



Communist Policy and Tactics 1966 – 1967, 5. hluti

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, AUGUST 1967

SUMMARY

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Chinese violence against the British Mission in Peking and the related disorders by the Staff of the Chinese office in London were intended to exert pressure over Hong Kong, but there are indications that the authorities wish to limit the scale of border incidents. Chinese propaganda encouragement of world revolution continued. (Paragraphs 1-5.)

CHINA: INTERNAL

Although the Maoists claimed to have regained control in Wuhan, disorder continued in other areas. The authorities have tried to curtail the violence. Criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i continued; the leaders probably wish to restrict attacks on other leaders. More efforts have been made to establish Maoist Revolutionary Committees in the provinces. (Paragraphs 6-9.)

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Chinese release of the Soviet ship *Svirsk* may have been in response to Mr. Kosygin's threat to cut trade relations. A major *Pravda* attack on Mao suggested diminished faith by the Russians in the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to oppose Mao. The Russians accused the Chinese of collusion with the West over Viet-Nam and Hong Kong. Sino-Mongolian relations deteriorated further. (Paragraphs 10-15.)

CONFERENCE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION:
HAVANA 31 JULY-10 AUGUST, 1967

Although the meeting emphasised the split between the champions of violent and peaceful promotion of Communism, an open breach between the extremists and the orthodox Latin American parties was avoided. Soviet-Cuban relations are likely to remain cool but without an open division. Both the Russians and Chinese have tried to play down the importance of the Conference. (Paragraphs 16-19.)

THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Soviet leaders have emphasised the need for Arab unity, probably to encourage a relatively moderate line by the UAR. The Russians maintained contacts with a wide range of Arab States. President Tito's initiative on the Middle East was intended to emphasise Yugoslavia's "non-aligned" status, as well as her interest in a settlement. (Paragraphs 20-23.)

SOVIET-WESTERN RELATIONS

Soviet ratification of the treaty on outer space and the agreement on tabling a draft non-proliferation treaty, showed Russian readiness to co-operate with the West on selected issues. (Paragraph 24.)

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CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

The wave of demonstrations against foreign Powers in Peking produced the most serious diplomatic incident so far with the burning of the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires' Office and the sacking of his Residence on 22 August. The attack, which was well organised and clearly had official approval, followed the expiry of a 48-hour ultimatum, contained in a Chinese Foreign Ministry Note to the United Kingdom of 20 August, for the reversal of action taken against Communist newspapers and journalists in Hong Kong.

2. Apparently for propaganda purposes, members of the Chinese Mission in London on 29 August attempted to provoke fights with policemen enforcing restrictions on their movement which were imposed by the British Government after the destruction of the Office in Peking. The Chinese rejected a British protest over the attack on the Office and ill-treatment of diplomats in Peking. They subsequently accepted a personal message from the Foreign Secretary to the Chinese Foreign Minister proposing discussions to resolve the problems in Anglo-Chinese relations including the position of the British Mission in Peking whose members are being detained in China. The initial response at official level was that Hong Kong was responsible for the deterioration in Anglo-Chinese relations and any improvement would depend on British acceptance of Chinese demands over the Colony. A substantive reply to the message is awaited.

3. Local Communist morale in Hong Kong seems to have improved since the Chinese Government ultimatum of 20 August and the sacking of the British Mission on 22 August. There has been an increase in terrorist incidents and there are indications that individual victims may now have been marked down for attack.

4. Terrorists continued for the second consecutive month to plant bombs and dummy bombs in public places—an activity which caused some deaths and which was applauded by the official Chinese news agency for its effect in harassing the police and local armed forces. On the border the behaviour of Chinese regular soldiers suggests that the authorities wish to limit the scale of border incidents.

5. Army Day in China provided the occasion for some comments on the prospects of world revolution: a *Red Flag* editorial said that "revolutionary people in many areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America are rising and driving out their opportunist leaders"; the Chinese acting Chief of General Staff expressed the conviction that under the guidance of Mao's thought "a great storm of revolutionary armed struggle will sweep across Asia, Africa and Latin America" and that this in turn would encourage revolutionary struggles in the West.

CHINA: INTERNAL

6. Reports from Wuhan early in the month suggested that forces loyal to Mao had regained firm control over the city, following the incident of mid-July, when the local military commander was implicated in the detention of Mao's emissaries. A new Commander of the Wuhan Military Region was appointed and appeared in the city on 4 August. There was, however, no reliable information on the situation in the military region as a whole or on the whereabouts of the dissident leaders.

7. The official Press acclaimed the defeat of the "reactionaries" in Wuhan, but acknowledged that "persons in authority and bad elements" were still active in other areas. There have been many reports of disorders and opposition to local "revolutionaries", for example in Kwangtung; dissident groups have been accused of seeking to overthrow the Revolutionary Committees already set up in Shanghai, Shantung and Kweichow.

8. The leaders' concern to end the present state of confusion and violent struggle was reflected in official Press comment during the month. Important articles concentrated on the need for good relations between "revolutionaries" and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and reaffirmed that party and Government officials should play an effective part in the Administration. There was further forceful criticism of Liu Shao-ch'i (still not mentioned by name in the official Press), of the dismissed military leaders P'eng Teh-huai and Lo Jui-ch'ing, and of certain other leaders who fell from power in 1966. Although

Red Guards and Rebels again attacked the Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi, and certain military leaders including Hsiao Hua, the direction of criticism in the official Press suggests that the leaders now wish to restrict the targets of criticism to those such as Liu Shao-ch'i who have already been accused.

9. There were indications that the current attempt to restore order involved a stronger effort to create Revolutionary Committees in the provinces and regions. The pattern for the formation of new Revolutionary Committees was illustrated by the example of Ch'inghai Province. The Ch'inghai Revolutionary Committee, the seventh to be set up since February, was inaugurated on 12 August and was apparently formed through the efforts of the local PLA Command, which had been the dominating influence in a Preparatory Group in existence since June. Local radio stations have reported the appearance of two new Preparatory Groups in Kansu and Kiangsi Provinces, and have referred to a "provisional organ of power" in Chekiang. The establishment on 31 August of a "Workers' Revolutionary Joint Committee" in Canton, with PLA support, also seems to be an important step towards the formation of a municipal Revolutionary Committee, and probably reflected a strong attempt to restore order and control over Kwangtung Province. Official Peking approval has not yet however been given to the new Committee and reports of clashes between workers, Red Guards and revolutionary groups in the Canton area continue.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

10. The continuing bad relations between the Soviet Union and China were highlighted by the incident of the detention of the Soviet merchant ship *Svirsk* at the Chinese port of Dairen. The rapid release of the ship immediately after a letter of protest had been sent by Prime Minister Kosygin to Chou En-lai looked like a climb-down in the face of the Russian threat to break off or reduce trade between the two countries. If this were the case, it would imply that the Chinese still set considerable store on the advantages of trade with the Soviet Union and that such pragmatic considerations can still on occasion take precedence over the excesses of the Red Guards. On the other hand, the very quickness of the Chinese response might suggest that they had been intending to release the ship anyway. In any event, efforts to maintain Chinese "face" were made by the organisation of demonstrations against the Soviet Embassy which developed into an outright attack involving considerable damage to the consulate buildings. For their part, Soviet dissatisfaction with the Chinese position was shown by further protest against hindrance to other Soviet ships visiting Chinese ports.

11. The main feature of the continuing polemic was a major article in *Pravda* on 16 August. It was written by I. Aleksandrov, who has been a major commentator on all aspects of foreign affairs since 1953. Since nothing is known about him except his articles, this may well be the pseudonym of a high level official. The article was the first recent attempt to give a full and consistent political interpretation of events in China. It saw the origin of the present crisis in Mao's introduction of the Great Leap and the communes, the failure of which he answered by a purge of the party. This was followed by serious departures from the international Communist line, including a denial that the Socialist system was the basis of the world revolutionary process—*Pravda* described this latter sin as "revisionist". The article saw the present situation as one of chaos resulting from Maoist repression of the opposition to his policies. It suggested that if the present course continued for a long time China might suffer "a major zigzag away from Socialism".

12. While the article maintains that the chief enemy is still Mao and his group, and while sympathy is expressed for those who oppose him, its tone suggests a diminished faith on the part of the Russians in the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to resist and to survive against Mao. The charge of "revisionism" by the Chinese has been made before in Soviet propaganda, but only rarely. It will probably now be applied more frequently to the Chinese, since it represents a more culpable deviation than "sectarianism". The most important innovation in the article is the cautious expression of concern that in present conditions China may cease to be Socialist.

13. The Russians have developed their accusations of "collusion" between China and the West in commenting on events in Viet-Nam and Hong Kong. They saw the relatively mild Chinese reaction to the incursion of two American

aircraft over China as evidence of an "understanding" between Washington and Peking that the Chinese would not interfere in Viet-Nam provided the United States did not attack China. On events in Hong Kong, the Russians have attacked the Chinese for lack of sincerity in their support of the local Communists and again have even spoken of a tacit agreement between Peking and London. Implausible as these accusations sound, the Russians presumably calculate that by constant repetition some mud will stick. The employment of these themes also suggests continuing sensitivity by the Soviet leaders about the effect on world Communist opinion of similar Chinese accusations of Soviet collusion with the United States.

Sino-Soviet frontier and Mongolia

14. A Chinese allegation of a Soviet armed incursion into the Ili area of Sinkiang was probably exaggerated or untrue. On the other hand, continuing Soviet concern for the security of the Sino-Soviet frontier was shown by a visit paid to the Far East Military Region by the Deputy Minister of Defence, Marshal Yakubovsky.

15. The Chinese have accused the Soviet Union of staging a massive build-up of Soviet forces in Mongolia. At the same time there has been further deterioration in Sino-Mongol relations. An incident in Peking involving attacks on a Mongolian diplomat produced a statement by the Mongolian Government the next day which included personal criticism of Mao Tse-tung. All restraint in the polemic between the two countries has now been removed. The Chinese now openly deny the reality of Mongolian sovereignty and describe Tsedenbal as a Soviet puppet.

CONFERENCE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION, HAVANA, 31 JULY-10 AUGUST, 1967

16. This Cuban-sponsored conference was attended by about 120 delegates from Latin America and the Caribbean and a number of observers from outside the Continent—including the Soviet Union. It emphasised the split between those respectively championing the violent and peaceful roads to revolution. But it is doubtful if it added significantly to the numbers or effectiveness of the supporters of armed subversion.

17. The orthodox Latin American Communist parties took a reserved attitude towards the conference and not all of them were represented. But an open breach between them and the extremists was avoided. This was due in part to moderating efforts by the Cubans, who attach some importance to the participation of the orthodox parties in the Solidarity Organisation. The Secretary-General of the Uruguayan Communist Party, Arismendi, has also been working for a *modus vivendi*. He must have discussed the problem during a visit to Moscow after the conference. He probably also considered with the Russians the advisability of holding a conference of Latin American Communist parties.

18. Soviet-Cuban relations are likely to remain cool; neither side is willing to modify its policies towards Latin America, but an open breach remains unlikely. For the Soviet Union there is no visible alternative to Castro and the latter can only turn to the Soviet Union for essential economic aid. Soviet propaganda tried to play down the importance of the conference; any boosting of Havana's status as a dissident revolutionary centre, even though at odds with Peking as well, must be very unwelcome to the Russians. But the latter may find it necessary to increase their criticism of Cuban policies, even if for the present this is only done indirectly by repeating comment by other Communist parties.

19. Neither China nor Albania sent an observer to the conference, and there was virtually no Chinese comment; this was probably due to the absence of the pro-Chinese Communist parties, the recent decrease in Chinese interest in Latin America and continuing Chinese coolness towards Castro.

THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

20. Although there have been no major Soviet initiatives to deal with the Arab-Israeli problem during August, Russian interest in at least some measure of settlement clearly remains. This may be one reason for the present emphasis

in their propaganda on the need for broadly-based Arab unity. They probably calculate that the support of the richer and "moderate" Arab States is essential to President Nasser for both financial and political reasons, and that if he is inspired towards seeking a political solution it will help him to this end if the theme of Arab unity is allied with the theme of moderation and reasonableness. The Russians have shown some impatience with the Arab extremists, particularly the Syrians and Algerians, who oppose any sort of compromise on Israel. Thus for the moment the theme of support for the "progressive" as distinct from the "non-progressive" Arabs is being soft-pedalled by the Russians. But they can be expected to make use of it again, and have in any case been careful to stress that Arab unity should not be based on narrow nationalism in opposition to Israel but on solidarity in the struggle against imperialism.

21. In pursuit of their policy of maintaining contacts with a large number of Arab countries, the Russians have received military delegations not only from the UAR, Iraq and Syria, but also from the Sudan, as well as an oil delegation from Kuwait. They have welcomed the announcement of agreement between the UAR and Saudi Arabia on the Yemen. It has also been announced in Amman that King Hussein's visit to Moscow will take place "shortly".

Yugoslavia

22. Following President Tito's visits to Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad from 10-17 August, he has sent messages to the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and France suggesting a package deal involving in the first place the withdrawal of Israeli forces in return for a guarantee of the pre-5 June frontiers by the Security Council or the Four Powers. The Yugoslavs are also canvassing support for these proposals from the African and Latin American countries. The degree of success which President Tito had in selling this proposal to the Arabs is unclear. Egyptian Press comment suggests that the UAR would be prepared to accept a solution on these lines. On the other hand Algeria, Syria and Iraq seem opposed in varying degrees to the idea of any political settlement. The Israelis have stated that they do not accept the Yugoslav proposals which they regard as being one-sided in favour of the Arabs.

23. Although President Tito has clearly used this opportunity to re-emphasise Yugoslavia's importance as a non-aligned Power able to intervene constructively in matters where the Great Powers are not able to do so, Yugoslavia's legitimate concern in East Mediterranean affairs makes a settlement important to her. It is not known whether President Tito discussed his ideas in detail with the Soviet leaders beforehand. The Russians are still playing their cards carefully—they have not yet commented openly on President Tito's proposals. The meeting in Belgrade of East European countries at the beginning of September to discuss aid to the Arab countries showed that the Yugoslavs desire to remain in close contact with the other Communist Governments.

SOVIET-WESTERN RELATIONS

24. The Soviet attitude towards the Western Powers, particularly the United States, has continued to be chilly. Nevertheless two events have shown that there are limitations to this reserve. First was the eventual ratification, after a long delay, of the treaty banning the use of outer space for military purposes. The second was the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the tabling at Geneva of a major part of a text of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the conclusion of which would probably be regarded by the Russians not only as a valuable achievement in itself but also as a welcome foreign policy success to mark the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution. This shows that, where they see it in their interests, the Russians are prepared for discussion and even co-operation with the West on selected issues.

CHRONOLOGY

- 20 July- Visit of North Viet-Nameese Vice-Premier and Economic Delegation to
6 Aug. China.
31 July- Conference of Latin American Solidarity Organisation, Havana.
10 Aug.

August

- 1 Soviet-Canadian agreement on supply of 2 million tons of wheat to Soviet Union.
1-15 Cambodian Foreign Minister visits North Korea.
3-9 Federal German Foreign Minister visits Rumania.
4 Announcement of signature of Federal German-Czechoslovak Commercial Agreement.
5 Chinese-North Viet-Nameese Economic and Technical Assistance Agreement signed.
Chinese Note to Swiss Government on Tibetan refugees in Switzerland.
6 Chinese Note to Indonesia on attack on Chinese Embassy on 5 August.
6-13 Visit of North Viet-Nameese Vice-Premier and Economic Delegation to North Korea.
7-9 Demonstrations against Indonesian Embassy in Peking.
7-11 Italian Foreign Minister visits Rumania.
7-15 Syrian Defence Minister visits Moscow.
9 Rumanian delegation to Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference proposes four conditions for conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement.
Anti-Mongolian demonstration in Peking.
10 Mongolian Government statement on China.
10-13 President Tito visits UAR.
10-18 Soviet Deputy Premier Polyansky visits Canada.
12 Soviet Premier Kosygin writes to Chinese Premier about detention of Soviet ship *Svirsk*.
13 Release of *Svirsk*.
Revolutionary Committee in Chinghai Province, China, established.
13-14 President Tito visits Syria.
14 Demonstration at Soviet Embassy in Peking.
Chinese protest to Britain over Hong Kong border incident.
Chinese protest to Burma demanding release of arrested overseas Chinese.
Chinese *Red Flag* editorial "Along the Socialist or Capitalist Road?".
14-16 President Tito visits Iraq.
14-18 Soviet-East German combined exercises.
15 Chinese protest to Ceylon on alleged hold-up of consignment of Mao badges.
Chinese publish excerpts from resolution condemning Marshal P'eng Teh-huai passed at Lushan Conference in 1959.
15-22 Cambodian Foreign Minister visits China.
16 *Pravda* article on China by Aleksandrov.
Czech writer Mnacko deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship.
16-17 President Tito revisits UAR.
17 Chinese mob invades Soviet Consulate in Peking.
18 *People's Daily* article welcomes start of "armed struggle" in Indonesia.
East German Premier Ulbricht visits Czechoslovakia on holiday.

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August

- 19 Demonstrations against Kenyan Embassy in Peking.
20 Chinese Note gives 48-hour ultimatum to Britain for release of arrested journalists in Hong Kong.
Demonstrations against Ceylon Embassy in Peking.
Soviet Note to China on hindrance to Soviet ships.
21 Chinese protest to Kenya on alleged restrictions on distribution of Mao's works.
22 Soviet Central Committee Decree on Social Sciences.
Chinese mob attacks and burns British Diplomatic Mission in Peking.
23 Tass statement on United States "escalation" of Viet-Nam war.
25 Anglo-Soviet "hot-line" Agreement signed.
25- Secretary of State for Scotland visits Soviet Union.
4 Sept.
27 *People's Daily* article urging revolution in India.
29 Violence provoked by Chinese Mission in London.
Further demonstrations against Soviet Embassy in Peking.
30, 31 Messages from President Tito to Presidents de Gaulle and Johnson and
and to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Kosygin on Middle East.
1 Sept.
31 Soviet Note accusing China of breaking talks on navigation of common frontier rivers.
Death of Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg.



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His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

TACTICS, SEPTEMBER 1967

MARY

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

8 November, 1967

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taken to emphasise Russian solidarity with minority peoples. Trouble continues on the cultural front despite efforts to maintain calm. No detailed plans have been announced for the 50th Anniversary celebrations. The further demotion of Shelepin had been anticipated. Major manoeuvres in the Soviet Union were probably partly a morale building exercise. (Paragraphs 8-16.)

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Soviet foreign policy lacks dynamism. In Eastern Europe further bilateral treaties have been signed between Warsaw Pact States. Rumania's independent attitude continues although slightly moderated in public. The Soviet leaders find increasing common ground with East European leaders in attacking Mao Tse-tung. There is no prospect of an early improvement in Soviet/Federal German relations. (Paragraphs 17-21.)

No shift in Soviet policy emerged at the start of the United Nations General Assembly. The Russians probably still want a Middle East settlement but are playing a waiting game in New York. The Soviet policy of cultivating their neighbours continued with visits from the President of Pakistan and the Turkish Prime Minister. (Paragraphs 22-24.)

VIET-NAM

The Soviet Government would probably accept a political solution in Viet-Nam but are inhibited by the rigid attitude of the North Viet-Nameese. (Paragraphs 25-26.)

EASTERN EUROPE

Visit of President de Gaulle to Poland

The Poles were unresponsive to the French appeal to adopt a wider perspective in their foreign policy. (Paragraph 27.)

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18 October, 1967

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, SEPTEMBER 1967

SUMMARY

WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

The Soviet leaders are again rallying opinion in favour of a conference. The chances are better than before but difficulties remain, notably the doubts of "neutrals" (e.g., Rumanians, Yugoslavs and North Viet-Nameese). The Russians appear more flexible on the composition and agenda of a conference. (Paragraphs 1-7.)

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Differences over policy probably centre on the allocation of resources, between competing civilian interests as well as between civilian and military bidders. A compromise has probably been reached in the 1968 Budget, although defence expenditure will rise. The redeployment of labour is causing trouble. Steps are being taken to emphasise Russian solidarity with minority peoples. Trouble continues on the cultural front despite efforts to maintain calm. No detailed plans have been announced for the 50th Anniversary celebrations. The further demotion of Shelepin had been anticipated. Major manoeuvres in the Soviet Union were probably partly a morale building exercise. (Paragraphs 8-16.)

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

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The Stoph/Kiesinger Exchange

The East Germans have adopted a negative attitude, virtually insisting on full recognition of the "DDR" as a prior condition for progress. (Paragraphs 28-29.)

Czechoslovak writers

Harder measures have been adopted against Czechoslovak cultural dissidents. The authorities are clearly alarmed at the seriousness of the problem. (Paragraphs 30-32.)

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Further efforts were made to tone down the extremes of the Cultural Revolution and to minimise divisions between factions with the aim of completing the system of Revolutionary Committees. Attacks were concentrated on the "extreme Left". The National Day was used to demonstrate the isolation of Liu Shao-ch'i. Foreign representation at the celebrations was unimpressive. (Paragraphs 33-37.)

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Chinese actions over incidents on the Sikkim border contrasted with the more skilful handling of relations with Cambodia. Chou En-lai may have taken direct control of foreign affairs. (Paragraphs 38-39.)

WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

There have been an increasing number of calls, notably by East European leaders, for a start on preparations for an international Communist conference. The Soviet leaders evidently calculate that the isolation of China makes this the most propitious opportunity that they are likely to get to rally opinion in the Communist movement; it would be impossible for China to produce enough supporters to stage a respectable counter-conference. But the Russians have in public refrained from committing themselves too far. They must be aware that the project for a conference still faces many difficulties.

2. Quite apart from the known opposition of the pro-Chinese Communist Parties, divisions remain among those who broadly favour the Soviet Union in the dispute. The problem of reconciling the advocates of violence and of the peaceful road to Socialism among Latin American Communist parties is a serious complication although the Russians have recently sought to play down their differences with Castro by statements emphasising their support for Cuba against the Organisation of American States. Many parties also continue to make use of a declared position of "neutrality" in the Sino-Soviet dispute to further or preserve their independence of the Soviet Union (e.g., Cuba, North Viet-Nam, Rumania and Yugoslavia).

3. Particularly at the time of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, a conference which would demonstrate the continuing existence of Communism as a co-ordinated international movement would obviously be valuable to the Russians. They have been prepared to offer a number of concessions in order to make the convening of a meeting more likely. The Hungarian Party Secretary, Kadar, on 7 September, repeated earlier suggestions that it would not be necessary to wait "until every party expresses its readiness to attend". He also spoke of holding "a big consultation", a formula which might ease the qualms of those who object to a conference making binding decisions. Others have stressed that there would be no question of excommunicating China. The Russians probably intend that the conference should deal with the co-ordination of aid to Viet-Nam, the anti-imperialist struggle and "the struggle for peace" and work for a broad consensus of views of Communists of many shades of opinion. Nevertheless it will be difficult to maintain that implied criticism of China, at the least, can be avoided.

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4. So far 58 Communist parties have publicly supported the holding of an international meeting and three more would probably attend (the Australian, Indian and Italian Communist parties). The "neutrals" remain the chief problem. Much indirect pressure is being put on the Rumanians in propaganda by the other East Europeans. But there is no sign that this has so far had any effect.

5. The Yugoslavs have up to now been among the strongest opponents of a conference. The general tenor of their public comments is far from uniform but suggests that they still retain this basic position. An article on 27 September in the ideological weekly *Komunist* said that international consultations with Communist and Workers parties could be "useful and acceptable" provided that this did not impair relations with parties which did not wish to join in. On the other hand a later article in *Ekonomiska Politika* took a firm stand against holding any consultative meeting at the present, while maintaining that Yugoslav Communists did not in principle oppose a conference if it should become a necessity. Tito's article in *Pravda* on 6 October, while stressing the right to pursue different roads to Socialism, avoided the subject of a conference. He has probably not yet made up his mind; meanwhile party theorists are avoiding committing themselves irrevocably on the question.

6. The attitude of the North Viet-Nameese is especially critical for the Soviet leaders because of the latter's wish to make aid to Viet-Nam a key issue of the conference. But the North Viet-Nameese seem to be continuing to balance between the Soviet Union and China and have not reacted to the recent proposal for a conference.

7. The Russians are still moving cautiously. They are technically bound by a decision of March 1965 to hold a "consultative meeting" before the conference proper. They would probably like this meeting to take place during the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary in Moscow, but they may find that they cannot get agreement on this in time, in which case consultations will have to continue on a bilateral basis. Even if agreement in principle is reached on holding a conference, it is unlikely that it would take place before the latter half of 1968 at the earliest.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

8. While the Soviet party presents a united front for the 50th Anniversary of the Revolution there are probably differences over policy within the party. These are most likely to be concerned with the allocation of resources; disagreements about this and about the implementation of economic reform have caused a prolonged delay in publication of the Five-year Plan for 1966-70. Although the Russian leaders continue to refer to the Five-year Plan it appears that in practice it has been replaced by separate annual plans for the remaining years of the period. The problem of resource allocation may have been made more acute by the United States' announcements of plans to deploy a limited ABM system, but it is unlikely that the issue is a simple argument between the claims of defence and civilian expenditure. There is also severe competition for resources between different civilian sections of the economy. For instance the Press is actively justifying heavy investment in agriculture, in particular an expensive irrigation programme, and there has also been strong pressure to produce more consumer goods and raise living standards in the jubilee year. In the proposals for the 1968 Budget, which the Supreme Soviet passed at the beginning of October, it looks as though the leadership has reached a characteristic compromise between the varying demands on resources. There is to be an increase in minimum wages and considerably more emphasis on consumer goods. The increase in next year's defence budget means that military spending will outstrip the growth in national income but it will nevertheless be not far out of line with the growth in total national expenditure; there may be no radical shift of resources to defence.

9. The Russians have recently shown greatly increased sensitivity to foreign criticism of their internal affairs and have inclined to attribute incidents or reports which put them in a bad light to a general Western campaign to discredit the 50th Anniversary celebrations. The Kachenko affair was an example of this.

Labour problems

10. The improved increments for workers in the Far North and East announced at the Central Committee Plenum on 26 September may go some way towards solving the problem of redeployment of labour which is causing increasing concern to the Soviet leadership provided that better amenities can also be provided in these areas. There is a shortage of labour in Siberia and the Far North while in European Russia, particularly in small towns, unemployment is becoming a problem. The economic reforms give managers the right, with certain qualifications, to dismiss redundant workers. So far the effects have been small because of administrative pressure on managers not to exercise this right and the absorption of dismissed workers by enterprises still working on the old system. As the reforms are implemented more widely and fully the problem is likely to become more acute. State Committees for the Utilisation of Labour Resources now exist in all the Republics, but so far no central organisation has been set up to cope with employment problems.

Nationalities

11. The approach of the jubilee has been accompanied by a good deal of propaganda in the central Press about the advantages enjoyed by the minority nationalities as a result of their association with the USSR, and their friendly and grateful feelings towards the Russian people. Only the newspapers of the Central Asian Republics, however, carried the recent decree on the rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars, the last of the seven small nationalities deported by Stalin to have their rights restored. The Crimean Tatars are now free to live anywhere in the Soviet Union but their homeland has been settled by Ukrainians and there is evidently no intention of re-establishing the Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic.

Cultural policy

12. The evident desire of the Soviet authorities to maintain a tranquil and conformist atmosphere on the cultural scene in the jubilee year has been disappointed by a number of incidents, notably Solzhenitsyn's protest against censorship at the time of the Writers' Congress and Voznesensky's recent outburst against his treatment by officials of the Writers' Union. The removal in May of the old party ideologue Pospelov as head of the Marx-Lenin Institute almost certainly reflects trouble with Soviet historians who have been objecting to the fact that the party line is still far removed from historical truth and also to attempts to restore the image of Stalin. The authorities have continued to follow a policy of avoiding open intervention against liberal dissenters unless they overstep certain bounds as in the case of the three students sentenced recently for demonstrating in connection with the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial.

Anniversary preparations

13. No detailed plans have been announced for the 50th Anniversary celebrations. The arrangements so far published suggest that it will be a more elaborate version of the usual annual junketings with the foreign guest list mainly drawn from the international Communist family. It is likely however that the occasion will be marked by some special measures. The possibilities include: further measures to improve living standards; a new space venture; an amnesty; a party conference.

Shelepin

14. The removal at the Central Committee Plenum of Shelepin from his post as a Secretary of the Central Committee was generally anticipated following his appointment in July as Chairman of the Trade Unions. This move confirms the view that his new appointment represented a loss of political power.

Manoeuvres in the Soviet Union

15. Major military manoeuvres, known as "Exercise Dnepr" were held in the Western Soviet Union in the latter part of September. The exercises, in which troops of all types were stated to have participated, were given considerable publicity. The Soviet Press stressed that delegations from all the Warsaw Pact countries as well as from Mongolia, North Korea and Yugoslavia attended as observers.

16. It is not possible at this stage to assess the military significance of "Exercise Dnepr". It is not known, for instance, whether or not a nuclear strike was simulated. However, the publicity which it received and the stress which this put on the role of political officers in the armed forces suggest that it was equally important to the Soviet leadership as a morale-building exercise intended to give the army a dramatic show in the 50th Anniversary Year and to emphasise the military and political solidarity of the Warsaw Pact allies.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

17. Soviet foreign policy remains primarily defensive and lacks thrust at present. This is not only because of the domestic preoccupations of the leadership and because they are concentrating particularly on the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution. They are also having to face up to a number of problems, for instance, in the Middle East and Viet-Nam, about the solution to which they are themselves undecided or on which they are unable to carry their allies with them. Nevertheless they have been by no means inactive, concentrating their efforts on recovering their position in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

18. In September, the network of new treaties designed to emphasise the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact countries and their support for Germany, was taken a stage nearer completion. Treaties were signed on 7 September between the Soviet Union and Hungary and between Bulgaria and the "DDR". As with earlier treaties in the series, these added little to the obligations already undertaken in the Warsaw Pact Treaty although that between Bulgaria and East Germany contained a provision for the "co-ordination" of external policy which might be used to inhibit the development of Bulgarian relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. There is no indication at present that the Russians envisage the treaty network as a substitute for the Warsaw Pact organisation, which would enable them to abolish the latter as a unilateral propaganda gesture. It is more probably a further device to shore up East European solidarity.

19. The Rumanians have so far kept out of this exercise although they may agree to automatic renewal of their 1948 Treaty with the Soviet Union when it falls due. Their recent participation in joint exercises with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria under Warsaw Pact auspices suggested some readiness on their part to moderate their public display of independence of the Soviet Union, but they are clearly not prepared to give up the individualist tendencies in their foreign policy.

20. The importance which the Soviet leaders attached to the Soviet/Hungarian Treaty of Friendship was shown by the attendance of both Brezhnev and Kosygin at the signing ceremony in Budapest. Brezhnev used the occasion to make a major speech in which he concentrated largely on attacks on China and on Mao Tse-tung personally, clearly implying that the latter was no longer a Communist and describing the Cultural Revolution as a "counter-revolution". Kádár spoke in similar terms. It is clear that the Russians regard the continuing excesses in China a convenient source of common ground with the East European leaders. The latter now show much less inhibition than in the past in attacking the Mao-ists.

21. The alleged threat from West Germany remains an important instrument for the Soviet Union in keeping its East European allies in line. Russian propaganda against the Federal Republic has continued steadily and there seems no prospect of any early improvement in Soviet/West German relations.

United Nations General Assembly

22. At the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Gromyko's speech suggested no shift on essential points of policy. His proposals for the inscription of items concerning the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and the definition of aggression seem to have been made largely for propaganda impact. The first, a traditional Soviet proposal, may also be linked in their minds with the proposed assurance—put forward in the context of the non-proliferation negotiations—not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which have no foreign nuclear weapons on their territory.

Middle East

23. The Russian proposal for a firm definition of aggression was clearly intended to provide further mileage for propaganda attacks on Israel. Mr. Gromyko's speech in New York took a tough line on the Middle East, repeating the demand for Israeli withdrawal and payment of compensation to the Arabs and for compliance with the United Nations decision on Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the indications are that the Russians do still want a measure of settlement in the Middle East. Their difficulty is that they also want to appear as supporters of the Arab demands and in particular do not wish to get ahead of more moderate Arab opinion on the question of the ending of the state of belligerency with Israel. They are thus playing a waiting game in New York and concentrating on renewed propaganda attacks on Israel. They have continued their well publicised contacts with Arab countries, for instance the visit to Moscow of the UAR Foreign Minister and that of King Hussein of Jordan at the beginning of October, but there is no evidence that they made any firm undertaking to supply the latter with arms or indeed that a Jordanian request was made for military help at this stage.

Soviet relations with neighbouring countries

24. The cultivation of their neighbours, whether or not they are closely associated with the West, continues to be a consistent thread in Soviet policy. The visits to the Soviet Union of President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey produced no surprises, but obviously contributed to establishing an atmosphere of confidence with both countries. The Russians took the opportunity of Mr. Demirel's visit to restate their position on the need for the independence of Cyprus and implicitly to warn against any kind of deal between Greece and Turkey which would involve Enosis in any form. The Soviet leaders made a good deal of the "Tashkent spirit" during President Ayub's visit. The communiqué made no mention, however, of Soviet arms supplies to Pakistan and there was evident reluctance on the Soviet side to go too far in responding to the President's warnings about Indian ambitions. The visit was indeed partly balanced by one by the Indian Minister of Defence earlier in September.

VIET-NAM

Soviet policy

25. While the Soviet leaders would on balance probably like to see an end to the Viet-Nameese war and would thus be ready to accept some form of political solution provided it did not look like an American victory, the North Viet-Nameese attitude prevents them from showing it. Publicly, therefore, they have had to harden their line, strongly opposing the reference of the Viet-Nameese problem to the Security Council and taking every opportunity in the General Assembly for propaganda against American bombing. The considerable publicity given to the new aid agreement recently concluded in Moscow with the North Viet-Nameese Deputy Premier was again intended to show continuing Soviet solidarity with Hanoi.

North Viet-Nameese position

26. In order, no doubt, to take advantage of international pressure for the cessation of the bombing, the North Viet-Nameese have caused a certain ambiguity to fog their public position by feeding foreign correspondents misleading interpretations of governmental statements. But it is much more probable that their real line is that represented by Mr. Pham Van Dong (the North Viet-Nameese Prime Minister) in his speech on 31 August when he said that, "If the American side really wants to talk, it must first of all stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the VDR. The United States have no right to demand any reciprocity whatever". He went on to reiterate the North Viet-Nameese firm adherence to their four points. More recently, the North Viet-Nameese have rejected with contempt the moderate proposals for a cessation of the bombing which President Johnson put forward in a speech on 29 September. It seems likely that the North Viet-Nameese, encouraged by the recent signs of dissent in the United States, believe that the American will is weakening and that, providing they can hold the present military position they will in the end win the war.

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EASTERN EUROPE

Visit of President de Gaulle to Poland

27. President de Gaulle scored a personal triumph in Poland during his visit there from 6-12 September. The immediate political dividends were less apparent. De Gaulle made a direct appeal to Polish national sentiment apparently in the hope of getting the Poles to take a broader view of the way to a solution of European problems. The Poles welcomed his pronouncements on the permanence of the present Polish frontiers ("which are and must remain hers") and on the Polish western territories (he described the Silesian town of Zabrze, formerly Hindenburg, as "the most Polish of Polish towns"). However, the Poles showed no signs of being moved by the General's statement in the official talks that the continued division of Germany was abnormal, or by his appeal to Poland to adopt a new perspective in Europe; Mr. Gomulka told the Sejm on 11 September that the alliance with the Soviet Union remained the cornerstone of Polish security.

The Stoph/Kiesinger Exchange

28. A further round in the exchange of letters between the East German Prime Minister Herr Stoph and the Federal German Chancellor Dr. Kiesinger was initiated in September with Herr Stoph's reply to Dr. Kiesinger's letter of June. The reply strongly attacked the Federal Government's claim to speak for the whole German people, maintaining that while this was retained no progress could be made. Herr Stoph attached a draft treaty between the "two German States" embodying all the demands made in his earlier letter (normalisation of relations between the two German States, renunciation of the use of force, recognition of existing frontiers, renunciation of nuclear weapons) as well as recognition of West Berlin as an independent political entity, acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line and acknowledgement of the invalidity *ab initio* of the Munich Agreement.

29. Dr. Kiesinger replied on 29 September in a short and dignified letter, inviting Herr Stoph to publish the correspondence and nominating the official State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery to negotiate with the East Germans on humanitarian and practical measures. The first East German response has been uncompromisingly hostile, and it remains to be seen whether they will now terminate the correspondence. In any event it seems unlikely to lead to early progress. The East Germans are virtually insisting on full recognition of the DDR as a precondition of any advance, and are clearly concerned to avoid any improvement in intra-German relations which might be taken by their East European allies as encouragement to improve their own relations with the Federal Republic.

Czechoslovak writers

30. The expected counter-attack by the party against the dissidents in the cultural world in Czechoslovakia has now taken place. At a Party Central Committee Plenum on 26 September three distinguished Czechoslovak writers, Ivan Klima, A. J. Liehm and Ludivk Vaculik, were expelled from the party. In addition Jan Prochazka (the author of a laudatory article on T. G. Masaryk in the weekly *Literarni Noviny*) was "relieved of the function" of candidate member of the Central Committee "for political errors". The Central Committee at the same time criticised *Literarni Noviny*, of whose editorial board the three writers were all members, for letting itself become a "platform for Opposition political views" and recommended that it be placed under the control of the Ministry of Culture and Information. The paper continues to appear under new party-controlled management. These measures represented the practical application of the harder line launched by Novotny and Hendrych in speeches on 1 and 16 September respectively after the Fourth Czechoslovak Writers' Congress in June.

31. The "Manifesto of Czechoslovak Writers to the World Public", published in the *Sunday Times* of 3 September and said to have been signed by over 200 writers and other intellectuals, seems from internal evidence not to have been all that it claimed to be. Although its theme reflected the current atmosphere fairly accurately its tone did not ring true and its existence in its present form has been denied by some of the alleged signatories.

32. It is clear from their sensitivity on this issue that the party have on their hands a much more serious revolt than they first imagined. They are determined to crack down hard on deviations from or opposition to party cultural

policies, and it remains to be seen whether this "hard line" will spill over into other spheres (e.g., affecting progress on the planned economic reforms).

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

33. The Chinese leaders made a new effort to apply the brakes in the Cultural Revolution with, it would appear, the aim of achieving some semblance of unity and good order before National Day, on 1 October. Official instructions issued at the beginning of September emphasised the need to restore order and production. Workers and students were again told to cease the practice of "exchanging experience" outside their home areas. The instructions prescribed that workers who stayed at their jobs should be rewarded while those who abandoned production to take part in the mass campaign should be penalised by loss of wages; criminals and speculators should be strictly punished according to the law; revolutionary organisations must hand in their weapons and those which engaged in violent struggle would be banned. In a further directive, military commanders were authorised to take strong action against any revolutionary groups resorting to violence. The directive was accompanied by a message, conveyed by Mao's wife, affirming the leaders' confidence in "all commanders in the army."

34. In a much publicised statement Mao acknowledged the harmful effects of divisions in the working class. Major Press articles urged all revolutionaries to concentrate on resolving conflicts and forming "revolutionary alliances". Reports were received of speeches by Chou En-lai and Hsieh Fu-chih (of the Peking Revolutionary Committee), which suggested that the leaders intend to conclude the campaign by mid-1969. Chou envisaged that the system of Revolutionary Committees would be completed at the provincial level, leading to the formation of an All-China Revolutionary Committee at the end of the campaign. The fixing of a date for the end of the campaign is an indication that the leaders are firmly resolved to enforce order and curb the revolutionaries. The formation of Preparatory Groups for Revolutionary Committees in Honan and Hunan provinces, mentioned by local radio stations in mid-September, brought the number of such groups now known to exist to six. Information on these groups suggests that the local military commands established them by order of the central authorities. A similar method may be followed in other areas.

35. Reports of disturbances and confusion in many areas had reached a high level by early September but declined later in the month. Meanwhile, the Press devoted much attention to the threat presented to the Revolution by enemies on the "extreme Left". T'ao Chu, formerly party leader in the Central-South area who held No. 4 position in the central leadership from August to December 1966, was attacked as an exponent of the "extreme Left". T'ao's present whereabouts are unknown. However, the revolutionary leaders in Szechuan recently announced that they have custody of Li Ching-ch'uan, who has been attacked as Mao's principal opponent in the South-West.

36. According to a report of 24 September, Mao recently inspected the progress of the Cultural Revolution in parts of Central-South, East and North China. The tour was apparently organised in order to lend Mao's personal authority to the attempt to resolve divisions among the revolutionaries. It is apparent, however, that Mao's journey took place with utmost security and that he made contact with only a very restricted number of people. Mao appeared in Peking on National Day together with a few of his closest supporters and certain other leaders, such as the Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi, who have recently been criticised. The turnout of leaders at the celebrations was evidently intended to demonstrate the isolation of the Head of State, Liu Shao-ch'i, and other principal victims of the Cultural Revolution, who did not appear.

37. The celebrations of National Day were on a more limited scale than in 1966. Among foreign countries only Albania, North Viet-Nam, Pakistan and Congo (Brazzaville) were represented by important delegations. Speeches by Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, together with newspaper comment, reinforced the impression of a slackening in the Cultural Revolution, suggesting that it should continue principally as an orderly programme of political education. Lin Piao emphasised the importance of economic progress, claiming that the campaign had not upset the economy. Chou En-lai discussed foreign policy in the usual terms but made no mention of Hong Kong.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

38. Two trends, in some ways contradictory, were apparent in the handling of China's foreign relations during the month. On the Sino-Indian border in Sikkim a series of incidents resulted in the use of artillery fire by both sides and a number of fatal casualties. The alignment of the border between India and China at this point has never been the subject of dispute. These particular incidents seem to have arisen when Chinese soldiers tried to prevent the Indians from completing a barbed-wire barricade along the boundary at a point where it overlooked Chinese positions. It is probable though not certain that the clashes were the result of local initiative rather than directives from Peking.

39. Relations with Cambodia were handled by the Chinese with more care and something of their former skill. Sihanouk announced that he intended to withdraw from Peking all the staff from the Cambodian Embassy with the exception of a caretaker, saying that this was partly because the Chinese had shown themselves incapable of protecting diplomatic missions in Peking and partly because of Chinese subversive activities in Cambodia culminating in a message to the Khmer-China Friendship Society after that organisation had been dissolved by Sihanouk himself. The Chinese reaction was for Chou En-lai to summon the Cambodian Ambassador in Peking and make soothing remarks about traditional friendship between China and Cambodia, guaranteeing that "friends of China" would never have their embassies attacked. On receiving this placatory message Sihanouk decided to cancel his plans for withdrawing the Mission and claimed that he had struck a decisive blow in preventing further Chinese interference with Cambodia's internal affairs. It was evident from this affair that China places some value on the friendship of "neutral" countries such as Cambodia. The more subtle handling of this affair by the Chinese suggests that poster reports in Peking, claiming that Chou En-lai had taken over direct control of the conduct of Chinese foreign affairs since 23 August, might have some truth in them even though, with Chou's many other preoccupations, it is unlikely that he will be able to devote much time to the details of foreign affairs.

CHRONOLOGY

September

- 1 Soviet Government expels two United States diplomats from Moscow.
Chinese Note to Burma protesting against treatment of overseas Chinese.
Chinese Note to Ceylon protesting against holding up of consignment of Mao badges.
Programme of "South Viet-Nam Liberation Front" published.
Meeting of Peking Revolutionary Committee addressed by Mao and other leaders.
- 3 *Pravda* article maintains that United Nations is not competent to deal with Viet-Nam.
- 4 Afghan Minister of Defence arrives in Soviet Union.
- 4-6 UAR Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
Meeting in Belgrade of Deputy Foreign Ministers of East European countries to discuss aid to Arab States.
- 5 Chinese Note alleges that Mongolia has cancelled 1967 Plan for cultural co-operation.
Announcement of agreement between China, Tanzania and Zambia on construction of Tanzania-Zambia railway.
- 6-9 UAR Foreign Minister visits Yugoslavia.
Brezhnev and Kosygin in Soviet party and Government delegation to Hungary.
- 6-10 Ulbricht visits Bulgaria.

September

- 6-12 President de Gaulle visits Poland.
- 7 Signature in Budapest of Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.
Brezhnev makes speech attacking Mao Tse-tung.
Signature in Sofia of East German-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.
Belgian Foreign Minister visits Yugoslavia.
- 7-11 Incidents on border between China and Sikkim.
- 8 Belgian Foreign Minister visits Hungary.
North Korean National Day. Chinese message cooler than that of Soviet leaders.
Soviet Government statement on Greek writer Theodorakis.
- 9-12 UAR Foreign Minister revisits Soviet Union.
- 10 Expulsion of three Japanese correspondents from Peking.
- 11 Chinese protest to India on border incidents.
Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Navy visits Sweden.
- 11-15 Czechoslovak President pays unofficial visit to Yugoslavia.
- 11-22 British Minister of State for Technology visits Soviet Union.
- 12 Mongolian Party Leader Tsedenbal and North Viet-Nameese Deputy Prime Minister received by Brezhnev.
Prince Sihanouk dismisses pro-Chinese Ministers.
- 13-17 Turkish Prime Minister visits Rumania.
- 14 Prince Sihanouk announces recall of Ambassador from Peking; later rescinds decision.
Peoples' Daily attacks Soviet theory of revolution without violence.
Chinese Note to Tunisia protesting against "anti-Chinese activities".
- 14-16 IVth Congress of Albanian Democratic Front.
- 14-17 Indian Defence Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 14-18 Yugoslav Foreign Minister visits France.
- 15 Brezhnev receives Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhivkov in Moscow (date of arrival not announced).
Indonesian Government orders withdrawal of all diplomats from Peking, but exit visas withheld.
- 16 Tkachenko incident in London.
Polish Party Secretary Gomulka makes speech favouring international Communist conference.
- 17 Joint statement by Communist parties of Soviet Union and Great Britain calls for international Communist conference.
Article in *Pravda* by Hungarian Party Secretary Kadar calls for international conference.
Tass statement on Cuba.
- 18 Letter from East German Prime Minister to Federal German Chancellor.
- 19 China closes Embassy in Tunisia.
- 19-29 Turkish Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 20 USSR-Guinea Economic Co-operation Agreements signed.
- 21 Sudanese President visits Bulgaria.
- 22 Soviet Foreign Minister's speech to United Nations General Assembly.
Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin receive Polish Party Secretary Gomulka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz in Moscow.
Exercise "Dnepr" in Western Soviet Union begins.
- 23 Signature of Soviet-North Viet-Nameese aid agreement.
- 24 Tunisian Government declares all Chinese Embassy staff *persona non grata*.
- 25- President Ayub Khan visits Soviet Union.
- 5 Oct.
- 26 Plenary Session of CPSU Central Committee.
Albanian party and Government delegation arrive in China.
Rumanian cultural delegation arrives in Peking.

September

26-27 Plenary Session of Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee.

28- Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhivkov visits Rumania.

1 Oct.

28 Soviet-Sudanese military talks end in Khartoum.

Rumanian Prime Minister reported on secret visit to Peking and Hanoi.

29 Federal German Chancellor's reply to East German Prime Minister.

Prime Minister of Congo (B) arrives in Peking.

Czechoslovak President visits Soviet Union.

Hungarian Party First Secretary Kadar visits Soviet Union.

Pakistan delegation arrives in Peking.

30 Albania rejects Soviet invitation to 50th Anniversary celebrations.



His Excellency
Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson,
Prime Minister

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
REYKJAVIK.

8 December, 1967

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INTERNATIONAL TACTICS, OCTOBER 1967

MARY

International Communist conference approach in the movement were led by leaders of various Communist groups and North Viet-Nameese persist in t-Cuban relations are again openly

ous in their tactics in the United States. In gestures of Soviet solidarity and to allay Soviet concern over the risk of propaganda on the Middle East has

g well but agricultural production here is to be additional defence

expenditure though its significance cannot be assessed in real terms. New emphasis is put on consumer goods production. There has clearly been controversy over agricultural investment. (Paragraphs 9-13.)

Economic reforms

These are being applied cautiously. A third of total industrial output is under the new system. (Paragraph 14.)

Military service

The reduction in the length of national service will probably not result in a significant increase in the civilian labour force. (Paragraph 15.)

Soviet history

There have been attacks on histories which are too critical of Soviet policy in the Stalin period. (Paragraphs 16-17.)

ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUMANIA

The new directives appear intended to follow the line of other East European countries. (Paragraph 18.)

VISIT OF RUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER TO PEKING AND HANOI

This was probably intended to demonstrate Rumanian independence. (Paragraph 19.)

ALBANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Albanian visits to China and Pakistan. There are signs of a limited Albanian wish to mend fences with Yugoslavia. (Paragraphs 20-22.)

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Indonesia

Relations have been suspended and diplomatic missions withdrawn. The Chinese handled the affair pragmatically. (Paragraphs 23-25.)

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10 November, 1967

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, OCTOBER 1967

SUMMARY

WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The campaign to convene an international Communist conference continued, but the differences of approach in the movement were shown in articles in the Soviet Press by leaders of various Communist parties. The Yugoslavs, Rumanians and North Viet-Nameese persist in their independent stand. Soviet-Cuban relations are again openly strained. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

The Russians remained cautious in their tactics in the United Nations. The *Eilat* incident resulted in gestures of Soviet solidarity with the Arabs but probably aroused Soviet concern over the risk of escalation. The volume of Soviet propoganda on the Middle East has declined. (Paragraphs 5-8.)

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Meeting

Industrial production is doing well but agricultural production may have declined slightly. There is to be additional defence expenditure though its significance cannot be assessed in real terms. New emphasis is put on consumer goods production. There has clearly been controversy over agricultural investment. (Paragraphs 9-13.)

Economic reforms

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Burma

Chinese technicians have been withdrawn and relations remain strained. (Paragraph 26.)

Cambodia

A flexible and conciliatory approach was adopted towards Cambodia although Prince Sihanouk has restricted subversive pro-Chinese activities. (Paragraph 27.)

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The army is playing a dominant role. There has been emphasis on the need for cadres to resume responsibility and for attacks to be concentrated on the Head of State Lu Shao-chi and a few others. Despite the formation of a Revolutionary Committee in Inner Mongolia there appears to be agreement on the need for consolidation and curbing of revolutionary activities. Chou-En-lai referred to the material cost of the Cultural Revolution. (Paragraphs 28-31.)

WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Statements in favour of a world Communist conference increased as the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution approached. According to a report to his Central Committee by the French Communist leader Waldeck Rochet, it is planned to hold a preparatory consultative meeting in the spring of 1968 which will announce the date and agenda of the conference itself. He said that the aim would be to ensure united action for peace and against imperialism, and that there would be no attempt to issue an ideological document on the model of the 1960 Declaration. Rochet also hinted at the possible participation of national liberation movements.

2. However differences remain in the Communist movement on the means of attaining unity. These were brought out in the series of articles on the 50th Anniversary contributed to *Pravda* by the leaders of a number of Communist parties. Zhivkov, Kadar and Gomulka (the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Polish leaders) all favoured an international Communist conference without China. They denounced Mao Tse-tung and condemned the stance of neutrality adopted by certain Communist parties in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Kadar asserted that nationalism, and not only that of the Chinese, was affecting the purity of the doctrine. Gomulka also saw nationalist ambition as the chief Chinese sin, citing their lack of co-operation over Viet-Nam as the prime example. He even argued that Communist parties could legitimately hold "different views on, for example, questions of war and peace": the Chinese might believe that nothing would prevent the "imperialists" from unleashing a new world war, while the majority of parties, including the Polish and Soviet, believed that war was not inevitable and could be prevented through united efforts. The expression of this unorthodox view was probably agreed with the CPSU in advance. In drawing a distinction between nationalist and ideological differences the Russians and Poles were probably trying to reassure other parties with which they have fairly fundamental divergences on points of doctrine but which have themselves quarrelled with the Chinese. The North Koreans are one example.

3. The Yugoslavs, Rumanians and North Viet-Nameese persist in their independent stand. Tito's article ignored the question of Communist unity, stressing the need for good relations between all States and the fact that "forms of Socialism varied, the ways of its construction differed". (His article originally published in the Yugoslav *Komunist* was shortened for *Pravda* by the omission of passages about the effects of Stalin's personality cult on Soviet-Yugoslav relations.) Unlike Tito, Ceausescu acknowledged the importance of Communist co-operation, as expressed in CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) (he did not refer to the Warsaw Pact) but he stated the right of each country to decide her policies, and he indicated that Rumania's contribution to unity would be confined to developing friendly relations with all Communist parties on a bilateral basis. Ho Chi-minh was the only Communist leader to praise in *Pravda* the achievements of the Chinese revolution and to declare that North Viet-Nam would maintain

friendly relations with the USSR, China and all Communist States. He attributed North Viet-Nameese successes to the correct policy of combining Marxism-Leninism with national practice. There was no North Korean contribution.

4. After a period in which the Russians seemed to be trying to play down their differences with Cuba since the Latin American Solidarity Conference, it is clear that relations are once more openly strained. The differences were brought to the surface by articles in the *Pravda* anniversary series by the Argentine and **Chilean Communist** leaders, which indirectly criticised Cuban policies in Latin America. Cuban representation at the Moscow celebrations was insultingly low. Despite an earlier announcement that President Dircicos would attend, their delegation was led merely by the Minister of Health. It is not known whether the Cubans took offence at the *Pravda* articles or whether these were only a symptom of an unpublicised quarrel—the latter seems more likely.

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

5. Although the Russians probably still want to make progress in the Security Council on a resolution which would bring at least a measure of settlement, their tactics in New York during October reflected the difficulty of reaching agreement on a resolution involving both Israeli withdrawal and an end to the state of belligerency. In their desire not to appear to be pushing the Arabs, the Russians, while accusing the Americans of doing this, seemed themselves to retreat somewhat from their earlier understanding with the United States on a draft resolution.

6. The sinking of the *Eilat* and the Israeli retaliation against Suez produced a predictable Soviet reaction in the form of renewed anti-Israeli propaganda and further visits by Soviet ships to UAR ports, which were probably intended mainly as a gesture of support for the Arabs.

7. The naval visits may also have been designed partly to deter the Israelis from further attacks against the north end of the canal, but the Russians still seem anxious to avoid any direct involvement. Indeed, the *Eilat* incident was probably a shock to them in demonstrating the risk of renewed hostilities. They are still determined to avoid any kind of confrontation with the United States. In any case, although their naval forces in the Mediterranean have been reinforced progressively over the last three years, they are a long way from equalling those of the American Sixth Fleet. The incident should therefore on balance incline them to make further efforts towards a temporary settlement, but it remains to be seen how far they will go in New York.

8. Aside from the *Eilat* affair, there was a considerable reduction in Soviet public statements on the Middle East in October, presumably reflecting the difficulty of making progress. For instance, of two major speeches made by Mr. Kosygin at the beginning of the month, the first dealt with the Middle East in standard terms while the second ignored the problem and concentrated on Viet-Nam. Russian propaganda has generally continued to emphasise the need for Arab unity, but for the first time for several weeks the Soviet Press criticised an Arab Government in attacking measures taken against local Communists by the Sudanese authorities.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Meeting

9. The October session of the USSR Supreme Soviet discussed the Budget for 1968 and economic plans for 1968-70, and adopted a new law on national service.

10. Industrial production is doing well. This year overall production is expected to exceed last year's figure by over 10 per cent and the targets for 1970 have been raised. Agricultural production will probably be slightly below last year's record figure. It is claimed that the livestock sector will do considerably better than last year which suggests that this year's harvest, though by no means a bad one, will be well down on last year's record.

11. The 1968 Budget provides for a 15.1 per cent increase in defence expenditure over last year's allocation, although in terms of the proportion of the total national Budget it represents an increase of only 0.8 per cent. The Science

Budget, which is generally regarded as covering some military work, is up by 10 per cent. It is difficult to assess the significance of this increase in real terms. It may be partly attributable to the higher costs of the modern weapons and there may have been price rises for defence supplies as a result of the recent revision of wholesale prices. However, it is significant that whereas the overall heavy industry target for 1970 was raised at the Supreme Soviet session the individual items in this category mentioned specifically have been either cut or maintained at the previous level. It seems probable therefore that a substantial additional effort is to be in the military field. Increased aid to Viet-Nam and the re-equipment of Arab forces would probably not account for more than a small part of this. Other possible causes might be naval building, new weapons and equipment and any unplanned expansion of the ballistic missile defence system. The Russians officially attribute the increase in defence expenditure to international tension generally.

12. New emphasis was put on the consumer goods sector. For the first time since the Soviet Union embarked on its massive industrialisation policy nearly 40 years ago the planned rate of increase in the output of consumer goods for 1968 (8.6 per cent) exceeds that for heavy industry (7.9 per cent) (although the primacy of heavy industry for the period up to 1970 as a whole has been maintained). This decision while perhaps reflecting a desire on the part of the Soviet leadership to show concern for consumer needs is a reaction to the problem of absorbing the surplus purchasing power which should be released by the considerable rise in money wages and incomes forecast over the period of the plan.

13. It seems unlikely that the Five-year Plan will ever be published now in final form. The evident failure of the Soviet leaders to agree on long-term economic goals has led to the adoption of the more flexible expedient of separate annual plans for the remaining period up to 1970. The economic targets outlined at the Supreme Soviet in general adhere fairly closely to those laid down in the 23rd Congress Directives, but there is a significant exception. Total capital investment up to 1970 has been cut by 2 per cent, but State investment in agriculture has been reduced by 13 per cent. The figure of 41 milliard roubles State investment in agriculture for 1966-70 announced by Brezhnev in March 1965 and confirmed by the 23rd Congress has been cut to 35.7 milliard. It seems likely that an even bigger reduction will in fact take place and that a decision on this has been partially postponed by the leadership. There is clearly controversy among the leadership over this question. In March this year the First Deputy Premier Polyansky publicly criticised the views of those who advocated a reduction in allocations to agriculture. After the Supreme Soviet session he published an article in the party journal *Kommunist* in which he repeated still more categorically his criticism of those who would sacrifice agriculture in favour of other sectors of the economy and referred to Brezhnev's earlier support of his views.

Economic reforms

14. The economic reforms continue to be applied cautiously and they do not yet seem greatly to have affected the economy's performance in spite of the fact that a third of the total industrial output now comes from enterprises operating under the new system. Nevertheless the reforms, although treated in a low key, received favourable comment at the Supreme Soviet session.

Military service

15. The Supreme Soviet has adopted a new law on national service which establishes a conscription period of two years for the army instead of the three years which recruits serve at present. In view of the population bulge and the new provisions regarding deferment, &c., it is doubtful whether the new measure will result in a significant decrease in the size of the armed forces or have much effect in the labour force available to the economy (although one commentator has suggested in the army newspaper that "hundreds of thousands" of extra working hands will become available). The aim of bringing more young people under a form of military discipline will be served by the provision in the new law for military training for 16 and 17 year olds in the two years before call-up.

Soviet history

16. The treatment of the Stalin period continues to be politically sensitive in the Soviet Union. The September issue of *Questions of History of the CPSU*

attacked a book entitled "1941, June 22nd", by A. M. Nekrich, who was alleged to have put forward the "absurd thesis" that "the party and Government allegedly under-estimated 'the danger of war with Germany'". Nekrich's work was in fact published in 1965, when it received at least two favourable reviews. It is possible that the recent Middle Eastern conflict has made "unpreparedness" a sensitive theme again.

17. The other target was a textbook by a Yugoslav historian, Dr. S. N. Kostic, published last year. There was little mention of Stalin in the review but he clearly loomed large in Kostic's book, as the latter was criticised for assuming that the USSR's foreign policy was "a question of personalities". The attack on the book was not surprising however as it included a number of highly embarrassing suggestions, for instance that the USSR was responsible for the outbreak of the last war and that the Red Army had deliberately awaited "the defeat of the Warsaw Uprising and the defeat of the allies in the Ardennes" in 1944. It has now been announced that the Yugoslav authorities have banned the use of the book by educational institutions, perhaps partly because of Soviet pressure.

ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUMANIA

18. On 6 December, the Party Conference of the Rumanian Communist Party will discuss draft directives from the Central Committee on economic reorganisation. The overall aim is to maintain the present high growth rate while eliminating admitted inefficiency and shortcomings. The Rumanians are carefully avoiding any reference to "reform" and are under-playing their indebtedness to other models. But in their typically pragmatic way, they appear to be coming into line with the economic experiments in other East European countries, especially in the devolution of decision-making from ministries to industrial complexes; the introduction of wage incentives; the organisation of factories on a profit basis with some access to foreign markets; and the beginnings of a realistic price mechanism.

VISIT OF RUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER TO PEKING AND HANOI

19. The Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer visited Peking and Hanoi from 24 September to 1 October. The visit was a demonstration of Rumania's continuing contact with Peking and Hanoi though there is no sign of any concrete results affecting the Viet-Nam war. It was probably intended primarily as a demonstration of Rumania's continuing independent line.

ALBANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

20. The Albanian Prime Minister, Mehmet Shehu, led a party and Government delegation to China from 26 September to 14 October, touring those areas most loyal to Mao, praising the Maoist line and receiving tributes to the correctness of the Albanian stand.

21. On his return journey he paid a brief visit (15-17 October) to Pakistan for talks with President Ayub Khan. President Khan accepted an invitation to visit Albania at a later date. The initiative on this occasion seems to have come from the Albanians who may be seeking friends in the United Nations in case of trouble with the Greeks, and markets other than China in case of economic difficulties there.

22. Albanian references to Yugoslav "revisionism" during the Peking visit were noticeably muted by comparison with those of the Chinese. The communiqué made no reference to Yugoslavia at all. There have been other indications that the Albanians may be thinking of mending their fences with the Yugoslavs, at least on a practical level.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Indonesia

23. The delayed effects of the Cultural Revolution were widely apparent during the month. Indonesia demanded that the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta and all Consulates in Indonesia should be closed before 30 October. This was the final act in a series of moves by which the Indonesians had tried to extricate their few remaining diplomats from Peking after the sacking of their mission by a mob of 5 August. Three days before the time limit expired, the Chinese said that they could not "but announce the closing of the Chinese Embassies and Consulates."

24. Officially relations between the two countries are now "suspended" rather than broken and it seems that both sides were and will remain anxious not to take the further step of formally breaking relations. The Chinese were probably reluctant to withdraw their mission from Indonesia since by doing so they are abandoning a large overseas Chinese community. The Indonesian Foreign Minister has announced that Indonesia is not considering recognising Taiwan, although trade relations are proceeding well.

25. The Chinese handling of this affair showed that the more extremist elements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to be kept in check. No demonstrations were organised and the tricky question of whose diplomats should be safely away first was solved by transporting the remnants of the Indonesian mission in the aircraft sent to collect the Chinese Embassy.

Burma

26. Since the anti-Chinese riots in June, Chinese technicians in Burma under the Economic and Technical Co-operation Agreement have been virtually on strike. On 6 October, the Burmese ordered all these technicians to leave by 31 October and on that day, the Chinese announced that they "could not but withdraw" all their technicians since the Burmese had unilaterally "torn to pieces" the agreement. Some reports suggested that the Chinese technicians took the precaution of removing much of the machinery and spare parts of projects on which they were working before they left. In their statement announcing the withdrawal, the Chinese emphasised that they would continue to give full support to "the Burmese people's revolutionary struggle" and it seems likely that Chinese antagonism to the Ne Win Government and support for Communist insurgent groups will continue.

Cambodia

27. Evidence that the Chinese might be attempting to turn towards a more flexible approach to Afro-Asian countries was contained in a speech by Chou En-lai on 9 October. In this he reverted to a theme which has been little used recently; that there was a need for the broadest possible international front to oppose the United States which, although excluding "revisionists" should "unite all anti-United States forces that can be united". Handling of relations with Cambodia was probably an example of this approach being put into effect. Despite a series of moves by Sihanouk to suppress Chinese subversive activities in Cambodia, the Chinese have continued to make efforts to improve relations and sent a friendly message on the occasion of Cambodia's 18th anniversary saying that they would always abide by the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" in their relations with Cambodia. This seems finally to have tipped the scales since Sihanouk has now publicly announced that the Press should not publish anything critical of China or refer either directly or indirectly to the crisis in relations between Cambodia and China. Sihanouk thus seems to have been successful both in restricting unwelcome Chinese activities in Cambodia and in retaining friendship with the Chinese Government.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

28. The attendance at National Day celebrations (1 October) in the provinces as in Peking provided a striking demonstration of the dominant role now being played by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The absence from the celebrations of certain senior military officers, including some regional commanders reflected the damage which the Cultural Revolution has caused in the leading ranks of the PLA itself. Nevertheless, the Peking leaders have continued to rely on the PLA to restore order and gradually pave the way for the establishment of "provisional organs of power" in the provinces. In this connection it was significant that a number of extremists in the Cultural Revolutionary Group of the Central Committee who have been criticised in wall posters, did not attend the celebrations.

29. Mao's call to "combat self-interest and repudiate revisionism" was the cue for instructions to the Red Guards and other "revolutionaries" to concentrate on rectifying their own errors, while continuing the criticism of the few allegedly "revisionist" leaders headed by Liu Shao-ch'i. On 17 October, the leaders instructed the "revolutionaries" to solve their differences by forming "alliances" on a functional basis. The *Liberation Army Daily* said that the PLA should use

its influence to ensure that the masses did not prevent officials from resuming responsibility. Other newspapers noted the need to dispel the distrust between "revolutionaries" and officials, while the *People's Daily* quoted a statement by Mao that the "correct treatment of cadres" was essential for the current tasks of the Cultural Revolution, including realisation of the "three-way alliance".

30. Chou En-lai, in a speech of 9 October acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution had exacted a certain cost in material terms, but claimed that the cost had been taken into account in advance and did not detract from the achievements of the campaign. He asserted, in a later speech, that the Cultural Revolution had attained "decisive victory". This statement was in line with the general tone of Press comment, implying that the leaders are agreed on the need for consolidation, restoring control and curbing the mass campaign.

31. At the end of the month, it was announced that a Revolutionary Committee would be inaugurated in Inner Mongolia on 1 November. The Region has had a Preparatory Group, controlled by local PLA Commanders, since June. Elsewhere, there was no sign of further progress towards the formation of "provisional organs of power". It appears that the leaders have been forced to recognise that time is needed in order to find acceptable political solutions in most areas. There have been indications of continuing disorder in some areas, although apparently much less widespread than in August; also that in some places students have defied orders to return to school.

CHRONOLOGY

27 Sept.-

11 Oct. Prime Minister of Congo (B) visits China.

October

- 1 Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny review troops in Kiev.
Chinese Embassy in Djakarta sacked.
Chinese National Day.
Pravda article by Bulgarian Party leader calls for international Communist conference.
- 2 Speech by Kosygin in Kishinev (Moldavian SSR).
- 2-5 King Hussein of Jordan visits Soviet Union.
- 3 Foreign policy speech by Tito in Gospic.
- 4 Chinese protest to Burma about treatment of Chinese experts.
Soviet-Jordanian Cultural and Scientific Co-operation Agreement.
Statements by Spanish, Finnish, Bulgarian and Polish Communist Parties
—call for international conference.
- 5 and 6 Plenum of Rumanian Communist Party.
- 6 Burma asks China to withdraw experts.
- 8 Moscow Radio attacks publication by China of the "programme of Communist Revolutionaries of the Soviet Union".
- 8-11 Mrs. Gandhi visits Poland.
- 8-18 Soviet Chief of Staff visits France.
- 9 Indonesia suspends relations with China.
Chinese protest to British Chargé d'Affaires over Hong Kong.
"Che" Guevara reported killed.
Speech by Chou En-lai at Wuhan.
Sino-North Viet-Nameese Agreement on goods exchange and payments for 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

October

- 10-12 Meeting of Supreme Soviet of USSR.
- 10-14 Hungarian Party First Secretary leads delegation to Czechoslovakia.
(Joint call for international Communist conference.)
- 11-13 Mrs. Gandhi visits Yugoslavia.
- 11 Bulgarian/Spanish Communist Parties' joint statement calls for international Communist conference.
- 12 Mao Tse-tung receives Albanian Prime Minister.
- 12-15 Mrs. Gandhi visits Bulgaria.
- 13 Japanese Communist newspaper *Akahata* criticises Mao Tse-tung.
- 14 Cuban Foreign Trade Minister arrives in Moscow.
- 15-17 Albanian Prime Minister visits Pakistan.
- 15 Speech by Brezhnev at unveiling of Volgograd memorial.
- 16-19 Mrs. Gandhi visits Rumania.
- 16-20 Norwegian Defence Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 17 Report by French Communist Party Secretary.
Article by Rumanian Party Secretary Ceausescu in *Pravda*.
- 17-22 Norwegian Prime Minister visits Yugoslavia.
- 17-21 Austrian Chancellor visits Bulgaria.
- 18 Soviet-North Viet-Nameese Scientific Co-operation Agreement signed in Moscow.
Soviet space station makes soft landing on Venus.
Notice by Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and other bodies on formation of Revolutionary Alliances.
- 19-24 Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister Polyansky visits Finland.
- 19-20 5th Congress of Czechoslovak Journalists.
- 20-24 Mauretanian President visits China.
- 21 Sino-Pakistani Border and Trade Agreement.
- 22-28 Norwegian Prime Minister visits Bulgaria.
- 22-26 Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defence Sokolov visits UAR.
- 23-26 Czechoslovak Prime Minister visits France.
- 24 *Izvestia* accuses Chinese Embassy in Moscow of subverting foreign students.
- 24-27 Mauretanian President visits North Korea.
- 25 *Pravda* publishes article by Secretary of Argentine Communist Party.
- 27-29 World Council of Peace meeting in Leningrad.
- 27 Soviet warships start visit to Port Said and Alexandria.
- 28 *Pravda* article by Ho Chi Minh.
- 29 Joint Soviet-East German parade in East Berlin. Protest by Western Commandants.
Pravda article by Polish Party Secretary Gomulka.
- 30 Joint statements by Bulgarian, Colombian, East German and French Parties demanding international Communist conference.
Link-up by Soviet unmanned space vehicles.
- 30-31 Nov. Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defence Sokolov visits Syria.
- 31 North Viet-Nameese delegation to 50th anniversary led by Le Duan arrives.
Soviet partial amnesty announced.