



Communist Policy and Tactics 1966 – 1967, 4. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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bjarnibenediktsson.is

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CONFIDENTIAL

14 December, 1967

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, NOVEMBER 1967

SUMMARY

October Revolution anniversary

The celebrations were marked by emphasis on the achievements and strength of the Soviet State and by further deification of Lenin. Brezhnev's importance was stressed but the present system of group leadership remains. The independent mindedness of several Communist parties, particularly the North Koreans, was confirmed and there was further evidence of strain in Soviet-Cuban relations. In the non-Communist world the publicity for the anniversary seems to have had a mixed effect. (Paragraphs 1-7.)

International Communist movement

A preparatory meeting for an international Communist conference is to be held in February 1968. Although a large majority of parties are in favour of the project, there are important doubters. The Soviet Press is stressing the importance of collective decisions presumably in deference to those parties which object to any in-roads on their autonomy. (Paragraphs 8-11.)

Sino-Soviet relations

The Chinese used the 50th anniversary to attack Soviet revisionism and to emphasise Mao's position. While the Russians continue to emphasise the extent of dictatorship in China there has been some tactical moderation of their attacks, probably in order to win international Communist support. (Paragraphs 12-14.)

Soviet foreign policy

The Russians took a relatively cautious line on the Middle East and Cyprus. Practical contacts with the United States continue. Propaganda use was made of both the devaluation of sterling and President de Gaulle's Press conference, although no mention has been made of the latter's remarks on Canada. (Paragraphs 15-19.)

West Bengal

The dismissal of the United Front Government led to Communist-organised strikes encouraged particularly by broadcasts from Peking. (Paragraphs 20-21.)

Chinese internal affairs

The attempt to reimpose order and rehabilitate the party continued, although there was still disorder in some areas. Although most students have returned to school, feuds among them continue. The leaders appear determined to keep up the principle of collectivisation in rural areas. Efforts were made to allay doubts about Mao being in full control and to restrict attacks on other leaders. (Paragraphs 22-26.)

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Hong Kong

There were talks between Chinese and Hong Kong officials on the regulation of a number of border issues. Attempts by the Communist Press to represent these as a victory for China have been overshadowed by the impression that the Chinese authorities are ready to talk rather than give full support to the local Communists. (Paragraphs 27-28.)

October Revolution anniversary

The authorities presented the anniversary to the Soviet people primarily as a patriotic event with the emphasis on the economic achievements and military strength of the Soviet State. The theme of revolution was reserved for the foreign guests and the outside world, for the leadership have no wish to encourage the idea of "continuing revolution" in the Soviet Union itself. At the same time the worship of Lenin exceeded all previous bounds. His memory could safely be invoked without arousing controversy about the status of his successors, Stalin and Khrushchev, and the symbols of his deification formed part of the quasi-religious ceremonial which the present leadership appear to find useful in encouraging support for the established order.

2. Although the cult of personality was reserved for Lenin, the celebrations did tend to emphasise Brezhnev's position as *primus inter pares*. It was natural that, as General Secretary of the Party, he should play a prominent part on the major Communist occasion; in fact he got the lion's share of the limelight. His four-hour report to the Joint Session of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviets of the Union and the Russian Republic was clearly intended to be much more important than the shorter speeches made on other occasions by Kosygin and others. Many of the speakers from the Union Republics took care to include congratulatory references to Brezhnev in their own addresses.

3. Nevertheless it would be wrong to conclude that the principle of group leadership is being seriously eroded. Brezhnev's report not only lacked any of the oratorical fire of a Khrushchev but also took care to avoid controversial topics or to express personal opinions. On the delicate question of resource allocation Brezhnev did allow himself to put slightly more emphasis on the demands of defence and agriculture but nevertheless gave a clear impression of commending the balance between all branches of the economy which had been symbolised in the budgetary proposals for 1968.

4. Viewed from the international angle, the celebrations were probably rather less satisfying to the leadership. The occasion was very much one for the international Communist family. The chief non-Communist visitors were Mrs. Ghandi and President Kekkonen of Finland but some party and Government delegations from the "progressive" non-aligned countries were also present. The main purpose was obviously to achieve an impressive demonstration of solidarity from other Communist parties at a time when divisions in the international movement are a real worry. But although the major parties, except those of China and Albania, were represented, the North Koreans showed their continuing independence by sending second-rank, albeit senior, representatives, while both Tito of Yugoslavia and Ceausescu of Rumania appeared to avoid getting involved in discussions with their colleagues on a world Communist conference.

5. The evidence of new strain in Soviet relations with Cuba was more serious. Despite a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement that the President, Dorticos, would attend, the small Cuban delegation was led merely by the Minister of Health, who did not speak except at a factory meeting and who departed insultingly early on the evening of 7 November. It had looked, until a few days before the celebrations, that the Russians were trying to play down their serious doctrinal differences with the Cubans. It is not known at present whether these are the sole cause of the new coolness. It is possible that the Cubans took umbrage at articles by the Secretaries of the Argentine and Chilean Communist parties which appeared in *Pravda* shortly before the celebrations, and which indirectly, but obviously, criticised Cuban policies in Latin America. But difficulties may well also have arisen in the economic field during the visit to Moscow in October of the Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade.

6. The North Koreans have taken some pains to demonstrate their close sympathy with the Cuban philosophy of independence of both China and the Soviet Union. The North Korean delegation to the celebrations paid a visit to Havana from 10-17 November, during which they expressed strong support for Cuban policies in Latin America and indirectly criticised the Soviet Union for taking too unadventurous an attitude towards the United States. This line was given more authority in a subsequent editorial in the North Korean party newspaper which took a midway stand between both "Left and Right opportunism".

7. In the non-Communist world, the publicity given to the October celebrations probably had a mixed effect. General interest in Soviet affairs has undoubtedly been heightened and there has been a good deal of genuine admiration for the major achievements of the country in industry and technology as well as for the qualities of the Soviet people. Press comment has been fairly objective in dealing with the history of the revolution, although some television programmes, relying inevitably on Soviet sources for much of their material, may have given an over-favourable picture of the Bolsheviks. But the increased interest in Russia has cut both ways. 1967 has not been an entirely favourable year for the international image of the Soviet Union. Apart from the serious damage done by the defection of Svetlana Stalin greatly increased attention has been paid to the lot of Soviet intellectuals. This interest has been stimulated particularly by articles and television programmes on such subjects as the imprisoned writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel.

International Communist movement

8. In the fortnight following the 50th anniversary celebrations, the first step was taken in organising an international Communist conference. The announcement on 24 November that a preliminary consultative meeting will be held in Budapest in February followed consultations in Moscow among representatives of parties which participated in the Moscow Conference of March 1965 (those of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, India, Poland, Syria, West Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union). Cuba, the 19th party present in 1965, was not named and took no part in the consultations.

9. It is not clear who is to be invited to Budapest, but the announcement referred again to the 1965 meeting, which had stipulated that a new Communist conference should be preceded by a consultative meeting of the 81 parties who had attended the 1960 conference. The Budapest meeting is bound to be smaller as it will not be attended by China and her allies, and probably not by Cuba, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, Rumania or Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs have publicly objected to the conference while the other four have shown their lack of support by silence. Among non-ruling parties, the Dutch and Swedish have opposed the conference, while some lesser parties, such as those of Norway and Iceland, have so far given no indication of their position.

10. The Soviet Press has tried to reassure doubters by stressing that the consultative meeting will only discuss the character and the aims of the conference, that the decisions will be taken collectively, that there is no intention of excommunicating any party and that the overriding objective is the unity of all anti-imperialist forces and the cohesion of the Communist movement.

11. However, even among the 65-odd Communist parties who favour an international conference and would be expected to attend the Budapest meeting, there are varying degrees of support. The East European parties and those of France and Chile, for example, have pledged unreserved support, but others, including the Communist parties of Britain, Portugal, Spain and Japan, would probably agree with the Italian Party that the form of the conference is what matters. The Italian First Party Secretary in articles in *Rinascita* and in an interview on his return from Moscow indicated that his party will take part in the preparations but that its participation in the conference will depend on the degree of agreement reached in Budapest and on the procedure, which must not limit the autonomy of the individual Communist parties. Likewise although the Japanese Party's break with the Chinese and moves to improve relations with the CPSU have contributed to a change of heart on the question of the conference, they consider its convening to be an "immense task" in view of the "opportunism, divisionism and chauvinism rampant in the Communist movement". They still

object to any attempt to impose "a unilaterally adopted view" but think that an international conference to discuss joint action against United States imperialism would be of "great significance" at present.

Sino-Soviet relations

12. Despite rumours in Moscow before the anniversary celebrations that the Chinese would try to spoil the occasion with some kind of demonstration, the eventual Chinese reaction was less dramatic. The complete breakdown on the party level was underlined by the fact that the Chinese message of congratulation was addressed from the National People's Congress to the Supreme Soviet and for the first time not from party to party. The usual Chinese propaganda attacks were made on Soviet revisionism and Mao's position as the greatest contemporary proletarian leader was emphasised. The *People's Daily* of 6 November referred to Mao as "the Lenin of the present age" and repeated the claim that the centre of world revolution had shifted from Moscow to Peking. More recently the Chinese have violently attacked the Soviet move to hold an international Communist conference.

13. Russian anti-Chinese propaganda, while not entirely ignoring Chinese attempts to restore internal order, has still put the main emphasis on the chaos prevailing in some areas of China and on the continuing opposition to Mao. Their attacks have, however, been on a somewhat reduced scale and it was noticeable that in his report on 3 November, Brezhnev balanced his attack on Mao not only by paying tribute to the importance of the Chinese revolution in Asia and Africa but also by stressing that the line laid down by the 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1956 represented a basis on which to build Socialism. This apparent moderation is certainly tactical. The Russians probably wish to stress their support for "genuine" Chinese Communists in order to win more supporters for the idea of an international conference.

14. A striking feature of the current phase of the dispute is the downright condemnation by each side of the other's governmental policies, with accusations in each case that these are no longer Marxist-Leninist. While the Russians stress the perniciousness of Mao's military dictatorship, the Chinese have concentrated on accusations that the Soviet Union is now wide open to "decadent Western bourgeois culture". The Russians have emphasised that the Chinese have abandoned the principles of Socialist internationalism and are motivated entirely by nationalist ambition. They accuse the Chinese of attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and national liberation movements and of assisting the United States by their extremist policies.

Soviet foreign policy

15. Although there has been no noticeable shift in Soviet policy on Viet-Nam, and anti-Western propaganda has continued fairly steadily, the continuing Russian desire to avoid the escalation of crises was a feature of the month. While the Russians felt it necessary to introduce for the record in the Security Council their own resolution on the Middle East which was strongly favourable to the Arab cause, they did not press this and voted for the British compromise draft. They continued to give support to the relatively moderate position adopted by President Nasser, and in the Press criticised by implication those extremist Arabs who attacked the passing of the Security Council Resolution.

16. The Soviet Union also took a cautious line on the Cyprus dispute. Their Government statement on 22 November appealed for restraint by both sides and they have shown no wish to get directly involved. This did not prevent them from making strong propaganda attacks not only on the Greek Government but also on the United States and NATO for allegedly wishing to make Cyprus into a NATO base.

17. There was also further evidence of Soviet readiness to continue practical discussions with the United States on a few matters of common interest. There has been a Soviet-American Agreement on the regulation of fishing in the Western Atlantic and talks on the implementation of the Air Services Agreement.

18. The Russians used both the announcement of the devaluation of sterling and de Gaulle's Press conference of 27 November to continue propaganda attacks against the British Government and the West. The Soviet Press clearly welcomed

the French President's pronouncement against negotiation on British entry into the EEC, reviving earlier suggestions that British entry would introduce too much American influence into the Common Market and arguing unconvincingly that this was something that worried not only France but also her partners in the Six. But at the same time the Europe of the Six was criticised as a potential barrier to East/West trade and it was suggested that one of de Gaulle's main concerns was for the interests of French industrialists.

19. The Soviet Press has avoided comment on de Gaulle's remarks about Canada. The Russians' attitude to Canada is ambivalent. They seem to want to improve relations in general and much has probably been done in this direction through the great number of Soviet visitors to Expo '67. On the other hand, specific problems intermittently sour these relations, as illustrated by the very intemperate Soviet reaction to a demonstration by numbers of refugee groups at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Revolution.

West Bengal

20. The Communist-dominated United Front Government of West Bengal was dismissed by the Governor on 21 November. Dr. P. C. Ghosh, who defected from the United Front and formed a new party from fellow defectors—the Progressive Democratic Front—was sworn in as the new Chief Minister. His party, with the support of the Congress Party, command a majority. The Governor's action was strongly criticised by the Communists throughout India and a protest strike was called in West Bengal on 22 November. Many Communists were arrested. Curfew restrictions were lifted on 26 November, but the Communists called for demonstrations again on 29 November when the Legislative Assembly was to meet to install the new Chief Minister, and to seek a vote of confidence. However, the Communists, with the collaboration of the Speaker, a Communist sympathiser, caused the meeting to break up in chaos. The Speaker adjourned the Assembly and the Governor later prorogued it. A constitutional impasse has resulted, and the situation remains fluid and confused. New strikes and demonstrations have been called by the Communists for 18 December (when the former United Front Government were to have reassembled).

21. The United Front Government took office on 2 March as a result of the general elections in February 1967. It comprised 14 non-Congress and largely Left-wing parties and was dominated by the pro-Peking faction (CP (M)) of the split Communist Party of India through the Deputy Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu. The Communists organised a peasant uprising in Naxalbari in May which was put down by police action in July. Law and order deteriorated steadily. Peking broadcasts directed to India have exploited the situation by inciting violence, giving encouragement to the peasant uprising in Naxalbari and praising the militant group in the CP (M), while dubbing the others as revisionists.

Chinese internal affairs

22. The Chinese authorities continued their attempt to reimpose order and gradually to establish Revolutionary Committees in the provinces, municipalities and other administrative divisions. There were increasing references to the importance of party leadership, while Mao was quoted as urging reliance on officials who had acquired "rich practical experience". According to reports of a speech by Hsieh Fu-chih, one of the active leaders of the Cultural Revolution, the leadership now intends to begin the process of reforming and rebuilding the party, with the aim of holding the Ninth Party Congress some time in 1968. Hsieh Fu-chih's remarks suggested that the party should remain a select organisation, that the overwhelming majority of its members should retain their positions and that only a relatively small proportion of Red Guards and other "revolutionaries" should be admitted after careful scrutiny.

23. Provincial Press and radio commentaries indicated that disorder continued in some areas and that there had been agitation against certain Revolutionary Committees and Preparatory Groups. A move towards the restoration of control was noted in Kwangtung, where the radio station announced that a Preparatory Group for the provincial Revolutionary Committee had been formed in response to an order from Peking. Elsewhere, the formation of

Revolutionary Committees and Preparatory Groups in certain large towns (e.g., Tientsin) and other administrative divisions was announced. But over half of China's 26 provinces and regions have still not formed Committees or Preparatory Groups.

24. The majority of Red Guards apparently complied with orders to return to their schools, colleges and universities, where they are allegedly engaged in studying the Thought of Mao and discussing the reform of the educational system. There were indications, however, that the students continued to pursue factional feuds and to resist any ideas of resuming an orderly programme of study.

25. A joint editorial by the *People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Daily* on 23 November dealt at length with Liu Shao-ch'i's alleged opposition to Mao's policy for agriculture. The article emphasised the threat of "capitalist restoration" in the countryside and noted the need for continuing efforts to "consolidate and develop the socialist system of collective ownership". The article evidently reflected the leaders' determination to prevent any further erosion of the collective system in the communes and to restore as far as possible by means of a campaign in the rural areas the damage done to the system in the Cultural Revolution. The article did not give any indication of an early move towards a more rigid form of collectivisation, e.g., by curtailing private plots, although it was clearly a reminder that the communes have some time to undergo further organisational changes in order to achieve agricultural socialisation.

26. Since National Day, Mao has continued to make fairly frequent appearances, and several comments by him on the "excellent" overall situation and methods to overcome difficulties have been reported. Lin Piao made a speech attacking Soviet "revisionism" at a meeting on 6 November to commemorate the October Revolution. The Press placed great emphasis on Mao's continued authority, while attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Teh-huai and others dwelt on their alleged opposition to Mao's position of leadership. These references to Mao seemed to suggest that the leaders were concerned both to allay doubts as to whether Mao remains in full control and to warn against any questioning of Mao's fitness for leadership at the present time. The extremists have again been told to cease attacks on Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister, and on the Cultural Revolution Group led by Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng and Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's wife). Mao has been quoted as saying that Ch'en Yi could be criticised but not overthrown, and the latter has begun to appear again somewhat more frequently, although he has apparently not yet resumed his full responsibilities as Foreign Minister.

Hong Kong

27. Talks took place between Chinese border officials and officials from Hong Kong Government between 1 and 25 November, about a number of local issues connected with the border. This was the first occasion, since the Communist confrontation against the Hong Kong authorities began in May 1967, on which protracted and detailed discussions had taken place with Chinese officials. The discussions themselves were relatively friendly and free from polemics. As a result of them, on 26 November the Chinese returned two Chinese policemen from the Hong Kong police force, who had strayed across the border, and the Hong Kong Government deported five Chinese citizens who had been arrested in Hong Kong territory. At the same time, the Hong Kong Government agreed to remove certain sections of an old barbed-wire fence, erected in 1962, which crossed fields farmed by peasants from a commune in China. The Hong Kong Government made it clear that they intended at the same time to strengthen and repair the border fence. The Government also agreed to make *ex-gratia* payment to members of a Chinese commune, who had been prevented from farming their fields in Hong Kong territory by the closure of a border bridge, and to pay compensation (in accordance with normal Hong Kong practice) to Chinese peasants whose family graves had been disturbed by building military defence works on the frontier. The talks had originally also been concerned with the release of Inspector Knight, a British policeman who had been dragged into Chinese territory by a group of protesting Chinese peasants. But Inspector Knight escaped from China five days before the talks were concluded.

28. The Communist Press in Hong Kong attempted to demonstrate that the successful conclusion of these talks was a great victory for China; but in practice the lesson which most people in Hong Kong have drawn from these talks is that the Chinese authorities are prepared to hold discussions on border problems rather than to give full support to the activities of local Communists.

CHRONOLOGY

November

- 1-2 East European and other leaders arrive in Moscow for October Revolution Anniversary celebrations.
- 1 Chinese Government Statement on Viet-Nam.
- 2-5 Polish Foreign Minister visits Belgium.
- 3 Joint meeting of Central Committee of CPSU and Supreme Soviets of the USSR and RSFSR. Report by Brezhnev, during which Chinese diplomats stage walk-out.
United States Defence Secretary states that Soviet Union is developing a Fractional Orbital Ballistic System.
- 6 Mrs. Gandhi arrives in Moscow.
Celebration meeting of Soviet leaders and guests to Anniversary celebrations. Cuban Ambassador fails to attend.
Peking Rally for October Revolution Anniversary.
- 7 50th Anniversary of October Revolution. Cuban delegation leaves Moscow.
- 8 Rumanian delegation leaves.
- 9-15 Polish Defence Minister visits Finland.
- 9-13 Norwegian Foreign Minister visits Poland.
- 10-17 North Korean delegation visits Cuba.
- 10 Brezhnev receives UAR delegation to celebrations.
- 11-15 "International Scientific Conference" in Moscow on World Communist Movement.
- 11 Komsomol Jubilee Rally in Moscow.
- 13 Mao Tse-tung receives "activists" in Peking.
People's Daily commentator denounces Soviet celebrations of Revolution Anniversary.
Soviet/Mongolian Economic Agreement for 1968-70.
- 13-17 Consultative meeting of Warsaw Treaty High Command in Dresden.
Netherlands Foreign Minister visits Czechoslovakia.
- 14 Ho Chi Minh requests Soviet Union to postpone award to him of Order of Lenin.
- 15 Canton Trade Fair opens (one month late).
- 15-20 Polish Foreign Minister visits Denmark.
- 16-19 Yugoslav Prime Minister visits Rumania.
- 16 North Korean *Nodong Sinmun* editorial supports Cuban line on revolutionary tactics.
- 17 Announcement of impending negotiations between Federal German and Yugoslav Governments on status of Yugoslav workers in Federal Republic.
- 17-18 East German Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.

November

- 20 Formation of Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee preparatory group announced.
Soviet draft resolution on Middle East tabled in United Nations Security Council.
- 20-25 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visits Sweden and Finland.
- 21 West Bengal United Front Government dismissed.
- 21-22 Cuban military delegation visits North Viet-Nam.
- 22-29 Cuban military delegation visits North Korea.
- 22 Soviet Government Statements on Greece and Cyprus.
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces visits Rumania.
Soviet Ambassador in Bonn received by Herr Brandt.
- 23-27 Swedish Prime Minister visits Poland.
- 23-24 Hungarian Party Central Committee Plenum.
Yugoslav League of Communists Central Committee Plenum.
- 23 Chinese *People's Daily/Red Flag* joint editorial on rural policy.
- 24 Soviet Union and Malaysia establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.
- 24-25 Polish Party Central Committee Plenum.
- 24 Announcement that preparatory meeting for international Communist conference will take place in Budapest in February 1968.
- 25-30 Hungarian Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 25- Yemen Republican Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 1 Dec.
- 26-27 Mr. Averell Harriman visits Yugoslavia.
- 26-28 30th National Congress of Communist Party of Great Britain.
- 26-30 Swedish Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 27 Chinese Foreign Ministry Statement of support for Cambodia.
- 27-29 Mr. Harriman visits Rumania.
- 27- Finnish Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 1 Dec.
- 28 *Pravda* editorial on international Communist conference.
- 29 *Pravda* commentary on President de Gaulle's 27 November Press conference.
- 29- Syrian Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 2 Dec.



His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
EMBASSY
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

22 September, 1967

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

INTERNAL

Internal disorder in many parts of China. State Liu Shao-ch'i continued but not as effective as before. The Wuhan incident brought about a change in leadership, but the leadership are trying to restore unity. (Paragraphs 1-7.)

Internal disorder is expected to deteriorate. Russian leadership like Mao Tse-tung the main target, a model for developing countries. Chinese expansionism in Asia. The attacks on the Soviet leadership.

They have also accused two disgraced Chinese leaders of having had secret contacts with the Russians. (Paragraphs 8-13.)

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

Interest in a meeting is being revived. (Paragraph 14.)

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Russians are working both to promote their influence with the Arab Governments and to prevent renewed hostilities. This ambivalence extends to their search for a settlement and to the Suez Canal question. They have continued to stress their support for "progressive" Arab régimes, while maintaining close contact with the "non-progressives". (Paragraphs 15-22.)

WORLD CONFERENCE ON VIET-NAM

This conference was dominated by the World Council of Peace. The North Viet-Nameese attitude remained rigid. (Paragraphs 23-25.)

RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS

This ostensibly "non-official" station is fully controlled by the Soviet Party and Government. It specialises in inflammatory propaganda to the third world and China. (Paragraphs 26-27.)

LATIN AMERICA—THE HAVANA CONFERENCE

The Cubans persisted in their line of support for violent revolution in Latin America. There are serious doubts about this among many Latin American Communist parties who will now probably not hold their next conference in Havana. (Paragraphs 28-31.)

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16 August, 1967

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, JULY 1967

SUMMARY

CHINA : INTERNAL

There was evidence of continued disorder in many parts of China. The campaign against the Head of State Liu Shao-ch'i continued but without achieving his formal removal. The Wuhan incident brought nearer the risk of a split in the army, but the leadership are trying to present an appearance of solidarity. (Paragraphs 1-7.)

SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

Inter-State relations continued to deteriorate. Russian propaganda, while continuing to make Mao Tse-tung the main target, criticised Chinese Communism as a model for developing countries and played up the dangers of Chinese expansionism in Asia. The Chinese have continued personal attacks on the Soviet leadership. They have also accused two disgraced Chinese leaders of having had secret contacts with the Russians. (Paragraphs 8-13.)

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RUMANIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE

The Rumanian leaders stressed their solidarity with their Communist allies but made no concessions in their espousal of national Communism or in their independent policies, particularly in Europe. (Paragraph 32.)

CZECHOSLOVAK/WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

The signature of an agreement on the reciprocal establishment of Trade Missions is a modest step forward but a long way from full diplomatic relations. (Paragraphs 33-35.)

THE FOURTH CZECHOSLOVAK WRITERS CONGRESS

Strong opposition among writers was confirmed and the party had to take a firm hand. But the practical effect of the opposition should not be over-estimated. (Paragraphs 36-38.)

SOVIET: INTERNAL

Military policy

The Soviet Government is paying more attention to the development of conventional forces and to the offensive capability of the navy. Their intention is probably to give the impression that they have a non-nuclear deterrent to match the United States overseas forces, but they have not necessarily decided to embark on a more bellicose policy. (Paragraphs 39-40.)

The demotion of Shelepin

Shelepin's appointment as head of the Trade Union Council suggests that the top leadership are removing him and his associates from the main corridors of power. This group wish to see greater efficiency in a more orthodox Communist society but are not necessarily hard-liners in foreign policy. There is no evidence of serious dissension among the senior leaders. (Paragraphs 41-43.)

CHINA: INTERNAL

Chinese provincial radio broadcasts and poster reports indicated that outbreaks of disorder continued to occur in many places. Numerous articles in the official Press called for greater discipline among revolutionary groups and criticised "anarchism" and struggle by force. As an important move towards curbing the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, increased emphasis was placed from early July onwards on the return of students to universities and colleges. This was celebrated by a rally in Peking. A normal educational syllabus is not yet in force, however, and much time is devoted to "revolutionary" activities. Students were directed to prepare for the resumption of regular studies, with a high political content, in the autumn.

2. The official Press campaign against the Head of State, Liu Shao-ch'i, continued for the fourth consecutive month with a new note of urgency. Despite assertions that Liu had been "overthrown", newspaper articles in July acknowledged that the campaign had not yet destroyed his influence and prestige. Defence Minister Lin Piao was quoted as urging more effective repudiation of Liu to ensure that he or others like him could not seize back power.

3. Several articles rejected a recent "self-examination" by Liu Shao-ch'i, which was indeed a remarkably unrepentant document, as a "counter-attack" on Mao. The articles suggested that Liu, although deprived of effective power, remains unwilling to concede a full admission of guilt or to resign from his leading party and State positions. In maintaining this attitude, he probably feels that he has the sympathy of a fairly large number of party and State officials, including members of the Party Central Committee and National People's Congress who have the Constitutional right to decide on his fate.

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4. An incident in Wuhan, central China, in mid-July provided the most serious indication so far of opposition by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to Mao's conduct of the Cultural Revolution. The local military commander, together with a "counter-revolutionary" mass organisation (the "Million Heroes"), was accused of responsibility for the detention and ill-treatment of a team which Mao had sent to help solve local political problems. The team was led by the Minister of Public Security, Hsieh Fu-chih, and a member of the Cultural Revolution Group, Wang Li. They were released, according to some reports after the intervention of the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, and returned to a "glorious welcome" in Peking on 22 July.

5. Subsequent reports suggested that Mao and his followers intended to take prompt action to overthrow and discredit the dissident leaders in Wuhan. The Press mounted a campaign in order to undermine their following in the local population and army units. Official reports at the end of the month referred to a continuing struggle against the dissidents in Wuhan, but it was not clear to what extent active opposition continued in the area.

6. The Chinese Press reported nation-wide expressions of support for Mao's handling of the Wuhan incident. There was no reliable evidence that other military area commanders were actively supporting the dissidents in Wuhan. It seems likely, however, that the incident has had an adverse effect on the PLA's morale, which had already been strained by earlier developments in the Cultural Revolution. It could induce military leaders to increase pressure on Peking to curb the Cultural Revolution. The incident has brought somewhat closer the risk of a serious split in the PLA with the attendant dangers of a further weakening in Peking's authority over some regions and provinces and, more remotely, of mutiny and civil war.

7. A Peking reception, held on 31 July for Army Day, was attended by numerous party and PLA leaders, headed by Chou En-lai. The attendance list emphasised the ascendancy of the Party's Cultural Revolution Group (led by Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife), which for the first time was ranked above the ordinary membership of the Political Bureau. However, the list included Chu Teh and several others who have been under criticism by the Red Guards for some months and are thought to have fallen from favour. The composition of the list suggested that the most important leaders are now concerned to present an appearance of solidarity in the highest ranks of the party and the PLA and to heal or disguise any new divisions which have arisen in the leadership. Party and PLA newspaper editorials for Army Day emphasised the leading rôles of Mao and Lin Piao, while ignoring Chu Teh's part in the formation of the PLA, and made forceful criticism of P'eng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing, military leaders who were removed from power in 1959 and 1966 respectively.

SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

8. There was a further deterioration in July in Sino/Soviet inter-State relations. The Chinese unilaterally abrogated an agreement between themselves, the Soviet Union and North Korea on the saving of life at sea. The Russians took the opportunity to list a number of other agreements on which they alleged the Chinese had reneged, including one with other Communist countries on the organisation of a joint nuclear research institute. However this has not prevented the signing of a new annual trade protocol between the Soviet Union and China on 27 July. Chinese sources are reported to have stated that Soviet deliveries will include chemical and engineering products (among which are five IL-18 and other civil aircraft) in return for food, textile goods and wolfram. They have also stated that the turnover has continued to decline. The Cultural Agreement between the two countries is also due for renewal, but this is a subject on which agreement is likely to be much more difficult.

9. Russian propaganda, particularly by radio, continued to give prominence to the confused situation in China, emphasising the growth of opposition to Mao and his Group. Comment on events in Wuhan played up the trouble in the Chinese Army and stressed the likelihood of outright disobedience to Peking, not only by the rank and file but also by senior Commanders of the PLA. This represents a significant shift from the Soviet line earlier in the Cultural Revolution which accused Mao of using the army to set up a military dictatorship against the party.

10. The Russians appear to be chary of commending any one group of Chinese among those opposed to Mao. It is noteworthy that while reporting the criticism of the Head of State, Liu Shao-ch'i, they have refrained from commending his policies and have pointed out that he was in fact one of Mao's supporters who had been discarded in spite of his loyalty. There has also been a recent tendency for Soviet comment to point to fundamental mistakes in the development of Chinese Communism from its earliest stages ascribing the blame to Mao's ambitions. It remains to be seen whether this criticism will lead to a denial of Chinese Communism *in toto*, a step which would almost certainly be opposed by many of the CPSU's own supporters within the World Communist movement. A major article in *Izvestiya* on 3 July attacked the idea that the Chinese road to Communism is an example to developing countries.

11. The other main line of Soviet criticism of China has been concerned with the danger of the export of the Chinese brand of revolution to their Asian neighbours. The deterioration of Chinese relations with Burma and Nepal was described by the Russians as a result of Chinese chauvinism, and the Russians took the opportunity to warn against blind reliance on armed struggle as the best means of spreading Communism. The Chinese were in particular accused of responsibility for wrecking the Indonesian Communist Party by encouraging the *coup* of September 1965 and of stirring up armed revolts without prospect of success in Burma, Malaya and the Philippines after 1945. Other attacks on Chinese subversive techniques and Mao's theories of guerilla warfare, made in connection with Chinese Army Day on 1 August, appeared to reflect the general preference of the Soviet leaders for a more peaceful road to Communism, while maintaining that Chinese "expansionist" ambitions have no connection with the promotion of genuine progressive forces.

12. While the Chinese polemic against the Soviet Union has continued the now familiar theme of Soviet "collusion" with the United States over the Middle East and Viet-Nam, they have also engaged in sharpened personal attacks on the Russian leadership. The *People's Daily* on 16 July carried an article by "Observer" denouncing the "traitor's face" of Brezhnev. The same article concluded with the suggestion that the present Soviet leadership was in danger of collapse. This has been a recurring theme with the Chinese for which they claimed to have found evidence in the demotion of Party Secretary Shelepin and other changes.

13. Maoist propaganda on domestic Chinese issues has for some time maintained that those "taking the Capitalist road" drew their inspiration from the Soviet Union. The description of Liu Shao-ch'i as "China's Khrushchev" is one example. A series of Chinese articles on the occasion of their Army Day however brought more direct accusations against disgraced Chinese leaders. Marshals P'eng Teh-Luai, dismissed as Minister of Defence in 1959, and Lo Jui-ching, the Chief of Staff who disappeared in late 1965, were both stated to have maintained "secret contacts with a foreign Power". P'eng almost certainly did have dealings with the Russians but it is impossible to assess how far Lo may have favoured a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

14. Now that the attention of the Communist parties is no longer dominated by the Middle East, interest in the proposed conference is being revived. Since 6 July, at least 10 Communist parties have issued statements or communiqués on this subject. While the parties of the Argentine, Brazil, Chile and Luxembourg confined themselves to general expressions of support, those of Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, France, Uruguay and the Soviet Union followed Brezhnev's formula of May 1967 that "all-sided practical preparations" for the conference should begin. *Pravda* of 23 July claimed that "the path is being laid for the holding of a new international conference". The joint statement by the French and Czech parties called "for preparatory work on a conference in which the greatest number of fraternal parties would participate". This last formula repeats a proposal made by the Hungarians last December and suggests that the Russians may prefer an imperfect conference to none at all. It is possible that Brezhnev, on whom the main responsibility rests, may contemplate making some statement at the October Revolution celebrations in November even though there is no sign that he would secure the attendance of important borderline parties such as the North Viet-Nameese or the North Koreans.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

15. The Soviet leaders are continuing their policy of seeking to extend their influence with the Arab Governments. At the same time they appear to accept that they must work to prevent a recurrence of hostilities with the attendant danger of a confrontation with the United States. In pursuit of the first objective, they have made general promises of military equipment to the Arabs. At the same time and consistent with the second, they are probably proceeding slowly at present over deliveries and stopping short of full re-equipment.

16. The Russians seem now to be seeking an interim settlement based on an Israeli withdrawal in return for a declaration by the Arabs of an end to the state of belligerence. But they are having a hard job to sell this proposition to the more extreme Arabs, such as the Algerians and Syrians, and are probably uncertain about their next step.

17. Soviet policy on the Suez Canal is similarly divided between a wish to damage and exert pressure on the West and their own interest, both political and economic, in getting the Canal reopened. An article in *Pravda* on 1 August put forward a tough line, maintaining that Israeli withdrawal was an essential pre-condition to the reopening of the Canal. On the other hand the Russians are probably concerned at the continued effect of the loss of Canal dues on the already shaky Egyptian economy, to which they will be obliged to provide assistance. The effect of the closure of the Canal on Soviet overseas trade is not great, but it is an important route for the supply of material to North Viet-Nam. In addition the Russians cannot altogether ignore the views of the Indian Government, for which the Suez Canal is an important route for food supplies.

18. While the Soviet propaganda campaign on the Middle East has continued to concentrate on attacking the role of the West, particularly the United States, a somewhat ambivalent attitude to the various Arab Governments and the question of Arab unity has appeared. The Russians have tended to represent the Arab struggle not in terms of a national or racial crusade against Israel but as part of a wider socio-political campaign against "imperialism". This, by implication at least tends to accentuate the division of the Arab régimes into "progressives" and "non-progressives".

19. The main emphasis has been on support for the "progressive" Arab régimes of the UAR, Syria and Algeria. But the "progressive" Arabs have not all proved easy partners for the Russians. Syria and Algeria have probably been pressing for more Soviet material support for action against Israel. This was presumably one of the objects of Boumedienne's visit to Moscow on 17 July.

20. At the same time the Russians do not wish to forgo the opportunity of improving their standing with the "non-progressive" Arab States. They have taken pains to foster relations with Kuwait and have received a Sudanese delegation which has probably been discussing arms supplies.

21. The Russians are also keeping up their contacts with the Yemeni Republicans, and the Soviet Press has endorsed the need for an agreement on the Yemen between the UAR and Saudi Arabia in the interests of Arab unity.

22. While the Middle East crisis has had the effect of improving relations at any rate on the surface between the Soviet Union and Iraq, which is now usually granted the status of a "progressive" State in Soviet propaganda, the Russian attitude to Jordan has illustrated the dilemma described above. Russian propaganda has been hesitant in endorsing Jordanian actions and has shown sensitivity at reports of possible bilateral negotiations between Amman and Tel Aviv. But they have been careful not to attack King Hussein who is reported in the Press to have been invited to visit Moscow. The Soviet leaders may consider that for the moment their best chance of increasing their influence in Jordan lies in working through, rather than against the régime. They are probably studying the question of including Jordan in their programme of military supplies.

WORLD CONFERENCE ON VIET-NAM

23. This conference, held in Stockholm on 6-9 July, was organised by the non-aligned Swedish Society for Peace and Arbitration, and sponsored by six international peace organisations, including the (Communist) World Council of Peace (WCP) and the (non-Communist) International Confederation of Disarmament and Peace (ICDP).

24. Though Lord Brockway on his return said that the Viet-Nameese delegates had shown signs of a more conciliatory line at the meeting, this was promptly denied by Hanoi. In fact the Viet-Nameese seem to have been as intransigent as ever; they opposed any softening of the final resolution and also the admission of Buddhist representatives, against the wishes of the rather ineffective "non-aligned" group at the conference. The World Council of Peace, by infiltrating the key commissions, succeeded in gaining control of the proceedings and pushed through an appeal (the only conference document so far published) which denounced the Americans as aggressors in Viet-Nam and accused them of genocide. Communist Press and radio media have made the most of this one-sided document, emanating as it did from an ostensibly non-aligned conference in a neutral capital. But the meeting was virtually ignored by the rest of the world's Press.

25. By using the Viet-Nam issue to exploit their hold over the rather disorganised non-Communist peace groups represented at the Stockholm meeting WCP succeeded in creating a Continuing Committee which may turn out to be a new "front" organisation.

RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS

26. The Indian Government's protest to the Russians about the activities of Radio Peace and Progress, announced in the Indian Parliament on 10 July, has focused attention on this service. Radio Peace and Progress, which began broadcasting in November 1964, is an external service of Moscow Radio beamed at the third world and (since March 1967) at China. The Russians take the line that it is "non-official", the pretext being that it is sponsored by a group of Russian public bodies including the Novosti Press agency. But it is of course as closely controlled by the party and Government as the rest of Moscow Radio.

27. Radio Peace and Progress specialises in more vicious and inflammatory propoganda than the other Russian services, being readier to encourage unrest within countries with which the Russians publicly have friendly relations. Its recent broadcasts to India tried to influence the elections and to make capital out of food shortages. Programmes for China (which now gets more time than any other area) are particularly provocative. Some broadcasts to Asia in English have been aimed at the negro members of the United States Armed Forces in Viet-Nam, and have played up the theme of racial conflict in the United States. A noticeable feature of recent programmes to Africa has been criticism of African Governments for undue friendliness towards Israel.

LATIN AMERICA

The Havana conference

28. Preparations in Havana for the first conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organisation (OLAS), launched by Castro in January 1966, continued during July apparently unaffected by Kosygin's visit to Cuba at the end of June. On 22 July Raul Castro, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, derided Vice-President Humphrey's suggestion (without specifically denying it) that Kosygin had heeded President Johnson's advice to put pressure on the Cubans to pursue less provocative foreign policies in Latin America. Fidel Castro in his 26 July anniversary speech reiterated that the Cubans must give more aid to foreign revolutionaries and at the same time be prepared to go it alone since their friends were too far away to give effective support against invasion.

29. The OLAS Conference opened on 31 July, three days later than planned. The tone was set by the election of the extremist Ernesto "Che" Guevara *in absentia* as its Honorary President, and of Stokely Carmichael, the United States negro extremist, present as an observer, to the status of "honorary delegate". Proceedings were opened with a speech by President Dorticos whole-heartedly endorsing Guevara's calls for the creation of "more Viet-Nams", in Latin America in particular.

30. Communist reservations about the OLAS Conference were revealed in various ways during July. The leaders of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) issued a statement dated 16 July violently attacking it as part of a plan by "a group of Cuban Communist Party leaders" to impose their own ideas on all other revolutionary movements without any consideration for their independence, and

announcing that the PCV would not attend. (Conversely, the Cubans announced that the PCV was not eligible for membership of the Venezuelan delegation because it could no longer be considered revolutionary.) More guarded reservations were implicit in an article by the Chilean Communist Secretary-General, Luis Corvalan, which appeared on 2 July and was reprinted in large part by *Pravda* on the eve of the conference. This allowed that Cuban experience of revolution might be successfully applied elsewhere in Latin America, but hedged this with a series of warnings aimed at the Cuban leaders.

31. The same reservations are probably shared by many if not all orthodox Latin American Communist Parties. July brought a series of bilateral communiqués agreed between the Brazilian and Argentinian, the Uruguayan and Chilean, and the Colombian and Venezuelan Communist Parties. The second two called for a new conference of Latin American Communist Parties, while the Brazilian and Argentinian parties (neither of whom sent delegates to the OLAS Conference) pointedly quoted the resolution of the last conference, in Havana at the end of 1964, that "the unity of each party is a necessary condition of the revolutionary process being carried forward in each country. Therefore all fractional activity—whatever its nature and origin—must be categorically repudiated." It is unlikely that most of the Communist Parties of Latin America could contemplate holding their next conference in the Cuban capital.

RUMANIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE

32. The debate on foreign policy in the Rumanian Assembly from 24–25 July produced no new lines of thought but was important in that it provided the first formal confirmation since August 1965 by the entire Rumanian leadership of Rumania's foreign policy and of its ideological basis. The meeting was distinguished by the emphasis placed on Rumania's firm adherence to Marxism-Leninism, and her solidarity with her allies and with the World Communist Movement. This did not prevent Ceausescu, the Party Secretary, from restating Rumania's position on national Communism, diversity within the Communist movement, the Middle East and non-proliferation over all of which there are differences (or at least differences of emphasis) between the Rumanian view and the views of the Soviet Union and other East European countries. It was made clear that there would be no climbing down from Rumania's independent position and the meeting revealed an obsessive concern for national sovereignty and a basic distrust of the Great Power influence. Reference to the Warsaw Pact was lukewarm and implicitly contradicted a *Pravda* article of 23 July condemning nationalism and reaffirming the value of the Alliance. Speakers were careful not to discriminate between China and Albania and the other Communist countries; and the Soviet Union, although mentioned warmly at the head of the list, received no other mark of primacy. The speech by the Prime Minister, Maurer, omitted any reference to his visit to Peking—a further indication that he had not achieved anything there. Other subjects which received emphasis were Balkan co-operation (there was only a mild reference to the Greek *coup*) and peaceful co-existence with the West. While there was strong support for North Viet-Nam, criticism of the United States was relatively restrained; Ceausescu again defended the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic (this has since been followed up by Herr Brandt's visit and by Maurer's acceptance of a return invitation). The intended effect of the debate was of unity, rationality, solidarity and universal goodwill. It seems clear that although the Rumanians felt it timely to reaffirm their loyal membership of the Communist world, they have no intention of changing their policies.

CZECHOSLOVAK/WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

33. A Trade Agreement between the two countries together with an agreement on the reciprocal establishment of Trade Missions was signed in Prague on 3 August. The question of the application of the agreement to Berlin was covered separately.

34. Although negotiations on the Trade Agreement were straightforward it proved much more difficult to reach agreement on the terms on which the Commercial Missions should function. It was eventually agreed that both Missions might issue visas, though still accredited to the respective Ministries of Foreign Trade rather than Foreign Affairs.

35. Although it is a long way from the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and Czechoslovakia the signature of these agreements marks a modest though welcome step forward in the development of relations between the two countries.

THE FOURTH CZECHOSLOVAK WRITERS' CONGRESS

36. The 4th Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, held in Prague from 27-29 June, confirmed opposition to the party extending far beyond cultural matters. A violent clash between the writers and the party representatives led by Hendrych, the Party Secretary responsible for ideological matters, led to the temporary disappearance of party control over the meeting. The writers passed a defiant resolution reiterating the rights of culture in a Socialist society, paying tribute to the achievements of the pre-war republic and directing the Central Committee of the Writers' Union to press for the restriction of censorship to matters of national defence alone.

37. The party was forced to go to unprecedented lengths to ensure that voting for elections to offices in the Central Committee of the Writers' Union was the way it wanted. It was apparently only by threatening a call to all party members to leave the Writers' Union that the Party Central Committee was able to avert the election of those speakers who had been the most critical of the party's role in cultural matters. Even this demand was only carried by 100 votes to 30 with 40 abstentions. Not unnaturally the Writers' Union regarded this as at least a partial victory.

38. This is the first time that the writers in Czechoslovakia have, as a body, produced a statement of this kind. Its practical effect should not however be over-estimated. The régime has already effectively shown its teeth. The sentences passed on 15 July on the writers Beneš and Tigrid (the latter *in absentia*) on charges of "disrupting the Republic" to 5 and 14 years' imprisonment, as well as violent attacks by President Novotny and other party functionaries on the more liberal speakers at the Congress, are warnings to the writers not to go too far.

SOVIET: INTERNAL

Military policy

39. There were two indications during the month that the Soviet Government is giving more publicity to roles other than defence and nuclear deterrence for its armed forces. An article by Marshal Yakubovsky on 21 July, while stressing the immeasurable increase in the fire-power of the ground forces since they had acquired nuclear weapons, made the point that in "a whole series of contingencies" they must be ready to undertake operations without them. This was in line with evidence that, although Soviet military doctrine still assigns the "decisive role" in war to nuclear weapons, and although Soviet formations are primarily trained for nuclear war, the view is growing that non-nuclear operations are possible in "local wars" (e.g., outside Europe) or in "certain directions of secondary importance". Writing in *Izvestia* on Navy Day at the end of the month, the head of the political administration for the navy emphasised the fundamental change which had occurred in its capability for strategic operations at long distance against other fleets and shores with its atomic submarines, rocket-carrying surface ships, aviation and marine infantry. The Commander-in-Chief told a *Pravda* interviewer that the major Capitalist Powers would sooner or later have to realise that they no longer enjoyed undivided mastery of the seas, while, in the military newspaper *Red Star*, his First Deputy went so far as to write that the navy would have a leading role in any future war and that the party had "indicated the path for constructing a modern ocean-going nuclear-rocket fleet able to carry out strategic tasks of an offensive character in modern war. . . . For the first time in its history our fleet has turned in the full sense into an offensive type of armed force for distant operations."

40. These statements by senior naval officers follow a demonstration of its capabilities by the Northern Fleet to Brezhnev and Kosygin in June. Preoccupation with defence matters was reflected in the heavy and repeated emphasis placed on military preparedness in the Theses for the Revolution

Anniversary and in a number of recent speeches. For example, in the course of his address to military graduates on 5 July Brezhnev stated that "questions of defence stand in the forefront of all our work". During the Middle East crisis the Soviet Government must have been very conscious of their local military inferiority and their inability to intervene effectively, had they wished to do so, without bringing nuclear and/or conventional forces from the USSR to bear. The Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean played a demonstrative role during the crisis and has since been employed in boosting Egyptian and Syrian morale, but it was and is patently no match for the United States Fleet. The Russians were anxious to avoid the risk of military engagement with the Americans, and there is no reason to suppose that if similar circumstances arose they would not pursue the same cautious policy even if their own local military strength were greater. It would be a mistake to assume that the recent statements indicate that the Soviet Government has decided to use their armed forces as active instruments in a more bellicose policy, but they do suggest that they are concerned to give the impression that they have or are creating an effective non-nuclear deterrent, especially one which is capable of being deployed in areas at a distance from the Soviet Union.

THE DEMOTION OF SHELEPIN

41. On 11 July Shelepin was elected Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council. This means that he is unlikely to remain a Secretary of the Central Committee and that, although he retains membership of the Politburo, he has been removed from the mainstream of Kremlin politics. His fortunes, like those of some half-dozen senior official associates, have been moving gradually downwards for two years now. Rumours of the further downgrading of some of these associates, including the Chief Leningrad Party Secretary, have not yet been confirmed. It is noteworthy that it was that another Party Secretary, Suslov, who was the senior Politburo member present at the meeting which effected his transfer and also the removal of Egorychev from the Moscow Party secretaryship (reported last month). The importance of this ascetic ideologue, whose smile one of our Ambassadors once likened to "moonlight on a tombstone", is not to be under-estimated.

42. Shelepin was the leading representative of a middle generation whose ambitions for greater power seem now to have been checked. He and his associates stand for stricter social discipline and greater ideological orthodoxy. They also share a particular interest in raising living standards and probably hope to see Communism develop under a more efficient society. They are not necessarily opposed to economic reform. It is less certain whether they want a tough foreign policy. The labels of "Young Turks" and "Hawks", which have been applied to them by some Western correspondents, probably do not take adequate account of the complexities of their position.

43. The demotion of Shelepin removes, at least temporarily, the most likely potential threat to the collective leadership. The top leaders appear to be trying to consolidate their position further by disarming or removing critics at lower levels who display extreme tendencies both in the direction of orthodoxy and of liberalism. July also saw three leading publicists in serious trouble for criticising the rigidity of theatre censorship. There is no evidence of serious dissension amongst the senior leaders themselves or of any instability at the top but it cannot be excluded that the sympathies of Brezhnev and Kosygin have not been entirely the same in at least some of these issues.

CHRONOLOGY

- July
- 1-3 Soviet Head of State Podgorny visits Syria.
- 1 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin sees President de Gaulle in Paris.
- Chinese protest to Kenya against expulsion of Chinese Chargé d'Affaires.
- Plenum of Yugoslav League of Communists.
- 2 East German Elections.
- 3 Chinese protest against "illegal activities" of Soviet Trade Mission.
- 3-4 Podgorny visits Iraq.
- 3-8 French Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 3-6 Yugoslav Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 3 Peking *People's Daily* "Observer" attacks Glassboro meeting.
- 4 Chinese protest to Nepal over anti-Chinese demonstrations of 1 July.
- Chinese Foreign Ministry protest to Burma over anti-Chinese activities.
(Chinese Embassy in Rangoon also makes several protests during July.)
- 4-10 French Communist Party Delegation visits Czechoslovakia.
- 4 Rumanian Prime Minister visits China.
- Soviet Government statement on Cyprus.
- 5 Anti-Burmese rally in Peking.
- Foreign policy speech by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev.
- 5-12 President of Cameroon visits Soviet Union.
- 5-11 President of Czechoslovakia visits Soviet Union on holiday.
- 5-7 30th Session of Executive Committee of Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow.
- 6-9 International Conference for Peace in Stockholm.
- 6-22 East German Deputy Prime Minister visits UAR and Syria.
- 7 Announcement of appointment of Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky as Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces.
- 8 Hong Kong border incident at Shataukok (Chinese Foreign Ministry protest to the United Kingdom on 9 July).
- 10 Soviet naval force visits UAR ports.
- 10-14 Austrian Chancellor visits Rumania.
- 11 Chinese protest to the United Kingdom over arrest of New China News Agency correspondent in Hong Kong.
- Soviet Party Secretary Shelepin appointed Chairman of Central Trade Union Council.
- 11-19 Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik visits UAR.
- 11-12 Meeting in Budapest of leaders of Communist countries on Middle East (attended by Yugoslavia but not Rumania).
- 14-29 UAR Military Delegation visit Soviet Union.
- 14 North Korean Military Delegation arrives in Soviet Union.
- 15 Soviet Statistical Board announces 10.6 per cent increase in industrial production for first half of 1967 over same period of 1966.
- 16 *People's Daily* "Observer" attacks Brezhnev.
- 17 Soviet Note to China deplores Chinese refusal to renew agreement on aid to ships and aircraft in distress.
- 17-21 British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs visits Poland.
- 17-18 President of Iraq and Prime Minister of Algeria visit Soviet Union.
- 17-21 Rumanian Prime Minister visits Netherlands.
- 18-23 Bulgarian Prime Minister visits Mongolia.
- 18-20 East German Foreign Minister visits Bulgaria.
- 19-22 Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade visits France.
- 19-28 Iranian Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.

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July

- 20-25 Japanese Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
20 West German/Czechoslovak trade talks restarted in Prague.
Council of State Security formed in Rumania.
- 20-23 Indian Foreign Minister visits Yugoslavia.
21- Kuwaiti Delegation led by Minister of Oil and Finance visits Soviet Union.
- 1 Aug.
21- Iraqi Military Delegation visit Soviet Union.
- 8 Aug.
21 Chinese Note rejects Nepalese protest.
Speech by Polish Minister of Defence attacking evidence of pro-Israeli sentiment in Polish forces.
Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Bulgaria and Mongolia.
- 22 Soviet Government statement on Middle East.
Return of Chinese Minister of Public Security from Wuhan to Peking.
- 23 *Pravda* editorial on Communist unity.
- 24-25 Rumanian Grand National Assembly.
- 25-27 Japanese Foreign Minister visits Poland.
- 25-31 International Youth Rally in Leningrad.
26 Announcement of establishment of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Malta.
- 27-29 Japanese Foreign Minister visits Prague.
27 Sino/Soviet Trade Protocol signed.
Chinese Note to Czechoslovakia protesting at expulsion of Chinese students.
- 28 Secretary of Israeli (pro-Arab) Communist Party Meir Vilner visits Soviet Union.
- 29- Sudanese Military Delegation visits Soviet Union.
- 7 Aug.
29-31 Japanese Foreign Minister visits Hungary.
30 *Pravda* reprints article by Secretary-General of Chilean Communist Party.
Soviet Navy Day.
31 Chinese Army Day. Editorials stress leadership of Mao and Lin Piao.
Chief Enahoro of Nigeria arrives in Soviet Union.
- 31- Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade visits Canada.
- 7 Aug.
31- Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visits Yugoslavia.

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2 August, 1967

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, MAY/JUNE 1967

(Because of the Middle East crisis it has been found convenient to cover two months in one Intel)

SUMMARY

THE MIDDLE EAST

Soviet policy

The Soviet Union's actions contributed to Arab belligerency but they miscalculated about the timing and course of hostilities and their prestige has suffered through their inability to prevent the Arab defeat. Since the cease-fire the Russians have worked to rebuild their influence by military aid and political support. But in both fields they have shown caution and a wish to prevent a recurrence of the conflict. Soviet hopes of increased control over Arab external and internal policies. Their support for the "progressive" Arabs. Their freedom limited by the cost of aiding the UAR, the need to avoid confrontation with the United States and continuing Arab suspicions of their good faith. (Paragraphs 1-8.)

Attitude of East European Governments

The Rumanians continued their independent line. Other East Europeans followed the Soviet line but had to deal with some domestic support for Israel. Tito co-operated with the Soviet Union while attempting to retain his "non-aligned" status. (Paragraphs 9-11.)

The Communist movement

Nearly all non-ruling parties were pro-Arab but there was some criticism of the Soviet Union. (Paragraphs 12-15.)

UNITED STATES/SOVIET RELATIONS

There were signs of a tougher Soviet attitude towards the United States before the Middle East crisis, especially over Viet-Nam. Perhaps the chief significance of the Glassboro meeting was that it took place at all. It resulted in no agreement on any major issue but may facilitate further direct contacts between the United States and Soviet Union. (Paragraphs 16-20.)

SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

The Middle East crisis increased Sino/Soviet polemics, although Soviet policy was not directly influenced by the dispute. It is unlikely that the Rumanians can succeed in moderating the Chinese. The North Viet-Nameese continue to keep a balance between Moscow and Peking. (Paragraphs 21-24.)

NORTH VIET-NAM

North Viet-Nam's attitude to negotiations is rigid. They are insisting on their four points. They seem to base their stand on an optimistic assessment of the military situation and of their continued ability to extract aid from China and the USSR. (Paragraphs 25-26.)

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LATIN AMERICA

Cuban support for guerrilla movements in Latin America continues to bedevil Soviet/Cuban relations. Kosygin's visit to Cuba is unlikely to have produced agreement on any of the points at issue. (Paragraphs 27-31.)

RUMANIA

The independent position of Rumania was emphasised by the Rumanian Party leader's attack on foreign Communist interference. (Paragraph 32.)

RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY

The East Germans have responded negatively to the Federal German Chancellor's reply to Herr Stoph about contacts between East and West Germany. But the door to further discussions has not been shut. (Paragraphs 33-35.)

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Soviet Writers' Congress gave a surface picture of intellectual unity. But there were clear signs of dissatisfaction among writers. (Paragraphs 36-39.)

The replacement of the heads of the KGB and of the Moscow Party Committee may have been part of a move to weaken the position of Party Secretary Shelepin. Both these institutions are now represented at Politburo level. (Paragraphs 40-42.)

The "Theses" of the anniversary of the October Revolution contain no new ideas and seem to be an attempt to steer a middle course between conflicting ideological views. (Paragraph 43.)

HONG KONG

The disturbances in Hong Kong were probably not instigated by Peking, but they have been strongly supported by the Chinese Government which appears to have modified its acceptance of the *status quo*. The local population's support for the Hong Kong Government has demonstrated the relative weakness of the pro-Communist agitators. (Paragraphs 44-46.)

CHINESE RELATIONS WITH BURMA AND NEPAL

The sharp deterioration in Chinese relations with Burma and Nepal is evidence of extremist influences in Chinese policy-making. Renewed efforts are being made in propaganda to stress the worldwide revolutionary significance of Mao's thought. (Paragraphs 47-49.)

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Despite efforts to promote order there was more evidence of unrest in many provinces. Attacks on the Head of State, Liu Shao-chi, continue. It is unlikely that he has been formally dismissed. The position of the Minister of Defence, Lin Piao, has been reaffirmed. (Paragraphs 50-54.)

China's hydrogen bomb test suggested that nuclear weapons development has been protected against the effects of the Cultural Revolution. At present the development of the means of delivery probably lags behind that of warheads. (Paragraphs 55-56.)

THE MIDDLE EAST

Soviet policy

Although the Soviet Government was amongst the first to recognise Israel, it had since the mid-fifties traditionally supported the Arab cause, had never been prepared to accept any proposals for arms limitation in the area and had become the major supplier of arms to the UAR, Syria, Algeria and Iraq; it probably

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calculated that, however the situation developed, the Soviet Union stood to gain by this: British and United States support for Israel would damage the West's position in the Middle East whereas Western inaction might lead to a significant Arab gain and a rise in Soviet prestige. The Soviet Government certainly did nothing to restrain Arab belligerency in the period leading up to the crisis or during the crisis. It therefore has a major responsibility for the creation of the situation which led to the war. Moreover by warning the Egyptian Government that there was a pre-meditated Israeli plan to invade Syria, it probably incited the Arabs to take anticipatory counter-action, although it is possible that it believed that this was in fact the Israeli intention. According to Nasser in his resignation speech, the Soviet Government communicated such a warning to a UAR parliamentary delegation in Moscow as early as the first half of May. However it clearly made a number of miscalculations both before and during the crisis particularly as regards timing. It was probably not party to the Egyptian actions which precipitated it—the demand for the withdrawal of the United Nations force and the declaration on the closure of the Straits of Tiran. It also probably calculated that the United States and Western Governments would, even after the closure of the Straits, effectively restrain the Israelis from launching an attack. The Soviet Government was also certainly taken by surprise by the rapid and overwhelming Israeli victory.

2. Although Soviet policies contributed to Arab belligerency, when the fighting broke out they could not intervene to save them from a humiliating defeat. They threw the full weight of their propaganda support behind the Arabs and behind the thesis that the Israelis had acted in collusion with the United States and Britain. But their actions were clearly limited by a desire to avoid the creation of a situation which could involve them in direct military confrontation with the United States. Although they quoted the story of United States and British participation in the fighting in some of their foreign broadcasts, they were careful not to endorse this fabrication officially. They were in a position to know that it was false and appreciated that it was calculated to strengthen demands for their own intervention.

3. Although United States and British interests in the area have suffered, Soviet prestige has also suffered a severe setback. The immediate Soviet aim since the cease-fire has been to rebuild Arab confidence in the Soviet Union. Arms, particularly aircraft, to replace those lost in the fighting have been despatched to the UAR. In the latter part of June there was a major airlift of supplies and shipments continue by sea. But it would take many months to replace all the Arab losses at normal rates of supply, and it seems likely that the Russians will hesitate to build up their armaments to their previous level, at least without additional safeguards. The Soviet Government may not yet have decided how far it will go. But its policy in this respect appears to be cautious and its actions so far are consistent with a desire to avoid the creation of a situation in which another conflict could arise. On the political front the Russians have also tried to hold back more extreme Arab policies towards Israel. The visits of the Soviet Head of State Podgorny to the UAR, Syria and Iraq were probably used both to make promises of assistance in general terms and at the same time to urge restraint. The Russians can presumably thus use the unfulfilled hope of military aid as a lever to ensure caution on the part of the Arabs.

4. The Soviet insistence on an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly and their subsequent tactics in New York can also be regarded as part of this immediate policy of regaining Arab confidence. They are anxious to show themselves as the Arabs' principal ally and champion. They have had some success, but their plans in the United Nations misfired since they could not achieve the necessary two-thirds majority for their resolution. They ended up by adopting a considerably softer position and were unable to persuade the Arab extremists to accept a resolution which linked Israeli withdrawal with an end to the state of belligerency between Israelis and Arabs.

5. The visit by Soviet naval vessels to Middle Eastern ports was another aspect of this morale-boosting exercise. These efforts have been accompanied by a major propaganda campaign designed not only to emphasise Soviet support but also to discredit the West. The Russians have enlisted the support of their East European allies in this campaign and the importance which they attach to Communist solidarity was demonstrated by their summoning another high-level meeting

of East European leaders in Budapest on 11 and 12 July only a month after a similar meeting in Moscow on 9 June. One of the main objects of the Budapest meeting appears to have been to discuss the co-ordination of Communist aid to the Arab countries. The communiqué reflected the relatively cautious Soviet line on military supplies and suggested that no firm commitments had been undertaken.

6. It is difficult to forecast how the Russians will now play their hand. They may see some advantages to be gained from the increased dependence on them of the Arab States, especially the UAR and Syria. They probably intend to attach conditions to the aid which they are now providing hoping to gain influence not only over Arab military moves but also over the development of their domestic political structure. Recent articles in the Soviet Press have stressed the importance of giving more scope to "Socialist" elements in the UAR. There is no indication that the Russians envisage a greater role for the Egyptian Communist party but they may well see greater opportunities for the advancement of Left-wing forces throughout the Middle East, including areas such as Libya, the Sudan and the Gulf where they have hitherto been less active. Associated with this trend has been the stress in Soviet propaganda on the role of the "progressive" Arab States and insistence that the Arab struggle should be seen as part of the general crusade against Imperialism. There are however limitations on Soviet freedom of manoeuvre. The Russians will be reluctant to be drawn into a position in which they find themselves responsible for keeping the UAR economy afloat: this would be very costly and would involve them in the sort of open-ended financial commitment which they much dislike. There is also, we must assume, the overriding desire to avoid a military confrontation with the United States. This is likely to mean the continuation of a policy of caution in their approach to the problem of Israel, although this is unlikely to be reflected in what they say publicly.

7. Even if they recognise that a solution of the Israeli problem is in their long-term interest, it is not easy for the Soviet leaders to ensure that the Arabs themselves will fall in with their plans. The United Nations debate demonstrated the extreme Arab reluctance to take any step towards the cessation of the state of belligerency and the recognition of Israel. More extreme Arab opinion may be dissatisfied with the assurances of support which they have received so far. There is some evidence that the visits to Moscow by Boumedienne and Arif were made in order to complain about the failure of the Budapest meeting to come out with a more aggressive line against Israel.

8. While the Soviet Government is intent upon re-establishing its position and prestige—and this phase may last for some time—the policy of all-out public support for the "progressive" Arabs will probably continue and the Russians are likely to be reluctant to take any diplomatic initiatives of which the Arabs disapprove. We must also assume that, even if they are interested in working towards some form of more permanent settlement which would reduce the risk of another conflict into which they could be drawn, they will also persist in the long-term aim of eroding Western influence in the area.

Attitude of East European Governments

9. The basic attitude of all East European Governments except the Rumanians has been one of close support for the Soviet line. But privately they must have had misgivings at getting involved in commitments as a result of Soviet mistakes. Moreover some of them have had to take account of domestic support for Israel, not only from the Jewish population. This has been particularly the case in Poland and Hungary where senior party leaders have found it necessary to defend their endorsement of the Soviet line and to reprove publicly supporters of Israel, but there have also been doubters in Czechoslovakia.

10. The Rumanians have used the Middle East crisis to emphasise still further their independence of the Soviet Union in foreign policy. After declining to sign the declaration at the Moscow meeting on 9 June, they refused altogether to attend the meeting in Budapest. The speech by Prime Minister Maurer to the General Assembly demanded Israeli withdrawal but was devoted mainly to a relatively impartial assessment and was moderate in its attacks on "Imperialism". In conversations with a number of world leaders, including Presidents Johnson and de Gaulle, Maurer emphasised Rumania's independent stance.

Yugoslavia

11. It was probably consciousness of his special commitment to Nasser which led Tito to attend both meetings of East European leaders on 9 June and 11-12 July; this was in marked contrast to the previous Yugoslav reluctance to join in multilateral meetings with the other Communist Powers; having decided to do so he could hardly, unlike the Rumanians, avoid signing the final statement and duly broke off diplomatic relations with Israel four days later. However, the Yugoslavs have subsequently taken pains to deny that they are passively following the Soviet line; they claim rather to have taken the lead in canvassing Communist support for a non-aligned victim of aggression. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two extremes—*i.e.*, it is unlikely that Tito persuaded the Russians to do anything that they would not otherwise have done but he must have been anxious to obtain as much backing as possible for President Nasser whose continued existence in power he regards as vital to the survival of non-alignment. As part of this face-saving operation Yugoslavia played a leading part in sponsoring the “non-aligned” resolution in the General Assembly demanding Israeli withdrawal. On the other hand a major speech by Tito on 1 July betrayed—as well as traces of more objective second thoughts and some sensitivity to informed opinion—an obsession with “Imperialist encirclement”.

The Communist movement

12. Although the leaderships of nearly all the non-ruling Communist parties were pro-Arab, the Middle East conflict caused dissension within several parties and led to some criticism of the Soviet Union.

13. In Western Europe, the United States and Australia, the main issue was the attitude to Israel and the Jews. The leading Communist parties of Western Europe had to take account of the Jewish communities in Western Europe and of their own substantial Jewish membership. While they condemned Israel as the aggressor, they advocated a settlement in the interests of both Arabs and Jews and they did not follow the anti-Israeli excesses of Soviet propaganda. The British Party admitted to 12 resignations among its rank-and-file though the total is believed to be about 40. The French Party was embarrassed by the pro-Israeli stand both of Left-wing intellectuals like Jean Paul Sartre and of their political allies in the Federation de la Gauche. Elsewhere, the Communist Party of Australia was one of the few to deplore excessive Arab nationalism, while the Communist Party of the United States sympathised with Israel.

14. The pro-Jewish faction of the Communist Party of Israel took a strongly nationalist line, rejecting the charge of Israeli aggression; the pro-Arab faction followed the Soviet line and is now quoted in the Communist Press as the only Israeli Party recognised as such in the Soviet Press. The attitude of the Arab Communist parties was co-ordinated at a meeting which was reported in *Pravda* to have taken place in May at an unspecified site; their clandestine radio stations operating from Eastern Europe projected the Soviet line.

15. Many Communist parties of the developing countries disagreed on the Soviet Union's role in the conflict. Some parties (*e.g.*, Dominican Republic and Chile) diverged from the Soviet line; others (*e.g.*, Colombia) felt obliged to counter criticism of the Russians. Predictably, the parties of Albania and New Zealand and the pro-Chinese splinter parties all followed China in denouncing “Soviet revisionists” for betraying the Arabs. The pro-Soviet factions of Ceylon and India spoke up in defence of the Soviet Union, though the former did so with some delay and, apparently, with reluctance.

UNITED STATES/SOVIET RELATIONS

16. Before the Middle East crisis, there were already indications of a hardening of the Soviet attitude towards Washington. This was most evident in the context of Viet-Nam where the Russians rigidly maintained their line that the bombing of the North must cease without conditions. They appeared to have abandoned support even in private for the idea of negotiations. The collision between Russian and American warships during exercises in the Sea of Japan received much publicity, as did the bombing of the Soviet ship *Turkestan* in a North Viet-Nameese port.

17. The main propaganda themes following the Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist Parties, while primarily anti-German, also included a strong anti-American element. The demands for an end to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1969 were accompanied by much emphasis on the need for the withdrawal of American influence from Europe.

18. The first effect of the Arab/Israel war was to sharpen Soviet antagonism to the United States, and Russian propaganda attacks on alleged United States aggressive aims in the Middle East continue. But the crisis was also the opportunity for the first summit meeting between a United States President and a Soviet Prime Minister since 1961. The meeting at Glassboro was a milestone rather than a turning point in United States/Soviet relations. Perhaps its chief significance lies in the fact that despite Viet-Nam and the Middle East war, the meeting took place at all. It confirmed a recognition by the Soviet Union of a responsibility for avoiding direct conflict with the United States resulting from heightened tension in any part of the world. The circumstances of the meeting underlined the increasingly bi-polar nature of communication between the two major Powers and it is possible that the habit of direct dealings will be intensified as a result. It is noteworthy that in agreeing to a meeting, the Russians were prepared to brook bitter Chinese attacks on "United States/Soviet collusion" and to risk giving an appearance of weakness to their Arab allies.

19. The Glassboro meeting did not result in any agreement on the Middle East or on Viet-Nam. The same applied to European problems. This was only to be expected. Soviet propaganda played the meeting in an extremely low key and gave no hints of Kosygin's amiability. The anti-American themes of Soviet propaganda have instead been growing steadily more virulent and it is notable that the Russians have taken the opportunity to compare and link Israeli action with the "revanchist" aims of the Federal German Government.

20. At Glassboro both sides did confirm their interest in the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement. The Chinese H-bomb explosion has also probably provided a further stimulus to agreement on this subject. It is possible too that the welcome accorded Mr. Kosygin in the United States and the personal relationship established with President Johnson may help the development of bilateral relations where some deterioration had set in as a result of bitterness over Viet-Nam.

SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

21. The Arab/Israeli dispute led to a sharp increase in the volume of polemic. The Chinese attempted to discredit the Soviet Union by alleging that Russian support for the Arabs was insufficient. The Glassboro meeting brought an intensification of charges of "collusion" between the Soviet Union and the United States, which was claimed to be aimed primarily against China. It seems unlikely that the dispute with China was an important influence on Soviet policy and actions throughout the Middle East crisis, but it remains an inhibiting factor in relations with the United States. The Russians are sensitive to these charges of collusion and responded sharply, not only by refuting the allegations but by repeating the even less credible counter-charges that the Chinese had a tacit understanding with the United States, especially on Viet-Nam. In an article in *Izvestiya* on 18 June they also took up the Hong Kong issue and ridiculed the Chinese for failing to take determined action against the colonialists on their doorstep.

22. At State level, the Soviet Government protested about the maltreatment of Soviet trade representatives who had been subjected to a mock trial by the Red Guards; the Chinese put in a counter protest about the "espionage" activities of "revisionist" and "Imperialist" representatives in Peking.

23. The Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer arrived in Peking on 4 July, presumably to make another attempt to influence the Chinese. But, despite Rumania's would-be neutral status in the Sino/Soviet dispute, he is unlikely to have cut much ice; ideological considerations apart, Rumania's attitude during the Middle East crisis must be even less acceptable to the Chinese than that of the Soviet Union. Moreover the Chinese leaders appear to be in no state of mind to accept advice, even from those who still claim to be their allies.

North Korea and North Viet-Nam

24. The North Koreans and North Viet-Nameese Governments pledged support for the Arabs. The North Koreans hinted that the "Socialist countries" could have helped the Arabs more actively. But neither followed China's lead in criticising the Soviet Union's role in the conflict. North Viet-Nam has continued to keep a careful balance between the Soviet Union and China, but there have been sharp differences with the latter, notably with regard to the right method of prosecuting the war in the South; the Chinese favour concentrating on more limited guerilla tactics, claiming that the war has not reached the stage when major pitched battles would be effective. The North Viet-Nameese are probably also embarrassed by the excesses of the "Cultural Revolution" and they dissociated themselves from some aspects of it in an editorial in the May issue of the Party Journal *Hoc Tap*, devoted to Ho Chi Minh's 77th birthday. Without naming the Chinese, they criticised by implication the reduction of the Communist Party's role in China and the deification of Mao Tse-tung. They redressed the balance, however, in welcoming enthusiastically China's hydrogen bomb test.

NORTH VIET-NAM'S ATTITUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS

25. The available evidence suggests that the North Viet-Nameese attitude towards negotiations to end the war, is now completely rigid and will remain so for some time. This probably reflects a view which they have arrived at themselves rather than as the result of Chinese influence. Recent pronouncements in Hanoi insisted that the Americans must accept the basic conditions set out in the four points, which include demands for the withdrawal of American troops and the settlement of the affairs of South Viet-Nam "by the South Viet-Nameese people themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Viet-Nam National Front for Liberation". Equally the North Viet-Nameese deny that they are obliged to respond to a cessation of bombing by scaling down their attacks. They have gone out of their way to attack all proposals (e.g., U Thant's standstill proposals of 14 March) which do not make a clear-cut distinction between the "aggressor" and those who "oppose aggression".

26. Hanoi's attitude seems to be based on a calculation that they can withstand foreseeable American military pressure at least until the United States Presidential election in 1968. They appear to think that the Americans may then be prepared to negotiate a peace on something like North Viet-Nam's terms. This calculation reflects an optimistic assessment of the progress in the war in the South which appears to be based on:

- (a) Mis-information about the extent of American casualties;
- (b) A measure of success in obstructing the progress of the vital pacification programme;
- (c) The effective use that has been made of new weapons, like heavy mortars and rocket launchers, against American airfields and other fixed installations;
- (d) Confidence that aid from China and from the Soviet Union will continue to enable them to withstand any increase in the American military effort.

It is also based upon an optimistic calculation of the effects of internal and external pressures on the United States Government.

LATIN AMERICA

Cuba and Venezuela

27. The announcement in Caracas on 12 May of the capture of two Cuban soldiers who had tried to land on the Venezuelan coast to join up with guerilla forces in the interior has again brought to the fore the question of Cuban support for guerilla movements in Latin America. This followed soon after the murder (attributed to Left-wing terrorists) of the brother of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister and renewed clashes with guerillas in Bolivia.

28. One of the first reactions was from Havana. A Central Committee communiqué acknowledged that Cuba was helping and would continue to help all revolutionary movements fighting against Imperialism in any part of the world. It denied that the Cubans in question were members of the regular Cuban Army but

invited the inference that they belonged to clandestine cadres. The Soviet Press published a brief resumé of the communiqué without comment but, in response to Cuban criticism of lukewarm Soviet support for Latin American liberation movements, seized the opportunity of a "Week of Solidarity with Latin America" held in Moscow from 20-27 May to show its support for Latin American patriots in general and Cubans in particular. This was in contrast to the minimal coverage accorded to a similar week held earlier this year.

29. The Venezuelan decision to take the matter of the captured Cubans to the OAS, and the resultant publicity for the activities of guerilla groups in Latin America is likely to cause some embarrassment to the Russians, but may not be unwelcome to Castro.

Soviet/Cuban relations

30. Kosygin visited Cuba, from 26-30 June, on his return journey from the United Nations in New York. The visit was played down by both the Soviet and Cuban Press. On the day that Kosygin arrived Havana television carried an implicitly critical commentary on Kosygin's Press conference in New York. Using a formula reserved for occasions where the known positions of the two sides make agreement unlikely, Tass stated that the talks had given an opportunity to exchange views with "complete frankness".

31. In the absence of a communiqué and of any comment from either side on the subject matter of the talks, the most probable supposition is that Kosygin wished to form a personal judgment of his recalcitrant and expensive client, and discussed the many differences between them, including Soviet policy towards the Middle East. On the most delicate problem of the promotion of Communism in Latin America, Kosygin may have tried to ensure that the forthcoming Latin American Solidarity Organisation Conference would not lead to a definite split between the Castroites and the orthodox Communist parties of Latin America. He may have sought to dissuade Castro from his policy of supporting subversion. But we have no firm evidence; and if he did it is unlikely that he succeeded.

EASTERN EUROPE

Rumanian/Soviet relations

32. The independent position of Rumania was emphasised in a comprehensive review of Rumanian Party policy by the party Secretary-General, Ceausescu, published in the party journal *Scinteia* on 7 May. The most obvious purpose was to explain to the rank and file of the Rumanian Party Rumania's absence from Karlovy Vary. Ceausescu referred to Rumania's "legitimate right" to attend or be absent from international conferences. But the significance of the article went further than this. Ceausescu implied that foreign, presumably Soviet, Communists had been trying to deal directly with members of the Rumanian Party without the authority of the Rumanian Central Committee. Rumanian Party members were also criticised for lack of discipline, moral laxity and divulging party secrets. The fact that Ceausescu found it necessary to criticise party leaders by implication argues strongly for the existence of stresses within his party. But there is no evidence for any weakening of Ceausescu's own position.

RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY

33. On 11 May the Federal German Chancellor received a letter from Herr Stoph, the Chairman of the East German Council of Ministers. Instead of returning it, Dr. Kiesinger broke with precedent by announcing publicly that its contents had been "noted". The letter, published in full by *Neues Deutschland* and summarised in *Pravda*, proposed a meeting at Heads of Government level to discuss the establishment of normal relations between the two German States and various other matters of common concern. Although none of this was new, the tone was not particularly harsh and Herr Stoph expressed the East German régime's readiness to consider proposals by the Federal Republic.

34. On 17 May it was announced that the Federal Government was setting up a Ministerial Working Group to co-ordinate policy and tactics towards Eastern Germany, including (a further departure from precedent) the question of a reply to the Stoph letter. After a great deal of speculation, including the publication of

a public opinion poll which showed that 74 per cent. of the West German population would welcome a Kiesinger/Stoph meeting, Dr. Kiesinger replied to Herr Stoph on 13 June, publishing the terms of his reply in a speech to the *Bundestag* the following day. In it he addressed Herr Stoph as "Mr. Chairman" (without saying of what) and in firm but moderate language took the latter to task for an "all or nothing" approach—*i.e.*, insisting on recognition of East Germany as a pre-condition of progress. Dr. Kiesinger then offered talks between "representatives" of the two leaders on improving practical, technical and human relations between both parts of Germany. Predictably, the reply was criticised within the Federal Republic for being too forthcoming and (among the SPD) for not being forthcoming enough.

35. The initial East German response has been negative; and they have not so far shown any readiness to reply to Dr. Kiesinger's letter, the text of which has not been published in East Germany. Herr Stoph and other Communist commentators (including Tass) have accused Dr. Kiesinger of not only maintaining but sharpening the Federal German claim to sole representation. The main indication that the door to further dialogue has not been shut came from Herr Ulbricht, in an election speech on 22 June, when he expressed interest in the West German proposal for an agreement to renounce the use of force and suggested that this should be the first object of a Kiesinger/Stoph negotiation. This suggests that the East Germans may have decided to keep open the option of negotiations at Ministerial level without insisting that the Federal Government must first give up its claim to sole representation.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The Soviet Writers' Congress

36. The Soviet authorities have taken pains to project a picture of unity and unanimity among intellectuals in the anniversary year of the revolution. This was the impression which the literary establishment sought to create at the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers which, after several postponements, was held in Moscow from 22-27 May. There were, however, some signs of opposition to this play-safe policy. Some delegates did not turn up. The novelist Mikhail Sholokhov felt impelled in his speech to refer to one notable absentee—Ilya Ehrenburg—and suggested that the latter's "contempt for the norms of public life" was infecting "certain overgrown young writers". From abroad, Aragon and Sartre, who had been invited, boycotted the Congress because of the treatment of Sinyavsky and Daniel. One French delegate, Armand Lanoux, spoke of the two imprisoned Soviet writers but his comments were not mentioned in the Soviet Press.

37. The election to the Congress's honorary presidium and later to the Board of the Writers' Union of prominent representatives of both literary factions showed the authorities' wish to steer a middle course. Indeed Sholokhov attacked the non-controversial atmosphere of the Congress and deplored the "unconcealed desire" to avoid "sharp corners".

38. An important, though unofficial event was the circulation of a letter to participants by A. Solzhenitsyn, the author of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich", condemning the Soviet censorship and the spineless attitude of the Writers' Union. It also revealed how Solzhenitsyn's own work had been banned and used against him. Western reports claimed that 82 members of the Writers' Union had petitioned the Congress to allow a debate on Solzhenitsyn's complaints. It was Sholokhov once more who appeared to be challenging Solzhenitsyn when he spoke of "some people who want so-called freedom of the Press for all".

39. Several speakers condemned both the Chinese cultural revolutionaries and Western attempts at "bridge building" and intellectual subversion. The novelist K. Simonov was one of the very few to pursue a genuine issue of principle when he rejected attempts by the military to hush up unpalatable truths about the last war. Some months ago Simonov apparently refused to allow his own war diaries to be published in a censored version in *Novy Mir*.

Changes in the second rank of the Soviet leadership

40. The heads of two institutions of considerable political potential were replaced by Candidate Members of the Politburo. Since the general tendencies in the anniversary year has been towards solidarity and immobility within the leadership, there must have been strong reasons for the changes.

41. The immediate cause of the replacement of Semichastny as Chairman of the KGB by Andropov (a Central Committee Secretary who was then promoted Candidate Member of the Politburo) probably lay in a series of reverses or mistakes by the security services involving the exposure of subversive and espionage activities in Yugoslavia, Rumania and some NATO countries, and the defection of Svetlana Stalin. A deeper cause of Semichastny's removal was probably his connection with Politburo Member Shelepin, whose associates are gradually being removed from positions of influence. Secondly, the replacement of Egorichev by Grishin (formerly Chairman of the Trade Union Council and already a Candidate Member of the Politburo) as First Secretary of the important Moscow City Party Committee took place immediately after the Central Committee Plenum on 20-21 June at which the Middle East was discussed. Egorichev had a special interest in the Middle East and may well have criticised the moderation of the Government's policy. But he has criticised economic policy in the past and, like Semichastny, has been a member of a group surrounding the leadership which has been strongly conservative, almost neo-Stalinist, in its views on social and ideological questions. Thus, the effect of his removal and that of Semichastny may be that the leaders will feel less embarrassed in following their middle course, though this is unlikely to mean greater relaxation of internal restraints.

42. Neither Andropov nor Grishin has any known political affiliations at the top; both are probably compromise candidates, acceptable to the top leadership. The fact that these two important institutions are now represented at Politburo level may mean that their affairs will be discussed and directed through that body rather than through the Party Secretariat. Whether this will mean a diminution in the direct influence over them of Brezhnev, the General Secretary, is as yet unclear.

"Theses" of October Revolution Anniversary

43. The "Theses" for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, approved by the Central Committee at the June plenum, are the longest programmatic document to be issued by Khrushchev's successors. They contain no new ideas or doctrine and skate round or ignore the more difficult or controversial subjects, such as Stalin and his repressions, or Khrushchev's mistakes. At the same time the lack of any positive mention of Stalin suggests that there has been some slackening in the movement for his partial rehabilitation, which was discernible some months ago. There is nothing of note on the economic reforms. In minor respects they hark back to themes of the Khrushchev era which have received little attention lately, such as the Party Programme, peaceful methods of achieving Socialism and the "state of the whole people", a theory which implies that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is no longer fully applicable in the Soviet Union's transition to Communism. However these ideas are given less emphasis than in the past. On the foreign side the theses present a militant and revolutionary image, with considerable emphasis on maintaining defence at a high level and on support for revolutionary forces. The line on international Communism is cautious and restrained, with vigorous criticism of Mao and his "group", but no reference to an international conference. In general, they fail to justify *Pravda's* description of them as a "document of vast inspirational and mobilising force": they convey little sense of achievement or vision of the Communist future.

HONG KONG

44. The recent disturbances in Hong Kong had their origin in a series of minor labour disputes which were exploited for political purposes by the pro-Communists. There is no evidence to suggest that these incidents were instigated by Peking; they arose rather from a more militant attitude amongst the pro-Communists in Hong Kong in response to the atmosphere on the mainland generated by the Cultural Revolution and the success of Communist tactics in Macao early in the year. On 15 May, however, the Chinese Government produced a very strong statement condemning the British authorities and making a series of "demands" (including release of those arrested, compensation and guarantees of good behaviour in future) which they must have known to be completely unacceptable to the Hong Kong Government. This intervention by the Chinese Government prolonged and intensified the disturbances in Hong Kong which are now of an entirely political nature.

45. In thus strongly intervening in the affairs of Hong Kong the Chinese Government appears to have modified its attitude of accepting the *status quo*. It was however significant that the Chinese "demands" were first made in a statement rather than a diplomatic note (although they were later included in a formal note of 26 June) and that the Chinese did not thereafter step up the level of their demands as they have done in the case of Macao. It seems that the action of the Chinese Government was taken in response to an existing situation and that the virulence of this response was determined by the present heady and chauvinistic atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution in which it is practically impossible for any Chinese leader (in particular those concerned with foreign affairs) to take anything except a demonstrably "anti-Imperialist" attitude. China's present tough anti-foreign line was also reflected in "demands" which they have made to the Indonesian, Mongolian, Indian and Burmese Governments all of whom they have accused of behaving in an "anti-Chinese" fashion.

46. Politically inspired disturbances are still continuing in Hong Kong and it is not yet possible to determine how far the Chinese are prepared to go in supporting the pro-Communists there. The pro-Communist leadership in Hong Kong appears to have been put into some disarray by the firm actions taken by the Hong Kong Government to counter disturbances, and perhaps even more, by the degree of support which the Hong Kong Government has received from the local population and which has demonstrated how isolated and relatively small in numbers are their supporters. The pro-Communist leadership now appears to be trying to reorganise and to replan its activities so as to win more support from the local population. To do this it has turned to strike action but this too is being relatively unsuccessful.

CHINESE RELATIONS WITH BURMA AND NEPAL

47. The increasingly chauvinistic attitude displayed by China in her dealings with foreign countries during recent months has been extended to Nepal and Burma. Violent demonstrations against the Chinese Embassy and members of the Chinese community in Burma have provoked a strong protest from the Chinese Government calling for the overthrow of the Ne Win Government by the Burmese Communist Party. The Nepalese Government has been accused of conniving at the destruction of the Chinese pavilion at a Trade Fair in Katmandu. There have also been further incidents involving old "revisionist" and "Imperialist" enemies but the attacks upon countries with which China had previously taken special care to maintain good relations mark a distinct hardening of Chinese policies.

48. The incidents are due partly to the over-zealous and tactless way in which Chinese missions abroad have been promoting the cult of Mao and the Cultural Revolution and the intensification of extremist pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking where many officials must privately regret the discarding of the fruits of China's earlier "Bandung" policies. The Chinese leadership may see advantage too in exploiting anti-foreign feeling as a diversion from the confusion and disorder which have accompanied the Cultural Revolution.

49. These developments should be seen in conjunction with Chinese Press articles commending "revolutionary" action by Indian peasants in West Bengal and stressing that armed struggle is the only path to success. Others have condemned the tactics of the Indonesian Communist Party in collaborating too closely with the national Government before the September 1965 *coup* and stressed the general importance of revolutionary action. The Chinese have an urge to proclaim the world-wide revolutionary significance of Mao's thought, but it seems likely that their efforts in this direction must for the moment be limited to propaganda.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

50. Throughout May and June Chinese leaders continued to emphasise the need for unity and for the cessation of violent struggle between different revolutionary groups. Despite Peking's repeated directives for a return to order, there were more reports in June of clashes and of activities adversely affecting the economy in many areas. The drive for the formation of Revolutionary Committees made no detectable progress at the provincial level, except in the cases of Inner Mongolia and Chinghai where preparatory groups were formed. In Szechuan, the situation remained extremely confused, despite the earlier formation of a provincial Preparatory Group by order of the Central Committee: the radio station of a neighbouring province mounted attacks on the Szechuan Party leader, Li

Ching-ch'uan, which suggested that he retained control in part of the province. By late June, however, Chang Kuo-hua, a military leader from Tibet who had been appointed to replace Li Ching-ch'uan, appeared in the Szechuan provincial capital.

51. The 10th anniversary of the publication of Mao's speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" was the occasion for more urgent calls for unity and public order. A *Red Flag* editorial acknowledged that the development of the Cultural Revolution was "uneven" and that many "complicated contradictions" had arisen. While strongly reproving leaders of mass organisations (e.g., Red Guards) for their sectarianism, self-interest and arrogance, the editorial affirmed that the present campaign should aim at "strengthening, not weakening leadership by the party". A further effort to limit the scope of the mass campaign was suggested by the statement that the overthrow of existing authority was necessary "only in certain sectors".

52. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) continued to fulfil the task of preserving order in the country as a whole, but an editorial in the *Liberation Army Daily* at the end of June admitted that the armed forces had encountered serious difficulties and had made mistakes in their attempts to resolve local political problems.

53. A *Red Flag* editorial, published to mark the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (1 July), acclaimed the party's leadership and achievements in the Cultural Revolution and its position as "the mainstay of the international Communist movement". The editorial asserted that the Head of State Liu Shao-ch'i (who was not named but described as "the top party person in authority taking the capitalist road") had been "exposed and overthrown". The word "overthrown" did not however appear to have the connotation of official dismissal and there has been no news of any formal move to remove Liu from his party and State positions; moreover, it is difficult to see how he could be removed in the present circumstances. By reminding party members that Liu has lost effective power and by urging them to play a leading role in the Cultural Revolution, the editorial clearly reflects Mao's desire to consolidate the party as a whole. The editorial suggests that Mao is satisfied that by the elimination of opponents at the highest level he has attained one of his principal objectives in the campaign, and that he may wish to see the gradual reassertion of party authority at all levels.

54. The Press has re-emphasised the pre-eminent position, after Mao, of Defence Minister Lin Piao. Chou En-lai continued to play the leading role in State affairs. There have been no new indications of any changes in the status of other party and Government leaders.

China's hydrogen bomb

55. China's test of a hydrogen bomb on 17 June suggested that the development of nuclear weapons was one field which had been especially protected against any adverse effects of the Cultural Revolution. An official Press communiqué said that the test had further broken the "nuclear monopoly" of the United States and Soviet Union and had undermined their "policy of nuclear blackmail"; that the test gave great encouragement to the world revolutionary people, particularly the Viet-Nameese and the Arabs, in their fights against Imperialism. The communiqué repeated the assurance that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and reaffirmed China's commitment to the ultimate aim of abolishing such weapons.

56. In the immediate future, China's stockpile of nuclear weapons is expected to remain small as a consequence of a shortage of fissile material. The means of delivery are thought to lag behind the development of warheads. China's present bomber force is obsolete and although she may have medium-range missiles within the next three years, it is generally believed that she will not possess inter-continental missiles until the mid-1970s.

CHRONOLOGY

May

- 1 Chinese representatives walk off May Day Parade in Moscow.
- 2-5 Austrian Chancellor visits Hungary.
Belgian Foreign Minister visits Czechoslovakia.
- 4-7 East German Foreign Minister visits UAR.
Peking *People's Daily* editorial attacking Karlovy Vary Conference.
- 5 *Pravda* correspondent expelled from Peking.
North Viet-Nameese editorial welcomes Karlovy Vary resolution on Viet-Nam.
- 7-10 East German Foreign Minister visits Syria.
- 7-12 Pakistan Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 8-13 Hungarian Foreign Minister visits Yugoslavia.
- 10 Chinese Petroleum Workers Trade Union refuses to attend international meeting in Budapest.
- 10-13 CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev visits Bulgaria.
- 10-12 East German Foreign Minister visits Lebanon.
- 11 Delivery of East German letter to Federal Chancellor Kiesinger.
- 12 Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.
- 12-16 Italian Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.
East German Foreign Minister visits Algeria.
- 13-19 Czechoslovak President visits Canada.
- 15 Chinese Government statement on Hong Kong.
- 16-23 Hungarian military delegation visits Hanoi.
- 16-19 East German Foreign Minister visits Iraq.
- 16-20 Australian Deputy Prime Minister visits Rumania.
- 18-19 East German Party Secretary and Prime Minister visit Hungary.
- 18 Spiljak appointed Yugoslav Prime Minister.
- 19 East German-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.
Andropov appointed Head of KGB in place of Semichastny.
- 20 East German Foreign Minister visits Belgrade.
- 21 Chinese teachers expelled from Mongolia.
- 22 4th Congress of Soviet Writers.
Ulbricht visits President Tito.
- 23-26 British Foreign Secretary visits Soviet Union.
- 23 Soviet Government Statement on Middle East.
- 24-26 Rumanian Party Secretary and Prime Minister visit Hungary.
- 25 Mass rally in Peking in support of Arab countries. Soviet Union accused of collusion with Israel.
- 25- Pakistan Defence Minister visits China.
- 3 June
- 25-28 UAR Defence Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 27- Soviet-Polish-East German joint exercises.
- 5 June
- 28 Chinese Government statement on Middle East.
- 29- Cambodian Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 7 June
- 29-30 Syrian President visits Soviet Union.
- 29- Soviet Head of State visits Afghanistan.
- 30 June
- 31- Rumanian Foreign Minister visits Japan.
- 7 June

CONFIDENTIAL

June

- 2 Soviet protest to United States on alleged bombing of Soviet merchant ship in North Viet-Nameese harbour.
- 3-8 Finnish Communist Party delegation visit Soviet Union.
- 5 Soviet Government statement on outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities.
- 5-6 Bulgarian Prime Minister visits Yugoslavia.
- 6 Soviet Government cancels visit to Portsmouth by Soviet warship.
Chinese Government statement on Middle East war.
- 7 Soviet Government statement calls for cease-fire in response to Security Council decision.
Chinese *People's Daily* attacks Soviet Union over Middle East.
- 9 Meeting in Moscow of East European leaders including Tito on Middle East. Rumanians attended but did not sign declaration.
- 10 Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia break diplomatic relations with Israel.
- 11 Federal Chancellor Kiesinger replies to letter from East German Prime Minister.
- 12 Algerian Prime Minister visits Moscow.
Rumanian Foreign Minister sees Arab and Israeli Ambassadors.
Poland and Hungary break diplomatic relations with Israel.
- 13 Algerian Prime Minister visits Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia breaks diplomatic relations with Israel.
People's Daily denounces statement on Middle East by East European countries.
- 14 Announcement of joint Soviet, Hungarian and Czech staff exercises under Marshal Yakubovsky.
- 15 Soviet protest to China about "provocations" against Soviet personnel in China.
- 16 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visits Paris; sees President de Gaulle.
Rumanian Foreign Minister visits Belgrade.
Fifth Plenary Session of Secretariat of Afro-Asian Journalists Association (pro-Chinese) in Peking.
- 17 Chinese hydrogen bomb test.
Kosygin arrives in New York.
5th Conference of Mexican, Central American and Panamanian Communist Parties in San José.
- 19 United Nations General Assembly Emergency Session on Middle East; speech by Kosygin.
- 20-21 Plenum of CPSU Central Committee; addressed by Party General Secretary Brezhnev.
- 20 Soviet Head of State Podgorny visits Yugoslavia; sees President Tito.
- 21-25 Podgorny visits UAR.
- 21 Soviet Union withdraws from world television programme ("Our World").
Andropov elected Candidate Member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo.
Soviet Government protests to China at ill-treatment of Soviet trade officials in Northern China.
- 21-25 President Kaunda of Zambia visits China.
- 22 Chinese Red Guard delegation visits Albania.
Meeting between Kosygin and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary in New York.
- 23 First Meeting of President Johnson and Kosygin at Glassboro.
Delegation of Polish United Workers (Communist) Party visits North Viet-Nam.

June

- 24 Podgorny visits Yugoslavia on return to Moscow.
- 25 Second Glassboro meeting.
Soviet Theses for 50th anniversary of October Revolution issued.
Kosygin gives Press conference in New York.
- 26-30 Kosygin visits Cuba.
- 26 Rumanian Prime Minister sees President Johnson.
- 27 Anti-Chinese riots in Burma.
- 28 Yegorichev replaced as First Secretary of Moscow City Party Committee.
Chinese *People's Daily* attacks Soviet role at United Nations.
Chinese Government protest to Burma about Rangoon riots.
Rumanian Prime Minister sees President de Gaulle in Paris.
- 29 Kenya Government expel Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Nairobi and recall Kenyan Ambassador from Peking. Anti-Burmese demonstrations in Peking.
- 30 Soviet protest to United States on bombing of Soviet ship in Haiphong.
Kosygin sees President de Gaulle in Paris.
Chinese protest to Soviet Union about termination of agreement waiving certificate of vaccination.