



# Communist Policy and Tactics 1968 – 1, fyrri hluti

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Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS, JANUARY 1968

SUMMARY

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Soviet policy combines caution and a continuing rigidity towards the United States, although practical co-operation with the latter, e.g., over the non-proliferation treaty, is not excluded. (Paragraphs 1-5.)

WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

Among the difficulties of organising the consultative meeting are the continuing hesitation of a number of parties and disagreement over the agenda of the main conference and over the possible participation of non-Communist Left-wing movements. Over-representation of European parties in the sponsoring group is causing concern and a smooth passage for the Russians is unlikely at Budapest. (Paragraphs 6-14.)

CONFERENCE OF MEDITERRANEAN "PROGRESSIVE FORCES"

A conference of "progressive parties" and movements of the Mediterranean Basin is to be held in March or April. The Italian and Yugoslav parties are the main sponsors. They opposed the participation of the Soviet Union and other Black Sea Powers. The Russians are probably annoyed at the Yugoslav tendency to equate the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean with that of the United States. (Paragraphs 15-16.)

GERMANY AND BERLIN

The Soviet line on Germany is tough but their *démarche* to the Federal Government criticising governmental links between West Berlin and Bonn does not suggest a desire to start a new crisis. They are probably more interested in pacifying Ulbricht. (Paragraphs 17-18.)

MR. KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO INDIA

This went off smoothly. The Russians probably pressed the Indians on the need to maintain an anti-imperialist line, to repair relations with Pakistan and to accept a non-proliferation agreement. (Paragraph 19.)

THE CUBAN ANTI-PARTY GROUP

The party and judicial measures against a "micro-faction" led by Escalante suggest that there was a conspiracy against Castro involving criticism of all his basic policies. The group made contacts with representatives of some Communist countries, including the Soviet Union. The affair shows Cuban readiness to attack other "Socialist" countries publicly on the governmental plane. Soviet patience must be wearing thin but they are not in a good position to put direct pressure on Castro. (Paragraphs 20-25.)

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## THE " PUEBLO " INCIDENT

Although no progress has been made so far the North Koreans may be ready eventually to settle the incident. The Soviet Union seem to wish to avoid getting involved but are happy to see the United States embarrassed. The Chinese reaction, though correct, reflects their bad relations with North Korea. The North Viet-Nameese supported Pyongyang more strongly. (Paragraphs 26-29.)

## CHINESE EXTERNAL RELATIONS

The Chinese are making efforts to normalise some aspects of their relations with foreign countries. (Paragraph 30.)

## CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Disputes between rival factions have worsened although some new Revolutionary Committees have been established. There is apparently rivalry for membership of the new organs of control, but there is no evidence of a serious split in the leadership. Mao's wife and Ch'en Po-ta have reappeared in public. A party congress is probably planned for the summer. (Paragraphs 31-33.)

## SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The trial of four intellectuals in Moscow has caused protests in the Soviet Union and abroad. The authorities have tried to discredit the group by linking it with an *émigré* organisation. (Paragraphs 34-35.)

## SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

During January the Soviet leaders continued to show caution and a wish to avoid becoming involved in crises. This impression of their current mood was confirmed during the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow. Soviet willingness to continue practical bilateral co-operation was combined with a reluctance to give ground on major international issues. The Soviet Press has continued to insist loudly that Britain, and other West European countries, need to cut loose from the United States.

2. The Russian attitude to the United States remains hard. There has been no appreciable shift in their stand on Viet-Nam and Mr. Kosygin was at pains during his visit to India to stress how great an obstacle the Viet-Nameese war was to an improvement in Soviet/United States relations. Equally, Soviet propaganda against the United States has continued to be very tough. A theme which has received increasing attention has been the danger of United States domination of Western Europe; the measures of economic retrenchment announced by President Johnson at the beginning of the month have been played up in order to stress the dangers to Western Europe of having too strong links with the United States, and the same point has also been linked with evident satisfaction at the French veto on negotiations for British entry to the EEC.

3. On the other hand Soviet reluctance to avoid involvement in crises has been evident over the *Pueblo* and the Russians have also appeared to wish to avoid raising the temperature over Berlin. It has been notable that more Soviet propaganda mileage has been made out of the crash of the United States nuclear bomber off Greenland than out of the *Pueblo* affair.

4. Despite Kosygin's remarks about obstacles to Soviet/United States co-operation, the tabling at Geneva of the full agreed draft for a non-proliferation treaty showed the pragmatic readiness of the Soviet leadership to act with the United States where their own interest seems to demand this.

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5. The relaxation of the Cultural Revolution in China, without prompting any moves on either side towards even a slight improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, has contributed to a slackening of mutual polemics. These can, however, be expected to be revived, at least on the Chinese side, with the approach of the consultative meeting for an international Communist conference.

#### WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

6. Cuba's announcement that she would not take part in the Budapest consultative meeting and her attempt to implicate the Soviet Union in the activities of the "micro-faction" expelled from the Cuban Communist Party must have added to the organisers' difficulties. The Hungarians, who have sent out the invitations, admit that preparations are not easy and that absentees are expected.

7. Nevertheless, the sponsors seem determined to hold the meeting. For the Russians, the continuing isolation of the Chinese makes an early date attractive. The Soviet leaders, especially Brezhnev, are personally committed to the project. The organisers claim that the overwhelming majority of the Communist parties intend to send their representatives to Budapest, though at the end of the month only 31 could be traced as having stated publicly that they would do so.

8. North Korea and North Viet-Nam have not made their intentions known but must be regarded as very unlikely starters. Yugoslavia is not coming to Budapest; she was not among the 81 participants of the 1960 conference to whom the invitations were addressed. The French party suggested however that Yugoslavia should be invited to the world conference and this may be proposed at Budapest. The Rumanians who had been among the main doubters announced in February that they would attend the consultative meeting. However they stipulated a number of candidates which emphasised their insistence on the sovereign independence of national parties.

9. All parties agree that the Budapest meeting will discuss the conference's "scope and agenda, the preparation of necessary documents, the venue and date". According to the Soviet Union, the participants will decide jointly and on an equal basis, all "political and organisational questions" relating to the conference. There is disagreement between those who regard the decision to hold a conference as having been taken and those who think that the decision whether to hold it or not should be taken at Budapest.

10. Meanwhile, there is also controversy over the procedure and agenda of the main conference and over the participation of non-Communist Left-wing parties and movements. On procedure the more independent Communist parties insist that all are equal; that their autonomy should be safeguarded; that no party be excommunicated; that discussions should not be held on previously prepared documents and that those issued by the conference should not be binding; that no centre for the Communist movement be established and that no party should aspire to hegemony.

11. On the agenda, all agree that the main item should be united action in the struggle against imperialism, and it is on this restricted basis that doubting parties (for example the British, the Italian and up to a point the French) have agreed to support the conference. The Russians have made it clear that they would prefer a wider agenda covering questions of the building of Communism, world peace and security and Communist strategy and tactics in developed and developing countries. Nevertheless the Hungarian acknowledgment that "a more limited agenda" would be better may represent an indirect Soviet concession.

12. The Italians and the Yugoslavs want non-Communist "progressives" to take part in the conference and the French Communist Party has suggested that they should come as observers. The Russian view however seems to be against this, on the grounds that Communist unity is an essential pre-condition of the broader anti-imperialist front.

13. The Soviet Union has represented the international conference as a legitimate continuation of those held in 1957 and 1960; but the Japanese Communist Party has questioned the validity of the sponsoring body of 18 parties and of their appeal to convene the present conference. The 18 sponsors were



members of the organising committee of 26 parties for the 1960 conference. The Committee's membership dropped to 19 when the pro-Chinese parties and Rumania refused to take part in the March 1965 meeting which decided how a new conference should be convened. It has now been reduced further to 18 by Cuba's defection. The 1965 statement, as the Japanese point out, was approved by only half the Socialist countries. It is hardly surprising that this matter should have been raised by a non-European party, as the sponsoring body is heavily weighted in favour of the European Communist parties and is dominated by the Soviet Union and its immediate allies. The Japanese party are now reported to have decided not to attend the Budapest meeting.

14. Against this background, the organisers cannot hope for a smooth passage at Budapest. The Rumanian attendance may well lead to more rather than less friction.

#### CONFERENCE OF MEDITERRANEAN "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES

15. A conference of the "progressive" parties and movements of the Mediterranean Basin is to be held in Italy at the end of March or beginning of April. Its hosts will be the Italian Communist Party and the splinter Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). This decision was taken at a consultative meeting in Rome on 22-23 January at which Algeria, Syria, the UAR and Yugoslavia were represented by their ruling parties or fronts. Cyprus, Greece, France, Morocco, Spain and Turkey were represented by Communist Parties or extreme Left-wing fronts or movements. The meeting discussed Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, the *coup d'état* in Greece, the Cyprus crisis and NATO activity in the area, events which allegedly stemmed from the "aggressiveness of American imperialism". The conference is to co-ordinate the anti-imperialist struggle in the area "with the aim of transforming the Mediterranean into a zone of peace".

16. The Rome meeting followed a series of smaller gatherings, held in Bologna, Algiers and Belgrade during 1967. The intention to set up a Mediterranean front is not new, although previous attempts to do so were made under the auspices of the international front organisations. The proceedings of the Rome meeting were not reported but Italian and Yugoslav Press comment suggests disagreement on whether the Soviet Union and other Communist Black Sea Powers should take part, and on whether the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean was compatible with its transformation into a zone of peace. On the first count, those opposed to Soviet participation, probably the Italians and the Yugoslavs, won their point as the communiqué suggested that participation at the conference should be confined to those who took part in the Rome meeting. On the second count, Yugoslav insistence that the Mediterranean should be neutralised through the withdrawal of all foreign fleets and forces, including United States and Soviet, found no support among the Arabs and Italians. The Russians may take some comfort from this, but they must regard the meeting as a deliberate demonstration by the Yugoslavs and the Italians on how international "progressive" meetings should be organised and must also be irritated at the Yugoslav tendency to equate the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean with that of the United States. The Soviet Press has not so far reported the Rome meeting.

#### GERMANY AND BERLIN

17. The Soviet leaders appear to have decided that, for the moment at any rate, their interests demand a continuation of the relatively tough line towards the Federal Republic. Especially in the context of attacks on the alleged resurgence of Nazism, they have stressed the need for the observation of the Potsdam agreements. Further evidence of the hard line was provided by the Soviet *démarche* of 6 January to the Federal Government which criticised the maintenance of governmental links between West Berlin and Bonn such as visits by Federal Ministers, Bundestag Committee Meetings, &c.

18. The circumstantial evidence suggests that the Russians do not intend to work this issue up into a new Berlin crisis. They have given their *démarche* in Bonn no publicity and did not accompany it with parallel representations to the three allied Powers. The Russians appear to be somewhat preoccupied by the problem of handling Ulbricht. It seems probable that the *démarché* is a



continuation of the exercise to reassure him and that it was intended to discourage the Federal German Government from "provocative" actions in West Berlin which in turn might make it more difficult for the Russians to restrain the East Germans. The Russians may be afraid that the latter might try to take more positive steps to assert their alleged authority over West Berlin, possibly in connection with the proposed new Constitution for the "DDR". The Soviet Government could of course force Ulbricht to abandon any such measures if it wished, but it would presumably prefer persuasion. But at all events this development, together with a continuation of heavy Soviet propaganda against West Germany on a wide range of issues including alleged support for nuclear weapon development in Israel, suggests that little is likely to come of the interest which the Russians had appeared to be showing in pursuing a diplomatic "dialogue" with the Federal Government on the subject of exchanging declarations renouncing the use of force. Nor is there any evidence that the Russians are contemplating a "bargain" involving Soviet toleration of a measure of success in Eastern Europe for the West German "Ostpolitik" in return for a reduction in Federal activities in West Berlin. It is probable too that the agreement between the Federal Republic and Yugoslavia will result in continued pressure by the East German authorities for a tough Soviet line towards Bonn.

#### MR. KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO INDIA

19. Mr. Kosygin visited India from 25-31 January. The visit had been broached some weeks beforehand when the Indian Press reported that it was expected to last 10-12 days. In the event, it was confirmed by the Russians to the Indians only a few days beforehand and lasted six days, thus lending some weight to Indian speculation that the question of a visit had become embarrassing to the Russians on account of the position of the Communist parties in West Bengal and other states, and the strains in relations between the Congress Party and the pro-Soviet faction of the Communist Party of India. The visit, however, passed off smoothly. Discussions covered economic aid and trade, India's relations with Pakistan, the non-proliferation agreement, Viet-Nam and Cambodia. References in the communiqué to the urgent need for a non-proliferation agreement and for an all-European security system were probably inserted at Soviet insistence. In public, Mr. Kosygin rather obviously linked closer co-operation in economic planning and increased trade between the two countries with India's maintenance of a policy of anti-colonialism, non-alignment and co-existence. Soviet interest in peace and stability in the sub-continent was brought out in the stress which Mr. Kosygin laid on the need for the settlement of differences between India and Pakistan and the implementation of the Tashkent agreement.

#### THE CUBAN ANTI-PARTY GROUP

20. A meeting of the Cuban Central Committee on 24-26 January, specially convened to consider the anti-party activities of a "micro-faction" headed by Anibal Escalante, expelled two members of the Central Committee and deprived a total of nine of the accused of party membership. Subsequently Escalante and 34 other accused were tried before the Havana Revolutionary Court from 27 January to 1 February, as a result of which they received sentences varying from 2 to 15 years' imprisonment. The cases of two Cubans who had been members of the armed forces were referred to a military court. One other was placed under house arrest. Six of the 43 implicated have yet to be accounted for. The three main speakers in the Central Committee were Raul Castro, Carlos Rafael and Castro himself. The first two speeches and the Attorney-General's indictment provide the main sources of the accusations against the accused as well as their alleged statements and those of their foreign contacts.

21. Although the non-publication of Castro's speech, the haphazard presentation of circumstantial facts in the speeches that have been released, and the not unnatural absence of comment from those who have not been in the dock, *i.e.*, Soviet, Czech and East German nationals (see below), mean that no comprehensive analysis can yet be made, the limited evidence available so far suggests that there was an intended conspiracy against Castro. The latter has chosen to use the opportunity to arraign the Soviet Union. The label "micro-faction", however numerically appropriate, is deliberately misleading. Escalante



and his associates are shown to have operated within a number of key Ministries and other official bodies. This carries more weight than the disclaimer that the micro-faction was not representative of the Communist old-guard party, the Partido Socialista Populár. Moreover the Group appears to have developed various foreign contacts, which their accusers claimed to have resulted in the strengthening of anti-Cuban attitudes abroad. Those publicly named include a senior departmental official of the Czech Central Committee, visiting GDR officials and a member of the GDR Embassy, Soviet Press correspondents, a senior Soviet Adviser of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, and a Second Secretary in the Soviet Embassy who left Cuba in August 1967.

22. The evidence is contradictory on what action was contemplated by the group against Castro's régime. However, they clearly proselytised Soviet and other officials; they sent or sought to send denunciations of the régime to other Communist countries; and they circulated copies of Communist articles critical of Castro's policies.

23. Taken altogether, the opposition views attributed to the group represent criticism of all of Castro's policies: encouragement of the guerilla struggle; the economic position; trade union policy; the attitude to the Soviet Union; leadership questions; moral incentives and the make-up of the party. While Castro evidently intended the trial as an act of defiance and a warning to those who hold such views, some of the disclosures might well prompt questions embarrassing to the régime. In the long run, it cannot help Castro to publicise in this way criticisms directed both at the conduct of Government and party affairs and at himself personally, for instance that Fidel wanted to outdo Marx and thought that Cuba was the navel of the world.

24. The most damaging charge attributed to the opposition is that the hard currency contributed by the Soviet Union to Cuba is being used to finance the promotion of an anti-Soviet line within Latin American Communist parties. This emphasises that the question of Cuban-Soviet relations is at the root of the affair. One immediate sequel has been the notification of Cuba's refusal to attend the consultative meeting for an international Communist conference. But more important than this is the evidence that the Cubans are now ready publicly to attack other "Socialist" countries, on the governmental as well as the ideological plane, and to impute to at least some representatives of the Soviet Union the desire to keep the whip hand over Cuba. For example the attitude of Soviet advisers to the Ministry of the Interior was strongly criticised, and a Soviet diplomat was alleged to have maintained that the Soviet Union could withhold oil supplies as it wished. On the other hand the allegations also provide evidence (admittedly second hand) that different views are held within the Soviet Union as to how to deal with Cuba (a remark attributed to the *Izvestia* correspondent in Havana). Moreover, the Soviet Union still cannot afford to be seen putting economic or other direct pressure on Castro and can certainly not rely on Castro to keep quiet about it. In these circumstances Castro is in a better position to answer back. Nevertheless Soviet patience must be wearing thin although there has so far been no reaction from Moscow to the latest events.

25. To the extent that the activities of this group and Castro's counter-measures have taken place over a period of time, the affair is less a matter of instant counter-revolution than one of political jousting. On the other hand if there is now to be no scope for criticism of the régime's policies—and the anxiety of Castro's subordinates to spell out the limitations to democratic discussion suggest that this is the case—the affair may open the eyes of future opponents of Castro to the need to be more conspiratorial and to rely less on appeals to the Soviet Union to intervene.

#### THE "PUEBLO" INCIDENT

##### *North Korea*

26. The North Koreans exploited the incident to the maximum for propaganda purposes but have not sought an international forum in which to put their case. They have made it quite clear that they do not wish the United Nations to be involved and took the initiative in proposing direct talks with the Americans at Panmunjon. No progress has been made so far. It looks as if the North Koreans are trying to extract some admission of guilt from the Americans. They



have produced no hard evidence that the vessel was in territorial waters, except the alleged "confessions" of the five members of the crew. North Korean motives in seizing the vessel remain unclear though it does not seem to have been part of a "grand design" co-ordinated with the attempt on the Presidential Palace in Seoul, and the North Viet-Nam activities in South Viet-Nam. Nor does it seem to have been co-ordinated in any way with either the Soviet Union or China. North Korean handling of the incident so far suggests that they have some interest in settling it, and may in the end be willing to release the crew in exchange for some, as yet unspecified, *quid pro quo*.

#### *Soviet Union*

27. Apart from predictable support for North Korea in the United Nations, the Soviet Union has played the incident in a low key, typified by Mr. Kosygin's remarks in India when he said the dispute should be regarded as one of territorial waters. It is clearly in Soviet interest to avoid any reopening of hostilities in Korea, when North Korea might invoke their assistance under the treaty of 1961. Assuming this can be avoided, the Soviet Union will be happy to see the Americans embarrassed and their relations with South Korea strained.

#### *China*

28. The Chinese came out in full support of North Korea in a Government statement of 20 January, linking the incident to the American position in Viet-Nam. The statement was correct rather than enthusiastic and did not commit the Chinese to any action, even in general terms, thus reflecting the poor state of relations between China and North Korea. The Chinese will probably watch the Soviet line carefully for opportunities to accuse them of "collusion" with the United States.

#### *North Viet-Nam*

29. The North Viet-Nameese official statement of 29 January was predictably warmer in tone than that of the Chinese. The South Viet-Nam Liberation Front Military Commission also sent a message of support to the North Korean Defence Minister on 26 January, while on 30 January the South Viet-Nam Liberation Front issued a statement denying the right of the United Nations to intervene in the affair, and pledged support for North Korea through increased efforts against the Americans in Viet-Nam.

#### CHINESE EXTERNAL RELATIONS

30. Following Chen Yi's resumption of his official duties as Foreign Minister in December, there have been further indications that the Chinese Government now wish to forget recent excesses of revolutionary diplomacy and to normalise some aspects of their relations with foreign countries. Preparations are being made to send back to some Western countries Chinese students who returned home early in 1967, and efforts are being made to speed up the negotiations of annual trade agreements. Other senior Foreign Ministry officials, who were severely criticised by extremist groups within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1967, are undertaking official duties again.

#### CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

31. Newspapers in many areas of China devoted much attention to the danger of factionalism, suggesting that struggle between rival revolutionary organisations had again reached serious proportions. Certain provincial newspapers noted also the resurgence of "economism"—an expression used to describe workers' demands for material benefits. However, some progress in restoring order and control was apparently made in the three provinces of Kiangsi, Kansu and Honan, where Revolutionary Committees were established.

32. One reason for the continued factional struggles may be competition among revolutionary groups for representation in the "alliance" organs which are currently being formed at all levels. The armed forces have been reminded that they should follow the policy of "supporting the Left but not any particular faction" and that they should seek to impose unity on the revolutionaries by persuasion rather than by forceful intervention. In these circumstances, the



persistence of local disorders is not surprising, but it may also in part be due to the belief of some revolutionaries that they have the support of extremists in the leadership. While there may be different opinions among the leaders about how to proceed at the present stage of the Cultural Revolution, there has been no evidence of a serious split, and equally no indication that extremist members are actively encouraging disorders.

33. After an absence from public view for over seven weeks, Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's wife) reappeared, as also did Ch'en Po-ta, amid rumours that they had recently visited the North-East. Mao and Lin Piao have continued to make occasional public appearances. Several recent reports suggest that the leaders hope to make speedy progress with the formation of further Revolutionary Committees and with reconstructing the Communist Party. A recently received report of a speech by Hsieh Fu-chih (Chairman of the Peking Revolutionary Committee) suggested that the leaders intend to hold a Party Congress in the coming summer; numerous delegates would apparently be appointed by the central authorities rather than elected in accordance with the Party Constitution, and would have the task of approving a new Constitution embodying Mao's Thought.

#### SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

34. On 8 January four young intellectuals were finally brought to trial in Moscow on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda after nearly a year's detention (contrary to Soviet law). Ginzburg and Galanskov, who pleaded not guilty, were sentenced to five and seven years respectively. The trial, which was held before a picked audience, provoked a further wave of protests in the Soviet Union and abroad. Dr. Litvinov and Mrs. Daniel openly handed a protest to Western journalists outside the courtroom; 31 Soviet intellectuals signed an appeal for more public information about the case, and Ginzburg's mother and Galanskov's wife attempted to give a Press conference, which the Soviet Foreign Ministry and police prevented Western journalists from attending.

35. The trial was not reported in the Soviet Press, except for a brief announcement of the sentences in the Moscow evening paper. Subsequently, the Press and Soviet officials have sought to discredit the group by concentrating on their alleged contacts with the *émigré* organisation NTS and asserting that they are not "writers" as claimed in the West, but traitors with criminal records.



## CHRONOLOGY

31 Dec. New year address by Ulbricht.

## January

- 3-5 Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Plenum.  
Rumanian President, Ceausescu, visits Yugoslavia.
- 4 Soviet protest to United States Government on bombing of Soviet merchant ship in Haiphong.
- 4-12 International Cultural Conference in Havana.
- 4-22 Afghan economic delegation visits Soviet Union.
- 5 Kiangsi Revolutionary Committee established.  
Czechoslovak protest to Allied Powers on alleged growth of neo-Nazism in Federal Republic of Germany.  
Novotny resigns as First Secretary of Czechoslovak Communist Party—replaced by Dubcek.  
Anglo-Soviet Claims Agreement signed.
- 6 Soviet Ambassador in Bonn presents Note protesting at Federal German activities in West Berlin.  
*Izvestia* publishes Mongolian article accusing China of designs on Mongolian territory.
- 7-13 Soviet First Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, Mazurov, visits UAR.
- 7-10 President Tito visits Afghanistan.
- 8-13 Yugoslav Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visit Italy.
- 8-11 French Finance Minister visits Soviet Union for meeting of Franco-Soviet Grande Commission.
- 8-12 Trial of Galanskov and other Soviet intellectuals.
- 9 CPSU accepts invitation to attend consultative meeting for world Communist conference.
- 10 Soviet economic delegation visits Jordan.
- 10-17 President Tito visits Pakistan.
- 12-14 Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny visit Poland.
- 12-27 Sudanese Defence Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 14 Chinese *People's Daily* welcomes start of armed struggle in Indonesia.
- 15-16 Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny visit East Berlin.
- 15 Mongolian protest to China about treatment of delegation in transit to North Viet-Nam.
- 16-20 Soviet Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers, Kirillin, visits Britain.
- 16 Interview in Paris by representative of North Viet-Nam, Mai Van Bo.
- 17-22 President Tito visits Cambodia.
- 18 Yugoslav party newspaper *Kommunist* says Yugoslavia will not attend Budapest consultative meeting.  
East German Press reports that SVNLF representative in East Berlin to have diplomatic status.  
Soviet statement to United States on concern over developments in Indo-China.  
Full draft non-proliferation agreement tabled in Geneva by Soviet Union and United States.  
West Berlin Governing Mayor dines with Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin.
- 19 Soviet authorities prevent Western correspondents attending Press conference by relatives of condemned writers.  
Announcement of resumption of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and Colombia.



## January

- 19-20 Rumanian party delegation visits Hungary.  
 20 Wuhan Municipal Revolutionary Committee established.  
 Resumption of Soviet-Colombian diplomatic relations.
- 22-24 British Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.  
 22 United States Ambassador in Moscow calls on Kosygin.  
 22-23 Consultative meeting for conference of Mediterranean "progressive forces".
- 22-27 President Tito visits India.  
 22-24 Rumanian Prime Minister visits Italy and sees Pope.  
 23 North Koreans capture USS *Pueblo*.  
 Chinese protest to Burma against expulsion of news agency staff.  
 23- Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister visits Britain.
- 3 Feb.  
 23- Soviet Minister of Education visits Britain.
- 2 Feb.  
 23-31 Polish party delegation visits Japan.  
 24-26 Emergency meeting of Cuban Party Central Committee.  
 24-31 Chad Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.  
 24 Chinese *People's Daily* attacks draft non-proliferation treaty.  
 25 Kansu Revolutionary Committee established.
- 25-31 Kosygin visits India.  
 26 United Nations Security Council debate on *Pueblo*.  
 27 Honan Revolutionary Committee established.  
 27- President Tito visits Ethiopia.
- 4 Feb.  
 28 Chinese Government statement backs North Korea on *Pueblo*.  
 Bulgarian Prime Minister's visit to Cuba postponed.  
 29 Soviet warships visit Yugoslav port.  
 29-30 Czechoslovak Party First Secretary, Dubcek, visits Soviet Union.  
 29 Soviet statement criticises Japanese Government's support for United States over Viet-Nam.  
 30- Rumanian party delegation visits North Korea.
- 4 Feb.  
 30 Viet Cong attacks on South Viet-Nameese cities.  
 CPSU delegation visits Japan for talks with JCP.
- 31- Kosygin visits Afghanistan.
- 1 Feb.  
 31 Re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Federal Republic of Germany.  
 Ulbricht proposes new "DDR" Constitution to Volkskammer.  
 China and People's Republic of Southern Yemen agree to establish diplomatic relations.



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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

FEBRUARY 1968

SUMMARY

COMMUNIST PARTIES' CONSULTATIVE MEETING AT BUDAPEST (26 FEBRUARY TO 5 MARCH).

The Russians achieved a superficial success in the agreement that an international conference should be held in Moscow at the end of the year. But they did this by adopting a tough line which led to the Rumanian walk-out and must have aroused serious misgivings by other parties. Apart from the Rumanians, the positions of the East European parties varied considerably, which may add to strains in the Warsaw Pact. Generally the Russians are working for a narrower, but more cohesive movement attuned to Soviet national interests. The Chinese have not yet commented.

VIETNAM

The Russians have followed the North Vietnamese line on the question of talks. They show no inclination to press Hanoi to meet essential American points. The Vietnamese show no signs of making concessions after the Tet offensive. The Chinese concentrate on the need for a protracted struggle.

COMMUNIST POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Nothing has come of President Tito's revived plan for an Arab/Israeli settlement. The Russians are acting cautiously on this issue, as over south-west Arabia where they are not in a hurry to commit themselves to help the Southern Yemen.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

The Soviet Union has over the past year stepped up its policy of extending relations with Latin American governments, supported by the East European countries. This includes a sharp rise in the proportion of Soviet aid destined for Latin America and an increase of cultural and trade links.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The scandal aroused by General Sejna's defection seems bound to snowball. Novotny's own position is under attack. Pressures for further democratisation are building up. However a more independent Czechoslovak foreign policy is unlikely to develop quickly.

SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ideological Problems

The Soviet leaders are showing increasing concern at the assertion of liberal ideas and at protests against restrictions on freedom. This movement is however part of a long-term process.

/Agriculture



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Agriculture

There are still apparently differences in the leadership on agricultural investment. The problem will be aired again at the next Central Committee Plenum.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Efforts to restore discipline continue, although still using mainly persuasion and indoctrination. Differences between local revolutionary groups continue. New peasant organisations are being formed. Another member of the Party Cultural Revolution Group is under attack. The central leadership of Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai still seems united.

15 March 1968



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COMMUNIST PARTIES' CONSULTATIVE MEETING AT  
BUDAPEST (26 FEBRUARY TO 5 MARCH)

The main feature was the low common denominator of agreement between the delegates, exemplified by the tough line adopted by the Soviet delegation and the sharp Rumanian reaction leading to their walk-out from the Conference. The meeting demonstrated the changes in the Communist Movement since the previous gathering in Moscow in 1960. In contrast to 81 delegations then, 63 full delegations were represented at Budapest, plus observers and representatives of unofficial parties which brought the total up to 67. Apart from the absence of the Chinese and their supporters, the meeting was boycotted by most Asian parties and by the Cubans, i.e. by the proponents of a tougher line towards the United States. The Yugoslavs were not invited. The final communiqué was on the face of it a successful outcome from the Soviet point of view although it certainly did not meet all their demands. It announced that an international Communist conference would be convened in Moscow in November or December 1968 to discuss "the tasks of the struggle against imperialism" and "united action by Communists and all anti-imperialist forces." A preparatory commission has been set up for the period preceding the conference in which all parties supporting the scheme can take part. Its task is to examine proposals and draft documents to be submitted to the conference. Its first meeting will be in Budapest on 24 April.

Soviet Line

From the start of the meeting the Russians presented an uncompromising list of requirements which contrasted with their apparently relatively conciliatory attitude immediately beforehand. It was evident from the content of the speeches that they had agreed these in advance with the East Germans and Poles. The Soviet delegate, Suslov, gave little away to the defenders of the sovereignty of national communist parties. He used the theme of the need to oppose the aggressive designs of imperialism (on which he could count on general support at the meeting) to argue that there must be a real closing of ranks in the Communist Movement, and he repeatedly urged the need to agree on a common line of action. He maintained that the international conference should agree on a single document which, while not repeating fully the ideas of the statements of 1957 and 1960, should nevertheless by implication be in the same tradition. He made a strong attack upon "the Mao Tse-tung group", whose refusal to attend the Budapest meeting he saw as an act of defiance to the Movement. He opposed the idea of including non-Communist progressive movements in the World Communist Conference although he agreed that these could attend a subsequent meeting.

Rumanian Reaction

The Rumanians can have had few illusions about ultimate Soviet aims but the blatant Soviet attitude must have contrasted with whatever assurances they had received before the meeting. By the third day Ceausescu had probably decided that there was little point in keeping his delegation in Budapest. The incident sparked off by the Syrian representative's attack on the Rumanians over their policy on Israel was rather the occasion for the Rumanian walk-out than its fundamental cause. By sending to the Rumanian delegation instructions to take a completely uncompromising line, after an apparent settlement had been achieved, Ceausescu was obviously challenging the meeting either to repudiate the Soviet line or to submit the movement to a public row. The subsequent Rumanian statements and the communiqué issued in Bucharest made it quite clear that their objections extended beyond the issue of the criticism of fraternal parties to the whole conduct of the meeting.

/Attitude

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Attitude of Other Parties

The Rumanian decision was probably influenced by early disappointment at the lack of support which they received from other delegations. It became clear that the Italians and other moderate "independents" were not prepared to go the whole hog in opposing the Soviet line. Nevertheless, there must be many parties who condemned the Rumanian action but to whom the Soviet aims are thoroughly objectionable. Indeed there appears to have been a good deal of bargaining before the final communiqué was issued at Budapest. The Russians seem to have had to accept a narrower agenda than they wanted, probably on the insistence of the French, the British and some other Parties. In return for this they seem to have got their way to some extent, on their demand that the Conference should proceed on the basis of previously drafted documents. But it is likely that there will be considerable scope for further argument at the sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the Moscow Conference.

Eastern Europe and Soviet Aims

A major part of the interest of the Conference lay in the differing attitudes of the East European countries. The hard-core of the Soviet support lay with the East Germans, Poles and Bulgarians, who for various reasons not only followed the Russian line but threw in the additional theme of the need to make loyalty to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Party a guideline for the Communist Movement. The Hungarians and Czechoslovaks were much more flexible. Although the latter regretted Rumania's withdrawal, they showed much less servility to the Soviet Union. They were opposed to the international conference issuing a single all-inclusive document and (with the Hungarians) thought that sections of the 1957 and 1960 documents were out of date, especially the passages condemning Yugoslavia. The Hungarians appeared chiefly concerned to pour oil on troubled waters, an attitude which may conceal a lack of sympathy for the extreme line of the Poles and East Germans.

The extent of the damage which the Rumanian action will have on relations within the Warsaw Pact cannot yet be assessed. It is bound to aggravate Soviet/Rumanian relations although both sides may try to hush this up. In the strictly Communist context, the Soviet Union may already have written off the Rumanians as beyond redemption before the Budapest meeting began. The Russians must realise that they have little room to manoeuvre but, within limits, are aiming at as cohesive a movement as possible, using the bogey of American imperialism. They are working for the promotion of a common line, while accepting that this will certainly ensure that other parties such as the Asians, Yugoslavs and Cubans, will not join in. In other words they prefer a smaller, more closely knit to a wider movement although the achievement of cohesion even on a narrower scale may well prove more difficult than they hope. At the same time, Suslov's speech made it clear that the Russians have no intention of encouraging other Communist parties to any precipitate action which would conflict with the Soviet Union's State interests of maintaining a modus vivendi with the United States. His remarks about support for the National Liberation Movements showed a clear leaning towards the development of united front action, as did his advice for Communist Parties in capitalist countries.

/Japanese



Japanese and Chinese Positions

The Japanese Communist Party has already stated its opposition to a conference at which six Communist countries would not be represented. This statement was made after talks between the Soviet and Japanese parties at the beginning of February, when it was decided to "normalise" relations, broken off since 1964, and to settle ideological differences without criticising each other. The Chinese have not yet commented on the Budapest meeting but they told the Russians in 1964: "The day your so-called meeting takes place will be the day you step in your grave."



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VIETNAM

Communist policy towards Vietnam and the possibility of negotiations has been ambivalent. The Soviet Union, although ostensibly anxious for peace, has followed without qualification the line laid down by Hanoi that talks will and can begin only as soon as the United States ceases unconditionally its bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV. This is said to be the only basis on which progress can be made and Moscow has shown no disposition to use any influence they may have with Hanoi to induce the North Vietnamese to make what the Soviet leaders well know to be essential moves to meet the San Antonio formula which they still maintain (as do the North Vietnamese) is unacceptable. The Soviet Union and East European countries have pledged all the necessary aid for Hanoi to continue the war until the United States accepts Hanoi's full demands.

While the North Vietnamese may have hoped for greater political gains from their recent offensive than they in fact achieved, there has been no sign that they feel under any political or military compulsion to make substantive concessions. In particular they have refused to give any indication that they would meet the San Antonio stipulation not to take military advantage of any cessation of the bombing. Nevertheless Hanoi clearly attaches importance to mobilising internal and international pressures on the United States administration to stop the bombing and they have consequently showed some presentational flexibility; in particular as to what could be discussed at any talks that might follow a cessation. The North Vietnamese now say these can include matters which might "be raised by the other side". But this seems designed more to put the Americans at a propaganda disadvantage than as a serious offer of negotiations that might lead to a settlement based on other elements as well as Hanoi's Four Points.

Chinese policy, however, has been to avoid all mention of negotiations or talks and to concentrate on the need for the Vietnamese to show determination to carry their fight through to the end by way of a protracted war of resistance to U.S. aggression and for national salvation.

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COMMUNIST POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

During President Tito's visit to the U.A.R. at the beginning of February he revived the plan which he first put forward in the autumn of 1967 for a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute, adding to it a proposal for a demilitarised zone around the borders of Israel. However, although the Egyptian press welcomed the proposal it was not officially endorsed by the Arabs and was condemned by the Israeli authorities as slanted against them.

The Soviet Government have continued to take a fairly prudent line on the Arab/Israel problem. They are giving formal support to Ambassador Jarring's mission, although they may not be exerting themselves to promote its success. They have accused the Israelis of trying to sabotage the mission. They also seem to have been acting cautiously over south-west Arabia. They have continued to support the Yemeni Republicans while apparently trying to avoid getting too deeply involved in the civil war. They have not been in a hurry to commit themselves to provide assistance to the People's Republic of the Southern Yemen (PRSY). Although the PRSY Defence Minister visited Moscow during the month accompanied by officers concerned with arms purchase, there was no communiqué after the visit and no evidence that the Southern Yemenis got what they wanted. The Russians are probably waiting to see how the PRSY government fares and may calculate that a policy which would stand a chance of establishing their influence there would cost more than they are prepared to pay. There is no evidence to suggest that there is any connexion between the recent dismissal of British contract officers from the PRSY armed forces and the Minister of Defence's visit to Moscow.

Nevertheless the Soviet Union will certainly keep a careful watch on the area and will take any opportunity to weaken Western influence there (e.g. their propaganda attacks on the alleged Western plan to encourage a military pact of Gulf states). They have now taken steps to establish an Embassy in Aden. The East Germans have also reached agreement on the establishment of consular relations with the PRSY but do not seem to be pressing for full diplomatic representation.

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SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

The last year or so has seen an increase in Soviet efforts to extend political and economic relations with a number of Latin American Governments. This campaign of peaceful penetration owes its renewed impetus largely to the strong reaction of Latin American governments to the Tricontinental Conference in January 1966, which they condemned as the first deliberate breach of the UN Declaration of Non-Intervention. The Soviet view that their policies would best be served by dissociation from militant Cuban policies was probably reinforced by the setbacks suffered by guerrilla groups in 1967, in particular the death of 'Che' Guevara.

Moreover very few Latin American Communist Parties have been wholeheartedly behind the local guerrilla movements; their advocacy of united front tactics and their condemnation of Cuban views, particularly as reflected in Régis Debray's "Revolution in the Revolution?" has become more open since the First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organisation in August and Debray's trial in October. Several parties are now threatened by Castroite splits, similar to that which occurred to the Venezuelan communists in 1966. Few are likely to acquire significant political influence in the near future, and they are therefore concentrating on building up their following among students, intellectuals, trade unionists and peasants.

Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Chile were re-established in November 1964; in January 1967 an economic agreement provided for a long-term low-interest Soviet loan to Chile of \$57m., and May saw the signature of a technical assistance agreement. In March 1967 a Soviet trade mission visited Bogotá and a Soviet-Colombian trade agreement was signed in July. The resumption of diplomatic relations followed in January 1968. Soviet trade delegations visited San José and Quito in January 1968 and there has been talk of a Venezuelan trade delegation going to USSR in March. Brazil and Uruguay, which have diplomatic relations with the USSR, were granted or offered credits of \$105m. and \$20m. in 1966.

The East European countries have supported this Soviet campaign: Hungary for instance signed three trade and cultural agreements with Chile in November 1967; an agreement signed in July 1967 provides for \$25m. of Colombian-East German trade in 1969. Hungary and Poland sent trade delegations to Lima in November 1967.

The proportion of Soviet aid destined for Latin America has risen steeply. In 1967 36.6% of all Soviet and East European offers of aid were made to Latin American countries, excluding Cuba: \$240 out of 655m. The corresponding figures for 1954-1966 were 3.7%: \$330m. out of 8,885m.

In view of the need of most Latin American governments to find new outlets for their primary products, they are unlikely to reject the Communist overtures out of hand. Any dramatic increase in Soviet-Latin American trade is, however, unlikely.

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At the same time the Russians have attempted to increase their influence through cultural and information links. Most Communist countries sponsor cultural institutes in Chile; in 1967 over 300 Chileans visited the Soviet Union in addition to the 600 invited to attend the 50th anniversary celebrations. The University of Chile has cultural exchange agreements with the Universities of Moscow and Leipzig, and over 200 Chilean students are at Lumumba University. Radio Moscow, Novosti, Tass and Pravda have resident representatives in Chile and in January 1967 Novosti launched there the monthly Enfoque, the first propaganda monthly designed specially for a Latin American country. A Colombian edition was started in May.



CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Sejna Affair

The defection of General Sejna is being used by the reforming, progressive wing of the Czechoslovak Party, represented by the new First Secretary Dubcek, in their continuing attacks on the old guard represented by President Novotny. It is now being openly asked in Prague how Sejna, a man of only moderate ability and allegedly a close associate of Novotny's son, rose to the rank of General at 40 years of age; and how he was enabled to escape abroad. In the light of public concern, fanned by rumours of Sejna's complicity in January in some plan to use a tank division to keep Novotny in power, the Party Presidium have established a special commission to investigate all aspects of the case. The scandal seems bound to snowball and thus increase the likelihood of further governmental and party changes. Novotny's own position is under attack; there have been calls for the resignation of Kudrna, the Minister of the Interior; and it is rumoured that the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Bucharest, Cisar, may be recalled to take up an important Ministry in Prague (possibly Foreign Affairs, Education or Culture).

Steps towards Democratisation

Meanwhile, with the debate between Dubcek and the dogmatists being conducted increasingly in public, the pressures on the Party to hasten the process towards greater democratisation are building up rapidly. There has already been an extraordinary relaxation of censorship, and it was announced on 6 March that the Press Law is to be changed. Following the success of the Writers' Union in securing control of the publication of their journal, the Chairman of the Journalists' Union, Hradecky (an associate of Novotny) has been openly attacked and his replacement seems only a matter of time. The newspapers have changed almost beyond recognition in the past month. Press references to the Masaryks have become increasingly frequent and wreaths were laid on their graves on 10 March (the anniversary of Jan Masaryk's death) without interference. Dubcek has promised full rehabilitation and some financial compensation for all who have suffered persecution from political motives, and historians are demanding a complete reassessment of the Republic between the two Wars. In the youth movements the situation is confused; but it is clear that the leadership of the youth union have been unable to cope with the new circumstances and appear to be in a state of disintegration.

Foreign Affairs

There are unlikely to be important early changes in Czechoslovak foreign policy. At the Budapest meeting of communist parties and at the Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, the Czechoslovak delegations went along with the Soviet Union on essentials although their representatives at both meetings made some points which differed from the Soviet line. Even the most eager proponents of the internal reform in Prague do not yet suggest publicly that Czechoslovakia's external objectives should undergo radical reassessment; close relations with the Soviet Union are likely to remain the corner-stone of her foreign policy, although the next few months seem likely to see a greater expression of national feeling. So far there has been no public Soviet comment on the latest events in Czechoslovakia.



SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ideological Problems

Members of the Politburo have attended some of the biennial conferences of oblast Party organisations. Some of the published speeches from the conferences (including one by Kosygin, in which he devoted unusual attention to ideological matters) have indicated that the Soviet leaders are becoming increasingly nervous over the assertion of liberal ideas by intellectuals which the leadership choose to ascribe largely to Western ideological penetration.

It is not new for the Russians to accuse the West of responsibility for their internal ideological troubles. The accusations in this case are probably in part a reaction to continuing protests in the Soviet Union against the conduct of the Ginsburg/Galanskov trial. Some 60 documents of protest are said to be circulating in Moscow, and a number of them have reached the West. The signatories mostly belong to the scientific and literary intelligentsia and range from the well-known writer Konstantin Paustovsky to a group of school children. One unusual protest comes from the chairman of a collective farm in Latvia, who is a member of the CPSU. He says that if information on the trial has reached his isolated farm the authorities can imagine what seeds they have planted throughout the country; he advises them to correct their mistakes "before the workers and peasants become involved". The documents suggest that concern over the trial is not confined to intellectual circles in Moscow and Leningrad. Soviet official concern at the situation was underlined by a reluctant admission in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* of 28 February that a number of letters had been received criticising several aspects of the trial. The scale of the movement of protest should not however be exaggerated. It is far from constituting a real threat to public order. The minority involved is still a small one. A far greater movement would have to develop before the pressures would be such that major concessions would have to be made in the direction of freedom to dissent. Nevertheless the present protest can be seen as a part of a long process of evolution.

Agriculture

There still seem to be differences among the Soviet leadership concerning the extent of necessary capital investments in agriculture. In his speech at Minsk on 14 February Kosygin spoke of 'change in the distribution of the national income in favour of agriculture' as an accomplished fact. Although Brezhnev said little about agriculture, he did announce that the next plenum of the Central Committee would discuss how to implement decisions on agriculture. Although this does not necessarily imply any change in basic policy it will give an opportunity for the agricultural lobby to air its views.

The leading protagonist of larger investments in agriculture has been Polyansky, who has been supported by several academic economists. Although it is not clear who are the opponents, it is possible that Kosygin, who has to take a view covering the whole of the investment pattern, is opposed to greater investment in agriculture at the expense of other sectors such as the consumer goods industries. The agricultural case may have been undermined by the exceptionally good harvest of

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1966, although this was due to unusually good weather conditions rather than to a basic improvement in productivity. Two other special difficulties weight the scales against agriculture. Any priority for agriculture runs up against the traditional priority for investment in industry. And however large the financial allocations, the physical means to carry out larger investments in the countryside may be not available. The debate is probably not yet concluded, and its issue is still in doubt.



CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The press campaign against factionalism, "anarchism" and indiscipline continued. Recent articles clearly reflected the leaders' growing concern over the unwillingness of workers and young people to settle their differences and apply themselves to their normal duties. Some reports have revealed that extremist groups have expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the Cultural Revolution and have evidently sought, in defiance of official directives, to continue the mass campaign against officials and against other revolutionary organisations. Press articles have also called for struggle against the "capitalist-roaders" and "class enemies", who are allegedly to blame for promoting the continued factionalism and indiscipline in many areas. However, the leaders still seem to be concentrating on the methods of persuasion and political indoctrination in dealing with the members of revolutionary groups in general and in order to restore order and discipline. In this, they depend largely on the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which remains the only effective force for maintaining control in most areas. A series of Mao-study courses for important branches of the PLA has been held in Peking, with the apparent objective of ensuring the PLA's unity and loyalty in exercising authority.

The differences among revolutionary groups in many areas present a serious obstacle to the formation of local Revolutionary Committees and in some places to effective government by Revolutionary Committees formed earlier in the Cultural Revolution. Factionalism also impedes the conduct of Party rectification and reconstruction. The number of provincial and regional Revolutionary Committees reached 12 (out of a total of 26 provinces and regions) with the recent establishment of Committees in Hopei, Hupei and Kwangtung.

The formation of Workers' and Poor and Lower-middle Peasants' Congresses, first noted in late 1967, has been receiving increasing attention in many areas. These meetings are evidently intended to help patch up differences among sections of the working population and may also be designed to pave the way for new organisations to replace the trade unions and poor peasants' associations which have been inactive since early in the Cultural Revolution.

The strains which the continuing confused situation has placed on the leadership were reflected in the mounting poster criticism of Ch'i Pen-yu, until recently a prominent member of the Party's Cultural Revolution Group and writer of the first official press attack on Liu Shao-ch'i which appeared at the end of March 1967. The Party journal, Red Flag, which has had Ch'en Po-ta as Chief Editor since its inauguration in 1958 and Ch'i Pen-yu as an assistant editor during 1967, has failed to appear for over three months. The reasons for Ch'i's apparent fall from grace are unclear, but the criticism of him may indicate a weakening in the position within the leadership of the Cultural Revolution Group. Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's wife) have, however, appeared again in recent weeks together with other leaders. Lin Piao has received new acclaim for his qualities as a "great thinker, statesman and soldier" and as Mao's "most ideal successor". Tributes of this sort seem designed to emphasise that the leadership of Mao, Lin and Chou En-lai remains united and that there is no change in Lin's status despite the important role being played by Chou in the current situation.



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CHRONOLOGY

FEBRUARY

- 2-14 Southern Yemeni Defence Minister visits Soviet Union
- 3 Hopei Revolutionary Committee formed
- 5-17 Cambodian Defence Minister visits Soviet Union
- 5 All-Union Ministry of Machine Building set up in Soviet Union
- 5 Trial of Polish satirist Szpotanski opens in Warsaw (19 February: sentenced to 3 years imprisonment)
- 5 Hupei Revolutionary Committee formed.
- 6-7 Rumanian Party Secretary Niculescu-Mizil visits Poland
- 6-21 Pelshe, member of Politburo of CPSU visits India for Congress of Indian Communist Party
- 8-19 C.-in-C. of Soviet Navy visits India
- 9 Tass statement on Vietnam
- 9-10 C.P.S.U. Secretary Ponomarev visits North Korea
- 9-17 Rumanian Party Delegation visits Cuba
- 10 Soviet aide-memoire to U.S. Government on crash of B52 off Greenland
- 11 U Thant visits Moscow
- 12-15 Netherlands Foreign Minister visits Hungary
- 12-16 Soviet Foreign Minister visits Bulgaria
- 12-13 Czechoslovak Party Secretary Koucky visits Rumania
- 14 China shoots down U.S. aircraft near Hainan
- 14 2 Soviet journalists ordered to leave Kenya
- 13 Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin sends letters to Allied Ambassadors in Bonn protesting at Federal German activities in West Berlin
- 14-15 Polish Foreign Minister visits East Berlin

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- 14-16 C.P.S.U. Secretary Ponomarev visits Hungary
- 14 Kosygin address local Party conference in Minsk
- 15-16 Meeting of Rumanian Grand National Assembly
- 16 Brezhnev addresses local Party conference in Leningrad
- 16 Soviet/Cambodian agreement on military aid
- 16-17 C.P.S.U. Secretary Ponomarev visits Rumania
- 17 Announcement of expulsion of three members of Politburo of Greek Communist Party
- 17 Chinese 'People's Daily' attacks Soviet military aid to India
- 19 Soviet diplomatic mission arrives in Aden to open Embassy
- 19-23 Bulgarian Foreign Minister visits Italy
- 20 Soviet officials in China refused permission to visit graves of servicemen in North East China
- 21 Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee formed
- 21 Bomb explosion at Soviet Embassy in Washington
- 21-24 East German Foreign Minister visits U.A.R.
- 22 Celebrations of 20th Anniversary of Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia; attended by Soviet and East European leaders
- 22 Chinese Note to Burma protesting at imprisonment of Overseas Chinese
- 23 50th Anniversary of founding of Soviet Armed Forces
- 23 At rally in Prague President Novotny admits "mistakes" in past
- 24 Soviet Foreign Ministry statement on "neo-nazism" in Germany
- 24-2 March East German Foreign Minister visits Burma
- 25 Defection of Czechoslovak General Sejna

/26-5 March



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26-5 March Consultative Meeting of Communist Parties in Budapest  
27 Warsaw Pact Deputy Foreign Ministers meet in East Berlin  
27-28 Plenum of Central Committee of Polish Party  
27-28 Closed session of Czechoslovak National Assembly  
27-1 March 33rd Meeting of CMEA Executive in Moscow  
27-4 March 14th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions  
27-7 March French Minister of Culture visits Soviet Union  
28 Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Yakubovsky visits  
Czechoslovakia  
29 Rumanian delegation withdraws from Budapest meeting  
29-1 March Polish Foreign Minister visits Czechoslovakia

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JULY 1968

S U M M A R Y

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Soviet Position

Soviet interests were bound to suffer whether or not they intervened in Czechoslovakia. Their policy has been a series of compromises, complicated by the lack of any clear Czechoslovak offence against the 'socialist system' and by the difficulty of applying economic pressure. They have now had to ease off the direct confrontation, hoping that Dubcek will proceed more cautiously with 'liberalisation'; but they have succeeded in getting some concessions from him.

The Czechoslovak Position

The Czechoslovak leaders stood firm against the threats in the Warsaw letter, but are probably sincere in wishing to maintain the Party's authority and their loyalty to the alliance with the Soviet Union. Their main problem is a possible division among the differing elements who have so far favoured 'democratisation'. The Russians although obliged to do business with Dubcek may try to make his task more difficult by continued though more discreet propaganda.

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

The Russians may be keener on a political settlement. There was probably less than full agreement during President Nasser's visit to Moscow.

SOVIET POLICY ON NIGERIA

The Russians continue to give general support to the Federal Government, while stressing the need for talks.

FEDERAL GERMAN/SOVIET DIALOGUE

ON THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE

The latest Russian note to the Federal German Government offers little hope of early progress.

POLAND : DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTY

The most important of a number of personnel changes in the Party is the promotion of General Moczar to candidate membership of the Politburo, but it is not certain that he will win the struggle for power in the Party.

NORTH VIETNAM

The North Vietnamese continue to show little flexibility in the Paris talks but have somewhat modified their insistence on the programme of the N.L.F. as the sole basis for a settlement. The Soviet attitude has not altered but Sino-North Vietnamese relations have somewhat improved.

/CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

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CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The leadership has been working to strengthen the authority and to streamline the administration of the Revolutionary Committees. They have also concentrated on improving higher and technical education. The economy has suffered from the Cultural Revolutions.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Soviet Position

The Bratislava meeting in early August marked the beginning of a new stage in Soviet/Czechoslovak relations. Strains will clearly continue, though direct confrontation has been called off. But however the Russians handled the affair, their interests were almost bound to be seriously damaged. Forceful intervention would in the short term, have fatally disrupted arrangements for the forthcoming International Communist Conference in November. It would have seriously damaged the international image of the Soviet Union and cast much doubt not merely on the sincerity of their objectives in Europe but also on the operation of the policy of peaceful co-existence in the world as a whole. The protests by the Rumanian and Yugoslav Parties against Soviet tactics showed that intervention could wreck Russian efforts to cement the cohesion of the communist movement. The West European parties, notably the French and Italians, have, for their part, been strongly influenced by the damage they would suffer after Soviet military action against a Party which, like themselves, professes to combine democracy with communism.

On the other hand, if the Czechoslovak experiment is allowed to continue substantially in its present form, as appears the probable result of the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, in the long term the face of Eastern Europe will be radically changed. The balance of development would swing towards a "revisionist" form of communism which could prove attractive in other East European countries and even, perhaps in due course in the USSR itself. For the moment, self-interest will keep Czechoslovakia within the Warsaw Pact system and she has stressed her loyalty to the alliance in the Bratislava communiqué. But those Russians of orthodox persuasion must fear that in the long term the Czechoslovaks will inevitably drift towards an independent stance in foreign policy, particularly towards Germany. The East Germans, and to a lesser extent the Poles, have not hesitated to encourage such fears.

At first the Russians probably miscalculated the nature of the move against Novotny and believed that Dubcek would be manipulated as easily as Kadar or Gomulka on fundamental issues. Since discovering that this was not so and, in particular, that Dubcek is prepared on occasion to yield to pressure from the more extreme liberals, they have tried to find means of influencing Czechoslovak policies, and bolstering the conservatives, short of military intervention, which they have clearly wished if possible to avoid. However they do not seem at any stage to have given up hope of doing a deal with Dubcek and have probably found no alternative to doing business with him. The results of the Cierna and Bratislava meetings suggest that they are now prepared to accept this for a further period. And if their tactics have resulted in increasing Dubcek's popularity in Czechoslovakia, the Russians have also at least have brought him to make some concessions to their sensibilities and will hope that they have frightened the extreme liberals into proceeding with more caution.

The Russians drew attention to their dilemma and reduced their margin of manoeuvre by the blatancy of their bullying tactics. Their policy has borne every sign of being a series of uneasy compromises, to the awkwardness of which the cumbersome nature of their present decision making machine must have contributed. Other factors have also been influential. The Russians had probably hoped to play a longer game, a hope scotched by Dubcek's decision to advance the Party Congress to September. This may have made the Russians feel compelled to bring matters to a head before the International Communist Conference in November so as to isolate the Czechoslovak virus and force other Parties to draw appropriate conclusions. At the same time, the Russians

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have in some ways been hampered because the Czechoslovak situation is less clear cut than that of Hungary in 1956. Czechoslovak protestations of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and to the communist system have inevitably taken a good deal of the wind out of the sails of Soviet criticism without settling the fundamental issues which concern the Russians. Their position has also been complicated by the difficulty of applying economic pressure. On the face of it the Russians have many levers to use against the Czechoslovaks, but they have hesitated to do anything so drastic as for example, to cut off the supply of oil, while they must recognise that trade sanctions would only tend to accelerate the reorientation of the Czechoslovak economy towards the West. They have been equally inhibited about using bribery. The sort of loan which would satisfy Czechoslovaks would also enable them to diversify their trade with the West. The economic meeting called for, once again, at Bratislava, may bring them to face these issues more decisively.

### The Czechoslovak Position

The hope of the Czechoslovak liberals has been the opposite of the orthodox Russians' fear. They hope that the Soviet leaders will be progressively obliged to accept polycentric communism in Eastern Europe. They must look forward to the day when the influence of the hard liners in Moscow, in terms both of men and ideas, will be much weaker than it is now. They may even hope that such a change will result from the present dispute.

The Czechoslovak leaders' reply to the Warsaw Letter was in keeping with this attitude. Their appeal was based on the importance of the process of regeneration in Czechoslovakia and the right to pursue domestic policies without interference. By frankly setting out the problems thrown up by the demise of the old regime, the Czechoslovak leaders offered some hostages to Soviet propaganda. But there is no reason to think that they any more than the Russians would welcome any weakening of the Party's authority by the growth of "anti-socialist forces" or that their repeated protestations of loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and to the CMEA are insincere. In economic policy, the Czechoslovaks certainly wish to develop their links with the West. But the Russians must be as well aware as the Czechoslovaks themselves of the possible advantages to the East European economic system as a whole of allowing the Czechoslovak economy to be reinvigorated with Western help. Mr. Kosygin, during his visit to Stockholm in July gave some indication that he appreciates this point. For these reasons, the Czechoslovak claim that the recent developments in Czechoslovakia could make Czechoslovak communism healthier and their alliance with the Soviet Union more sound, is not altogether idle.

The Russians doubtless have it in mind that the opposite may happen and that the Czechoslovak leadership will be unable to deal successfully with the tasks ahead of them. In particular, they may feel that freedom of the press will lead to such ideological confusion that Czechoslovak communism and the Party's control will be fatally endangered. Even if the Czechoslovak regime is now both united and unusually popular, largely on account of Russian bullying tactics against them, the process of "democratisation" was brought about by a coalition of differing interests, which may not hold together indefinitely. Each of its component parts have interests of their own - federalisation for the Slovaks, freedom of expression and association for the writers and economic reform for the economists. Although a measure of agreement has been reached between these elements on the basic characteristics of the new regime, in particular the need for the progressive elimination of the old guard, differences about future policy could well emerge. Already there are signs of difficulties between Czechs and Slovaks over the new Federal Constitution and growing concern about the introduction of the economic reforms, which are only beginning to be worked out in detail and will clearly not yield immediate results. The possibility of industrial unrest also remains a real one.

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If they are to meet these problems successfully, the Czechoslovak leaders will need to be free from external pressure intended to undermine their unity and their public support. Yet it seems more than likely that the Soviet leaders, even if, as the Cierna and Bratislava meetings suggest may well happen, they establish an uneasy modus vivendi with Dubcek and his colleagues, will continue their propaganda campaign against the dangers of liberalisation. Such a policy would be designed to encourage a previval of conservative influences among the Czechoslovak leaders and in public opinion. Yet a conservative reaction would be likely only to weaken Czechoslovakia further both politically and economically at a time when her weakness may already be a source of concern to the Russians. The old regime was neither popular nor particularly competent in economic management. It was in the last few years of Novotny's reign that the most serious decline in the competitiveness of the Czechoslovak industry took place. The return of the old methods would probably produce the old results.

Such an outcome would be likely finally to convince many Czechoslovaks, who may now be prepared to accept the continuing dominance of the Communist Party because Soviet pressures in recent weeks have shown this to be necessary, that communism can never be the solution to their problems. The recent crisis has re-kindled in many Czechoslovaks a nationalism which, if it never died, has for some time been largely latent. Soviet policy has given the present leadership an opportunity to harness this nationalism in their own support and that of the Party. But unless the Russians are prepared to leave them free to exploit it and unless they are willing to accept that they are unlikely to gain much more by maintaining their pressure on Czechoslovakia, they may well in the long term do far greater damage than they realise to their own best interests not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in Eastern Europe.

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SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

While still anxious not to appear to get ahead of the Arabs, the Russians may be putting more emphasis on the need for a political settlement in the Middle East. Their main reason for doing this would probably be concern at the danger of a renewal of hostilities, in which they might become involved, should the Jarring Mission fail to produce a settlement. They may calculate, too that by adopting a moderate line now they are also insuring themselves against recriminations if they decide to take a tougher stand later on. It is not clear, however, whether this was a serious point of difference during President Nasser's visit to Moscow from 4 - 10 July. The visit was extended for two extra days for discussions at the end of which the communiqué referred to a "frank" exchange of views, suggesting something less than full agreement. It is possible that, despite President Nasser's remarks to the contrary, the United Arab Delegation were not altogether satisfied with the scale of arms supplies from the Soviet Union.

Although the communiqué endorsed the Soviet Memorandum on Disarmament of 1 July in general terms, it did not mention the suggestion that the Middle East was an area susceptible to regional disarmament or arms limitation. This may have been another point of UAR dissatisfaction, but the Russians seem to have been doing their best to reassure the Egyptians. In the Press Conference in Stockholm on 13 July, Mr. Kosygin drew a careful distinction between justified supplies of arms to the Arab Countries and unjustifiable shipments to Israel.

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SOVIET POLICY ON NIGERIA

While Soviet arms shipments to the Federal Military Government have continued, the Russians have considerably reduced their press and other comments on the Nigerian situation. They have, however, maintained their standard line, giving general support to the Federal Government while stressing the need to start talks with Eastern Nigeria. This line was maintained in the communiqué after a visit by a Nigerian Government Delegation to Moscow from 16-20 July.

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FEDERAL GERMAN/SOVIET DIALOGUE  
ON THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE

On 10 July, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn handed over to the Federal Foreign Ministry a memorandum replying to a German note of 9 April about the possibility of exchanging declarations on the renunciation of force (a German idea for normalising relations with East European countries). The memorandum was strongly worded and like earlier Soviet notes questioned Federal German sincerity in seeking normal relations while refusing to recognise East Germany. Shortly afterwards, Soviet newspapers published the text of this and of earlier Soviet notes in the "dialogue" on this subject which has been in progress between the two Governments since October 1967; and the Federal German Government followed suit by publishing its side of the exchange.

Despite its tough language the Soviet note expressed willingness to continue with the dialogue; and it may possibly be of some significance that (as in a previous note in the series) it insisted on Federal recognition only of the "existence" of the DDR, but did not expressly demand diplomatic recognition. Some have seen this as a sign that Soviet policy in this field may be oscillating owing to disagreement within the present leadership. Nevertheless, the latest Russian moves have made it publicly clear that there is little hope of early progress over renunciation of force.

Moscow is considered to be the center of the "revisionist" group of political personalities who are active in the Party and who have had extensive experience of Soviet administration. They tend to be more liberal in their views on relations with the West. They are more likely to be influenced by the West and to be resistant to Soviet ideology, but it is by no means certain that they will succeed in changing it. Many members of the Central Committee are believed to have reservations about the Polish nation, and while the majority support a moderate, pragmatic and non-dogmatic approach, they are not always as flexible as they seem. There are signs that Moscow did not take any steps to curb the activities of the left of any report of his intentions. The situation of Germany, and the moderate line taken by Gorbachev and his ally Khrushchev in the anti-Semitic campaign. There were no movements at the Politburo, or perhaps that some of the Jewish members of the Politburo had purged from their office and were not to speak in their own defense.

The struggle for power in the Party, as long as it remains, has been going on the open. The next step would be preparation for the Congress which would decide whether Gorbachev's proposal for the USSR seriously weakened and, if so, whether Khrushchev or Gorbachev would be the winner.

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POLAND: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTY

The twelfth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party (P.Z.P.R.) was held on 8 - 9 July. It decided that the Fifth Party Congress should open on 11 November, the fiftieth anniversary of the re-establishment of an independent Poland (and thus on a national and not, as had been expected, a Party anniversary). During the next four months there will be intensified Party activity, including a series of local meetings to elect delegates to the Congress.

Some important changes in the top Party bodies were announced: Ochab, the former Head of State, resigned on health grounds from the Politburo and an elderly Central Committee secretary, Wicha, also resigned. Jaszczuk, considered a supporter of Gomulka, was promoted from candidate member to full member of the Politburo; and General Moczar became a candidate member of the Politburo and a secretary of the Central Committee. General Moczar has since resigned from the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministers of Finance and Health, neither of great importance, have also resigned.

The most important of these changes is the promotion in the Party hierarchy of General Moczar. This is only partly counter-balanced by his replacement as Minister of the Interior by a man who does not appear to be one of his supporters. Moczar's candidate membership of the Politburo could put him within striking distance of the top.

Moczar is considered to be the leader of the "partisan" group of practical political personalities who spent the war years in Poland and who have no extended experience of Soviet communism. They seem to have no positive programme; they are reputedly against Jews, intellectuals, liberals and contracts with the West. They are nationalists and to this extent could be expected to be resistant to Soviet influence. They are more interested in power than ideology; but it is by no means certain that they will succeed in obtaining it. Many members of the Central Committee are believed to have misgivings about the Polish nationalism which the partisans appear to represent; Gierek, the Silesian Party secretary who has a reputation for a practical, technological and non-doctrinaire approach, may yet emerge as eventual heir apparent. There are signs that Moczar did not have everything his own way at the Plenum: the lack of any report of his interventions, the promotion of Jaszczuk, and the moderate line taken by Gomulka and his ally Kliszko over the anti-Zionist campaign. There were disagreements at the Plenum, for example over some of the Jewish members who have been purged from their jobs but were allowed to speak in their own defence.

The struggle for power in the Party, so long concealed, has come partly into the open. The next four months of preparation for the Congress should show whether Gomulka's position has been seriously weakened and, if so, whether Moczar or Gierek can displace him.

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NORTH VIETNAM

The North Vietnamese have shown little flexibility at the Paris talks where they continue both to insist that the Americans must end all bombing of North Vietnam before any progress can be made, and to resist all attempts by the Americans to find areas of common agreement. Nor, despite a lull in their offensive activity in the South, do they appear to have forsworn their tactic of fighting while negotiating. On the other hand they have gone some way to modify their insistence that the programme of the N.L.F. is the only basis on which the political problem of South Vietnam can be settled. In certain circumstances this could ease the way for political negotiation with the South Vietnamese and the Americans.

The Russians, while displaying a generally benevolent attitude towards the talks, show no signs of being willing to get ahead of the North Vietnamese attitude in the interests of a peaceful settlement, nor of wishing to activate the Geneva Conference machinery.

There have been some signs of an improvement in North Vietnam's relations with China. The peripatetic North Vietnamese economic delegation has now been to Peking, where agreement was reached on further aid. Nhan Dan, the Hanoi daily, has described this as a brilliant expression of militant solidarity, having earlier (on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist party) thanked the "Chinese Party, government and people" for "valuable support and assistance" and spoke of the "long standing very intimate fraternal relations" between the two people. These are the warmest expressions of North Vietnamese feeling to have been made towards the Chinese for some time. It would appear that both the North Vietnamese and Chinese are making efforts to correct the impression of a rift between them which had been attracting wide comment. On the other hand, there is no sign that the Chinese have any intention of moderating their hostility towards the Paris talks.

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CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

A joint editorial of the People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily, published on 1 July to mark the 47th Anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, concentrated on the need for Revolutionary Committees to maintain close links with the masses. While its main emphasis was on the tasks of the Cultural Revolution - particularly on the need to strengthen and defend the Revolutionary Committees - the editorial claimed that the Party was "becoming purer and stronger and more vigorous" through exposure to the mass campaign.

There was very little evidence, however, of concrete efforts to reconstitute Party organs - or to prepare for the 9th Congress. For the time being at least, priority is being given to strengthening the authority of the Revolutionary Committees and to streamlining administrative structure. Committee members are encouraged to go down to the people and to work with them, a small number only remaining at headquarters to attend to day-to-day business. An important publicity campaign using the slogan "better troops and simplified administration" and citing the example of the Lingpao county Revolutionary Committee in Honan, was launched in the People's Daily of 11 July. In this campaign apparently Revolutionary Committees of all levels are expected now to investigate the administrative structure for which they are responsible and to effect simplification and economies in staff.

For the second month in succession, no new Revolutionary Committees were formed at provincial level. Such committees have yet to be formed in five major administrative areas - Fukien and Yunnan provinces; Kwangsi, Tibet and Sinkiang autonomous regions. Reports were received during the month of serious clashes between armed factions in Kwangsi. In a speech, reported by a Red Guard newspaper, Chou En-lai deplored the fact that the clashes had led to a temporary stoppage of trains in June, which had delayed supplies to North Viet-Nam.

In an instruction published on 22 July, Mao turned his attention to higher and technical education. The instruction appeared to lay down the general principles for building a new system of higher education mainly devoted to technical and scientific training, with shorter courses, "politics in command" and a reformed selection procedure. Mao affirmed that universities were still needed but implied that they should be concerned mainly with subjects such as physics and engineering. He added that students should be chosen from workers and peasants who already had some practical experience: the superiority of selection by this method was publicised in the report of an investigation of engineers and technicians at the Shanghai Machine-tool Plant.

The efforts to strengthen the leadership of Revolutionary Committees and to simplify administrative machinery and the new instructions on technical education seem to reflect the beginning of an attempt to mark up the achievements of the Cultural Revolution and prepare for the concluding phase, of the campaign. The Shanghai newspaper Wen-hui Pao on 21 July suggested that further reforms would soon be undertaken in various fields, including for example industry.

However many recent reports have drawn attention to the damage caused by the Cultural Revolution to the economy. There are indications that industrial production for the first half of 1968 was lower than that for the corresponding period of 1967. Commodity shortage have become widespread, particularly of light industrial consumer goods, including cloth. Reports by the Chinese news

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agency have suggested that in some areas production has recently begun to recover, but in others industrial undertakings, as well as transport services, have continued until recently to suffer disruption. Farming was somewhat more gravely affected by the Cultural Revolution than in the first six months of last year. Owing to unfavourable weather conditions and a shortage of fertilizer, the prospects for the harvest are not bright. Moreover, recent press and radio reports suggest that the erosion of authority and discipline in the rural communes may, as in 1967, cause procurement difficulties.



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DRAFT CHRONOLOGY

JULY

- 1 Signature of Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 1 Soviet publication of Memorandum on Disarmament
- 1 Chinese Government refuses invitation to attend Non-Nuclear conference
- 1 President Johnson announces agreement between the United States and Soviet Union to hold talks on the limitation of strategic missiles
- 1 US plane carrying troops forced down in Kurile Islands
- 2 Soviet Government releases US plane
- 2 - 12 North Korean Military Delegation visits Hungary
- 3 Western Powers deliver Notes to Soviet Union protesting at new East German Regulations on passports and visas
- 3 Speech by Brezhnev at meeting in Moscow for Hungarian Party Secretary Kadar
- 3 - 9 President of Tunisia visits Bulgaria
- 2 - 4 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visits Rumania
- 3 Rumanian President receives Chairman of International Monetary Fund
- 4 Soviet - N.Vietnam agreements on economic and military aid signed in Moscow
- 4 Rumanian President receives President of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- 4 - 10 President Nasser of UAR visits Soviet Union
- 5 Soviet Note to Federal German Government replying on the question of the renunciation of the use of force
- 5 - 8 North Vietnamese Economic Delegation visits North Korea; North Korean-North Vietnamese 1969 Agreements signed for military and economic aid
- 8 Brezhnev addresses military graduation ceremony in Moscow
- 8 - 9 Plenum of Central Committee of Polish United Workers Party
- 8 - 12 Turkish Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union
- 7 - 14 "Baltic Week of Peace" in East Germany

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- 8 - 18 President of India visits Soviet Union
- 9 - 15 President of Tunisia visits Rumania
- 9 General Moczar promoted Deputy Member of Polish Politburo
- 9 - 24 North Vietnamese Economic Delegation visits China
- 10 - 12 President Nasser visits Yugoslavia
- 11 Pravda article draws attention to "counter-revolutionary" danger in Czechoslovakia
- 11 Isvestia publishes texts of exchanges with the Federal German Government on renunciation of the use of force
- 11 - 13 Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin visits Sweden
- 11 - 20 North Korean Parliamentary delegation visits Pakistan
- 12 - 19 Soviet/East German/Naval manoeuvres
- 13 East German "Neues Deutschland" article on Czechoslovakia
- 13 Soviet troops stated to start leaving Czechoslovakia
- 14 Hold-up announced in departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia
- 14 - 15 Meeting in Warsaw of Soviet, Polish, Bulgarian, East German and Hungarian leaders to discuss Czechoslovak situation. Letter sent to Czechoslovak leadership
- 14 Polish "Trybuna Ludu" article on Czechoslovakia
- 14 - 17 Secretary-General of French Communist Party visits Soviet Union to discuss Czechoslovakia
- 14 - 17 Italian Communist Party Delegation visits Soviet Union to discuss Czechoslovakia
- 15 Rumanian President Ceausescu makes speech supporting Czechoslovaks
- 15 - 19 Soviet Minister of Defence visits Algeria
- 16 Soviet/United States Cultural Agreements signed
- 16 Plenum of Central Committee of League of Communists of Yugoslavia
- 16 President of Mali visits Soviet Union
- 16 - 20 Nigerian Government Delegation visits Soviet Union

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- 17 Czechoslovak Party Presidium replies to letter from Warsaw meeting
- 17 French Communist Party suggests a meeting of European Communist Parties to discuss Czechoslovak situation
- 17 Memorandum by North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry on Anniversary of 1954 Geneva Agreements
- 17 Polish Prime Minister speaks on Czechoslovak situation
- 16 Statement by Central Committee of League of Communists of Yugoslavia supporting Czechoslovakia
- 18 Soviet military delegation arrives in Cairo
- 18 Speech by Czechoslovak Party Secretary, Dubcek on radio and television
- 19 Pravda article on Czechoslovakia and items alleging "NATO plot" and discovery of hidden arms in Czechoslovakia
- 19 Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee unanimously approves reply to Warsaw letter
- 19 Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, Yakubovsky, leaves Prague after manoeuvres
- 19 - 20 Secretary-General of French Communist Party visits Czechoslovakia
- 20 Pravda publishes invitation by Soviet Party Politburo to Czechoslovak Party Praesidium for bilateral meeting
- 21 French Communist Party withdraws proposal for Conference of European Communist Parties
- 21 Meetings of Soviet Party Local Aktivs in support of Central Committee's policy on Czechoslovakia
- 21 Mao Tse-tung's instruction on training technical personnel
- 22 Soviet Note to Czechoslovakia calls for the stationing of Soviet troops on the Czech-West German border
- 22 Pravda editorial on Czechoslovakia
- 22 Soviet Union agree to meeting between Soviet Politburo and Czechoslovak Praesidium taking place in Czechoslovakia
- 22 Bulgaria expels Albanian Ambassador and five members of diplomatic mission in Sofia. Albania reciprocally expels Bulgarian diplomats in ~~Tunisia~~ Tirana including the Charge d'Affaires
- 23 Izvestia announces Soviet exercises on Western frontiers of the Soviet Union

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- 28 - 6 Aug. World Youth Festival in Sofia
- 29 - 1 Aug. Talks between Czechoslovak Praesidium and Soviet  
Politburo at Cierna-Nad-Tissou, near Czechoslovak-Soviet  
border
- 24 - 26 Plenum of Bulgarian Communist Party
- 31 Iraqi Minister of Defence visits Soviet Union

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