



Communist Policy and Tactics 1968 – 1, seinni hluti

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

MAY 1968

SUMMARY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Internal Developments

At the plenary meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee:

- (a) Ex-President Novotny was expelled from the Central Committee. Other 'conservatives' were also demoted.
- (b) It was decided that an Extraordinary Party Congress should be held in September 1968, an important concession to liberal demands.
- (c) A balanced line was taken on the leading role of the Party.
- (d) It was stressed that the Action Programme should be implemented more energetically.
- (e) The need to exercise some control of mass media was mentioned.
- (f) The seriousness of the economic situation was stressed.
- (g) References to friendship with the Soviet Union were balanced by assertions of independence in foreign affairs.

Dubcek appears unmoved by Soviet pressure but faces serious problems at home.

Soviet and East European Attitudes

Soviet handling of the situation has appeared hesitant, involving high-level meetings with the Czechoslovaks and with other East European leaders and visits to Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. The Russians have exerted psychological pressure by troop movements near the Czechoslovak borders. There has been considerable mutual criticism in the Czechoslovak and Soviet press despite the public Czechoslovak line that their relations with the Soviet Union are correct. The East Germans and Poles have encouraged a tough line; the Hungarians have been more moderate. The Yugoslavs and Rumanians are sympathetic.

BERLIN

East German restrictions on access to West Berlin do not appear to be a prelude to a real attack on Berlin's viability, but they are potentially dangerous.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Russians appear to be preparing the ground for new attacks on Mao at the International Communist Conference.

VIETNAM - THE PARIS TALKS

For the moment the North Vietnamese seem to be using the talks as a propaganda sounding-board while keeping up military pressure in South Vietnam. The Chinese have made clear their displeasure at the talks. The Russians are sticking to Hanoi's line.

NORTH KOREA

The North Koreans are showing a more aggressive attitude towards the South but on balance will probably refrain from an outright attack.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

The Chinese are trying to return to more normal relations with some developing countries.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

An attempt is being made to give an impression of unity at the top but problems remain among the leaders. There have been fresh attacks on 'top capitalist-roaders' and new emphasis on the rôle of mass organisation in administration. A new line has appeared on 'factionalism'. Five provinces and regions still remain without revolutionary committees.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Internal Developments

The main results of the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party held between 29 May and 1 June were:

(a) Membership of the Central Committee

Ex-President Novotny was deprived of his membership of the Central Committee, and suspended, with six others, from membership of the Party "pending clarification of their responsibility for the political trials of 1948-54". Demands for the resignation of other members of the Central Committee "who had lost the confidence of the Party" and who, as Dubcek subsequently revealed, had refused to resign before the meeting in spite of pressure to do so, were repeatedly made in speeches, but in the event only the ex-Minister of Defence (General Lomsky) and two other conservatives, Cvik and Skoda, volunteered their resignations, the first two as members, the last as alternate member of the Central Committee. A number of other supporters of Novotny were removed from their positions on Central Committee commissions.

(b) Extraordinary XIVth Congress

In his opening statement Dubcek proposed that the Party Congress should meet in Extraordinary Session in September 1968, and the Committee decided that the Congress should open on 9 September. This date, six months earlier than Dubcek had hitherto proposed, represents an important concession to liberal demands for early elections to a new Central Committee free from the conservative old guard. The agenda of the Congress will also include a draft political directive on a new federal constitution, and new Party statutes.

(c) The Role of the Communist Party

The Central Committee's resolution stressed the leading role of the Party and described as "justifiable" fears that the process of democratisation might encourage anti-communist forces; but it made clear that there would be no return either to the pre-January 1968 conditions or to those pre-1948, still less those of pre-1938. It said the Party would contribute to the extension of the activity of the National Front, but would allow no opposition parties outside the Front. These balanced statements reflected Dubcek's pre-occupation with the dangers to the process of democratisation from both right and left.

(d) The Action Programme

The Resolution admitted that the Party's Action Programme was being applied "slowly, insufficiently and hesitantly". Dubcek stated as the first immediate task of the Party the resolute implementation of the Action Programme.

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(e) The Role of the Mass Media

Criticism of the mass media confirmed earlier indications that the Party leaders are conscious of the need to impose some control short of formal censorship on the press, radio and television. Nevertheless, it is still proposed to abolish Press Censorship formally during June.

(f) Economic Problems

Referring to recent discussions with the Soviet Union, the Central Committee said that Soviet help would be important if Czechoslovakia's economic problems were to be solved. At the same time more effort would be called for from the people. Repeated references to the problem of the working classes revealed some concern about possible labour troubles; a significant note of caution was struck by the Committee's resolution that the people should be told "the truth, even the bitter truth, about the limited possibilities of the present economic situation".

(g) Foreign Affairs

Warm, but by now traditional, references to the Soviet Union and other friendly Socialist countries were neatly cancelled out by the reassertion of Czechoslovak determination to countenance no interference.

The decision to hold the Congress in September suggests that Dubcek is unmoved by the Soviet war of nerves. He has taken some care to avoid giving the Soviet Union serious cause for anxiety about the pace and nature of internal evolution, notably by refusing to allow opposition parties outside the National Front; but his reference to the Soviet Union had a perfunctory air, and the reassertion of Czechoslovakia's rejection of interference in her internal affairs and Dubcek's change of mind on the crucial point, the date of the XIVth Congress, cannot have pleased the Russians and must have heartened the progressives.

In yielding to pressures in the Party to advance the Congress, Dubcek has shown a high regard for constitutionality and a genuine concern to interpret the will of the Party at all levels. But having decided to brazen it out with the Russians on this score, he is still faced with an equally difficult problem at home, that of winning over the workers and the young to present policies. For the first time since January, there were signs at the Central Committee that this problem was at last being grasped. The warning that sectional claims accompanied by strike threats would help nobody was unusually plain speaking.

Soviet and other East European Attitudes

A hint of continuing Soviet concern may be seen in the joint communiqué issued after Mr. Ulbricht's visit to Moscow from 29-31 May which called for "increased watchfulness and uncompromising ideological struggle". Before the Czechoslovak Central Committee meeting, the East Germans and Poles had been pressing the Soviet Union to take a hard line, but the Soviet leaders may have been divided on how to act.

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The series of unannounced high level visits between Moscow and Prague in May was not in itself unusual, but produced the impression that the Soviet handling of Czechoslovakia has been hesitant. Dubcek and his most liberal colleagues were in Moscow from 4-5 May and Hajek, the Foreign Minister flew there on 6 May. It is clear that no substantial agreement was reached. Gomulka, Ulbricht, Kadar and Zhivkov (but not Czechoslovak or Rumanian representatives) then flew to Moscow for another hastily arranged meeting. Little was announced about the discussions, but it seems clear that this meeting was arranged so that the Soviet leaders could inform or consult their loyal allies about the Czechoslovak situation. On 17 May, the Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshal Grechko, accompanied by the Chief of the Central Political Directorate of the Soviet Army flew to Prague in order to "acquaint themselves with the new command of the Czechoslovak Army". Later the same day Kosygin also arrived unexpectedly "for a short holiday and medical treatment" and to "continue the exchange of views". He left on 25 May, apparently cutting his visit short. There have been no firm indications as to his purpose, but in addition to informing himself at first hand on the internal Czechoslovak situation, but he may well have discussed economic matters including terms for a Soviet loan to Czechoslovakia.

This bargaining should be seen as a complement to a tougher Soviet line in advance of the Czechoslovak Central Committee. Beginning on 9 May there were considerable Soviet troop movements towards and in the area of Czechoslovak borders. The purpose appeared to be psychological pressure on Czechoslovakia, with no intention at any rate for the time being of intervention, in the hope of encouraging the conservative elements in the country and compelling Dubcek to modify or at least slow down his policies in accordance with Soviet wishes. These sabre-rattling tactics appear to have been ill-judged; they seemed to take insufficient account of the fact that the Czechoslovak population, in their exalted mood, could not readily acquiesce in the sight of their leaders giving in to Soviet pressure. Reports that Grechko was trying to obtain agreement to station Soviet troops permanently on Czechoslovak soil during his visit were probably exaggerated. But he clearly pressed the case for more Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia. The agreement reached to hold a Joint Command/Staff Exercise in June looks like a compromise.

Relations with the Soviet Union and also with Poland and East Germany have been complicated by the ending of Government control of the press. Czechoslovakia's allies are unaccustomed to hear a variety of criticisms freely expressed through the press and radio. Their reactions have been heavy-handed. For example, the Russians accused Thomas Masaryk, the founder of the Czechoslovak Republic, of bribing agents to murder Lenin, and they denied that Soviet security advisers were involved in the death of Jan Masaryk in a way that can have convinced no one.

The public Czechoslovak attitude has been that their relations with the Soviet Union are friendly and correct and that it is perfectly natural that their allies should be keenly interested in recent developments. They have maintained that the movements of Soviet troops were Warsaw Pact exercises of which they had been informed, although they have hinted that the details were unknown to them. The Russians have made some effort to deny that differences exist between them and the Czechoslovak leaders, but there has been considerable mutual criticism, much of it indirect, in the press. The Russians have gone so far as to publish a number of authoritative and strongly-worded ideological articles which, while not naming Czechoslovakia, have

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referred pointedly to the danger that a weakening of the Party's guiding role may lead to a form of revisionism. The Poles and East Germans have continued very strong criticism of the trend in Czechoslovakia but the Hungarians have adopted a more moderate attitude and there clearly is some sympathy for the Czechoslovak experiment in many circles in Hungary.

The Yugoslavs have continued to express sympathy for the Czechoslovak experiment. This was given an authoritative stamp in a statement by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister at the end of a visit to Prague. The Rumanians are also sympathetic. There is obviously a considerable community of interest between the three countries which is being fostered by continued contact. President Ceausescu visited Belgrade at the end of May and may soon go to Prague. But a relationship the basis of which is a common belief in the right of every communist country to its own form of development is likely to remain informal. The Russians would react sharply to a new "Little Entente".

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BERLIN

The East German "ordinances" of 10 March and 13 April, restricting respectively members and supporters of the NPD, and Ministers and senior officials of the Federal Government from transiting East Germany have not so far been applied at all rigorously though the Governing Mayor of Berlin, Herr Schütz, was turned back on the Autobahn on 26 April in his capacity as President of the Bundesrat (the German Upper House) and Acting Federal President. This suggests that the restrictions on access are a form of political warfare rather than a prelude to a real attack on Berlin's viability. The Soviet Government support these measures, but it is not altogether clear whether the East is concerned with trying to weaken Federal links with West Berlin or with making political capital out of attacking them, or both. But the measures are potentially dangerous, as they serve to increase tension and there is always a risk of escalation.

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SINO/SOVIET RELATIONS

The increase in hostile propaganda on both sides has continued. The Russians have sought to strengthen their case that the Chinese Communist Party is in danger of becoming divorced from Marxism/Leninism, the true communists in its ranks having been rendered impotent by Mao. An article in the Soviet Party magazine "Kommunist" said that if the present trend in China continued other parties in the Communist Movement would find themselves dealing with a Chinese party which was communist only in name. Although the Russians have maintained that, at the International Communist Conference in November, no party will be "excommunicated", they still seem to be laying the ground for a strong condemnation of Mao from the Soviet side.

Chinese propaganda has centred particularly on individual affairs. On 13 May the New China News Agency published an article which it alleged has been produced by a body of 'anti-revisionists' in the Soviet Union - the "Stalin Group". This called openly for the overthrow of the present Soviet leadership and provoked a sharp denunciation on the Soviet radio.

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VIETNAM - PARIS TALKS

The North Vietnamese have in no way shifted from their opening position of demanding a total and unconditional cessation of the bombing before proceeding to talks on other matters. Their aim is apparently still to secure this cessation without meeting any of the American demands for reciprocal measures of de-escalation (thus admitting that "victim" and "aggressor" can be on the same footing) and without in any way restricting their future action, political or military. At the same time they are maintaining military pressure in South Vietnam, particularly on Saigon. They probably hope that this will produce sufficient public pressure, both in the US and internationally, to force the American negotiators to make further concessions and that their military pressure will produce a climate in South Vietnam favourable to compromise with the NLF possibly in a coalition government. For the moment, therefore, the North Vietnamese seem content to use the Paris talks as little more than a propaganda sounding-board for their attacks on the United States.

Chinese displeasure at the talks to which they have made no public reference has been expressed by Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, who has called on the North Vietnamese "to increase their resolve to fight and win". Since the beginning of the Paris talks posters in Peking supporting North Vietnam have been removed and there has been a decline in pro-North Vietnam manifestations.

The Russians are maintaining solidarity with Hanoi by echoing their uncompromising stand. The Russians apparently see either no reason, or no possibility, of inducing a more flexible line in Hanoi's approach. Mr. Gromyko was unbending during the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow on 22 and 23 May; he also indicated that he saw no prospect of an early reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

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NORTH KOREA

Changes in the relative positions of individuals in the published lists of the North Korean hierarchy suggest that Choe Hyon, a former Vice-Minister of Defence, Pok Song-chol, the Foreign Minister and Kim Chang-pong, the Minister of Defence now occupy positions of greater influence. They are all three closely concerned with policy vis-à-vis the South, particularly with the increased infiltration and guerilla activity which was noticeable during 1967.

In addition, the recent North Korean budget showed an increase of approximately one third in military expenditure over the previous year.

These developments within North Korea have been followed by speculation that the North may be preparing for some form of direct attack across the Demilitarized Zone. The North would however probably be deterred from a direct military assault by fear of retaliation, particularly as neither the Soviet Union or China would be likely to welcome a re-opening of hostilities in Korea. North Korea therefore will probably confine its activities to a further increase in infiltration activity, although because of the militant attitude of the régime, the possibility of a direct attack cannot be completely ruled out.

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CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

There are continuing signs that the Chinese are trying to return to rather more normal diplomatic relations with some developing countries. Notes delivered to the Burmese Government have lost some of their offensiveness. The Foreign Ministries of Guinea, Mali and Nepal visited Peking in May. The Guineans and Malians signed a joint agreement with the Chinese on railway construction (24 May). Protocols with the Tanzanians and Zambians, regarding the financing and construction of their joint railway project had already been signed on 8 April.

There were reports from Peking that Chou En-lai was once again contemplating foreign travel but these remain unconfirmed.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The list of Chinese leaders who appeared with Mao and Lin Piao at the Peking May Day celebrations was clearly designed once again, as at the major celebrations of last year, to give an impression of unity at the top and solid support by the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) The main differences by comparison with May Day 1967 consist in the absence of Yang Ch'eng-wu, Ch'i Pen-uy and other important persons who have recently been criticised and in the prominence accorded to the members of the Cultural Revolution Group (including Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing).

The leading group in the May Day list included, besides members of the Party Political Bureau and Cultural Revolution Group, the names of seven other leading figures most of whom are senior members of the armed forces. At two further meetings attended by Mao and Lin on 8 and 20 May, four of these, including the recently appointed Chief of General Staff, Huang Yung-sheng, and Lin Piao's wife, Yeh Ch'un, gained even greater prominence by being placed immediately after the members of the Cultural Revolution Group and before the ordinary members of the Political Bureau. These changes remain unexplained, but they seem to reflect the increasing influence at the centre of powerful groups associated with the armed forces and security apparatus. Certain other military leaders (for example Su Yu, a member of the Party's Military Commission) have however been relegated or criticised.

While these developments suggest that serious problems remain within the leadership, the most important leaders have apparently agreed, at least for the time being, to sink major differences in an effort to maintain control. A workable modus vivendi evidently exists between Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, and ostensibly extends also to Chiang Ch'ing, who enjoys the limelight among the leaders of the Cultural Revolution Group.

Two important editorials, published jointly by the People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily, on 1 and 16 May, outlined several important points of policy for the Cultural Revolution in its current stage. Both editorials emphasised the need for continued struggle against "class enemies"; that of 16 May denounced the "top capitalist-roaders", Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and other disgraced Party leaders (eight of whom were listed by name) as "renegades, secret agents and counter-revolutionary revisionists"; it implied that they should be treated virtually as major criminals.

The Chinese press continued to stress the importance of giving mass organisations a meaningful part to play within the new administrative system of Revolutionary Committees. One function now being fulfilled by workers' organisations, according to reports from several provinces, is that of armed vigilantes; they help the local public security personnel, now generally under military control, to maintain order, curb black-marketeering and carry out other police and security duties.

The joint editorial of 1 May set out the revised official line on "factionalism". The new line recognises the existence of factions among the proletariat as well as those which represent the bourgeoisie. It is apparently designed to prevent the condemnation of Left-wing organisations for their factional activities and to facilitate efforts at reconciliation between rival

factions. At the same time, the new line may involve a certain risk of weakening the position of P.L.A. representatives and officials in dealing with the mass organisations, but this danger has been counter-balanced to some extent by repeated appeals for support to the P.L.A. and co-operation with the majority of officials.

Following the Shensi Revolutionary Committee (established on 1 May), the Liaoning Committee was set up on 10 May. However, the formation of the Szechuan Committee was delayed until 31 May, despite an announcement over the provincial radio in late April that it was imminent. The provinces of Fukien and Yunnan and the regions of Kwangsi, Sinkiang and Tibet still remain without Revolutionary Committees. It was evident from the May Day attendance lists that representatives from all of these areas except Kwangsi were then in Peking, presumably holding discussions on the formation of Revolutionary Committees.

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CHRONOLOGY

May

- 1 May Day Celebrations.
1 Shensi Revolutionary Committee Established.
2 Announcement of Czechoslovak purchase of Iranian oil.
3 North Viet-Nam and United States announce agreement on holding Viet-Nam talks in Paris.
4 Soviet Union ratifies consular agreement with United States.
4-5 Czechoslovak Party First Secretary Dubcek visits Soviet Union.
5 150th Anniversary of Karl Marx's birth. Soviet Politburo member Suslov makes speech including attack on China.
5 New Viet Cong attacks on Saigon and other cities.
6 Polish Government protests to Czechoslovakia about "anti-Polish campaign".
6 New Czechoslovak Ambassador to Moscow presents credentials; President Podgorny refers to "anti-Socialist" elements in Czechoslovakia.
6-8 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
7 Dubcek gives interview to "Rude Pravo" on his visit to Moscow.
7 'Pravdo' article warns against Western 'subversion'.
7 Tass denies allegations of Soviet implication in Jan Masaryk's death.
7-8 Joint meeting of Presidium and Secretariat of Central Committee of Czechoslovak Communist Party.
7 'Kommunist' editorial attack on Chinese Cultural Revolution.
8 Meeting in Moscow of leaders of Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian Parties.
8 Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao receive Army cadres.
8 and 14-15 10th Session of Rumanian Grand National Assembly.
9 Silesian Party First Secretary Gierek speaks at Czechoslovak-Polish Friendship Rally.
9 Article by President Svoboda of Czechoslovakia in "Pravda".
9 Kosygin receives North Viet-Nameese Delegation, led by Xuan Thuy, en route to Paris.
9 Reports of closure of Czechoslovak-Polish frontier and of Soviet troop movements in Poland.
9 Anniversary of Czechoslovak Liberation attended by Soviet Marshal Konev.
9 Statement by Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin on Berlin situation.
10 United States-North Viet-Nameese talks open in Paris.
10 Liaoning Revolutionary Committee established.
11 Chinese protest to Yugoslavia about criticisms of Chinese policy.
11-17 Soviet warships visit Iraqi port.
12-13 Two day conference in Prague of Czechoslovak Central and Regional Communist Party leaders.
13 New China News Agency publishes pamphlet by "Stalin Group", alleged to exist in Soviet Union.
13 Sino-Mongolian Trade Protocol for 1968.
13-15 Yugoslav Foreign Minister visits Czechoslovakia.
14 All-Union Economic Conference of Soviet Union opens.

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May

- 14 Press conference by Czechoslovak Prime Minister.
14 Article in "Sovetskaya Rossiya" attacks former Czechoslovak President Tomas Masaryk.
14 Sino-Guinean Commercial Protocol for 1968.
14-18 President de Gaulle visits Rumania.
15 Announcement by Polish Government that exercises have been held near Czechoslovak border.
15 Statement by Czechoslovak President of National Assembly on Dubcek's visit to Moscow.
15 Soviet-UAR Agreement on Financing of Helwan Steel Works.
15-16 Polish Party First Secretary and Prime Minister visit Hungary.
16 Signature of Polish-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation.
17 Peoples Daily/Red Flag/Liberation Daily editorial: "An epoch-making document".
17-22 Soviet Defence Minister visits Czechoslovakia.
17-25 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visits Czechoslovakia for cure and consultations.
18 Czechoslovak protest to "DDR" about article in "Berliner Zeitung" of 9 May alleging US and Federal German military units in Czechoslovakia.
18-27 Soviet Chief of General Staff visits Iran.
18-25 Guinean and Malian Foreign Ministers visit China.
19-22 Czechoslovak Minister of Technology visits Soviet Union.
20-25 Austrian President visits Soviet Union.
20-25 Mongolian President visits Hungary.
21-28 Mexican Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union.
21, 22 and 23 Peking demonstrations in support of French and other unrest in the West.
22 "Izvestia" on failure of Chinese foreign policy.
22-23 British Foreign Secretary visits Soviet Union.
22-24 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visits Hungary.
23 Kurt Hager and other East German SED leaders visit Soviet Union.
23 Czechoslovak reply to Polish Note about "anti-Polish campaign".
24-25 Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak visits Soviet Union.
24 Announcement in Prague that Warsaw Pact Command-Staff exercise will take place in Czechoslovakia in June.
24 Meeting of North Vietnamese National Assembly.
24-1 June Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister visits China.
25-29 Foreign Minister of Upper Volta visits Bulgaria
25 China-Guinea-Mali Railway construction agreement.
25-1 June Soviet warships visit Karachi.
27-1 June President Ceausescu of Rumania visits Yugoslavia.
27 Chinese protest to UK over US naval visits to Hong Kong.
28 Tass statement attacking West German legislation on emergency powers.
28 Sino-Nepalese Trade Agreement and Protocol.
29-1 June Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Plenary meeting.
29-31 Ulbricht visits Soviet Union.
30 "Pravda" article likening anarchists in Europe to Mao.
31 Szechuan Revolutionary Committee formed.

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

JUNE, 1968.

SUMMARY

SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICY

The Soviet Foreign Minister's speech on 27 June presented the Soviet Union as a super power ready to negotiate from strength with the West, especially the United States. The only new item of substance was the offer to discuss the limitation and reduction of strategic missiles. On other disarmament questions there was no apparent significant change in position but the Russians may be more ready to discuss these questions. Gromyko avoided extremes over Vietnam and the Middle East. His proposal that preparations should start for a European security conference may be largely a propaganda move. He took a tough line on Eastern Europe and Germany. Generally the speech suggests no change in the general direction of Soviet foreign policy but a possible shift in tactics. It may affect the presentation of the Soviet position at the International Communist Conference. A speech by Brezhnev on 3 July provided a sharp contrast.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Warsaw Pact Exercise

This appears to have ended but there has been much confusion in Czechoslovakia lest the exercise was only a prelude to the stationing of allied troops.

Relations with the Soviet Union

These have continued to show signs of strain although high level contacts between the two countries have continued. The Soviet leaders appear still far from reassured about the policies of the Czechoslovak Government. The Russians may defer a decision about a loan to Czechoslovakia in order to maintain pressure on Prague.

Czechoslovak-East German Relations

The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister's visit to East Berlin probably did little to remove tension between the two countries.

General

Dubcek is still finding it difficult to strike a balance between pressures from liberals and conservatives. The Government and Party reacted strongly against an appeal for more radical measures.

CZECHOSLOVAK - HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

Visit of Dubcek and Cernik to Budapest

The Hungarians took the opportunity to express support for the Czechoslovak experiment. Kadar realizes the need to meet pressures in Hungary for more liberalisation but wants to keep progress at a manageable pace. Hungarian support is valuable for Czechoslovakia.

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INTERNAL SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

The student demonstrations reflected general dissatisfaction with the progress of economic reform. Tito enhanced his prestige by his offer of concessions but difficulties, including disagreements inside the Party, lie ahead.

BERLIN

The latest East German moves are an attempt to assert "D.D.R." sovereignty. The Soviet Government appear willing to back Ulbricht but not to want a major crisis.

SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Political

A number of recent personnel changes suggest that steps may be being taken to reduce the risk that Brezhnev might abuse his power as General Secretary, but there are no signs of any serious friction in the Politburo.

Economic

The All-Union Economic Conference revealed several complaints about the progress of economic reform although the general view was that it should be completed more rapidly.

SOVIET ATTITUDE TO YOUTH

The Russians are concerned that actions by extremist student leaders in the West will damage the orthodox Communist movement. The Chinese have warmly supported all the examples of student revolt.

THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Preparations are continuing for the International Communist Conference. The Russians are maintaining their ideological attacks on Mao, probably with an eye to the Conference.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

In order to keep alive the revolutionary spirit, Mao and his supporters seem ready to take the risk of some increase in disorders. So far, however, the disputes in different provinces, although violent, appear to centre on local issues. The Army has a hard task holding the ring.

SINO-NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

China is increasingly isolated on the Vietnam issue. There are indications of a worsening of relations with Hanoi.

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SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICY

The Soviet Foreign Minister reviewed international affairs in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 27 June. This was the most important and extensive statement of the position of the Soviet Government to have been given for some time. Mr. Gromyko's language was measured and relatively restrained. The speech was designed to indicate a positive approach to the main international problems and to relations with other States. With one exception it contained little of substance that was new but it was of considerable interest because of the relative emphasis which it gave to various questions.

The general purpose of the speech was to present the Soviet Union as a super power confident of its strength and jealous of its interests; devoted to the solution of international problems; and ready and because it was strong, well able, to negotiate and deal with the "imperialist powers", notably the United States, if those powers were prepared to draw the correct conclusions from the alleged bankruptcy of some of their policies, and to seek the basis of agreement with the Soviet Union and her friends and allies. The criticisms of "imperialism" were strong and the analysis of its decline was conventional. But the tone of the speech lacked the sharpness which had marked recent articles in the Soviet Press which had appeared to snub appeals by President Johnson for an increase in Soviet-American co-operation.

The new item was Gromyko's statement that the Soviet Government was ready for an exchange of views on the mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems a statement which was quickly followed by President Johnson's announcement that the two sides had agreed to start talks "in the nearest future". Gromyko also reaffirmed the Soviet interest in pursuing discussion on a wide range of other disarmament questions, and this was given greater precision by Kosygin in the Soviet memorandum (handed over after the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) setting out the measures on which the Soviet Government would like to see agreement. The encouraging feature of the memorandum is the interest shown in curbing the nuclear arms race. On other questions there appears to be no indication of any significant change in position which the Soviet Government has long held; for example, while advocating that underground nuclear tests should stop the Russians continue to reject any idea of control by inspection. It is thus too soon to judge whether progress is likely to be possible on these other aspects of disarmament, but it seems likely that the Soviet Union intends to pursue discussion of them with greater vigour.

The decision to discuss missile limitation must be regarded as an important one. It is reasonable to assume that it is the outcome of intensive debate in the Soviet leadership since it implies a willingness, if the discussions should make progress, to halt the development of an anti-ballistic missile system in the Soviet Union. An important reason for this decision is almost certainly a concern among the Soviet leadership about the heavy cost of establishing a "thick" system of anti-ballistic missiles, and the damaging effect of this on the Soviet economy as a whole. A further consideration may well have been the need to respond to the wide international pressure for the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be followed by further action by the nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race and reduce their stockpiles.

Gromyko took the standard Soviet line on Vietnam but he did not devote himself extensively to this question. He avoided extremes of language and reaffirmed the Soviet desire that a settlement should be reached. He

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was also brief on the Middle East but again showed a wish to appear constructive, for instance in commending the Jarring Mission. Mr. Kosygin's mention on 1 July of the possibility of including the Middle East among areas susceptible to arms limitation agreements was the first public reference by the Soviet Government to this idea; however the Soviet memorandum on disarmament makes clear that the Russians are still insisting on Israeli withdrawal as a precondition for any discussion on arms limitation in the area.

After a period of several months in which the Soviet Union has had little to say on the subject of a conference on European security Gromyko dealt at some length with this subject. Here again, however, he had nothing new to say. He emphasised the solidarity which he claimed inspired the Soviet Union and their Eastern European allies in their approach to problems of European security and he largely rested his argument on the proposals as set out in the Bucharest and Karlovy Vary statements. Gromyko proposed that preparations should begin for a European conference on European Security and co-operation and declared the readiness of the Soviet Union for discussions with other European governments. He complained, however, that some Western European countries were not willing to discuss the essence of the matter but were attaching too much importance to questions of procedure. His language, without being precise on the question of American participation, made it effectively plain that he contemplated a conference of European States alone. The Russians may intend this passage largely as a propaganda move.

Gromyko took a firm line on the need to preserve the unity of the East European countries stressing, with Czechoslovakia obviously in mind, that any attempt to remove even one "link" from among them would not be permitted.

Some of Gromyko's strongest language was directed against the Federal Republic of Germany, although he reaffirmed the willingness of the Soviet Union to keep discussions going with the Federal Government.

A particularly sour passage on relations with China appeared in the section of the speech dealing with relations with non-Communist countries. Gromyko accused "Mao Tse-tung's group" of vying with imperialist propaganda in their slander of the Soviet Union and of betraying Marxism-Leninism. He asserted that it was their fault that trade between the two countries had shrunk by 95% since 1959 and that cultural ties had been severed.

No reliable indication of a change in the general direction of Soviet foreign policy can be deduced from the speech, although it does suggest a possible shift in tactics. However, the decision to discuss nuclear missiles, the emphasis on the Soviet Union's great power status and the expressed interest in taking part - by implication with the United States - in the solution of major international questions suggest that the Russians are more ready to assert publicly that on certain issues at least the concurrence of the super powers is essential and, by implication, that co-operation between them is necessary. Nevertheless too much should not be made of the undogmatic tone of the speech. It must be noted that this was a speech in the name of the Government and not in the name of the Party. Therefore while Gromyko made the obligatory references to the ideological struggle he did not have to develop ideological themes in the way in which these are developed in Party statements, and which give a characteristically negative and aggressive impression of Soviet relations with the rest of the world. Nor did he mention the forthcoming conference of Communist Parties, presumably because that is a matter to be left for Party statements.

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Nevertheless, the speech may contain indications of the themes which the Soviet Union wishes to establish for the conference. Anti-imperialism has already been accepted as a major theme, but this may be found to have limitations. The fact that the United States and North Vietnam are engaged in talks takes some of the edge off the Vietnamese issue. The decision by the Soviet Government to talk with the United States Government about missiles offers a prospect of co-operation which similarly puts some limitation on the exploitation of anti-imperialism. While therefore it is to be expected that this subject will continue to play a prominent part at the conference, the Soviet leadership may be concerned that the policies which they perhaps feel obliged to follow in their international relations may make it more difficult to put across convincingly the anti-imperialist theme which is an important ingredient of their efforts to establish communist solidarity. It is also possible that the Russians intend to give emphasis to the theme of European security at the conference. Finally, Gromyko's attack on China confirms other indications that the Soviet Union have by no means abandoned their design to keep that issue before the conference.

A speech by Brezhnev on 3 July provided, in the sharpest tones, an example of a Party approach and the other face of Soviet attitudes. In this speech Brezhnev spoke in the most critical unfriendly terms about a number of Western countries, especially the United States but also including some, such as France, about whom Gromyko had made favourable remarks. This speech was directed primarily at a domestic and international communist audience and Brezhnev probably had much in mind the need to keep the anti-imperialist theme in the foreground during the months leading up to the Conference of Communist Parties in November. Despite the strong contrast this speech should probably not be taken as cancelling out the foreign policy intentions of the Soviet Government as set out in Gromyko's speech.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Warsaw Pact Exercise

The Warsaw Pact Command and Staff Exercise planned for late June has been the main item of the month. Czechoslovak official statements about the exercise have as much as admitted that it was hastily planned. This fact and public nervousness in Czechoslovakia about the scale and nature of the exercise have led to considerable confusion and speculation. The exercise, in which Soviet, Polish, Hungarian and East German staffs and units took part, began on 20 June and according to the Czechoslovaks ended on 30 June. According to Czechoslovak official statements this was essentially a staff/communications exercise and it has been emphasised that foreign troops participating in it would leave Czechoslovakia after it was over. Fears that the exercise was only a prelude to the stationing of allied troops in Czechoslovakia have, however, not yet been allayed.

Relations with the Soviet Union

Although both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have presented the exercise as an example of close cooperation between the members of the Warsaw Pact, relations between the two countries have continued to show signs of considerable strain. A series of articles in the Soviet press during June reflect concern about developments in Czechoslovakia, especially the results of the Central Committee's Meeting at the end of May. The Soviet Government made a formal protest to the Czechoslovak Government on 7 June, about anti-Soviet articles in the press and on 14 June Pravda published a long theoretical article by Academician Konstantinov which accused a Secretary of the Central Committee, Dr. Čestmír Císař, of expressing revisionist ideas in a speech on the occasion of the 150th Anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx. Konstantinov argued that Císař's ideas, in particular the assertion that Leninists must not be allowed to claim a monopoly interpretation of Marxism, were such as lead inevitably to the abandonment of Marxism altogether. On both occasions, the Czechoslovak press reacted sharply to these criticisms. It was, in particular, pointed out that the Pravda article was a remarkable personal attack on a Secretary of a fraternal party at the very moment when the Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly was paying an official visit to Moscow.

High level contacts between the two countries have continued. Immediately after the end of the Central Committee Meeting, a Czechoslovak Parliamentary Delegation led by the Chairman of the National Assembly, Smrkovsky, visited Moscow and had meetings with Brezhnev and Podgorny. Smrkovsky later said that at all levels he had found agreement with the view that every Socialist country should solve its internal affairs according to its own internal conditions. For their part, the Czechoslovak Delegation were careful in their public statements to play down features of development in Czechoslovakia about which the Soviet Government had expressed concern and to emphasise their country's loyalty to the Soviet alliance. Significantly, Smrkovsky was criticised, on his return to Prague, for having gone too far in his attempts to reassure the Russians on these points. Nevertheless, the visit appears to have been the occasion of some remarkably plain speaking, in particular about the freedom of the Czechoslovak mass media.

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The fact that hostile comment about Czechoslovakia in the Soviet press has been, if anything, intensified since this visit suggests that the Soviet leaders are still far from reassured.

The Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the conduct of economic affairs, Strougal, also visited Moscow in June to continue discussions on economic cooperation between the two countries. The possibility of a Soviet loan to Czechoslovakia was no doubt discussed, but the subsequent statement that this question was to be considered again early in July by experts shows that no decision has been reached. The Soviet leaders are likely to continue to use Czechoslovakia's need for hard currency as a way of bringing pressure to bear on the Czechoslovak leadership to moderate their domestic policies. It may well be, therefore, that no decision will be taken about it before the Party Congress in September at the earliest. During Strougal's visit two agreements were signed about the supply of raw materials by the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia, although it is too early to say what is the significance, if any, of these in the context of Czechoslovak requests for an improved trading and currency relationship with the Soviet Union.

Czechoslovak-East German Relations

The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Hajek, visited East Berlin on 18 and 19 June and held talks with the East German Foreign Minister, Winzer, and Ulbricht. Although both sides expressed "understanding" of each other's position at the end of this visit, it seems unlikely that these exchanges did much to remove the tension which has characterised relations between the two countries.

General

Events since the Central Committee Meeting have again underlined the delicacy of the Czechoslovak leaders' position. Dubcek has continued to take every opportunity to rally support to his own moderate approach and to try to contain the more extreme liberals whose ideas cause sharp concern both to moderate and conservative opinion in Czechoslovakia (perhaps including Dubcek himself) and to the Soviet Union. Yet to do this, as emerged clearly from addresses he gave to meetings of the National Front on 15 June and the Trades Union Congress on 19 June, he has been compelled to lay increasing emphasis on an appeal to national unity and the need for support for the Party and its Action Programme and less on intra-Party democracy and dialogue. At the same time, the Government's determination not to abandon their declared objectives was shown by the passage in the National Assembly, by overwhelming majorities, of two major parts of their legislative programme - the bills for Judicial Rehabilitations and the abolition of censorship.

Dubcek's appeals have not yet been successful and pressures for greater liberalisation remain strong. The anxieties and demands of the radicals were crystallised by the publication on 27 June of an appeal entitled "Two Thousand Words to Everybody", signed by 70 prominent writers and scientists. The appeal, launched during the period of the elections of delegates to the Party Congress in September, called for new initiatives to resist conservative influences, if necessary by the use of strikes and by setting up local committees. Reacting strongly to this appeal, the Party Presidium accused its signatories of attacking the Party leaders and of endangering the achievement of the Action Programme. The evident alarm of the leadership about the possible consequences of the appeal may be explained by a combination of several factors, including the continuing strength of the conservatives in the Party organs and the danger of industrial unrest. The appeal also, in effect, challenged the Party's declared

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hostility to opposition groups outside the National Front. The Presidium may also have decided that any sign of weakness in this matter might have served as a pretext for the Czechoslovak conservatives or the Russians to claim that "anti-socialist" forces in Czechoslovakia had reached dangerous strength. Continuing Soviet press criticism of internal developments in Czechoslovakia may in itself be intended as a warning that there may be limits to what the Soviet Union will tolerate; and the appeal was launched at a time when Warsaw Pact forces were still engaged in their exercises in Czechoslovakia.

There is no reason to doubt that Dubcek is sincere in proclaiming the need to preserve the dominant role of the Party and to contain "anti-socialist" elements. If he could guarantee success in this it would go a long way towards reassuring the Soviet and other East European regimes. These critics are evidently, however, far from reassured. They seem to fear that the compromises which Dubcek is making in the search for national unity represent a long term threat, if not a short term one, to the role of the Czechoslovak Party and the preservation of "socialism".

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CZECHOSLOVAK - HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

Visit of Dubcek and Cernik to Budapest

This was Dubcek's first visit abroad, apart from the Soviet Union, and reflected, in Dubcek's words a "new quality" in relations between the Hungarians and the new regime in Prague. Kadar expressed his full solidarity with the Czechoslovaks and implied that both parties were moving in the same direction, but he added the proviso that "Socialist solidarity" should be preserved and revisionist elements kept in check. He also appealed to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which had been the source of some difficulty to Dubcek, to rally round the Czechoslovak leadership. Dubcek thanked the Hungarians for their support and echoed their expressions of loyalty to the alliance with the Soviet Union. In contrast with Kadar, however, Dubcek added to his support for East Germany an expression of Czechoslovakia's wish for normal relations with Bonn, subject to guarantees against a revival of Nazism.

In taking a line sympathetic to Czechoslovakia, Kadar was probably not only following his own conscience but also well aware of the need to respond to pressures in Hungary for progressive liberalisation in the social and political as well as the economic fields. He is concerned to make progress, but at a manageable pace. He will also be aware, however, of the importance of avoiding the danger that by giving unqualified support to Czechoslovakia he would be regarded by the Russians and others as launching Hungary upon an identical path, thus increasing the threat which those reactionary elements in the Warsaw Pact see being posed to their own internal and external interests. Hungarian pronouncements are therefore carefully balanced; they are careful to emphasise that Czechoslovakia is doing nothing which need cause concern to other "socialist" countries. Nevertheless in giving his support to Czechoslovakia, Kadar is establishing a relationship which may not only have important consequences for the development of further liberalism in Hungary itself, but may, by strengthening the links between the two countries, notably increase the force of the liberal idea in Eastern Europe.

The value to Czechoslovakia of this forthcoming Hungarian attitude is obvious. It means a friend in the Communist camp so long as Czechoslovakia continues (as Dubcek no doubt intends her to continue) to profess solidarity. It may provide the basis for joint efforts to improve the arrangements in C.M.E.A.; it may mean an ally in the campaign for some measure of convertibility (both Hungary and Czechoslovakia are interested in joining the I.M.F.); and it may help Dubcek on the international front.

The conclusion of the Friendship Treaty between the two countries is not in itself of particular significance. The existing Treaty was due to run out next year, the Czechoslovaks had already concluded one with the Bulgarians earlier this year and the Treaties with all the other Warsaw Pact countries, except Rumania (with whom the existing Treaty remains in force until next month) had already been negotiated before the change of regime. It is of interest, however, that the Treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia contains references to the Federal Republic of Germany of an unusually mild and ambiguous nature. The Hungarians, whatever may be their inner feelings, are prepared to go along with the traditional Communist attacks, whereas the Czechoslovaks, possibly with an eye on credits from the Federal Republic of Germany, prefer to tone down their attacks. These sections of the Treaty look like a compromise, and there seems no reason to suppose that the Hungarians found it a difficult one to accept.

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INTERNAL SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

Demonstrations began in Belgrade on 2 June with a brawl between students and young workers over admission to a musical performance. Students turned on the police who attempted to break up the fight and were dispersed with some force. Meetings were subsequently held at which demands were made for, among other things, a reduction in social inequality and unemployment, increased democracy and self-management, university reforms, freedom of the press and of demonstration, and the dismissal of those to blame for the militia's rough handling of the students. Students in other cities gave those in Belgrade verbal support but little else. On 9 June Tito delivered a radio and TV address which was conciliatory in tone. He expressed his conviction that the students' revolt had come about spontaneously, though it had been infiltrated to a certain extent by "alien" elements. The essential justice of the students' demands was incontestable; the workers had problems too which were even more pressing. "If I am not capable of solving these problems, in that event I should not any longer occupy the place where I am. I think that not a single old communist among us who has the consciousness of a communist should insist on remaining where he is, but should yield his place to people who are more capable".

Tito's speech was greeted with enthusiasm and was followed by a return to work at Belgrade University and the publication on 14 June of Party guidelines for future action. These emphasised the need to operate existing policies efficiently rather than to change them.

The student unrest seems to reflect a general atmosphere of doubt and dissatisfaction in Yugoslavia over the progress of the economic reform. Where enterprises are not implementing the reform quickly enough, students complain that too many jobs are still filled by Party stalwarts without appropriate qualifications; on the other hand some firms which are operating in the spirit of the reform are more intent at present on reducing staff than on recruiting graduate trainees. But if these and other grievances are to be redressed the solution may lie in more Federal and "bureaucratic" intervention in the economy and less self-management. This is the reverse of what students were demanding, and some press comment suggested that they were being manipulated by conservatives who did not want the reform to work. The speed with which the Federal Chamber and the Federal Executive Council adopted on 5 and 6 June various measures aimed at expanding the building industry and increasing the recruitment and mobility of labour was the subject of sarcastic comment, the Party weekly "Ekonomska Politika" noting that the same people had been considering the same problems in depth for some time before the student demonstrations without apparently feeling that such radical action was necessary.

While the Government has the present situation under control and Tito's prestige has, if anything, been enhanced by his skilful handling of the students, it seems that a difficult period may lie ahead. One sign of this is the postponement (not yet publicly announced) of the Ninth Party Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which was due to take place towards the end of this year. There are indications that an intensified struggle is going on between the reformers and reactionaries over the future of self-management and the role of the Party, and more time is evidently needed to resolve this. In a speech to the Yugoslav Trade Union Congress on 26 June Tito made references to both "dogmatist" and "technocrat" opponents of party policy and promised radical action to improve the economic situation and reduce inequality of incomes.

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BERLIN

The latest East German measures which were passed in the Volkskammer (People's Chamber) and announced on 11 June extend passport and visa requirements for the first time to Germans residing in the Federal Republic and West Berlin who wish to travel between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Imposts on inter-zonal goods traffic were announced at the same time, together with changes in customs documentation for freight in transit through East Germany between Berlin and the Federal Republic. These moves followed East German decrees of 10 March and 13 April which had affected travel by limited categories of Germans from the Federal Republic.

The East German Minister of the Interior, Herr Dickel, told the Volkskammer that the new measures were being introduced because of the adoption by the Federal Parliament of legislation to provide for emergency powers. He also declared that the measures had been taken in answer to the 'presumption' to sole representation of "West German ruling circles". There is in fact no valid connection between the new measures and the Federal emergency legislation (which is broadly comparable with provisions made in other parliamentary democracies to cover states of emergency, and which does not in any case apply to West Berlin). The East German moves are clearly an attempt to assert East Germany's claim for recognition as a sovereign state.

The visa procedures have been efficiently applied and there have been no undue delays to road traffic. The measures affecting freight have not yet come into force and it is too early to judge how far they might affect the flow of goods between the Federal Republic and Berlin. Meanwhile certain Allied countermeasures, endorsed by N.A.T.O., have been taken in the travel field against the East Germans.

The Soviet View

The Soviet Representatives, who were summoned in the Allied capitals on 14 June and told of the grave Allied concern at the East German actions, played down the significance of the measures, which they described as "procedural". They claimed that they were not intended to limit Berlin's normal economic and cultural relations with the Federal Republic, nor to interfere with Allied access. They too asserted that the measures were a reaction to the Federal emergency legislation. Pravda came out in support, and it seems clear that although the Russians are not looking for a major crisis at present, they feel obliged to support Herr Ulbricht so long as Allied rights are not openly and directly called in question.

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SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Political

Changes in the leadership of the Young Communist League on 12 June were a sign that political adjustments are continuing. The transfer of the First Secretary, Pavlov, to a less important job in charge of sport can be seen as a blow at one of the few remaining colleagues of Shelepin to hold positions of influence. (Until a year ago the latter appeared to be a political challenge to Brezhnev). The appointment in Pavlov's place of Tyazhelnikov, an obscure provincial Party Secretary from the Urals who had become known for his practical approach to social questions, suggested that the Party is seeking more effective ways of forestalling problems with youth. The replacement of another Secretary dealing with international student affairs, and also of the Chairman of the Committee of Youth Organisations, indicated the seriousness of the Party's concern, especially since these changes were made in the middle of preparations for the Sofia Youth Festival.

One might have expected to see Brezhnev's influence in the new appointments, of the kind which was obvious when one of his acquaintances was appointed to the new Ministry of Public Order eighteen months ago. But there is no firm evidence for this; On the contrary, there are indications that measures are being taken to reduce the danger that Brezhnev might abuse the power which he has as General Secretary. Thus, for example, it is fairly clear that a new Departmental Head and a Central Committee Secretary (Ustinov) have been interposed between him and the powerful Central Committee Administrative Organs Department (which has an important say in police and military matters). Until recently it was thought that Brezhnev controlled this Department directly. A similar filter seems to have been placed between him and other Departments. The means by which this control, if such it is, has been established are not clear. It seems probable that they are the result of a consensus in the Politburo to which Brezhnev has assented. There are no signs of any serious friction. There is insufficient basis for speculation that these developments mean an increase in the influence of Kosygin or other members of the Politburo, but they may reflect uneasiness about the possibility of a return to one-man leadership in the light of the efforts being made in some quarters to restore the reputation of Stalin. It has been rumoured in the past that Brezhnev wished to do this, but the main support for 're-Stalinisation' seems to be centred in more conservative elements in the military Party and Government bureaucracies. The main purveyors of the idea are a very few writers, including military and other historians.

Economic

An All-Union Economic Conference, held in Moscow on 14-17 May, discussed the progress of the economic reform and possible further adjustments. There were a number of complaints about the slow progress of the economic reforms, especially in connection with the use of investment and incentives, and with bureaucratic delays in the supply branch and in introducing new technology. Very few speakers from the floor proposed any important alterations in the direction of the reform. Baibakov, the Chairman of Gosplan, indicated in his main speech that there would be a shift towards a demand-oriented system, but he rejected any more radical suggestions, such as that State corporations might be granted independent access to foreign markets, and attacked the views of Soviet radical economists. Although the Conference did not characterize the general state of the economy, it showed that the Soviet Union already faces in some branches a labour shortage which is expected to become more

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generally acute. In spite of the large participation (5,000 people) and the importance and topicality of the subjects discussed, the Conference was not attended by the three top leaders. The conference was conducted in a low key and there may have been a deliberate intention to play it down in view of the difficulties which the reforms have run into.

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SOVIET ATTITUDE TO YOUTH

Soviet comment on the student demonstrations and their aftermath in France and other Western countries has revealed considerable apprehension. The commentators have declared support for the student movement as a whole, claiming that they are rightly protesting against the evils of capitalist society. But they draw a sharp distinction between the 'mass' of the students and the extremist militant leaders, such as Cohn-Bendit, whom they have portrayed as irresponsible adventurers, anarchists, Trotskyites and Maoists, seeking to confuse the movement and divide it from the workers and the Communist Parties. An article by Yuri Zhukov in Pravda of May 30 made a particularly bitter attack on the ideological attitudes of the extremists, as represented by Prof. Marcuse, who was condemned for attacking industrial society as a whole, instead of the capitalist system; for making the intellectual elite, not the workers, the vanguard of the revolution; and for substituting the conflict between generations for the class struggle.

The Russians are clearly concerned that the Communist parties in Western Europe, by seeking power through the existing political system, have failed to capture the imagination of the young, who have instead been led astray into false doctrines of revolution "blasphemously using Marx's name". They are probably even more worried that the pattern of student protest may infect the East European Countries and even the Soviet Union. The demonstrations in Prague in October 1967 and in Poland during March this year have already revealed the resentment of the students in these countries against unenlightened bureaucratic control from above. President Tito's action in admitting the justice of the students complaints in Yugoslavia makes a bad precedent for other Communist countries, and Soviet press reports of these events have been selected from Yugoslav sources in such a way as to stress the role attributed to 'alien elements' and to conceal the extent of Tito's concessions. Mass protest in the Soviet Union is not likely, but there is manifest anxiety about the political apathy or dissent of Soviet youth.

The Russians' worries will be increased by the imminence of the World Youth Festival, jointly organised by the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, which is due to take place in Sofia in July/August. They may well fear that some of the frustrations may break out there and have been warning prospective delegates to come well prepared against efforts to subvert the Festival.

The Chinese have suffered none of these inhibitions, and have welcomed all examples of student revolt with indiscriminate enthusiasm. Mass rallies in support of the French students were held in Peking. Reports spoke of the 'storm of the revolutionary mass movement' sweeping France, while the French Communist Party and the Russians were condemned for betraying the revolution.

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THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

A further meeting of the Working Group to prepare the international Communist conference took place in Budapest from 19-21 June. The 38 participating Communist Parties exchanged views on the documents to be submitted to the conference on the single item of its agenda: "the tasks of the struggle against imperialism and the unity of action of Communist Parties and other anti-imperialist forces". However the Communiqué issued after the meeting did not report progress on the substance of the discussion, only claiming agreement on the "further work of the Working Group".

The Rumanians attended as observers. They seem anxious to take part in the preparations lest they incur the charge of breaching Communist unity but they continue to insist that no party should be "attacked, condemned or blamed", and that there should be wider participation at the Conference.

Disregarding the Rumanians, the Russians continued their polemical attack on the Chinese, completing a series of three articles in the party magazine Kommunist. These articles advocate a more active policy against Mao's regime. The Russians say that Mao has brought about the destruction of China's political system and the paralysis of her Communist Party. Attempts are being made to set up a Maoist Party which will have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. As a result Chinese society is being polarised into supporters and opponents of Mao. The latter are listed as being the anti-Maoists in the party and army, the qualified workers to whom Mao opposes unskilled recruits from the countryside, potentially the peasantry which has shown some resistance, the bulk of the intelligentsia except for a group of technicians (mainly those concerned with the nuclear programme), and, finally, the minorities, especially in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. It is admitted, however that Mao's opponents have not "a single centralised organisation" or a political platform and there is no specific commendation of individual opposition leaders, although Liu Shao-Ch'i and others are named as the victims of Mao's campaigns.

The articles refer to the need for 'international aid' for Mao's opponents, although they do not specify what form this should take. Simultaneously the Communist Parties must give a "collective rebuff" to Mao's foreign policy which is dangerous, in spite of its failures, as it is backed by the economic, military and manpower potential of China. The developing countries are warned that Mao's policy towards the national liberation movements can only weaken them, but it is admitted by implication that Maoism can succeed in backward countries with large peasant populations, as it did in China.

In asserting that in future foreign Parties would be dealing with a Chinese Party that was Communist in name only, the Russians have taken a stage further their formal position on the breach in the international movement. This has been timed to influence the preparations for the international conference, but their further intentions remain unclear. It is possible that they will make a strong attack at the conference and may try to give further mileage to the view that 'Mao Tse-tung's party' is beyond the pale and that no self-respecting party should have relations with it.

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CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mao's hope of keeping alive the spirit of the Cultural Revolution was reflected in his instructions, published on 2 June, emphasising the importance of "protecting the masses". In line with this instruction, newspapers published numerous articles calling for renewed mass participation in the current tasks of the campaign. There have been reminders that the system of Revolutionary Committees must not be challenged and that "over ninety per cent of cadres are good or comparatively good", but the general tenor or press comment has been calculated to encourage greater militancy.

The rectification of the Communist Party was discussed again in the Shanghai Wen-hui Pao. The articles on this subject show that the task of rebuilding the Party remains on the agenda, but they suggest that the leaders are now less interested in any time schedule for completing this task and more concerned to stimulate revolutionary fervour in the conduct of rectification.

While Mao and his supporters clearly have no wish to promote violent struggles between factions, there have been suggestions that they are prepared to accept the risk of some increase in disorders in the effort to foster greater militancy. Newspapers at provincial level have revived the theme (propounded by Lin Piao earlier in the Cultural Revolution) that disorder may be beneficial in exposing the enemy. They have criticised as harmful the tendency to fear disorder and seek stability. Statements of this kind have doubtless given encouragement to extremists and malcontents who remain active in Red Guard and Rebel organizations in many areas. There was a significant increase in the number of reports of clashes between rival factions, in some cases involving the army. Among the places affected were several areas of South China, including Kwangtung province. Violent disputes have been commonly described in local newspapers as "civil wars", but, as far as is known, all such disputes centre on local issues, with both sides professing their loyalty to Mao. The available evidence suggests that the disorders have not reached such serious proportions as in mid-1967.

An increased level of activity by mass organisations is bound to impose additional strains on the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.), both in its work of assisting with the administration through Revolutionary Committees and in its exercise of public security duties. A possible reference to P.L.A. misgivings over its political role appeared in the Liberation Army Daily of 16 June: the editorial pointed out that it was not enough merely to carry out political assignments, but that it was necessary to understand the political significance of the work in hand. The editorial acknowledged that the armed forces faced "arduous tasks" with the additional duty of training new recruits (following the recent resumption of recruitment after a break since early 1966). However, it suggested that the P.L.A. could cope with any difficulties and attain further "revolutionisation", provided that it paid due regard to education in the class struggle.

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SINO-NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Recent visits to Peking by the Foreign Ministers of Mali and Guinea and by President Nyerere of Tanzania served, among other things, to emphasise the extreme isolation of the Chinese regarding the Paris talks on Vietnam. None of these visitors was prepared to endorse the Chinese line in public. In contrast, the Chinese leaders spoke on the subject in a way that can only have been embarrassing for their guests.

At a reception for the Guinean and Malian Foreign Ministers on 24 May, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien failed to include the customary praise of Vietnam. The same was true of Chen Yi's speeches at a reception for the Nepalese Foreign Minister on 26 May and at the Nepalese National Day on 11 June. In his speech at the Banquet for President Nyerere on 18 June, Chou En-lai condemned the American "peace talks scheme" and urged the Vietnamese people to persevere in protracted war.

The Chinese leaders have continued to withhold from their own public the fact that the Paris talks are taking place, although responsible cadres are well briefed. However, the Chinese press has ceased to provide significant coverage of Vietnamese events, even of Vietcong successes in the Saigon area. Unconfirmed reports have been received that demonstrations took place about 12 June outside the North Vietnamese Consulates in Canton, Nanning and Kunming, ostensibly in support of the North Vietnamese for their determination to continue the struggle in Vietnam, but by implication condemning the Paris talks. North Vietnamese consular officials were reported to have been obliged to take part. There were also reports of an interruption of railway communications between China and Vietnam. The North Vietnamese Ambassador who left Peking on 28 April for unexplained reasons has only now returned.

A North Vietnamese Economic Delegation, led by Le Than Ngi, has left Vietnam on its annual aid pilgrimage. Normally China has headed the list of Donors, but this time there is no sign of any negotiations so far with the Chinese. A report from Hanoi suggests that the Chinese may be demonstrating their displeasure over the Paris talks by refusing aid on the first time of asking, and reserving their position until the results of the Mission's visits to other countries have become apparent.

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- 10 - 13 U.A.R. Foreign Minister visits East Germany.
- 10 - 15 President of India visits Yugoslavia.
- 11 East German regime imposes regulations for passports and visas on travel to and from the Federal Republic and Berlin.
- 11 Soviet protest to Czechoslovakia at publication of "anti-Soviet" story in Czechoslovak newspaper.
- 11 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister reports to Czechoslovak National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee.
- 11 Chinese Foreign Minister condemns U.N. Resolution on non-Proliferation Treaty.
- 12 Allied Three-power Statement on East German restrictions.
- 12 Tyazhelnikov appointed Soviet Komsomol First Secretary.
- 12 Soviet/Czechoslovak Economic Agreement signed.
- 12 - 15 Federal German Foreign Minister visits Yugoslavia.
- 13 Iran/Soviet Economic Co-operation Agreement.
- 13 - 15 U.A.R. Foreign Minister visits Poland.
- 13 - 16 Czechoslovak Party First Secretary and Prime Minister visits Hungary.
- 13 - 24 Finnish President visits Soviet Union on holiday.
- 14 Pravda article criticises speech by Cisar, Czechoslovak Party Secretary.
- 14 Three-power protest on Berlin to Soviet Ambassadors in capitals.
- 14 Ratification of United States/Soviet Consular Convention.
- 15 North Korean Parliamentary Delegation visits Cambodia.
- 16 Signature of Czechoslovak/Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation.
- 17 Czechoslovak/North Vietnamese Economic Technical and Aid Agreement for 1969.
- 17 Interview with Soviet Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces published in Czechoslovak "Rude Pravo".
- 17 - 18 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visits East Germany.
- 17 - 25 President of Chad visits Soviet Union.
- 18 Statement by (pro-Chinese) Malayan Communist Party on Twentieth Anniversary of start of "Liberation War".
- 18 Federal German Foreign Minister sees Soviet Ambassador in Berlin.
- 18 Soviet Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces arrives in Prague for start of Warsaw Pact exercise.
- 18 Chinese Prime Minister calls for protracted war in Vietnam.
- 18 - 21 Meeting of Working Group preparing for International Communist Conference in Budapest.

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- 1 "Kommunist" article on Chinese Foreign Policy.
- 1 Diplomatic relations established between Soviet Union and Singapore.
- 1 - 15 Malian military delegation visits China.
- 2 Mao Tse-tung's instruction on "protecting the masses".
- 2 - 3 Student demonstrations in Yugoslavia.
- 3 North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho joins Peace Talks in Paris.
- 3 - 8 British President of Board of Trade visits Soviet Union.
- 3 - 14 King of Afghanistan visits Soviet Union.
- 3 - 15 Czechoslovak National Assembly Delegation, led by Smrkovsky, visits Soviet Union.
- 4 President Johnson's Glassboro speech calls for United States/Soviet co-operation.
- 5 - 7 Rumanian Party Delegation visits Hungary.
- 5 - 9 Soviet ships visit Iranian Ports.
- 5 - 10 British Foreign Secretary visits Yugoslavia.
- 5 - 10 President of Congo (Brazzaville) visits Rumania.
- 5 - 9 Lebanese Foreign Minister visits Moscow.
- 6 'People's Daily' Commentator article criticising French C.P. leaders.
- 6 - 8 Plenum of East German SED Central Committee.
- 6 - 10 President of India visits Hungary.
- 6 - 11 Bulgarian President visits Finland.
- 7 Polish/North Vietnamese agreement on Economic Co-operation, Aid and Trade for 1969.
- 7 - 11 Italian Communist Party Delegation visits Rumania.
- 9 President Tito announces concessions to Yugoslav students.
- 9 Reports of Chinese aid to Naga Rebels.
- 9 Central Committee of Yugoslav League of Communists adopt "guidelines".
- 10 Chinese warning over alleged Indian air intrusion over Tibet.
- 10 Report of election of Pavlov, lately Soviet Komsomol Secretary, as Chairman of Central Sports Council.
- 10 - 12 Polish Prime Minister visits Denmark.
- 10 - 13 Czechoslovak Economic Mission led by Deputy Premier Strougal visits Soviet Union.
- 10 - 13 President of Congo (Brazzaville) visits Bulgaria.

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- 18 - 22 President of Tanzania visits China.
- 19 Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister starts visit to United States.
- 19 Pravda article on U.S./Soviet relations.
- 19 Plenum of Central Committee of Rumanian Communist Party.
- 20 Sino-Sudanese 1968 Trade Protocol signed.
- 20 - 22 Rumanian First Deputy Foreign Minister visits Israel.
- 20 - 30 Warsaw Pact staff manoeuvres.
- 21 Declaration by East German "Council of State" on relations with Federal Republic of Germany.
- 21 Pravda article attacks China.
- 21 Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao receive President of Tanzania.
- 22 - 25 President of Tanzania visits North Korea.
- 22 Cisar replied to attack by Konstantinov.
- 23 Signature of East German/North Vietnamese Economic Aid Agreements for 1969.
- 23 - 28 Visit of Indian Minister of Trade to Soviet Union.
- 23 C-in-C of Pakistan Army visits Soviet Union.
- 23 - 29 North Korean Parliamentary Delegation visits Burma.
- 24 North Vietnamese Economic Delgation starts visit to Soviet Union.
- 25 Soviet warships visit Aden.
- 25 Canton radio reports serious flooding in Kwangtung Province.
- 25 Rumanian Foreign Minister starts visit to Morocco.
- 25 - 27 Meeting of Soviet Supreme Soviet.
- 26 Czechoslovak National Assembly passes anti-censorship and rehabilitation laws.
- 26 CPSU Delegation visits Italy.
- 27 Speech to Supreme Soviet by Soviet Foreign Minister - announces Soviet Union ready for exchanges on limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive.
- 27 Dr. Gunnar Jarring - U.N. Special Representative on Middle East - visits Soviet Union.
- 27 Pravda article attacks conditions in Indonesian Prison Camps.
- 27 Publication of "Appeal of 2,000 Words", by Czechoslovak intellectuals - condemned by Party and Government.
- 27 - 4 July Hungarian Party First Secretary starts visit to Soviet Union.
- 29 - 1 July Soviet President attends Ulbricht's 75th Birthday Celebrations in East Berlin.
- 29 North Korean Parliamentary Delegation arrive in Singapore.
- 30 Mao and Lin Piao receive military cadres.

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