



Communist Policy and Tactics 1966 – 1967, 6. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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bjarnibenediktsson.is

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, DECEMBER 1967

CORRIGENDUM

Paragraph 19, line 3. For "National Assembly" read "National Committees."

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SOVIET-RUMANIAN relations Rumanian complaints about alleged SOVIET economic pressure have been added to the causes of strain. The Rumanians are still avoiding committing themselves on participation in a world Communist conference. (Paragraphs 9-12.)

CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP

The causes behind Novotny's resignation of the party leadership include disagreement over the economic reforms, intellectual dissent and uneasy relations between Czechs and Slovaks. It is too early to assess the likely performance of the new First Secretary, Dubcek, but he is probably fundamentally on the side of the "progressives". (Paragraphs 13-19.)

COMMUNIST POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The Russians have continued to demonstrate their support for the Arab countries. In the Yemen they actively supported the Republicans with aircraft and Soviet pilots. This may have been intended as a short-term rescue operation, but a long-term plan to increase their influence in the southern Arabian Peninsula cannot be excluded. (Paragraphs 20-24.)

VIET-NAM

The speech by the North Viet-Nameese Foreign Minister on 30 December could mark a step forward although it implied that the North Viet-Nameese still wish to negotiate on their own terms. (Paragraph 25.)

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The leaders seemed intent on reconstructing the party apparatus. This is likely to be a slow process because of the leadership's wish to limit the entry to the party of Red Guards and other "revolutionary" elements. The campaign against Liu Shao Ch'i continues. Efforts

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23 January, 1968

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, DECEMBER 1967

SUMMARY

SOVIET POLICY ON GERMANY

The Russian motives in continuing talks with the Federal Government are probably to improve the status of East Germany and to cause dissension in the Federal Republic. The strong Soviet statements against the alleged revival of Nazism were probably partly intended to reassure the East Germans and Poles. The East Germans have been totally negative in responding to Federal German suggestions for co-operation between East and West Germany. (Paragraphs 1-8.)

RUMANIA

Ceausescu's assumption of the presidency and other changes have consolidated his control over the party and party control over the Government. Although late in the field the Rumanians are starting their economic reforms from a position of strength. In Soviet-Rumanian relations Rumanian complaints about alleged Soviet economic pressure have been added to the causes of strain. The Rumanians are still avoiding committing themselves on participation in a world Communist conference. (Paragraphs 9-12.)

CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP

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will probably be made to improve the army's "image". Emphasis is being placed on production and defence preparedness. Mao Tse-t'ung, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai continue to receive top billing. (Paragraphs 26-32).

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

50th anniversary of the KGB

The publicity on this occasion was linked with attacks on the CIA as well as with the Philby case. Efforts are being made to improve the KGB's "image". (Paragraphs 33-34.)

Dissidence among young intellectuals

Pressure on writers and others continues to grow (Paragraph 35.)

Government reorganisation

There seem to have been major changes in the organisation of Government Committees in the cultural and ideological fields. This may partly reflect blame for some the current disarray in such matters. (Paragraph 36.)

SOVIET POLICY ON GERMANY

Soviet policy towards the Federal Republic has outwardly been contradictory. On the one hand, they have shown some interest in continuing with the Federal Government the series of bilateral discussions which were initiated by West Germany in July. The main point on which the Russians seem prepared to talk is the idea of an exchange of declarations with the Federal Government on the renunciation of the use of force. But they seem determined that East Germany should be included in this exercise on the same basis as other East European countries so as to enhance the status of the "DDR".

2. On the other hand a wholly negative tone was struck by the Notes delivered in Moscow on 8 December to the Ambassadors of the Federal Republic and of the three Allied Powers on the alleged revival of Nazism in West Germany. The Russians used the recent Convention in Hanover of the Right-wing NPD as a peg on which to hang a series of distorted criticisms of the Federal Government's policies. The only slightly moderating passage was that which acknowledged that the majority of the West Germans did not support neo-Nazism. There was also a statement that the Soviet Government would support a "realistic" approach by the Federal Government but this amounted in practice to no more than a renewed demand for recognition by West Germany of the *status quo* in Europe.

3. Soviet motives for these actions are unclear. One of them may be the wish to keep their lines open to West Germany in the hope that gradually they will be able to encourage acceptance there of the status of East Germany. They probably hope also to foster disagreement within the Federal Republic about the policy of *détente* with Eastern Europe.

4. Although this probably amounts to little if any alteration in the basic Soviet attitude towards West Germany, the more experimental tactics of the Russians probably do cause misgivings among some of their East European allies, particularly the Poles and the East Germans. Russian attacks on neo-Nazism may have been intended to reassure the latter. This view is strengthened by the inclusion in the statement of 8 December to the West German Government of a passage reaffirming the conditions for normalisation of relations with West Germany which have previously been demanded by the Poles, Czechs and East Germans, and specifically linking these conditions to the idea of an exchange of declarations on the renunciation of the use of force.

Attitude of Poland and East Germany

5. The Ulbricht régime's apprehension about the Soviet approaches to West Germany has been shown by a further hardening in the East German attitude, which may well have been prompted also by the imminence of negotiations between the Federal Republic and Yugoslavia on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The East German Foreign Minister visited Belgrade early in the month,

presumably in an attempt to dissuade the Yugoslavs from this move. The East Germans have taken a totally negative line on further efforts by the Federal authorities to establish contacts between the two parts of Germany, by rejecting outright the suggestion by the West German Postal and Transport Ministers for discussions at a high official level. There has also been considerable emphasis in public on the "special" status of West Berlin with reiteration of the assertion that it is "on the territory of the DDR".

6. Such signs of nervousness are familiar enough when talks between the Soviet Union and West Germany are taking place. They do not suggest that basically the policies of Moscow and East Berlin are very far apart, although the Russians will probably ensure that the East Germans do not take action which might threaten access to West Berlin or allied responsibilities there.

7. The Russians may well have taken steps not only to reassure the East Germans but also to keep them in line during the visit to Moscow by Ulbricht from 11-12 December. At the same time they probably also discussed economic co-operation within and outside the CMEA as well as the preparation for an international Communist conference.

8. During his visit to Poland from 6-10 December, Foreign Minister Gromyko probably also took the opportunity to explain Soviet policy on Germany and to reassure the Poles that the Russians had no intention of agreeing with the West Germans on a declaration on the renunciation of the use of force without prior conditions which would be satisfactory to Poland. The Poles have on more than one occasion made clear that these conditions should include the recognition of the Oder/Neisse Line.

RUMANIA

Government changes

9. On 9 December Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Party, was elected President in place of Stoica, who became a Party Secretary. Two of the First Deputy Prime Ministers and a Deputy Prime Minister were demoted, leaving Ceausescu's supporter, Verdet, as sole First Deputy Prime Minister with control of all economic ministries. Together with other changes, these moves amount to the consolidation of Ceausescu's control over the party and of party control over the Government. Their declared aim was to avoid "parallelism" between party and Government. The changes were no doubt also carried through with an eye to the possible political implications of the decentralisation foreseen in the economic and administrative reforms which were debated and approved by the Party Conference on 6-7 December.

Economic and administrative reforms

10. The reforms aim primarily at increased efficiency and their tone is highly pragmatic. The economic reforms contain the usual elements of devolution, self-financing, profitability and economic incentives, but they do not go as far as in Czechoslovakia in aiming at the creation of a Socialist market economy. Although late in the field, the Rumanians, who claim a growth rate of over 13 per cent in 1967, are starting their reforms from a position of strength.

Soviet-Rumanian relations

11. The election of Ceausescu as President and the demotion of the old guard have further strengthened the nationalists in the Rumanian leadership and, to this extent, have anti-Soviet overtones. There have been other signs of a deterioration in Soviet-Rumanian relations. Three days before his election, Ceausescu hinted to the Party Conference that the Soviet Union (and possibly other East Europeans) was putting economic pressure on Rumania, probably by withholding supplies of coke and iron ore and by threatening to cancel orders for Rumanian machinery. This was probably the main topic discussed between Ceausescu and the Russians during his visit to Moscow from 13-15 December. The non-committal communiqué stated that there had been an exchange of views on commercial relations but did not claim any identity of views. A trade agreement which foresees a modest increase was finally signed after some delay on 31 December. Significantly there was no mention in the communiqué of any of

the outstanding issues between Rumania and the Soviet Union—relations with West Germany, the World Communist Conference, the Middle East, or the Soviet-Rumanian Friendship Treaty (which is due for renewal on 4 February).

Rumanian attitude to a world Communist conference

12. The official attitude remains non-committal and the final decision will probably hinge on the terms of reference which the conference is given. On 18 November the party newspaper *Scinteia* reprinted an article by Luigi Longo which stated that the Italian party would participate in a conference on condition that it was of a consultative character with the purpose of enabling all parties to benefit from the experience of others in the struggle against Imperialism. The Rumanian view probably goes further than this. They might insist that there should be prior agreement that a conference would positively endorse the idea of the overriding importance of national parties in the world movement. The Russians are most unlikely to go as far as this and there has been continuing criticism by other East European Communist parties of the danger for international Communism of narrow nationalist ideas.

CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP

13. It was announced on 5 January that Novotny had resigned as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (he remains President and a member of the Party Presidium). He was replaced as First Secretary by a Slovak, the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, Dubcek. The Presidium was at the same time enlarged by four additional members.

14. The time taken for a decision to be reached on these changes and the fact that the meeting of the Central Committee from 19–21 December was to be reconvened on 3 January demonstrates the intensity of the struggle within the party, if this were not already clear from the unexpected visit of Brezhnev to Prague on 8 December. It now seems plain that there was a clear majority against Novotny. It is likely that Brezhnev went to Prague with the object of seeing whether Novotny's position could be held, or if not how he could be eased out with the minimum public upset.

15. The basic causes behind this change are deep seated. The economic situation in Czechoslovakia and the progress of the economic reforms are at the heart. The more progressive elements regard successful implementation of the reforms as essential if the economy is to be put right. Novotny, though publicly supporting the reforms, is well known to have been less than fully enthusiastic and is in any case inhibited by his Stalinist past.

16. There has also been growing discontent among the writers and intellectuals ending in the dispute at the last writers' congress last June. This resulted in severe measures against those demanding relaxation of censorship but was symptomatic of a climate in which relics of the Stalinist age would not be easily accepted without protest.

17. All this has been intensified by the long-standing uneasy relationship between Czechs and Slovaks going back to the repressive measures against Slovak nationalists in the early 'fifties and to Czech hostility, for which Novotny was held largely responsible, towards Slovak aspirations in the middle and late 'fifties for a greater degree of autonomy. The Slovaks have also complained that Slovakia was treated as a poor relation especially in economic matters.

18. It is too early to assess Dubcek's likely performance. His appointment may well owe as much to his Slovak nationalist as to other qualities. But the tone of the communiqué announcing these changes is "progressive" rather than "conservative" and may augur a more flexible approach to practical problems, and especially the economic reforms.

19. It seems unlikely that the posts of First Secretary and Prime Minister will both continue to be held by Slovaks. Lenart may therefore well go, though this may be delayed, perhaps until after the elections to the National Assembly in May. The most likely candidate to succeed Lenart seems to be Deputy Prime Minister Černik, who has had responsibility for implementing the economic reforms. Although he has sometimes appeared to take an over-cautious line and has been criticised for this by the planners of the reforms, he is probably on the side of the "progressives".

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COMMITTEE 5

COMMUNIST POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

20. While apparently still showing interest in some sort of provisional settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, the Russians have recently taken much more active steps to demonstrate their readiness to give practical support to the Arabs. The visit to Moscow at the end of November of the Syrian Prime Minister was part of this process. It provided an opportunity to reaffirm the demand for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory. On the other hand there was probably not full agreement on future political steps. The communiqué after the visit contained no reference to the Security Council resolution which called for withdrawal coupled with recognition of the right of all States in the area to exist; the Syrians have made their objections to this resolution clear.

21. Besides the continuing presence of Soviet warships in UAR ports, another public demonstration of Soviet support was the visit of a squadron of Soviet bombers to Cairo. It may be that increasing use will be made by the Russians of facilities both for warships and aircraft in Arab countries. There are also large numbers of Soviet military advisers with the armed forces of the UAR and Syria, but it seems unlikely that the Russians will go to the lengths of acquiring bases in the formal sense in Arab countries. To do so would not only put them in a weak propaganda position, in view of their criticism of Western bases, but might also involve them in too great a physical commitment to the Arabs; *i.e.*, it would make it even more difficult than it was in June 1967 for the Soviet Union to avoid direct assistance if there were a resumption of hostilities with Israel.

22. There are signs, however, that this argument may not weigh so strongly with the Soviet planners in their consideration of the south-western corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Early in December there were reliable reports of considerable Soviet assistance to the Yemeni Republican authorities, involving not merely the supply of aircraft but also the participation of Soviet pilots in operations against Yemeni Royalist villages and concentrations. The Soviet motives for this action are not clear. They may have decided to undertake a short-term operation to rescue the Republican Government which, at the end of November, was in imminent danger of suffering severe setbacks at the hands of the Royalists. The Russians may have calculated that it would seriously harm their prestige in the Middle East if they failed to respond to an appeal for assistance from a Left-wing Arab régime. Moreover, it would have been clear to them that this was almost the only area in the Middle East in which, following the British withdrawal from Aden, they could intervene without seriously risking a confrontation with the West.

23. Even allowing for this the Soviet action in the Yemen shows a remarkable contrast with their caution in other areas and it cannot be altogether excluded that they regard the southern Arabian Peninsula as a region in which they can usefully hope to expand their influence on a long-term basis. They might wish to do so with an eye to exercising some control over the east-west sea route through the Suez Canal and acquiring facilities for other operations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf in the future. Such a plan would certainly involve not only the Yemen but also the People's Republic of Southern Yemen. The Russians quickly overcame their earlier misgivings about the National Liberation Front in Aden and recognised the new Government of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen. They may be anxious to offset the possible growth of Chinese influence in the area because of the reported adherence of some members of the National Liberation Front to Maoist principles. Two members of the Soviet Embassy in Cairo arrived in Aden for talks with the new Government in mid-December. But it remains to be seen whether the Russians will try to move in with extensive offers of aid to South Yemen.

24. The meeting of Foreign Ministers of East European countries in Warsaw to discuss the Middle East appears to have been an attempt by the Russians to demonstrate solidarity with their allies before Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Cairo in January. The participation of the Yugoslavs was consistent with their record of public co-operation on the Middle East with other East European countries. Attendance by the Rumanians, albeit at Deputy Foreign Minister level, suggested that they wish to continue to associate themselves publicly with their Warsaw Pact allies where this can be done without compromising their principle of independence.

VIET-NAM

25. In Viet-Nam, the most important recent event has been the speech made by the North Viet-Nameese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh, on 30 December. On the face of it, his statement that the North Viet-Nameese will hold talks with the Americans on "questions concerned" after the United States had ended unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against North Viet-Nam, could mark a step forward from their previous position (set out in an interview which Trinh gave on 28 January, 1967) which went no further than saying that talks "could" take place if the bombing stopped. On the other hand, Trinh's recent speech reiterated Hanoi's adherence to their Four Points and to the Liberation Front Programme. He also went out of his way to attack the proposals which President Johnson put forward at San Antonio on 29 September, when he said that the United States Government were willing to stop the bombardment of North Viet-Nam "when this will lead promptly to productive discussion. We would assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation." While the first indications are sufficiently encouraging to make further investigation worth pursuing the speech as a whole suggests that the North Viet-Nameese are still only prepared to negotiate on their own terms, although presenting these with some flexibility.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

26. The Chinese Press increasingly emphasised the need to rebuild the Communist Party organisation, and the rectification and reconstruction of the party was given as one of the major tasks for 1968 in the New Year's Day editorial of the *People's Daily*, *Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily*. The editorial described 1967 as the year of "decisive victory" in the Cultural Revolution, but added that "all-round victory" would be attained in the future through the implementation of Mao's latest instructions (*i.e.*, those which are directed at restoring order and control).

27. The leaders apparently intend gradually to restore effective party leadership at all levels through the formation of Party Core Groups. The Core Groups, which already exist in Shansi and Chinghai provinces, have been publicised in the Peking Press. The leaders of these groups are drawn from the principal party representatives on the local Revolutionary Committees, including some who previously served in the military party organisation and others with a civilian party background.

28. The reconstruction of the party is likely to be a slow process. Press articles have intimated that "revolutionaries" and representatives of the masses should take part in discussions on party-building and presumably on the selection of party officials. The New Year editorial reaffirmed that "advanced proletarian elements" who had emerged in the Cultural Revolution should be admitted into the party, but the general tenor of comment on this subject suggests that the leaders wish to limit the entry into the party of "rebels" and Red Guards to fairly small numbers. The editorial also mentioned the Communist Youth League, which is evidently to be rebuilt through a process of rectification. It served notice to the Red Guards and other revolutionary organisations that they must "heighten political consciousness and purify their ranks".

29. Among the other tasks for 1968 are continuation of the campaign against Liu Shao-ch'i and other "top capitalist-roaders" and consolidation of the "great alliance" and "three-way alliance". The latter task clearly involves the completion of the system of Revolutionary Committees, which have yet to be formed in 20 out of China's 26 provinces and regions. (Preparatory Groups have been formed in at least 6 of these 20 provinces.)

30. The editorial acknowledged the armed forces' "tremendous contribution" to the Cultural Revolution and declared that in the coming year they would have to undertake tasks of "still greater importance". While making clear that the leadership continued to rely on the armed forces to enforce control and give political guidance in all areas, the editorial, together with other recent Press comments, suggested that the army should make determined efforts to improve its relations with the revolutionaries and the masses.

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31. Another passage in the New Year editorial concerned the importance of boosting production and increasing defence preparedness. It emphasised the need to protect transport and communications—a sector which has suffered particularly severe disruption in the mass campaign. On industrial achievement, the editorial was remarkable for its reticence, a further indication of the harm suffered by industry during the Cultural Revolution. An unprecedentedly high harvest was claimed for 1967 (according to another report, about 10 million tons more grain than in 1966), but there have been indications that unrest and transport problems have in certain areas hampered the proper distribution of food and other supplies and also the State purchasing programme. The editorial acknowledged that many difficulties had still to be overcome and called for further efforts to combat self-interest, strengthen labour discipline and safeguard social order. The serious problems of social unrest and delinquency were reflected in the Press of Shanghai, where the Public Security Bureau issued a special notice on the suppression of hooligans and delinquents.

32. Mao appeared, together with Lin Piao, Chou En-lai and others at a New Year's Eve reception of "revolutionary fighters" (including army officers), but Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's wife) and Ch'en Po-ta (his closest lieutenant in the propaganda field and leader of the Cultural Revolution Group) were absent—a possible sign that they will play a less prominent part in the Cultural Revolution in the year ahead. Earlier in the month, Press reports placed even greater emphasis than hitherto on Lin Piao's position. Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister, continued to play a very active role in the direction of affairs, particularly in attempts to secure solutions of political problems in the provinces. Also present at the New Year's Eve reception were certain regional military leaders. The attendance of Wang En-mao and Saifudin (Party leaders in Sinkiang who have been under severe Red Guard criticism throughout the year) suggested that an attempt is being made to patch up the differences between them and the central authorities.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

50th anniversary of the KGB

33. The expected publicity for the 50th anniversary of the Soviet security services (KGB) has been marked by a new slant to some of the revelations about its exploits. Recently published material has included the serialisation in *Literary Gazette* of the memoirs of an alleged former CIA agent working in India, and a prominent article about Kim Philby in the Government newspaper *Izvestiya*. This publicity for Western defectors is evidently intended not only to discredit Western intelligence agencies but also as a retaliation for the publicity in the West about Svetlana's memoirs and the defection of Colonel Runge. The Russians have in recent months shown increasing sensitivity about what they claim to be a CIA-inspired campaign to discredit the Soviet Union, and about the activities of anti-Soviet *émigré* organisations, notably the Popular Labour Alliance (NTS) which has its headquarters in Frankfurt.

34. There has been a growing tendency since about 1964 to publicise the espionage and counter-espionage exploits of the KGB with the apparent object of giving it a more favourable and romantic image with the Soviet public. The past and present activities of the KGB directed against dissident Soviet citizens have been played down. Andropov, the recently appointed head of the KGB, assured his audience at an anniversary rally that there could be no return to past violations of Socialist legality which took place when "political adventurers" controlled the security police. The special attention devoted to the anniversary and the accompanying award of decorations and promotions to police officials may be partly intended to boost the morale of the security service following the recent demotions of Shelepin and Semichastny which seem to have entailed the removal of some senior KGB officials.

Dissidence among young intellectuals

35. Despite Andropov's assurances the KGB has clearly been increasingly active recently on the home front. A number of reports have reached the West about the arrest of groups of young intellectuals accused of subversive or dissident activities. There is little hard information but according to recent reports four men have been sentenced in Leningrad to heavy prison sentences for setting up a

conspiratorial political organisation. An article on the 50th anniversary by the Leningrad KGB chief seemed to confirm that a political trial had taken place. These four may be part of the group of 25 or more people connected with the Philosophy Department of Leningrad University which, according to earlier reports, had been arrested in Leningrad on charges of political conspiracy. Western Press reports and Moscow rumours have spoken of caches of arms in connection with this case. There were also forecasts about the impending trial in Moscow of several young writers, including Ginzburg and Galanzkov, on charges connected with the circulation of documents about the Sinyavsky-Daniel case and an underground magazine *Phoenix 66*. In September three young men, Bukovsky, Delannay and Kushev, were sentenced in Moscow for demonstrating against the arrest of Ginzburg and his associates. The grandson of the former Minister Litvinov has now sent to the West a document about the Bukovsky trial and an account of his own interrogation by the KGB about his intention to circulate this document.

Government reorganisation

36. The fate of four Government Committees in the cultural and ideological field, dealing respectively with foreign cultural relations, broadcasting and television, the Press, and cinematography, is in the balance following a recent inspection. The functions of the Committee for Cultural Relations seem to have been divided between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture. The Committee for Science and Technology and possibly also the Union of Friendship Societies are likely to gain from its dismemberment. The abolition seems to be the final stage of a process which was already visible in October 1965, when the chairmen of these committees lost their status of Minister. There are both political and administrative explanations for the change. Their Chairmen, who will now lose influence, seemed once to enjoy the patronage of Khrushchev, and three of them were closely connected with Shelepin and his generation. Secondly, the Government probably regards this as a field in which it can most easily make economies. Thirdly, the committees may well have incurred blame for some of the current disarray and confusion in ideological and cultural matters. There have been rumours in Moscow that Demichev, the Candidate Member of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretary responsible for cultural matters, may lose his post: he certainly does not seem to have shown much ability.

CHRONOLOGY

30 Nov.—

2 Dec. Hungarian-Czechoslovak party talks in Budapest.

December

- 1 Iranian military delegation arrives in Moscow.
Soviet-Yemeni Republican Economic Co-operation Agreement signed.
- 2 Communiqué on visit of Syrian Prime Minister to the Soviet Union.
- 3 Soviet Union recognises the People's Republic of South Yemen.
Squadron of Tu-16 Soviet bombers visits UAR on goodwill mission.
- 4 Resumption of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Congo (Kinshasa).
Mongolian party newspaper attacks Chinese "chauvinism".
- 4-9 President Podgorny leads Soviet delegation to Finnish 50th anniversary celebrations.
- 5-14 USSR Supreme Soviet delegation visits Nepal.
- 6-8 Rumanian Communist Party National Conference.
- 6-10 Soviet Foreign Minister visits Poland.

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December

- 8 Soviet Government statement attacking "neo-Nazism" in the Federal Republic of Germany.
- 8-10 Brezhnev visits Czechoslovakia.
- 9 Ceausescu appointed President of Rumanian Council of State by Grand National Assembly.
- 10 Hanoi broadcasts Chinese "decision" to accord full diplomatic status to Mission in Peking of South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front.
- 11-12 Albanian Workers' Party Central Committee Plenum.
Ulbricht visits Soviet Union.
- 11-15 East German Foreign Minister visits Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
- 12-15 Rumanian party and Government delegation led by Ceausescu visits Soviet Union.
- 12 21st Session of Council of CMEA in Budapest.
- 13 South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front submit memorandum to United Nations through Rumanian authorities.
Mongolian party newspaper again attacks Chinese "adventurism".
- 14 Czechoslovak Government statement on student demonstrations admits police brutality.
- 14-16 First session of North Korean Fourth Supreme People's Assembly.
- 16-20 Rumanian warships visit Sevastopol.
- 17 Pakistan Government Economic delegation visits China.
New Head of South Viet-Nam Liberation Front Permanent Mission received by Chinese Government leaders.
- 18 Mao Tse-tung receives Albania-China Friendship Association delegation.
- 19 Soviet Prime Minister receives Governor George Romney of Michigan.
- 21 Soviet and Chinese Ministers of Defence send messages celebrating North Viet-Nameese Army Day.
- 19-21 Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Plenum (resumed on 3 January, 1968).
- 19-22 Foreign Ministers of East European countries including Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister and the Yugoslav Foreign Minister meet in Warsaw to discuss Middle East situation.
- 20 50th anniversary of the KGB (Security Services) celebrated in the Soviet Union.
- 21 Four young Russian intellectuals sentenced in Leningrad to imprisonment for "political conspiracy".
- 22 Czechoslovak Party's Central Committee resolution on economic policy.
Federal Republic of Germany rejects accusations in Soviet statement of 8 December.
- 24 Seventh Chinese nuclear test (not announced by China).
- 25 Soviet-Iraqi Oil Agreement signed in Baghdad.
- 25-29 Mongolian party and Government delegation visits North Viet-Nam.
- 28 Article in *Izvestia* implies a threat to re-try Mr. Gerald Brooke for espionage.
- 29 Rumanian Minister of Foreign Trade visits Moscow.
- 30 Sino-Rumanian Goods Exchange and Payments Agreement signed in Peking.

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25 May, 1967

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, APRIL 1967

SUMMARY

The Conference of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary was mainly unsuccessful as a demonstration of Communist unity but provided a platform for propaganda against NATO and Federal Republic of Germany. (Paragraphs 1-6.)

The East German attitude to contacts with the FRG remains negative. (Paragraphs 7-8.)

The Communist "front" organisations are supporting the themes of the Karlovy Vary Conference. (Paragraphs 9-12.)

The British Communist Party is adjusting to the current "united front" tactics in Western Europe. (Paragraphs 13-15.)

The division among Latin American Communists between the advocates of violence and peaceful tactics. (Paragraphs 16-20.)

The Soviet Union is working for better relations with Malaysia while relations with Indonesia remain cool. (Paragraphs 21-23.)

Soviet relations with Iran and Iraq. (Paragraphs 24-26.)

The Soviet Memorandum on United Nations Peace-keeping. (Paragraphs 27-28.)

The Soviet leadership. Potential causes of disagreement. (Paragraph 29.)

Government reshuffle in Hungary. (Paragraph 30.)

The position of the party in Yugoslavia. (Paragraph 31.)

Chinese internal events. The attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i. (Paragraphs 32-35.)

THE CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

Inter-party relations

As a demonstration of the unity of a section of the World Communist Movement, the conference held at Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia from 24-26 April was not an unqualified success. Although the Russians put considerable pressure on the Rumanians to participate, neither the Rumanians nor the Yugoslavs attended. Like other absentees including the Communist parties of the Netherlands and Norway, they were clearly suspicious that the CPSU would try to use the conference in order to strengthen its position in the Communist movement. Probably in order to counter criticism on these lines, the Russians did not in fact attempt at Karlovy Vary publicly either to press their attack on the Chinese or to seek endorsement of the idea of a world Communist conference. But they have certainly not dropped the proposal for a world conference; at the Congress of the East German Communist Party (SED) a week earlier, Brezhnev made a strong plea for a start to be made on preparatory discussions for a world meeting, and he was supported by a number of speakers, notably the East Germans.

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2. At Karlovy Vary, Brezhnev did expand on the need for Communist unity in the context of assistance to North Viet-Nam. But, as at the SED Congress, he was restrained in referring to China, only maintaining that Chinese co-operation was necessary for joint action over Viet-Nam. Although there was some reduction in the volume of polemic in the latter part of April and the Chinese chose not to make their attacks on President Liu Shao-ch'i (paragraphs 32-33 below) a direct issue in the dispute, they rejected Brezhnev's suggestion about co-operation on Viet-Nam and mutual recriminations continue.

European security

3. The main theme of the Karlovy Vary Conference was the problem of European security, on which a statement was issued. As this was the first Pan-European Conference of ruling and non-ruling Communist parties, the organisers had to allow for the varying interests of different groups of participants. The East European leaders were chiefly interested in the intergovernmental conduct of East/West relations in Europe; West European Communist parties wanted discussion on the best tactics for them to employ at home.

4. The East European group are not entirely united, particularly in their attitude towards relations with Western Germany. They were prepared to follow Brezhnev's lead in the very harsh public line which the conference took on the Federal Republic and to express warm support for the DDR. However, the Hungarians, Bulgarians and Czechoslovaks gave no sign of being any more willing than before to set specific conditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, although Ulbricht in his speech tried to imply that they had done so.

5. The speech by Brezhnev set the tone on East/West relations. He said that the Russians continued to be interested in practical contacts with the West and made it clear that they hoped to use these contacts to weaken the Western Alliance and to strengthen anti-American feeling. The concluding statement announced that a major propaganda campaign would be launched against the extension in 1969 of the NATO Treaty. The proposals in the statement were claimed to represent the basis for a "system of European security" which would replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The main new idea put forward was for a European treaty on the renunciation of the use of force and of interference in the internal affairs of all countries. Otherwise the provisions mainly followed those of the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966.

6. The last part of the statement endorsed the recent moves by West European Communist parties for "popular front" tactics and alliances with Social Democrats, trade unionists, &c. The call for co-operation with "progressive" Christians confirmed the increasing interest of European Communists in gaining the support of religious elements. Waldeck-Rochet and Longo, the leaders of the French and Italian Communist parties respectively, probably played a major part in the drafting of this section. A close link was implied between this "united front" movement and the efforts at Government level of the East European countries to reduce American influence in Europe. The inevitable contradiction between the interests of Governments and parties, illustrated by the dilemma in the Soviet Union's relations with the French Government and the French Communist Party, was ignored, and the reference in Brezhnev's speech to the establishment of Communism in West Europe through class struggle was not included in the statement.

EASTERN EUROPE AND GERMANY

Congress of East German SED

7. The chief interest at the meeting, which was held from 17 to 22 April, was in the reaction of the SED to the statement by Chancellor Kiesinger and to the open letter by the West German SPD both of which proposed improved practical contacts between East and West Germany. The East German response to this has been generally negative. They made clear that discussions with the Federal Government could only take place at Government level. But there was little suggestion that the régime set much store by the early establishment of such contacts. The new Central Committee of the SED is to reply to the letter from the SPD. The East German régime had cause to be well satisfied with the strong expressions of support for the DDR made at the Congress by Brezhnev and other speakers.

8. The East European leaders except the Rumanians have continued publicly to keep in step with the harsh anti-German line, and like the Russians to support East German moves which tend to emphasise the separate entity of the DDR and to push the idea of reunification even further into the background. Hungary and Bulgaria are concluding Treaties of Friendship and Co-operation with the DDR on the lines of those signed by Poland and Czechoslovakia.

COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

9. Communist "front" organisations are organising a major propaganda campaign on the theme of European Security to follow up the statement issued at Karlovy Vary.

10. The World Council of Peace (WCP) is planning a European Congress of Peoples on European Security to be held early in 1968. Brezhnev made a reference to such a meeting in his speech at Karlovy Vary; it is a separate project from the proposal for a security conference of European Governments. Several smaller meetings to prepare for the Congress are to be held during 1967. In line with its efforts to influence non-Communist bodies, the WCP has also declared its support for the East-West Round Table and Pugwash Conferences on European Security, and will doubtless participate in the Christian Peace Conference meeting on European Security planned for November in East Germany.

11. A Youth and Students' Conference on European Security is to be organised jointly by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and International Union of Students (IUS) in Czechoslovakia in September-October. The WFDY is also organising a Youth Conference of representatives from NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Finland in November. The IUS is organising a Seminar on the Potsdam Agreement in the autumn, in conjunction with the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL).

12. The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) is organising a Conference of Scientists on European Security in Vienna in April 1968, and a Study Group has been set up to prepare it.

DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES

The Communist Party of Great Britain

13. The contents of the programme now being revised by the British Party (CPGB) in preparation for its Party Congress in November 1967 were foreshadowed in the Executive's Declaration "in defence of free discussion and democracy". The declaration, the most "revisionist" to have been yet issued by the CPGB, brings it into line with the leading West European Communist parties in asserting its belief in democratic institutions and in adopting a less doctrinaire approach to science, culture and religion.

14. The party's present programme, "The British Road to Socialism", published in 1951, was one of the first to advocate the parliamentary road to "Socialism". The current declaration welcomes "the most critical, enquiring and searching spirit among scientists" and quotes the Lysenko case as an example of what happens when scientific investigation is restricted. In the field of culture, the concept of "one school of thought" is rejected and the party undertakes not to direct "what should be written, painted or composed" under Socialism. The dialogue between Marxists and Christians is welcomed and faith is declared to be no bar to Communist Party membership, even in the case of ministers of religion. The political section, compared to past pronouncements, goes further in undertaking to maintain existing freedoms and institutions and in calling for a broad front with "the Socialists of the Labour Party and labour movement"; the party now stands for "a plurality of parties, including those that do not accept, or oppose, Socialism".

15. It does not seem likely that the declaration's attempt to reduce ideological barriers between the Communists and the non-Communist Left will benefit the CPGB which has little influence on British public opinion. Moreover, the gradualist approach will create new problems, especially in the case of those younger members who criticise the party's lack of militancy and seek salvation in pro-Chinese and Trotskyist groups.

Divisions among Latin American Communists

16. Guevara's message to the peoples of the world commissioned by the Tricontinental Organisation and published in Havana on 16 April tends to confirm indications that the main division in the Latin American extreme Left is not now between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, but between extreme Left-wing groups ready to take up arms, which have Cuban backing and those, including both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements, who pursue peaceful tactics even though they may advocate violence. Guevara's message, which appears to be authentic, preached the necessity of a protracted, world-wide struggle primarily by guerillas in the countryside and designed to tie down the imperialists in as many places as possible. He suggested the creation of two or three Viet-Nams in Latin America.

17. Castro had warned on 13 March that failure to resort to armed struggle automatically disqualified a party from the title of Communist. He specifically attacked the Venezuelan Communist Party, but almost all Latin American Communist parties are town-based and are concentrating on maintaining or extending their legal position and on infiltrating the trade union movement. The pro-Chinese parties were also attacked in a book "Revolucion en la Revolucion" by the French Marxist Debray, published with Cuban Government backing in January, not only for failing to launch the guerilla struggle which they accused the "revisionists" of sabotaging, but also of sabotaging it themselves.

18. Debray's heterodox thesis, based he claims on Cuban experience, is that the orthodox urban-based Communist parties cannot direct the armed struggle; that the first requirement is a military nucleus and that out of this nucleus an embryonic party will emerge. He, Castro and Guevara agree that subjective revolutionary conditions need not precede revolutionary action; they maintain that revolutionary awareness can be forged in the course of the struggle.

19. Material support for guerillas is considered by the Cubans as a basic duty of Communist parties. Guevara attacked both Russia and China for having hesitated to make Viet-Nam an inviolable part of Socialist territory at the risk of world-wide war. Similarly, Castro attacked the Russians for helping the counter-revolutionary struggle by extending trade links with Latin American Governments, thus warning them that the Cubans disapproved of their policy of offering verbal support to the cause of revolution while pursuing their own national interests.

20. Castro's open quarrel with the Venezuelan Communist Party and the recent outbreak of guerilla activity in Bolivia, where Debray has been captured, have highlighted the Communist parties' dilemma. The fact that Arismendi, the leader of the Uruguayan Communist Party, should go to Havana on his way to Moscow and that the Uruguayan Communist Party, a long-standing advocate of united front tactics—Uruguay has neither jungle nor mountains—should express support for both the Bolivian guerillas and Guevara's message indicates the wish to prevent a further split of the extreme Left. An informal meeting of some Latin American Communist leaders may have taken place in Moscow during Arismendi's visit and the SED congress in April provided an opportunity for discussion before the first Latin American Solidarity Conference due to be held in Havana from 28 July to 5 August, when the Cubans and the militants will have further opportunities of airing their views.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA

21. With the end of "confrontation" and the decline of Soviet influence in Indonesia, Moscow has stepped up its efforts to achieve a better relationship with Malaysia and Singapore. The opportunities to expand trade with Malaysia are important to the Soviet Union and politically the Russians continue to be interested in countering any spread of Chinese influence in South-East Asia.

22. Following the signature of a trade agreement on 3 April, Malaysia and the Soviet Union have announced their agreement in principle to establish diplomatic relations. The agreement provides for the establishment of a trade mission, three of whose members are to have full diplomatic immunity; presumably its conversion into a diplomatic mission is to follow. A similar agreement was reached with Singapore on 2 April.

23. Meanwhile Soviet/Indonesian relations remain cool but correct and there is continuing evidence of Russian indecision about their attitude to the new Indonesian Government. An article in *Pravda* on 27 March complaining about the banning of Soviet literature and stating that militant anti-Communism at home can only harm Indonesia's relations with the Soviet Union and her allies caused hostile reactions in the Indonesian Press. The only official Indonesian reaction was a conciliatory statement by Malik, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 29 March when he said he did not believe that the *Pravda* article would harm relations. This was subsequently rebutted by Moscow Radio, but there has been no attempt in more recent articles in Russian journals to pursue the *Pravda* line.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND IRAQ

24. A protocol on Soviet/Iranian economic co-operation was signed in Tehran on 15 April. There is to be a substantial Soviet contribution to the Iranian Fourth Plan in the fields of industry and communications, hydro-electricity, &c., to be amortised through deliveries of gas and oil to the Soviet Union. But no details have been published about the co-operation envisaged in the exploration and exploitation of oil in the "free zones" of Iran. It appears most likely that no firm implementing agreements have yet been reached and that the protocol was essentially an expression of intent.

25. On the Russian side the move can be seen as part of a general policy of developing relations with the Soviet Union's immediate neighbours. In the discussions in Tehran their objectives appear to have been to increase their economic influence in Iran in the hope also in the long term of increasing their political influence. The Russians have not stated how they intend to use the imported supplies of natural gas and oil from Iran; but they could presumably use them to meet the admitted fuel deficit in Transcaucasia. This could release Soviet supplies to Eastern Europe. The Russians are also developing transit routes from the Caspian to the Baltic which should facilitate the supply of Iranian goods to Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.

26. There is little information about the outcome of the visit of the Foreign Minister of Iraq to the Soviet Union at the end of April. The question of a construction of a Euphrates dam in Iraq to match that planned in Syria may have been discussed. Soviet engineers have already surveyed a site.

UNITED NATIONS

27. In April the Soviet Union circulated a memorandum on "United Nations Operations for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security". This, disregarding past Soviet actions in the peace-keeping field such as their support for the "uniting for peace" resolution which circumvented the Anglo-French veto in the Security Council at the time of Suez, and their subsequent acquiescence in (despite their opposition to) the establishment of UNEF by the Assembly and through the executive agency of the Secretary-General, restated in more rigid terms than ever before Russian views on the constitutional aspect of peace-keeping and their financing implications.

28. On the one hand, this document constitutes a new tactical card, designed to persuade the non-aligned majority in the United Nations into deferring once again any decision on peace-keeping conflicting with Soviet views. It also reflects the continuing Soviet objective of retaining all decisions on United Nations peace-keeping action in the hands of the Security Council where subject to the Soviet veto. The memorandum expresses this in standard anti-imperialist terms citing the Soviet view of past United Nations peace-keeping operations, particularly that in the Congo, but there can be little doubt that Soviet concern is currently sharpened by African advocacy of United Nations action in the context of the South-West Africa question to which the Soviet attitude is one of considerable caution mixed with their usual opportunist desire to appear as a supporter of African aspirations.

SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

29. With the approach of the 50th Jubilee of the Revolution the Soviet leaders appear anxious to avoid or shelve contentious issues. There seems to be a stalemate or truce in most of the traditional fields of controversy. Nevertheless

several potential fields of disagreement continue to exist. As Brezhnev's power has increased, greater emphasis has been placed on the directing and organising role of the party; this has been stressed recently with regard to the armed forces. There may well be friction where the party overlaps the responsibilities of Government. The economy provides several possible causes of friction, especially over the conflicting claims for resources of agriculture, industry and defence. Polyansky recently warned that complacency over last year's good harvest should not lead to a reduction in agricultural investment. There has been some criticism of obstruction of the economic reforms, which fall primarily within Kosygin's competence. Brezhnev has said remarkably little about them in his public speeches, and has implied that reforms should proceed cautiously. The present impassiveness of the collective front of the leadership could conceal sharp tensions, although there is no sign that these may become critical.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Hungary

30. On 14 April the Hungarian State leadership was rejuvenated and reshaped to meet the needs of economic reform and political evolution. Dobi, President of the Presidential Council (*i.e.*, Head of State) was replaced by the younger and more influential Losonczy. The prestige of the National Assembly was raised by the appointment of the outgoing Prime Minister, Kállai, who is a "politician" rather than an economist, as its chairman. Kállai's successor, Fock, an economist, will have the task of carrying out the economic reforms which are to be put into effect on 1 January, 1968.

Yugoslavia

31. The writer Mihajlov, who was jailed for 10 months in 1966 for spreading false information on Yugoslavia, was sentenced on 19 April to 4½ years in jail, followed by a four-year ban on public activity on charges of hostile propaganda and distributing *émigré* leaflets. The sentence appears to be intended as a warning to others who may be tempted, by the current debate about economic and party reform, to go too far in expressing radical and nationalist ideas. Tito alluded to these and other fissiparous tendencies in a speech to a Belgrade City Party Conference on 17 April, in which he emphasised the need for unity, pointing out how the purges of 1948 had strengthened the party for its struggle with the Cominform. He gave no hint, however, of a reversal of the party's present policy of guiding rather than commanding the development of Yugoslav society; and recent speeches by other party leaders have, in contrast, stressed the dangers of seeking to impose either an artificial unity of thought within the party or an unconditional acceptance of party policy in the community at large.

CHINA INTERNAL

32. The central theme of Chinese internal propaganda during the month was the official attack in the party Press on the Head of State, Liu Shao-ch'i. He has still not been mentioned by name in the official Press but there can be no doubt in the mind of any reader about the identity of the "top party person" under attack. In order to blacken Liu's name much rewriting of history has been in progress; to the extent even of ordering the deletion from Mao's works of any reference to Liu. Although the attack is centred on Liu, Teng Hsiao-p'ing (General Secretary of the Party) and possibly others are also included. Great efforts have been made to associate Liu and Teng with P'eng Chen (the ex-Mayor of Peking) and the chief villains of last year. Both groups have been accused in posters of involvement in plans for a military coup in February 1966. The evidence so far produced for the existence of such a *coup* is flimsy, although it is possible that there was in existence a programme of political opposition to Mao.

33. Although Liu was violently attacked in Red Guard newspapers in late 1966, the decision to carry this attack into the official Press was a reversal of previous policy which appears to have been decided, after much debate, at a high-level meeting in mid-March. Reasons for this change of policy are not yet clear. Possibly the Maoists would have preferred Liu to have confessed his errors and thus win his soul. He may have resisted such pressure from the conviction that he was in the right and had sufficient support to win in the end. Secondly,

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by officially attacking Liu and all he is said to stand for, the Maoists are putting additional pressure on those, particularly in provincial party organisations, who sympathise with his views. They may thus hope to make it clear which is the winning side and give recalcitrant cadres a chance to redeem themselves by joining in the general attack on Liu and by taking part in the revolutionary "triple alliances" together with representatives of the revolutionary groups. Thirdly, an attempt has been made to focus attention on Liu as a means of achieving unity amongst the members of the groups themselves. Despite this, the campaign for "takeovers" by revolutionary committees is going very slowly. The formation of a Revolutionary Committee for Peking along the approved lines was announced on 20 April, but this was the only new "takeover" for some time and only brings to six the total number of such approved "takeovers" throughout the country.

34. With the development of attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i there was also an increase in poster warfare in general. A number of prominent vice-premiers have been the victims of poster attacks, including Ch'en Yi (the Foreign Minister), T'an Chen-lin (an agricultural expert) and Li Hsien-nien (economic affairs). Some military leaders have also been under attack. Some of these attacks are probably a by-product of re-priming the machinery of "extensive democracy" for the attack on Liu and it is impossible as yet to say how much mud will stick. Despite heavy attacks in poster and Red Guard newspapers, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi has continued to attend receptions and to make important speeches.

35. Some of those who have been under attack appeared in public on May Day at an unusually large gathering attended by a number of important military and party officials from outlying areas. This was probably intended to demonstrate that those under attack were indeed, as the party newspapers claim, only "a handful". Prominent absentees from the May Day gatherings, who can now be considered as definitively in disgrace, include Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, T'ao Chu (Propaganda Chief), Ho Lung (an aged military leader), P'eng Chen (ex-Mayor of Peking), Lu Ting-yi (former Party Propaganda Chief), Lo Jui-ch'ing (former Chief of Staff) and P I-po (an economic expert). It would, however, be going too far to conclude that all those who appeared are now in safe waters. There was a marked distinction in publicity between the grouping of the general mass of top officialdom and the small core of leaders round Mao and Lin Piao (both of whom have made three recent appearances together in public after an absence of five months). Amongst these the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, and two members of the Politburo, Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng, continue to play the leading roles.

CHRONOLOGY

March

31- First Secretary of Italian Communist Party visits Rumania.

5 April

April

3-6 Party First Secretary Gomulka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz of Poland visit Bulgaria.

4-8 Yugoslav Foreign Minister visits Belgium.

5 Soviet Government's memorandum on United Nations Peace-keeping.

6 Polish-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.

6-11 Polish President Ochab visits Italy.

6-12 Swedish Foreign Minister visits Hungary.

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- April*
- 8 Soviet-Malaysian agreement on establishment of trade missions.
 - 9 Chinese Trade Delegation arrives in Moscow.
Yugoslav elections.
 - 10 Yugoslav journalist expelled from China.
 - 12 Marshal Grechko appointed Soviet Minister of Defence.
 - 13 Plenum of Hungarian Party Central Committee.
Article in Albanian *Zeri i Popullit* attacks Karlovy Vary Conference.
Tricontinental Solidarity Organisation meeting in Pyongyang (North Korea).
 - 14 Hungarian Government reshuffle. Fock appointed Prime Minister.
 - 15 Soviet-Iranian agreement on economic co-operation.
 - 17-22 Iraqi Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
 - 17-21 Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhivkov visits Rumania.
 - 18-22 East German SED Congress.
 - 19 Yugoslav writer Mihajlov sentenced to 4½ years imprisonment.
 - 20 Peking Revolutionary Committee formed.
 - 24 Soviet astronaut Komarov killed.
 - 24-26 Conference of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary.
 - 25-29 Belgian Foreign Minister visits Hungary.
 - 25- French Chief of Staff visits Soviet Union.
 - 3 May
 - 26-28 Iraq Foreign Minister visits Rumania.
 - 27- UAR Parliamentary Delegation visits Soviet Union.
 - 14 May
 - 28 Soviet statement on Manolis Glezos.
 - 30 Chinese *Peoples' Daily* attacks Soviet Union over Viet-Nam.

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24 MAY 1967

February
COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, MARCH 1967

SUMMARY

East-West Relations. Soviet interest in contacts between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe. Soviet attitude on anti-ballistic missiles. (Paragraphs 1-3.)

Continuing bad Sino-Soviet relations. (Paragraphs 4-5.)

Plans for a conference of European Communist parties. (Paragraph 6.)

Pro-Chinese, Polish and Russian groups sponsored by Albania. Sino-Albanian relations. (Paragraphs 7-8.)

Asian Communist parties. Decline of support for China in North Korea and Japan. Poor Sino-Mongolian relations. Chinese and Russian influence in North Viet-Nam. (Paragraphs 9-12.)

The Indian elections. (Paragraph 13.)

Cuba. The development of Castro's ideas on Cuban Communism. Relations with the Soviet Union. (Paragraphs 14-17.)

Communist Front Organisations. Ninth World Youth Festival. A Communist "Peace Corps". (Paragraphs 18-19.)

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation. (Paragraph 20.)

Cultural trends in the Soviet Union. (Paragraphs 21-23.)

Internal developments in China. (Paragraphs 24-30.)

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Russian Press comment on the development of contacts with West European countries has combined satisfaction at the advantages to be gained in the bilateral field with attempts to represent the visits by Soviet leaders to France, Italy and the United Kingdom as part of a successful Soviet diplomatic exercise to encourage "independent thinking" in West European countries. By this is meant independence from the United States, and the attempt to create divisions within the Western Alliance clearly remains part of Soviet European policy. But, as was evident during Kosygin's visit to London, there is also a greater readiness to discuss certain international issues in more flexible terms. Moreover, although there were bitter attacks on the United States Government, particularly after the resumption of the bombing of North Viet-Nam following the Tet truce, the Russians have nevertheless been trying to keep open their lines of communication with the Americans on international as well as bilateral issues.

2. The main target of Soviet criticism during the month has been not the United States but the Federal Republic of Germany. There are obvious propaganda advantages for the Soviet Union in continued attacks on German "revanchist" tendencies and "nuclear ambitions". But the anti-German campaign must also be calculated to co-ordinate the East European countries' response to Bonn's new *Ostpolitik*. It is doubtful whether either the Soviet Union

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or the East Germans were fully satisfied with the results of the meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers which took place in Warsaw from 8-10 February. A short communiqué said that "full mutual understanding" had been reached on questions covering European security, which suggested something less than full agreement, particularly on policy towards Bonn. But it does seem likely that the meeting will result at least in a slowing up in the development of political contacts between Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary on the one hand and the Federal Republic on the other. Speeches at the end of February by a number of East European leaders showed signs of wishing to allay East German fears by reassurances of support for the "GDR". Even the General-Secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, Ceausescu, made a speech in this sense, though the Rumanians remain unrepentant over having gone ahead with the establishment of diplomatic relations. The line which seems to be generally accepted now in Eastern Europe is that a "normalisation" of relations with the Federal Republic is impossible unless the Germans provide satisfaction on the question of renunciation of nuclear weapons, the acceptance of present frontiers and recognition of the "GDR". On the other hand these conditions have not been specifically described as a prerequisite for the establishment of diplomatic relations. The passing of the new "GDR" citizenship law, and other measures which emphasise the division of Germany, are evidently designed to weaken Bonn's claim to speak for the whole of Germany. The East Germans seem also to be urging those East European countries which have not yet concluded with them bilateral treaties of friendship and co-operation to do so soon. During a visit to Warsaw by the President of Czechoslovakia, Novotny, a new bilateral treaty between Czechoslovakia and Poland was signed to replace the previous 20-year treaty which had expired. Visits to Moscow by the Hungarian leader, Kadar, and the Polish Defence Minister have been other contributions to an exercise to demonstrate continuing Warsaw Pact solidarity.

3. There was some confusion during February about the Soviet public attitude on anti-ballistic missiles. Much interest was roused by an article in *Pravda* which maintained that, during his Press conference, the Soviet Prime Minister had said that his Government were ready to discuss "the question of averting a further arms race, both in offensive and defensive weapons". This went well beyond Kосygin's actual words and was disowned by "authoritative" Soviet sources; although the *Pravda* commentator may have been aware that the Soviet Government had agreed to discuss the subject with the United States, as subsequently stated on 2 March by President Johnson, it is difficult to explain how he came to let the news out prematurely in this way. In connection with Soviet Army Day, there were a number of speeches and articles by high-ranking military officers, giving rather different impressions of the capabilities of the Soviet anti-missile system. An article by the Soviet Minister of Defence took a more modest line than that in a speech by the Head of the Soviet Military Academy. The respective advantages of developing offensive and defensive missile systems may well be under debate in Moscow.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

4. Soviet attacks on Chinese Leadership reached a new level of bitterness during the first two weeks of February when almost continuous demonstrations were staged against their Embassy in Peking. In London, Kосygin went so far as to refer to Mao's dictatorship before a capitalist audience on British television, and, on 16 February, *Pravda* issued a major statement declaring that Chinese leaders had put themselves "outside the framework of the Communist movement and had gone over to open struggle against the Soviet Union". The Embassy families were evacuated in the face of harassment by Red Guards and the visa abolition agreement between the two countries was denounced by both parties. During the latter half of the month the Chinese demonstrations tailed off. This coincided with the efforts made generally to curb the Red Guards and reduce internal confusion. But polemics continued in the Press. The Russians made frequent references to Chinese obstruction of military aid to Viet-Nam; this accusation was denied by North Viet-Nam as well as China but the Viet-Nameese ascribed it only to Western and not to Soviet sources. The Chinese in turn accused the Russians of colluding with the Americans and British over Viet-Nam during Kосygin's visit to London. The Russians retorted that the Chinese wished to continue the Viet-Nameese war for their own purposes and that Peking's criticism of attempts to end the bombing was inhumane.

5. The anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 passed for the first time without being marked in any way in Moscow or Peking. Neither side has suggested that the treaty is not still in force, but its effectiveness is seriously in question. A Note of 9 February from the Soviet Foreign Ministry accused the Chinese of violating "the relations arising from the treaty" and *Pravda* quoted an article by a Swedish Communist asking rhetorically how the Chinese could "see any sense in a policy that ruins the military alliance with the Soviet Union".

RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

6. The Soviet leaders have recently paid much less attention to their proposal to convene a world conference of Communist parties. They may well be resigned to its postponement for a considerable time, although *Pravda*, in reporting a speech on 22 February by the Italian Communist leader, Longo, omitted his remark that an international conference could hardly take place this year. Longo suggested that this was due not only to the problems arising from the Sino-Soviet dispute but also to other "centrifugal tendencies" in the Communist movement. There has however been further activity in connection with a conference of European Communist parties, although the Russians have kept in the background. A preparatory meeting for the European conference was held in Warsaw from 22-26 February. The main absentees, were the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs, who were already known to be against the project, and the Dutch, Swedish and Norwegian parties. All these parties, probably have doubts about the wisdom of holding a conference which might strengthen the central authority of the CPSU. It was announced that the main conference of European parties is to take place at Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia from 24-27 April. The only subject officially announced for the agenda is European security, but Communist newspapers have indicated that Viet-Nam, Germany and the adoption of "United Front" tactics by European Communist parties will also be discussed.

PRO-CHINESE GROUPS WITHIN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

7. The Albanians have referred in the past three months to two "Marxist-Leninist" groups, which they claim represent opinion opposed to the "revisionist" Polish and Soviet Governments. The only known member of one of these groups, the so-called "Communist Party of Poland", is its General Secretary, Kazimierz Mijal, a Stalinist, who escaped to Albania on a forged passport in February 1966 and now resides there. A former member of the United Workers Party's Central Committee, he may be the author of pamphlets that have been circulating in Poland since 1964. The party amounts to no more than a small group of exiles under the Albanian and Chinese tutelage. The Albanians also claim the existence of a Russian group of "Soviet Revolutionary Communists (Bolsheviks)". That there is also a move to institutionalise the status of pro-Chinese parties is shown by the establishment on 12 February of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Austria". But the influence of all these Communist groups based in Albania appears to be negligible.

8. Chinese-Albanian relations remain cordial and Albanian party and military delegations which visited Peking were given red-carpet treatment. In Albania itself the current campaign against bureaucracy and "bourgeois" tendencies bears some superficial resemblance to the Cultural Revolution, but there has been no suggestion of following the Chinese example to the extent of forming Red Guards in Tirana.

ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

North Korea

9. The Chinese have continued to lose support among Asian Communist parties. The North Korean Workers Party, which has been moving away from China for the past two years, issued a statement on 26 February attacking the Chinese Government for "unfriendly acts": these included wall posters in Peking which alleged political unrest in North Korea and described the North Korean Government as "revisionist". A visit by a North Korean Government delegation to the Soviet Union in February accentuated the Korean estrangement from China, although their aim appears to be to maintain a position independent of both Russians and Chinese.

Japan

10. Prior to the general election on 29 January, the Japanese Communist Party had to clarify to the electorate their position on developments in China. They denied that they would imitate current Chinese policy if they attained power and insisted that they were following an independent line in the Communist movement. They won five seats during the elections, an increase of one. Now that the main Japanese Communist Party, with its membership of 240,000, is clearly disenchanted by events in China, the CPSU probably has little interest in supporting the relatively insignificant "Communist Workers Party" within which the pro-Soviet groups have hitherto been united.

Mongolia

11. Although rather slower than some other parties to endorse the idea of an international Communist conference, the Mongolian leadership's firm adherence to the Soviet Union has been underlined by a further deterioration of relations with China. On 22 February the Mongolians also abrogated their visa abolition agreement after protesting against the activities of the Chinese Embassy in Ulan Bator and against the treatment of Mongolian Embassy officials in Peking.

Chinese and Russian influence in North Viet-Nam

12. There is a good deal of evidence of a continuing struggle between a pro-Russian and a pro-Chinese faction in Hanoi. However, we know very little about the composition of these factions and we can only guess at their relative influence and at the effect which outside events, like the Cultural Revolution in China, has had upon them. Taking into account North Viet-Nameese reactions to recent peace efforts, it would seem that Hanoi is still inclined to follow the Chinese line, although the Soviet leaders have claimed that Chinese opposition to talks runs counter to the declared policy of the North Viet-Nameese Foreign Minister. But recent Chinese statements, which have appeared to build up the South Viet-Nameese National Liberation Front, suggest that the Chinese feel that in case their grip on Hanoi should be loosened they may need to establish an alternative centre of influence in Viet-Nam. In the last resort the hard facts of geography and of the war economy will compel the North Viet-Nameese to stick to a difficult balance between the Chinese and Russians in the foreseeable future. The North Viet-Nameese are heavily dependent on the Russians for supplies especially of sophisticated weapons and other materials but they are equally dependent on the Chinese for supplies of food and war materials. In addition they would find it very difficult to do without the lines of communication controlled by China. Accordingly it is hard to see how the North Viet-Nameese could risk antagonising the Chinese unless they decide it is a mistake to continue with the war and that it would be better to put an end to it even if this meant accepting something like American terms.

THE INDIAN ELECTIONS

13. The two Communist parties (split in 1964 into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese groups) did not gain as large a proportion of the anti-Congress vote as some other parties. The two factions together now form the third largest group in the *Lok Sabha*, whereas in 1962 they were the leading Opposition party. On the other hand in the Kerala State election, the Communists won an outright victory, having fought as a united front; they have formed a government in which the pro-Peking faction is the dominant element. In West Bengal the dissident Congress leader, Ajoy Mukherjee, who fought the election in a united front with the pro-Moscow faction of the Communist Party, has formed a government in which a pro-Peking Communist leader is to hold a key post. But there is no sign of a general reconciliation between the two factions of the Communist Party. Although the Communists did better than anticipated in Bihar, they fared unexpectedly badly in Andhra as a result of their quarrels. After the elections, the two groups are fairly evenly balanced; in the Lower House of the Central Parliament, the Right-wing (pro-Soviet) Group holds 21 seats against 19 won by the Left-wing; in the State assemblies, the Left-wing has the total of 125 seats against the 118 seats of the Right.

CUBA

14. In his anniversary speech on 2 January Castro promised that in future the slogan "All with the Party. All with the Central Committee of the Party" should replace the slogan "All with Fidel". The signs are that the question of autocratic authority versus collective leadership is one of several basic problems which are being discussed internally in Cuba.

15. Externally, over the year that has elapsed since the Tri-continental Conference put out its highly militant resolutions, there is little to show in terms of the advancement of revolution in Latin America or elsewhere. It has not been for want of exhortation that other Latin American countries have failed to follow Cuba's revolutionary example. Nevertheless Latin American Governments generally seem reluctant to deepen the estrangement of Cuba; there was a lukewarm response to a recent Panamanian suggestion that the OAS recognise a Cuban Government in exile.

16. There have been a number of signs that a major formulation of Castro's ideas on Cuban Communism is impending. One was the announcement on 9 February by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the suspension of publication of the régime's official organ, *Cuba Socialista*, pending adoption of decisions of the First Party Congress (due to be held this year) on some "theoretical, strategic and tactical problems of the world revolutionary movement and various problems relating to the construction of Socialism and Communism". Castro's increasingly critical attitude towards Soviet policies also emphasises the need to specify and highlight the Cuban contribution to revolutionary theory and practice. The points likely to be stressed would be:

- (a) the importance of the use of armed force from the start;
- (b) the primacy of moral over material incentives;
- (c) international solidarity between all genuinely revolutionary movements.

(For Castro any resemblances to Chinese theory are purely coincidental. Cuban relations with Peking remain strained.)

17. Cuba cannot afford to be too wayward in practice: she is still economically (and militarily) dependent on the Soviet Union; the signing of the latest Soviet-Cuban trade protocol on 1 February will have been a reminder of this. It is equally true that it would be difficult for the Soviet Union to withdraw support from Castro at present. But Castro is unlikely to moderate his advocacy of more militant tactics and it is symptomatic that the First Latin American Solidarity Conference to be held in Havana from 28 July to 5 August is to have as its master slogan "the duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution".

COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANISATIONS

The Ninth World Youth Festival

18. It has been announced that the festival will be held in Sofia, but it is to be postponed again from 1967 to the summer of 1968. Two earlier attempts to hold the festival in Algiers in 1965 and Accra in 1966 were upset by the overthrow of Ben Bella and Nkrumah respectively. The latest decision may be due to Soviet preoccupation with the 50th Anniversary celebrations in connection with which they are planning a special International Meeting of Youth in Leningrad in August.

Communist "Peace Corps"

19. The Communist countries are showing more interest in trying to compete with the American "Peace Corps" in developing countries. Brezhnev told the Central Committee of the *Komsomol* (Communist youth organisation) on 1 February: "Every Soviet youth, every girl must become a worthy ambassador of the land of the Soviets, a good propagandist of the cause of Communist construction in the USSR". On 24 February it was announced that, at a meeting in Moscow, the International Bureau of Tourism and Youth Exchanges, a subsidiary of the Communist-front World Federation of Democratic Youth, had decided to form an "International Volunteer Youth Service of Solidarity and Friendship", to undertake a number of constructional, educational and other tasks in developing countries.

THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION (AAPSO)

20. The decline in the Chinese following among members of the non-governmental AAPSO has given the Russians an opportunity to consolidate their position. This was demonstrated at the Council Meeting in Nicosia from 13-16 February. The Chinese, having lost support in the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat, were unable to prevent the meeting being held in Nicosia where the Russians ran it more or less as they wished. The Chinese boycotted the meeting, leaving themselves free to disregard its decisions; their supporters either stayed away, walked out or were refused admission. They have made it clear that they do not recognise the decision to hold the Fifth Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference which is due to take place this year in Algiers instead of Peking, and a split in the Organisation, similar to that in the Afro-Asian Writers' Permanent Bureau, seems inevitable. There is a possibility that the pro-Soviet group will draw closer to the World Council of Peace (WCP); several WCP members, including the Secretary-General, attended the AAPSO meeting in Nicosia.

THE SOVIET UNION—INTERNAL

Cultural trends

21. As the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution approaches, official pressure for orthodoxy in the cultural field is intensifying after a period of relative non-intervention. At the end of January a plenary meeting of the USSR Artists' Union was used for a concerted attack on young experimental artists by the Minister of Culture. No explanation was given as to why the moderate First Secretary of the Union, B. V. Ioganson, took no part in the Plenum. Shortly after the meeting an exhibition of Chagall's paintings was stopped at the instigation of local party officials; a week earlier an attempt by a number of young abstract artists to hold a private showing was similarly frustrated.

22. *Pravda* on 27 January sounded the call for discipline in literature with a lengthy article attacking the two leading literary journals, the liberal *Novy Mir* and the more reactionary *Oktyabr*. Although the article appeared to attack both with equal vigour its cutting edge was directed against the liberal camp. *Novy Mir* was criticised for its ideological content, particularly for its treatment of rural life and the Stalin period, whereas the accusations against *Oktyabr* mostly concerned style and form. There has been further evidence of official pressure with the disappearance of two prominent members of *Novy Mir's* editorial board. It is nevertheless significant that the Soviet authorities choose to give an impression of impartiality; they are evidently still reluctant to antagonise the liberals and opinion abroad too far. The awards, announced a few weeks later of the highest Soviet decoration, "Hero of Socialist Labour" to seven senior Soviet writers, including Sholokhov, Fedin and Leonov, seemed to point the moral that orthodoxy and respectability in literature is highly rewarded by the régime.

23. The morale of young intellectuals is a continuing cause of concern to the régimes in Eastern Europe. According to one or two recent reports by Western correspondents, young Soviet writers have received prison sentences, under the laws passed last October banning public criticism of the régime, for taking part in demonstrations or circulating illegal literature. In Czechoslovakia Party Secretary Hendryk, addressing a Plenum of the Central Committee, complained that many people, especially cultural workers, were "motivated by a philosophy opposed to Marxism-Leninism" and stated that "effective" measures must be taken to remedy this state of affairs.

CHINA—INTERNAL

24. Efforts were made by the central authorities to damp down the Cultural Revolution during February. The confusion and economic disruption generated by the campaign appear to have caused serious concern and made it necessary to concentrate on pressing economic tasks such as spring farming.

25. Primary Schools have now resumed classes and, according to poster reports, the Middle Schools are due to return on 1 March. By thus sending back to school those who formed the largest element of the Red Guards, the part played by the latter in the general political scene will be greatly diminished. Orders have also been given that "revolutionary liaison" visits throughout the country are to cease and those who have left the countryside and returned to the cities (ostensibly to take part in revolutionary activities) have been ordered to return to their places of work.

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26. Although the general effect of these new orders is bound to be a falling off of "revolutionary activities" throughout China, it is unlikely that the Cultural Revolution campaign is finished. The agricultural sector of society has hardly been touched and a campaign of sorts may be carried out there later in the year. From present evidence it seems unlikely that the same methods will be used as against the cities and intellectuals during the past nine months.

27. The progress of "revolutionary take-overs" in the provinces has been very slow. So far the only take-overs to be approved officially by Peking are in Heilungkiang (North-East China), Shansi (North China), Kweichow (South-West China), Shantung (East China) and the municipality of Shanghai. There have been local reports of take-overs in other provinces but these have not yet been officially approved by Peking, possibly because there are doubts about how far they have been successful and whether the right people are now in charge. These new organisations will probably carry out the functions of the former party and Government committees, at least until such a time as new provincial party committees and administrative systems are set up. There is no suggestion that the party itself will be destroyed and there is indeed some indication that take-overs may not be necessary in all areas.

28. The situation has probably been aggravated by bickering amongst the various revolutionary groups which are meant to form one part of the take-over body. The standard model laid down by Peking is that take-over groups should consist of a "three-way alliance" between revolutionary mass organisations, revolutionary cadres (*i.e.*, Government and party officials who have not committed really serious errors) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Great emphasis has been placed on the valuable role which can be played by existing cadres, presumably in an attempt to persuade as many as possible to co-operate in the new stage of the campaign.

29. The PLA has continued to play an important part in the campaign. In Peking, public security and police duties are now under the supervision of the PLA, and they appear to have taken over similar functions in Shansi province at the time when the new take-over group was trying to consolidate its position. There have been poster reports that the PLA have been suppressing "true revolutionaries" in areas such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Honan (Central China). These reports have, however, come from aggrieved Red Guards who have naturally condemned the PLA for being anti-Mao. There is not in fact any evidence to suggest that the PLA by acting in this way have been going against explicit orders of Peking; rather it appears that local commanders in sensitive areas may have taken steps on their own initiative to limit the disruptive activities of Red Guards which might very easily provide a focus for dissatisfaction amongst the national minorities.

30. Chou En-lai has continued to play a very prominent moderating role. According to posters he is even quoted as the direct authority for ordering the PLA to take over the management of information offices and local newspapers in Honan province. Although such orders are well within his competence as Prime Minister, it is surprising that the name of the Minister of Defence, Lin Piao, was not associated with them. The fact that Lin Piao himself has not appeared since November and was not present to meet the visiting Albanian Minister of Defence is not necessarily significant, but it is surprising that his name has not even received formal mention in one or two recent articles about the PLA and, in particular, an editorial in the army newspaper (*Liberation Army Daily*) of 24 February emphasising the need for discipline and unity in the army. Although there is not sufficient evidence to reach firm conclusions, it is possible that Lin Piao's influence is on the wane at a time when the Cultural Revolution has entered a more restrained phase.

CHRONOLOGY

February

- 1 Families of Soviet officials leave Peking.
- 2 East German *Neues Deutschland* criticises establishment of diplomatic relations between Rumania and Federal Republic of Germany.
- 2-4 Visit by Tito to Hungary.
- 3-13 Goodwill visit to Soviet Union by Government Delegation from Upper Volta.
- 4 Soviet Note to China on "provocations" in Peking. Rumanian *Scinteia* replies to East German criticism.
- 4-6 Visit by Brezhnev, CPSU General-Secretary, to Prague.
- 6-10 Visit of Rumanian Foreign Minister to Belgium.
- 5-13 Visit by Kosygin, Chairman of Soviet Council of Ministers, to United Kingdom.
- 7 Soviet Note rejects claim by Federal Republic of Germany to sole representation of Germany.
- 8-10 Meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Warsaw.
- 9 Soviet Union abrogates visa abolition agreement with China. Chinese follow suit.
- Soviet Note to China on further "provocations".
- 10 Kosygin refers to Mao's "dictatorship" on British television.
- 10-11 Meeting of World Council of Peace Secretariat in Budapest.
- 11 Anti-Soviet rally in Peking, followed by tailing-off of demonstrations.
- 13 Communiqué of Kosygin's visit to the United Kingdom.
- 13-17 Meeting of Council of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) in Nicosia.
- Visit by Tito to Austria.
- 14- Visit of North Korean Government delegation to Soviet Union.
- 3 Mar. 15 Major anti-Soviet article in Peking *People's Daily*.
- 15-20 Finnish Foreign Minister visits Rumania.
- 16 Major anti-Chinese article in *Pravda*.
- 17 Czech Foreign Minister's visit to Soviet Union.
- 20 "Observer" article in Peking *People's Daily* alleges United States-Soviet conspiracy on Viet-Nam.
- East German régime passes law on "GDR" nationality.
- 21-24 Plenum of Central Committee of Italian Communist Party.
- 21- 28th Meeting of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
- 21 Mar. Executive Committee in Moscow.
- 21-27 Visit by Polish Foreign Minister to United Kingdom.
- 22 Announcement of establishment of four new Soviet Construction Ministries.
- 22-23 Visit of Yugoslav Foreign Minister to Rumania.
- 22-26 Preparatory meeting in Warsaw for Conference of European Communist parties.
- 24 Announcement of establishment of "International Volunteer Youth Service of Solidarity and Friendship".
- 25 Presidium of World Council of Peace meets in Prague.
- 25-27 Visit of Polish Defence Minister to Soviet Union.
- 25- Visit of Kadar (Hungarian Party First Secretary) to Soviet Union.
- 1 Mar. 27- State visit of Emperor of Ethiopia to Soviet Union.
- 2 Mar. 27- Visit of Bulgarian Foreign Minister to Norway.
- 3 Mar. 28- Visit of Czech President to Poland (Czech/Polish Treaty of Friendship signed 1 March).
- 2 Mar.

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9 May, 1967

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, MARCH, 1967*

SUMMARY

Moves to strengthen Warsaw Pact solidarity. (Paragraphs 1-4.)

The Sino-Soviet dispute and Communist Conferences. (Paragraphs 3-6.)

Soviet-Yugoslav relations. (Paragraph 7.)

The Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Cairo. (Paragraph 8.)

Internal events in China. Moves towards greater order. (Paragraphs 9-12.)

Soviet Internal. Election speeches by Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin. (Paragraphs 13-14.)

EASTERN ROUTE

East German moves to offset the effects of the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Rumania have continued with the backing of Poland and the Soviet Union. On 15 and 17 March East Germany signed Treaties of Friendship with Poland and Czechoslovakia respectively. The East German Foreign Minister, Winzer, was in Budapest on 29 and 30 March, discussing the text of the corresponding agreement with Hungary and there is evidence that the Bulgarians will follow suit.

2. The signature of these Treaties serves as an expression of solidarity with East Germany but the permanent effects are doubtful. Several of the East European Governments might like to establish relations with the Federal Republic but, under pressure from Warsaw and Moscow, as well as from East Berlin, are unlikely to hasten to follow the Rumanian example. Ulbricht must thus work to keep the issue of support for the DDR alive. The present Soviet policy of playing up the bogey of West German "revanchism" is a help to him particularly in influencing Czechoslovakia, but these arguments appeal more to the Northern than the Southern countries of the Warsaw Pact and crystallisation of the different attitudes of North and South is always a danger.

3. The renewal of a number of the existing bilateral Treaties of Friendship may be intended to lessen this risk. Poland and Czechoslovakia renewed theirs on 1 March. The Bulgarians, during the visit of Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, to Moscow from 13 to 15 March, agreed to renew theirs with the Soviet Union this year, although the present agreement does not expire until next year.

4. During March intensive discussions took place between the Soviet and other East European leaders. Apparently general agreement was reached on plans for the Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist Parties, except with the Rumanians, who refused to attend.

* The last issue covered the month of February and not March as printed.

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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

5. Tension between China and the Soviet Union continued throughout March. On 1 March the Soviet station "Radio Peace and Progress" began broadcasts to China in standard Chinese, emphasising support for the Chinese people against Mao. Soviet suggestions that resistance to the Cultural Revolution was so powerful that Mao had been forced to compromise with his opponents were replaced towards the end of the month by reports that Mao was imposing military rule throughout China. Other broadcasts accused Mao of oppressing minority groups especially in Sinkiang and broadcasts to Africa claimed that Chinese diplomats had been instructed to encourage the setting up of African Red Guards and violent revolution in Africa. On 11 March the Chinese expelled two members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, and on 18 March two Chinese diplomats were expelled from Moscow in reprisal but demonstrations against the Mission were not renewed and less was heard of the possibility of a rupture in relations.

Communist Conferences

6. The proposed world Communist Conference had not been mentioned in the Soviet Press for some time until, on 27 March, a communiqué was published after a visit to Brezhnev by Arismendi, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uruguay. This stated that conditions for such a conference were ripening—the formula used when the proposal was revived in November 1966. However, the communiqué issued after the visit to Moscow of Longo, First Secretary of the Italian Party, from 27 to 29 March, was less optimistic, stating merely that "much political and organisational preparatory work" would be required. This public acceptance of cautiousness suggests that the CPSU recognises the need for a cautious and flexible approach in view of the even stronger reservations of the other parties. The Russians may be prepared to wait for a long time for the World Conference. The Italo/Soviet communiqué urged all European parties to attend the Conference to be held at Karlovy Vary from 24 to 27 April. During a visit to Bucharest Longo probably tried to persuade the Rumanians to take part in the Conference.

SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

Controversy about the positions of Party and State

7. In a long theoretical article published in *Pravda* on 20 February, Pomelov (joint author in 1958 of a critical article on the Yugoslav Party programme) emphasised the leading and increasingly more important role of a Communist Party in a Socialist society which was becoming ever more complex, and condemned all efforts at restricting that role. The course pursued by the Chinese was openly criticised and, although not named, mention of "diffused ideological leadership" from the "rightist reformist elements" is thought to be an oblique reference to recent Yugoslav developments towards a more limited concept of the party's role in society. The article and a subsequent one in *Pravda* of 27 February stressing the importance of the state were both summarised, without comment, in the Yugoslav Press. The Soviet articles clearly dissociated the Russians from current Yugoslav thinking and were probably intended to discourage possible imitators elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A subsequent speech by Tito in which he defended "democratic centralism" and reaffirmed his faith in Marxism as the basis for the development of Yugoslav socialism was extensively quoted in the Soviet Press and no doubt construed as a gesture in the direction of orthodoxy. But other pronouncements by Yugoslav Party leaders, while denying that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia intends to play a neutral or passive role in society, have confirmed that it will continue its policy of abandoning "command positions" and withdrawal from direct political power.

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO CAIRO

8. Although exchanges of visits between the UAR and the Soviet Union are fairly frequent, the visit by Gromyko to Cairo from 29 March to 1 April was apparently arranged at unusually short notice. There is no firm information about the subjects discussed. The situation in South Arabia was almost certainly covered but was not mentioned in the communiqué, which referred to Viet-Nam, to the unity against imperialism and colonialism, to disarmament and a non-proliferation agreement and to European security. The discussions may also have

dealt with measures to help the UAR tackle their continuing economic crisis. The visit coincided with another by a high level Soviet economic delegation, which apparently did not offer any new measures of economic assistance. It looks as though the Russians are unwilling to give Nasser all the backing he would like for his economic programme or his political ambitions and would prefer him not to prejudice the chances of aid from other sources.

CHINA—INTERNAL

8. The trend towards greater order and control continued throughout March. The main stream of propaganda has clearly been directed towards such important tasks for the economy as completing spring agriculture work and making sure that industry maintains a high level of production.

9. There has however been evidence of cross currents in the leadership. Serious attacks on a number of prominent Vice-Premiers (notably T'an Chen-lin) could have been indirectly aimed at the more moderate elements in the leadership and even at the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, himself. According to an unconfirmed report, a high level party meeting took place during the month at which there was an argument between the advocates of extreme and moderate views. Another report said that the Head of State, Liu Shao-ch'i, had himself been worsted on several occasions at this meeting. Credibility was given to this latter report by the publication on 31 March of an article in *Red Flag* which seemed to mark the opening of an official and direct attack upon the Head of State, who has been under unofficial criticism for some months.

10. While Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta (a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo) and Chiang Ch'ing (Mrs. Mao) have continued to play an active role in public affairs there has been no news of Lin Piao for over two months. However Lin's personal prestige has again been emphasised by the use of the title "Deputy Supreme Commander" and Mao's "Comrade-in-Arms".

11. The army has continued to play an extremely important role. It has administrative capacity and a countrywide chain of command still intact which enables it to work towards sorting out the confusion in the provinces. Despite the importance of the army's role, it appears that the PLA is being used as an instrument by the State organisation rather than vice versa. Editorial comment in the official Press has pointed out that party and Government officials, the majority of whom "are good or relatively good", should provide the core and backbone of the re-organised party and administrative apparatus while the army acts in a supporting role. But the cohesion of the PLA and its existing control of important aspects of works in many provinces has given it a dominant role to play at the moment.

12. The reform of the State administrative structure continues to move very slowly, although a nationwide system of "takeovers" by revolutionary committees may still be the ultimate objective. The replacement of discredited elements in the party and Government apparatus is proving a slow process, complicated by the difficulty of welding together different revolutionary organisations into one cohesive whole. In Peking there have been congresses of Red Guards, workers and former "poor and lower middle" peasants which are presumably aimed at providing the foundation for a single and unified organisation which will form one of the elements of a new revolutionary committee. Elsewhere in China the work is no doubt proceeding just as slowly; but Shansi is an exception: there the establishment of the revolutionary committee has been approved by a mass meeting and the regulations of the Shansi committee suggests that it has taken over the whole range of provincial administration which was previously handled by the People's Council. The organisation also seems to indicate that a separate provincial party organisation is being preserved.

SOVIET INTERNAL—ELECTION SPEECHES

13. Before the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) and eight other republics which were held on 12 March, the senior members of the Politburo made speeches. In Moscow Kosygin and Podgorny spoke in the Bolshoi Theatre and Brezhnev wound up the campaign with a speech in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. The three speeches were all televised, but while Kosygin's and Podgorny's were published

in full only in the local Press, full texts of Brezhnev's speech appeared in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*. Brezhnev is thus obviously treated as *primus inter pares*.

14. In discussing internal affairs all three leaders acknowledged shortages of consumer goods and admitted that the housing situation was still very unsatisfactory but promised that new measures were in hand to rectify both of these problems. Kosygin spoke at some length about the progress of the economic reforms but avoided taking any position on the more debatable issues; he was careful to ascribe credit to both party and Government and gave the party specific credit for the improvement in agricultural performance. Brezhnev said nothing at all about the reforms while Podgorny mentioned them only in passing. Brezhnev was the only leader to say anything substantial on ideology and the arts; he took a conservative line. The most noteworthy point in the published summaries of the speeches of the other members of the Politburo was Polyansky's criticism of certain comrades who wish to reduce investment in agriculture after last year's good harvest. This undoubtedly reflected continuing argument over the allocation of resources.

10. While Chen En-lai, Chen Po-ta, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and Chang Ching (Mrs Mao) have continued to play an active role in public affairs there has been no news of Lin Biao for over two months. However Lin's personal prestige has again been emphasized by the use of the title "Deputy Supreme Commander" and Mao's "Comrade-in-Arms".

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CHRONOLOGY

March

- 1 "Radio Peace and Progress" starts broadcasts in standard Chinese.
- 1 Polish-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation signed.
- 1 Soviet-North Korean agreements on economic, scientific and technical co-operation.
- 2 Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia visits Czechoslovakia.
- 6 Chinese Government statement on dismissal of Chinese staff by Soviet Embassy.
- 6 Chinese Note to Soviet Government on incident at border railway station.
- 7-8 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev visits Hungary.
- 8-9 First Secretary Gomulka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz of Poland visit Hungary.
- 10 Stalin's daughter defects.
- 10 Expulsion of two Soviet diplomats from China.
- 12 Elections in RSFSR.
- 13-15 First Secretary Zhivkov of Bulgaria visits Soviet Union.
- 14-21 Chancellor Klaus of Austria visits Soviet Union.
- 14 Renewed demonstrations in Peking.
- 14 Decree on five-day working week in Soviet Union.
- 15 Polish-East German Treaty of Friendship signed.
- 16-17 Ulbricht visits Czechoslovakia.
- 17-18 First Secretary Ceaușescu and Prime Minister Maurer of Rumania visit Soviet Union.
- 17 East German-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship signed.
- 18 Expulsion of two Chinese diplomats from Soviet Union.
- 19 General and local government elections in Hungary.
- 21 Ulbricht visits Soviet Union.
- 23 Plenum of Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party.
- 25-29 First Secretary of Uruguayan Communist Party visits Soviet Union.
- 25-29 Third Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Beirut (pro-Soviet faction).
- 26-28 Plenum of Central Committee of Rumanian Communist Party.
- 27 Red Guards hold up Soviet diplomats in car for six hours.
- 27-29 General Secretary of Italian Communist Party visits Soviet Union.
- 28- East German Minister of Defence visits Yugoslavia.
- 3 April
- 29-30 East German Foreign Minister Winzer visits Hungary.
- 29- Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits Cairo.
- 1 April
- 31 Death of Soviet Defence Minister Malinovsky.
- 31 Soviet-North Viet-Nameese Plan for Scientific and Cultural Co-operation signed.
- 31 Peking *Red Flag* article attacking Liu Shao-chi (not by name).