinal Wyszynski had been refused his passport. The whole episode seems to have been clumsily inflated by the Polish party, but serves as a reminder of their sensitivity to anything that might be interpreted as "bridge building" under auspices other than their own.

#### COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

##### (a) *Italian Communist Party Congress*

14. The 11th Congress of the Italian Communist Party, and the first since the death of Togliatti, was held in Rome from 25-31 January. The party is mainly concerned to end the current Centre-Left alliance in Italian politics by means of its proposals for economic reform, and also its own isolation, which has recently been increased by progress towards the reunification of the Nenni Socialists (PSI) and the Social Democratic Party (PSDI). The party will continue to pursue united front tactics, but the proposal for a united workers' party of the Left, put forward in 1964 by Amendola, one of the contenders for Togliatti's mantle, and endorsed in diluted form by the Central Committee against continued opposition led by Ingrao, received less attention than might have been expected in the main report by the party's Secretary-General, Longo. References to the Italian way to Socialism were also fewer than usual. Instead, Longo concentrated on appealing for a Communist/Catholic dialogue. His praise for the foreign policy of the Holy See, in particular the proposals for peace in Viet-Nam, was accompanied by assurances of Italian Communist opposition to State atheism, as well as to State religion. Longo appears to have succeeded in ensuring that the party leaders presented a united front to the Congress and his own position as leader may have been strengthened. Amendola and Ingrao were dropped from the Secretariat but not from the Central Committee; they were also made members of a new nine-member political office. Those who wish to extend the limits of dissent were not encouraged to state their views; factionalism, intrigue and hypocrisy within the party were criticised by Pajetta, a member of the Central Committee, and Ingrao was criticised in particular for his dissident views about a unified Left-wing party. It therefore seems unlikely that existing divisions within the party will be lessened. Although the PCI's attitude to a world Communist conference remains ambivalent, the leader of the Soviet party delegation to the Congress, Suslov, will have welcomed a strong attack on Chinese policy by Longo: the Chinese themselves stayed away.

*(b) Finnish Communist Party Congress*

15. There has been increasing criticism in the Finnish Communist Party of the conservative leadership, who, unlike their colleagues in other Scandinavian Communist parties, have made no concessions to the hopes of younger members for a measure of democracy within the party and greater autonomy within the international Communist movement. At the 14th Party Congress held in Helsinki from 29 January to 1 February, some account has been taken of this criticism. Aimo Aaltonen and Oiva Lehto have been replaced as chairman and vice-chairman by Aarne Saarinen and Erkki Salomaa respectively, both trade unionists. Although Ville Pessi has retained his position as Secretary-General, the younger and more liberal elements of the party are better represented than before on the Central and Political Committees. During the congress there was much talk of adapting the party to changed conditions, although no decisions were in the end taken on whether there should be changes in the party rules or programme.

16. Pessi reaffirmed the importance of developing united action in the working-class movement. This, combined with the changes mentioned above, may improve in some degree the party's chances in the elections in March, at least in the sense that the SKDL (the parliamentary front comprising Communists and fellow-travellers) may not lose votes as substantially as at one time seemed possible. With 47 seats out of 200 the SKDL is at the moment the second largest party in the Diet, although Communists have been excluded from office since 1948. The Social Democrat leaders have resisted Communist overtures to form a united front, but if, as appears likely, they increase the number of seats (38) they hold and are invited to join a coalition with the Centre Party, the Soviet Union may exert strong pressure for Communist inclusion in the Government as well.

## CHINA INTERNAL

17. The New Year was hailed in Chinese newspapers as the first year of China's "great Third Five-year Plan", but no details have been released of either past economic performances or concrete targets for the Five-year Plan, nor are there any signs of either the National People's Congress or a Party Congress being convened, which would be a normal preliminary to an economic drive of this kind. The Chinese Press, however, has made quite clear the general lines which will be followed, at any rate during the early stages of the Third Five-year Plan. Politics will take first place relative to economic work. The emphasis on agricultural production will be maintained and intensified. In industry "efforts will be made" to build some new enterprises, to strengthen national defence work, basic industry, communications and transport, and to improve the distribution of industry in the country. The "Socialist education" campaign will be continued and further intensified in all fields. The need to increase the production of raw materials and other materials, fuels, electricity, major machinery and electrical equipment, and to increase grain and cotton production and take precautions against "natural calamities" is also emphasised. It is admitted that Chinese agriculture is still not strong enough to withstand the latter and that there are still "quite a number of weak links" in China's industry, transport and capital construction. The Chinese people's inspiration in a continuing hard struggle is to be self-reliance and defence of the revolution and the action against the threats of "revisionism" and "imperialism". The impression left is that China is entering the period of the Third Five-year Plan with many problems yet unsolved, in spite of the leaders' claim that "a new upsurge in the national economy" has been organised over the past two years. Obviously, the agricultural situation is still far from satisfactory and there are serious shortcomings on the industrial front, particularly in the extractive and power-producing industries.

18. An example of the conflicts created by political primacy was provided in the military sphere by a report published in the Chinese Press of a conference on political work in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by the Director of the General Political Department of the PLA, Hsiao Hua. His account made clear that there is still a certain amount of resistance to absolute party control within China's armed forces, and that some people would still prefer more attention to be paid to up-to-date weapons than to "millet and rifles". There is, however, no reason to think that there is serious opposition to the party on this issue. The issue of the supremacy of politics over military affairs was settled in 1959, when those who doubted it were dismissed.

## SOVIET UNION INTERNAL

*(a) The trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel*

19. Over four months ago news leaked out from Soviet literary circles that two Soviet writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel, had been identified by the Soviet authorities as being the authors who had published in the West material critical of Soviet conditions under the pseudonyms of Terz and Arzhak. A Press campaign has now been opened against them including a vicious article in *Izvestiya* and the publication of letters from the provinces demanding in sharp language that the two writers should be brought to trial. *Literaturnaya Gazeta* has also published a long article without committing itself on the question of a trial. The classic Stalinist methods of misrepresentation have been employed to ensure that public opinion is firmly weighted against the writers. The case at present is an isolated one, and there is no reason to suppose that it foreshadows a campaign of repression against other members of the liberal intelligentsia. In fact one motive behind the grant of a foreign passport for a visit to the United Kingdom to another heterodox writer, Tarsis, may have been to offset the impression of renewed persecution which has disturbed intellectuals abroad. The decision to bring Sinyavsky and Daniel to trial has already been seen by the "liberals" as a warning, which will have been reinforced by the recent announcement that the historiography of the period of the "cult of personality" is to be revised. At best, the case is an unpleasant reminder of the ubiquitousness of State control and the determination of the Government to set strict limits to freedom of speech.

*(b) Agriculture*

20. A number of financial concessions have been made to Soviet collective farmers in fulfilment of promises made at last year's Central Committee plenum on agriculture. They involve a reduction in the price of agricultural machinery and electricity; improvements in credit facilities for collective farms; and the reduction in rural areas of retail prices for sugar, cotton textiles and some other consumer goods to the level operating in the towns. This last measure is expected to be worth 400 million roubles a year to the rural population. In addition it was announced on 25 January that the Central Committee had set up a high-level commission under the chairmanship of Brezhnev and including party and Government leaders, charged with drawing up a new Collective Farm Charter and preparing for the long overdue Third Congress of Collective Farmers which is to take place this year. The commission itself is far too unwieldy more than to rubberstamp decisions taken elsewhere. It is unlikely that the Soviet authorities are yet ready to grasp the nettle of collective agriculture, but the high standing of the new commission's members is a further indication that the leadership cannot afford to allow agriculture to be elbowed aside or forgotten.

## CHRONOLOGY

## January

- 2 Speech by Castro in Havana criticising Chinese performance in economic relations with Cuba.
- 2-11 Kosygin in Tashkent for talks between India and Pakistan.
- 4-15 Tri-Continental Conference in Havana.
- 4 NCNA published Chen Yi's interview in *Akahata* denying that China was isolated.
- North Viet-Nameese Foreign Ministry Statement on United States peace talks.
- 5 South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front Statement on intensification of the war by the United States.
- 7-13 Shelepin headed Soviet delegation to Hanoi.
- People's Daily* article on "Johnson Administration's gigantic conspiracy".
- 7 Soviet/Indian Trade Agreement signed in Delhi.
- 10 Signing of Indo-Pakistan declaration in Tashkent.
- 10-13 Rumanian Prime Minister, Maurer, visited Hungary secretly.
- 11 Death of Shastri.
- North Viet-Nameese Foreign Ministry statement on escalation of war in Viet-Nam.
- 12-17 Soviet delegation, headed by Brezhnev, visited Mongolia: Treaty of Friendship renewed.
- 13 Vice-President Humphrey conferred with Kosygin in Delhi.
- 14 Kosygin paid a short visit to Afghanistan *en route* from Delhi.
- Pravda* editorial on the economics of Communism.
- 15 Soviet/North Viet-Nam Communiqué on Shelepin's visit published.
- 16-22 Japanese Foreign Minister, Shiina, visited Soviet Union.
- 18-19 Polish delegation lead by Gomulka visited Budapest.
- Soviet/Pakistani Trade Agreement signed in Rawalpindi.
- 18 *People's Daily* editorial on Havana Conference.
- 19-20 Novotny and Hendrych visited Moscow.
- Cypriot Communist Party delegation received by Suslov and Ponomarev.
- 21 Soviet/Japanese Air and Trade Agreements signed in Moscow.
- 24 Ho Chi Minh addressed similar letters to Heads of various States on the United States peace initiatives and North Viet-Nameese conditions for negotiations.
- 24-25 Czech delegation led by Novotny visited Poland.
- 25-31 Italian Communist Party Congress.
- 26-29 Rumanian Prime Minister, Maurer, visited Belgrade.
- 29- Finnish Communist Party Congress in Helsinki.
- Feb. 1
- 31 Resumption of United States bombing of North Viet-Nam.