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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

SEPTEMBER 1968

SUMMARY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: INTERNAL SITUATION

Despite heavy pressure from the Russians the Czechoslovak nation and leadership maintained its unity and some margin for manoeuvre during September. The leadership appear determined to preserve at least some measure of reform despite restrictions on freedom of association and on the mass media. Economic policy will present the most severe test. The project for federalisation symbolises the continuing spirit of subdued defiance.

SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

During September the Russians faced the problem of reconciling their reluctant decision to deal with the Dubcek leadership with their continuing dissatisfaction with that leadership's implementation of the Moscow Protocol. They would clearly like to engineer changes in the Czechoslovak leadership but did not face up to this during September. They implicitly criticised the Czechoslovak theme of national unity as one which could encourage "anti-socialist elements". Soviet impatience has been most clear in its criticism of Czechoslovak information media. There was almost certainly a major debate in the Kremlin about policy towards Czechoslovakia before the visit of Dubcek to Moscow at the beginning of October.

RUMANIA

Relations with the rest of the Warsaw Pact remained tense despite a lessening of the fear of invasion. The Rumanians continued to adopt a more moderate tone on Czechoslovakia and to emphasise their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact although they did not appear ready to compromise on their essential principles of independence.

YUGOSLAVIA

Soviet-Yugoslav relations have sharply declined, especially in the propaganda field. The Yugoslavs are in no mood for a reconciliation. While there is no evidence of an imminent Soviet military threat, Yugoslavia would be vulnerable to economic and other sanctions.

ALBANIA

Mutual propaganda attacks by the Soviet Union and Albania have also increased. There may be some form of Yugoslav-Albanian rapprochement.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

The Russians have had to bow to West European communist pressure and agreed to the postponement of the International Communist Conference. The British, French and Italian parties have continued their criticism of the Soviet Union.

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EFFECT OF CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS ON COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANISATIONS

Opposition to the invasion of Czechoslovakia has caused a major split among the front organisations, notably the World Federation of Trade Unions. The Russians have tried to paper over the cracks, but with only limited success.

SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS

The Russians have increased their propaganda against the Federal Republic of Germany. This has been partly intended to divert world attention from the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but the latest campaign has included statements asserting the Soviet Union's right to intervention in certain circumstances in the affairs of the Federal Republic. The Russians do not appear to want a major crisis with the Western powers but may plan increased harassment of federal activities in West Berlin.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Chinese have exploited the invasion of Czechoslovakia to attack the Soviet Union and to express their support for Rumania and Albania. They have also protested against Soviet air intrusions over North East China and at alleged Soviet military concentrations on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders.

SOVIET UNION: DISSENT AMONG INTELLECTUALS

Despite pressure on Soviet intellectuals throughout this year, the campaign appears to have stopped short of mass repression. There has been little open reaction from Soviet intellectuals to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although this may lead to renewed measures against Soviet writers and artists.

CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The establishment of the last two Revolutionary Committees appeared to mark the start of the concluding stage of the cultural revolution. The emphasis is on eliminating disorder and consolidating the new administrative system. More serious efforts are being made to revitalise the Communist Party. Strong emphasis continues to be placed on the pre-eminence of the working class.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: INTERNAL SITUATION

Greater diversity through national unity - the paradox is all too obvious - has been the consistent policy of the Czechoslovak leaders since the Moscow Agreements of 27 August. Up to the point of the Czechoslovak leaders' visit to Moscow in early October, at least, the nation seemed to have accepted the disciplines of unity without allowing their acceptance to become resignation. For the moment, too, the constraints imposed upon the leadership by the need for unity have also been generally accepted, although the different pressures on them, both from within the Party and from the Russians, must have been severe. To a large extent, the cement of this unity must have been the margin for manoeuvre, however limited, which the Czechoslovaks retained under the Moscow Agreement. It is hard to see how full unity could be preserved if the Russians decided progressively to foreclose on this freedom of action, as seems likely and succeeded in doing so.

In their persistent appeals to the people, the Czechoslovak leaders have not ceased to emphasise their determination and their ability to pursue the "post-January course". The precise meaning of this phrase in present circumstances is necessarily left somewhat obscure. The restrictions on freedom of association and the mass media imposed during September have already reduced the new freedoms which had been enjoyed in the weeks before the invasion and also finally dispelled some of the wilder dreams to which the publication of the Action Programme in April gave rise. But the Party leaders never entertained such extreme ideas and were, on their own admission, already concerned before the invasion at some of the results of the liberalisation process. More important, perhaps, as a touch-stone of Czechoslovak success in the new situation, will be whether they avoid restoring to office the old-style bureaucrats whose methods were so admirably pilloried by Havel in his notorious play "The Memorandum", and were probably the feature of the old régime which most contributed to its collapse. The removal of these men was perhaps the most welcome single achievement of the new.

In the new system of censorship and in the stated policy of strengthening the Ministry of the Interior the leadership have clearly tried not to resort to the old cumbrous methods of control. However the acid test will come in economic policy. The Czechoslovak leaders have already stated their determination to pursue the main lines of their economic reforms, especially the new system of management. But even before the invasion they had not, for whatever reason, gone much further in implementing the reforms than their predecessors. Now, with the economy damaged by the invasion and probably subject to pressures from the Soviet Union, on whom Czechoslovakia is dependent for raw material and fuel supplies, their difficulties will be all the greater. The temptation to resort to increasing State intervention in the attempt to break out of these difficulties might well prove attractive, especially if there were signs of incipient economic or industrial unrest. Were the leaders to succumb to this temptation, however, they would be bound to prejudice their chance of maintaining unity.

The invasion has therefore by no means yet broken the spirit of the Czechoslovaks and a note of subdued defiance continued to penetrate the measured tones of official speeches and the press during September. The issue which has symbolised this spirit is the new federalisation law which is to be introduced before 28 October, the 50th Anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic. The federal system has always been a corner-stone

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of the process of democratisation, especially for the Slovaks. In practical terms, the federal system could offer such leaders as Husak (whose claims the Western press, and perhaps also the Russians, have been quick to advance as possible successors to Dubcek and other liberals), attractive outlets for their ambitions through the separate Czech and Slovak states, whose powers are likely to be wide in comparison with the federal authorities. The latter would continue to be led by the team of four who between them have come to symbolise Czechoslovak national unity, Svoboda, Dubcek, Cernik and Smrkovsky. In this way, the federal system could help the Czechoslovaks to respond to Russian attempts to divide their leaders in order to rule their country. This could explain why there has been speculation about Soviet attempts to prevent the federalisation law being introduced although a federal system might offer the Russians attractive possibilities to exploit conflicts of interest between Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechoslovaks' success in holding to their time-table on federalisation (and there are technical difficulties enough to make this hard) could provide some proof of their claims that recent events have not made them abandon the fundamental principles of their policies.

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SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

Soviet policy during the month following the invasion of Czechoslovakia concentrated on a solution to the dilemma presented by their failure to follow up the efficient military occupation with a smooth political plan. While their attention was mainly on Eastern Europe, they had also to take into account a wider complex of problems, including the generally hostile reaction of the outside world and serious criticism within the world Communist movement.

The Russians' problems may well have arisen from a basic miscalculation at the time the decision to invade was taken. A factor strongly influencing this decision was probably an over-estimate of the strength of "conservative" forces within the Czechoslovak Party and, further, a belief that these forces would make a successful move against Dubcek and thus provide a collaborationist Government.

If this was the case, the lack of any such coup within the Czechoslovak Party and the unexpected solidarity of the Czechoslovak nation led to the Russian decision, however reluctantly taken, to negotiate with the liberal leadership, instead of adopting the tougher policy of imposing virtually direct military rule, which quite apart from the intrinsic difficulty of such a course, would have caused them even greater difficulties in maintaining their image before the Third World and the Communist movement.

In choosing to deal with and, as they hoped, to operate through Dubcek, if only temporarily, the Russians must have calculated that the presence of their troops and the strong Czechoslovak desire to get them withdrawn would enable them to extract from the Czechoslovak leadership concessions which would amount to satisfactory curbs on the process of liberalisation.

During the first post-invasion Soviet-Czechoslovak talks in Moscow, the Czechoslovaks accepted a number of specific obligations. But the Russians had subsequently to face the fact that, while the Czechoslovaks had gone a long way towards fulfilling the letter, if not the spirit, of their obligations, they still appeared determined to persist with the process of "democratisation". Worse, from the Russian point of view, some Czechoslovak leaders had been pointedly referring to the Soviet obligations under the agreement, especially the withdrawal of troops. The month-long mission of Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to Prague and the visit of the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Mr. Cernik, to Moscow were clearly part of a Soviet attempt to find the best way out of this dilemma.

The Russians have adopted a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the Czechoslovak leadership. Certainly their acceptance of Dubcek had been grudging but they went so far as to commend some of the decisions of the leadership. On the other hand they criticised the Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Assembly, Mr. Smrkovsky, indirectly but pointedly and there can be no doubt that they would like at some stage to engineer major changes in the Czechoslovak leadership. There have been some signs in Soviet press treatment that they regard the new Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, Mr. Husak, as a man with whom they could more easily do business. But all along their difficulty has been the united front presented by the top Czechoslovak leaders. Husak himself has recently been at pains to deny any rift in the leadership.

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The Czechoslovak leadership's reiteration of the theme of national unity made more difficult the Soviet attempt to justify their continuing occupation on the ground that "counter-revolutionaries" continued to operate in Czechoslovakia. This, with the allied theme of the strategic danger presented to the Soviet Union by events in Czechoslovakia, almost entirely superseded the previous Soviet claim that they were "invited" to intervene. The Russians have argued that vigilance is still necessary against "anti-socialist elements" and that therefore unity is only possible and desirable for those forces which maintain the true Communist cause. They have thus, implicitly, criticised the kind of unity for which the Czechoslovak leaders have been calling.

The control of the press, radio and other information media was certainly a major point in the Moscow Agreements. The Russians publicly commended the law on censorship passed by the Czechoslovak National Assembly, but, for reasons which are not far to seek in the Czechoslovak press, they clearly remained dissatisfied with its application in practice. They maintained a continuous stream of press comment attacking the persistence of "anti-socialist" personalities in information circles. Although the Czechoslovaks replaced the heads of the Radio and Television Hezlar and Pelikan, they seem to have installed new men of equally liberal approach.

It seems clear that the means of dealing with this unsatisfactory situation must have been under intensive discussion in Moscow during September. It is not possible to establish any pattern of opinion on this question within the Soviet leadership or to judge whether any major shifts are likely as a result of the debate. It would probably be an over-simplification to see this as an argument between hard and weak factions in Moscow. Almost certainly there is general agreement on the potential strength of their position, and a common frustration at the delay in translating this potential into satisfactory results. The Soviet leadership probably also agrees on the need to maintain some troops permanently in Western Czechoslovakia. But there must be some reactions to the failure to secure an adequate political follow-up to the invasion. There are probably also differences between those who would like to bring matters to a head by much more direct use of the occupation forces and those who prefer more subtle use of stick and carrot methods to induce the Czechoslovaks to make concessions. In the latter case the inducements would include not merely the prospect of an early withdrawal of some troops in return for good behaviour but possibly also an increase of economic assistance. First impressions of the outcome of the further visit to Moscow by the Czechoslovak Party leaders in early October are that the stick is still the primary instrument. Carrots tomorrow, perhaps.

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RUMANIA

The fears of imminent invasion diminished but Rumania's relations with her Warsaw-Pact allies remained tense. There were signs that the Rumanians were afraid of economic pressures from their allies. Although they consistently denied that a request had been made for Warsaw Pact manoeuvres within their borders, the Rumanians were clearly apprehensive on this score. It is not known whether Marshal Yakubovsky's contacts in Bucharest and the other East European capitals dealt with this question or with the more general one of strengthening the Warsaw Pact. Provincial tours by Ceausescu indicated that he still felt the need to whip up domestic support, especially among the suspect Hungarian minority. The Rumanian leaders continued to express their views on Czechoslovakia in moderate terms and to emphasise the importance of the implementation of the Moscow Agreement. They were also anxious to stress their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and this was apparent in the unyielding line they took on the German question during the visits to Bucharest by the British and Belgian Foreign Ministers.

Nevertheless the fact that these visits took place was itself indicative that the Rumanians intend to pursue their policy of developing contacts with the West. And Rumanian praise for China in the party newspaper of 29 September suggested that Ceausescu was not prepared to appease the Soviet Union on subjects outside the Warsaw Pact context.

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YUGOSLAVIA

The sharp Yugoslav reaction to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia generated a press polemic between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Poland and Bulgaria playing a prominent part on the Soviet side) of an intensity probably unparalleled since 1948, when the Yugoslav Party was expelled from the Cominform. The main theme of Soviet comment has been that the Yugoslavs have, by their reaction, aligned themselves with the imperialists and the Maoist schismatics. Much attention has been devoted, especially by the Poles, to the alleged evil effects of Yugoslav economic revisionism; personal attacks have been made on Tito; and polemic between the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians on the Macedonian question has once again increased in bitterness.

The Yugoslavs show no sign of moderating their stand and appear determined for the present not to seek a reconciliation with the Soviet Union unless the latter extricates itself from the Czechoslovak situation in a manner which satisfies Yugoslav ideas on correct relations between Socialist states. While there is no evidence of an imminent Soviet military threat to Yugoslavia, the leadership still speaks unambiguously of the country's determination to defend itself if attacked. A national Defence Bill setting out the duties of all citizens in the event of war was passed on 24 September by the Federal Assembly. Yugoslavia would be vulnerable to Soviet counter-measures, short of outright aggression; the Yugoslav forces are largely dependent on the Soviet Union for defence supplies and 30% of Yugoslavia's trade is with the C.M.E.A. Soviet sanctions in either of these areas could have serious effects. The threat of Soviet action has been made the basis for appeals to national unity in the face of danger, and there appears to be some uneasiness lest national or political minorities should seek to exploit the present situation to their own and Soviet advantage. But there is no evidence so far of Soviet attempts at internal subversion, and Soviet/Yugoslav trade relations remain superficially normal; a new technical co-operation programme was agreed recently and a Yugoslav representative attended the regular Comecon meeting in Moscow at the end of September.

Nevertheless, it seems clear that a prolonged period of cool political relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union is in prospect. This may make the maintenance of a credible Yugoslav policy of non-alignment more difficult, although it will certainly not diminish their attempts to promote this doctrine. (The Russians are probably working hard against the plan for an early non-aligned Conference, which might do them some harm in present circumstances.)

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ALBANIA

Soviet propoganda against Albania has also increased in intensity. Albania has continued its violent attacks on the Russians and announced its formal withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact on 13 September. Albania later accused the Russians of sending troops to Bulgaria with hostile designs on Albania. Bulgaria has however denied any aggressive intentions. In the circumstances moves towards a Yugoslav/Albanian rapprochement are not unlikely. The long-standing Albanian press and radio campaign against Yugoslavia has already ceased.

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Representatives of 58 Communist Parties assembled at the end of the month in Budapest for a preparatory meeting for the world Conference of communist parties which had been scheduled to meet in Moscow on 25 November. Several West European parties, notably the Italian, French and British, had declared that their representatives at the Budapest meeting would oppose preparations for a world Conference in view of the situation in Czechoslovakia and would urge postponement. The pressure for postponement in the event proved overwhelming, and it was agreed to "re-examine the date" for the Conference. This is to be done at a further preparatory meeting in November. Even so, postponement must be seen as a blow to Soviet prestige, and particularly to the personal position of Brezhnev who for two years has consistently associated himself with the plans for a Conference. Moscow Radio, shortly before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, said that the Conference would be held. But to have pressed on with it at once would clearly have aggravated Communist disunity, and the Russians have had to accept this reality.

Among the communist parties which condemn the military intervention in Czechoslovakia and contest the Soviet version of events there the most forthright in recent weeks has been the British Communist Party, which, though small, is influential internationally. A report published in the Morning Star for September 24 by Jack Woddis, Head of the Party's international Department and its representative at the Budapest meeting, effectively demolished the various Soviet pretexts for the invasion. The British Party also reacted sharply and swiftly to an article by Kovalev in Pravda of September 26, which asserted that the independence of "socialist" states and communist parties was always subordinate to the higher "interests of world socialism and of the world revolutionary movement." By thus setting clear limits to the application of normal international law between communist countries the article appeared to be an ideological justification for the maintenance by force of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. "It is to be hoped," said the Morning Star on September 27, "that Mr. Kovalev's thesis' will be speedily and officially repudiated. It would do irreparable harm to the unity of the international communist movement and relations between socialist states if it gained any further currency."

Irritation with the clumsiness of the Russians' attempts at justification over Czechoslovakia has been shown by the French Communist Party. A pointed statement in L'Humanité on September 13 drew attention to journalistic sharp practice in Pravda, which on September 12 had re-published an article by Duclos which referred favourably to the world communist Conference, without revealing that it had been written before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. On September 20 L'Humanité criticised at length an apologia for the invasion of Czechoslovakia supplied by the Novosti agency to Le Monde.

Representatives of the Italian Party have been exchanging views on the Czech crisis with East and West European parties. Giancarlo Pajetta, who had previously visited London and Paris, arrived in Bucharest on September 7 and saw Ceausescu. He later went on to Budapest. His colleague Galluzzi visited Belgrade and Sofia. The party's continuing criticism of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and defence of the principle that individual parties should be free to pursue their own development has drawn heavy fire from Pravda and the Polish Trybuna Ludu.

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/The question

The question of a conference of West European parties appears to be still under discussion, and the Swedish party leader Hermansson is reported to have been canvassing it with the French and Italians.

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**EFFECT OF CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS ON COMMUNIST
FRONT ORGANISATIONS**

The occupation of Czechoslovakia has brought the international communist front organisations to a state of complete disarray and, in some cases, open revolt against Moscow for the first time.

Several of them, including the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and most of its Trade Union Internationals (TUI), the International Union of Students (IUS), and the International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ) have their headquarters in Prague and have been vehemently pro-Dubcek. This gives the Russians a special problem; unless they can achieve absolute control in Czechoslovakia they may have to move these front organisations to a safer place, such as Sofia, or risk losing control of them altogether. In addition, a very large proportion of the headquarters staff of the front organisations are French, Italian or Czechoslovak, and reflect the attitude of the national Communist Parties.

The WFTU has been the most outspoken in its condemnation of Soviet actions. Strongly supported by its French and Italian affiliates, it called the invasion "a contradiction of all the fundamental principles of the WFTU and its affiliates" and expressed its full solidarity with the workers of Czechoslovakia. The World Council of Peace (WCP) also issued a critical statement, though in more guarded terms. Leaders of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), International Association of Democratic Journalists (IADL) the International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ) and the International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR) have also condemned the invasion in strong terms and the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) and the International Union of Students (IUS) are expected to follow them.

The Russians will try to paper over the cracks. They have already invited the more important West European trade unions to Moscow, in an attempt to reach an accommodation. But this has met with only limited success. The Italian C.G.I.L. refused to go, although the French CGT later met with unions of the invading Warsaw Pact countries.

The fact remains that never before has there been such open defiance of Moscow policy by the front organisations. Uneasy as many were at the excommunication of Tito in 1950, and dismayed as some were at the invasion of Hungary in 1956, they never went so far as to express their condemnation publicly, as most of them have now.

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SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS

One feature of the Soviet follow-up to the invasion of Czechoslovakia has been a sharp increase in propaganda against the Federal Republic of Germany. This has been partly intended as a smoke-screen to divert world attention from their own action and to try to gain support for their claim that a Western, and particularly West German, threat made action in Czechoslovakia necessary.

To raise the German bogey is a familiar Soviet tactic. However the latest campaign has included a number of Soviet statements apparently intended to assert a hypothetical right to intervention in the affairs of the Federal Republic. Using the so-called resurgence of "neo-Nazi" forces in West Germany as a pretext, the Russians have invoked both the Potsdam Agreements and certain Articles in the United Nations Charter as giving them this right. They may have hoped, by raising irrelevant legal points, to cause difficulties between the Federal Republic and the three Western Allies. They met with a firm response from the latter, and the reiteration of their determination to defend Germany against unilateral attack.

Despite this irresponsible propaganda, the Russians do not appear anxious to follow it with action, for instance in Berlin, which would present a threat to the position of the Western Powers. But it cannot be ruled out that they plan some harassment of Federal German activities in West Berlin. A tough line of this nature would certainly please Herr Ulbricht, who may have been dissatisfied with the way the Russians followed up the invasion of Czechoslovakia, particularly since they failed to remove Dubcek.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Chinese have lost no opportunity of exploiting the recent events in Czechoslovakia to draw renewed attention to the "aggressive" nature of the Soviet Union and to suggest that they themselves are prepared to uphold the weak. The issue of Czechoslovakia is of course one on which the Communist parties generally have shown scant sympathy for the Soviet positions, and the Chinese have seized on it as a means of blackening the Soviet name and of winning back if possible a modicum of sympathy for their own position. (It remains to be seen whether they will make any alteration in the presentations of their policies in order to assist this). During the Czechoslovak crisis they protested against the violation of Chinese diplomatic immunities in Prague by the Soviet occupying forces. The Chinese also expressed support, in unspecific terms, for the Rumanians. Their promises of support for the Albanians were much firmer but fell short of a specific military commitment. A report that a Chinese military delegation might recently have visited Tirana remains unconfirmed.

The Chinese have also alleged the existence of a threat to their own borders. On 16 September a note was delivered to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Peking protesting against 29 intrusions by military aircraft into Chinese air space over Heilungkiang between 9 and 29 August. The note drew attention to a series of such intrusions in recent years and added that the recent intrusions "took place around 20 August when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia". It is known that unpublished protests to the Russians and Mongolians have been made by the Chinese in past years regarding air intrusions. The latest protest is therefore not new and differs only in being published. The note itself is framed as a propaganda document and sets the alleged air intrusions firmly in the context of recent incidents in Czechoslovakia. It is probably to be read as an attempt to draw attention to the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union generally and to demonstrate that China too is a potential victim of this aggression. The link was made even clearer in a speech by Chou En-lai at a banquet for a visiting Albanian delegation on 29 September. He drew a parallel between Soviet action in Eastern Europe and "armed provocations" against China, including the stationing of "massive troops" on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders.

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SOVIET UNION; DISSENT AMONG INTELLECTUALS

In the eight months following the wave of protest over the trial of Ginsburg and Galanskov some twenty signatories out of a total of around 274 are known to have suffered by expulsion from the Party and in some cases loss of their jobs. Although the number may in fact be greater, there does not appear to have been any mass repression. The reason for this apparent leniency may have its roots in disagreement among the leadership over how to deal with what is for them the new phenomenon of overt protest; it probably also lies in the authorities' evident desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the dissident members of the intelligentsia and to rely on disciplinary action being taken at local and professional levels, where it does not appear to have been wholly effective.

The scientific intelligentsia appears to be causing particular concern. The Party Central Committee newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya complained on 11 September that among scientists in Obninsk (site of an atomic power station some 60 miles from Moscow, where over half the Party members and candidates work in scientific institutes), views "alien to the Party", including views on literature and art, were spread unhindered by Party officials and scientists. The Obninsk party secretary explained in the journal Party Life that local propagandists were not always able "convincingly to demonstrate the inner relationship between the Marxist-Leninist world outlook and modern developments in the natural sciences". The situation in Obninsk was evidently considered serious enough to warrant an investigation by Central Committee officials.

There has been little open reaction from the Soviet intellectual community to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. One public demonstration of protest is known to have taken place in Red Square; among the demonstrators were some who had been active during the Ginsberg trial. The Western press has published a letter of sympathy for Czechoslovak intellectuals said to have been signed by 88 Moscow writers, but its authenticity has not been confirmed. On the other hand the authorities have not been able to muster much in the way of public expressions of support from intellectuals other than the most conservative. Reactions have in all probability been mixed, ranging from outright sympathy for the Czechoslovaks among a small number of intellectuals and perhaps Russians serving abroad who have had access to Western sources of information, to wholehearted approval of Soviet action, especially among the older generation. There may have been many who, while sceptical of the whole range of the Soviet Union's pretensions will have been convinced by two of the régime's arguments: that of the physical danger from Germany if Czechoslovakia were to leave the bloc, and of the ultimate danger to the structure of Soviet society if the Czech experiment were allowed to take its course.

The events in Czechoslovakia are likely to lead to renewed pressures for conformity on Soviet intellectuals, particularly writers and artists. A hint of this was contained in the report to the Congress of the RSFSR Artists' Union at the end of the month, where a secretary of the Board of the Union, having condemned neglect of "socialist realism" and the ideological side of art, claimed that the actions of "counter-revolutionary forces" in Czechoslovakia were proof that "forces hostile to social progress" usually started their offensive in the fields of literature and art.

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CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The establishment of Revolutionary Committees in Sinkiang and Tibet on 5 September concluded the long process of forming new organs of power at the provincial level, 20 months after the events of January 1967 in Shanghai which began it. A People's Daily - Liberation Army Daily joint editorial declared that the completion of the system of Revolutionary Committees had brought the Cultural Revolution to a new stage of "struggle-criticism-transformation" on a national scale. This is apparently to be the concluding stage of the movement, in which emphasis will be placed on consolidating the new administrative system and eliminating any remaining sources of disorder. Considerable attention is already being given to educational reforms in line with Mao's present recent instructions on means of ensuring working-class leadership in schools and colleges.

Reports from Shanghai and certain provinces showed that the authorities have started more serious efforts to rectify the Communist Party and that they are proceeding, although still with great caution, in the direction of reconstituting the Party organisation. A senior official recently stated that the Ninth Party Congress was now planned for the Spring of 1969.

The current emphasis on working-class leadership was further reinforced in the preparations for the National Day celebrations on 1 October; these involved the selection, allegedly by Mao's decision, of workers to represent the various provinces, regions and cities at the Peking celebrations.

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CHRONOLOGY

SEPTEMBER

- 2 Chinese Prime Minister at reception at North Vietnamese Embassy attacks Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
- 3 Resignation of Czechoslovak Economic Minister Ota Sik.
- 4 "Izvestia" criticises Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Hajek.
- 5 Chinese protest to Soviet Government against "provocations" by Soviet troops against Chinese Embassy in Prague.
- 5 President Tito publicly calls for withdrawal of Warsaw Pact troops from Czechoslovakia.
- 5 Revolutionary Committees established in Tibet and Sinkiang.
- 6 Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Kuznetsov, arrives in Prague.
- 6 - 9 Italian Communist Party Delegation visits Rumania.
- 7 Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister Gheorghe Radulescu leaves for tour of Latin America.
- 7 Communiqué issued on meeting of Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium.
- 7 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Hajek returns to Prague from Belgrade.
- 8-11 British Foreign Secretary visits Rumania.
- 10 Czechoslovak Government Proclamation guaranteeing individual rights of citizens.
- 10 Czechoslovak Prime Minister holds talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow. Soviet Czechoslovak Economic Agreement signed.
- 11 Pravda article by Kovalev on "peaceful counter-revolution".
- 12 Chinese "Peoples' Daily" and "Red Flag" commentator's article on re-educating intellectuals.
- 12 East German/Mongolian Treaty of Friendship signed at Ulan Bator.
- 13 "Pravda" and Izvestia" criticise activities of Czechoslovak Press.

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SEPTEMBER

- 13 Speech by Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Cernik.
- 13 Czechoslovak National Assembly passes Bill "on certain temporary measures in the field of the press and other mass communications media".
- 13 Albania formally leaves the Warsaw Pact.
- 13-17 M. Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister, to visit Rumania.
- 14 Meeting in Budapest of Trade Union delegations from Czechoslovakia and the five occupying countries.
- 15 Broadcast by First Secretary of Czechoslovak Communist Party, Dubcek.
- 15 Soviet Circumlunar Rocket "Zond 5" launched.
- 15 Edward Kardelj reaffirms Yugoslav position on Czechoslovakia.
- 16 Bulgarian Party First Secretary Zhivkov visits Moscow for talks with the Russians.
- 16 Chinese protest to Soviet Government against alleged Soviet intrusions over Chinese air space.
- 18 Tass notes appointment of Professor Ota Sik as special economic adviser at Czechoslovak Embassy in Belgrade.
- 18 Communiqué of meeting of Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium.
- 18 Article in "Pravda" on alleged Soviet right to intervene in the Federal Republic of Germany.
- 18 Chinese Foreign Minister makes speech denouncing Soviet support for Nigerian Federal Government.
- 19 "Izvestia" article on Soviet right to intervene in Germany.
- 19 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Hajek resigns. Prime Minister Cernik takes over Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 19 Marshal Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces visits Bulgaria.
- 20 "Pravda" articles on obstacles to "normalisation" in Czechoslovakia and on need to strengthen Warsaw Pact.
- 20 Czechoslovak Paper "Rude Pravo" on limitations on the leading role of the Communist Party.

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SEPTEMBER

- 20 Statement by Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior denying that individual citizens have been detained.
- 20-1 Oct. Rumanian Communist Party Delegation visits Italy.
- 21 Albanian Note to Bulgarian Government protesting against alleged presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria.
- 21 Speech by Czechoslovak Prime Minister says that Warsaw Pact forces will leave soon.
- 22 Iraqi military delegation visits Soviet Union.
- 23-24 Rumanian Presidium member Paul Niculescu-Mizil visits Hungary.
- 23-26 Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia visits Yugoslavia.
- 24-4 Oct. Shah of Iran visits Soviet Union.
- 24 Marshal Yakubovsky visits East Germany.
- 24-5 Marshal Yakubovsky visits Poland.
- 24-26 36th meeting of CMEA Executive.
- 25 Soviet Foreign Ministry Statement on Middle East.
- 25-26 Marshal Yakubovsky visits Hungary.
- 26 Speech by Ulbricht criticises Rumanians.
- 26 "Pravda" article by Kovalev on right to intervene in Communist countries.
- 27 Marshal Yakubovsky visits Czechoslovakia.
- 27-1 Oct. Meeting in Budapest of Preparatory Commission for International Communist Conference agrees to postpone conference.
- 27-29 Marshal Yakubovsky visits Rumania.
- 28 Czechoslovak "conservative" Party Secretary Indra, returns to Prague from Moscow.
- 29 Television broadcast by Slovak Party Leader, Husak.
- 29 Rumanian "Scinteia" article praising China.
- 29 Speech by Chinese Prime Minister at banquet for Albanian Delgation (led by Defence Minister) - attacks Soviet Union for invasion of Czechoslovakia and for concentrating troops on Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian border.

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SEPTEMBER

- 30 Broadcast by Czechoslovak National Assembly Chairman, Smrkovsky, appealing for better relations with Soviet Union.
- 30 Chinese Prime Minister addressing reception on eve of National Day says "A new historical stage of opposing US imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun".

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

OCTOBER 1968

SUMMARY

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The chief concern of the Soviet Government has been to play down the effects of the invasion of Czechoslovakia on other aspects of their foreign policy and to promote the idea of "business as usual". They have been sensitive towards rejections of this and of their claim to a free hand in Eastern Europe. Soviet propaganda attacks have concentrated on Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. The long-term repercussions of Czechoslovakia on Soviet foreign policy are unpredictable, but they are likely to remain both ambitious and opportunist.

SOVIET/CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

The Czechoslovak leaders made further concessions to the Soviet Union, both in the treaty on the stationing of troops and on press control and other points. But they are still holding to the essentials of the post-January policies. The Soviet government cannot allow the situation to relax too far for fear that this will be exploited by the present Czechoslovak leaders. They would therefore like to see a change of leadership in Prague, but probably realise that the time is not opportune. The Soviet position is a strong one if they can exercise patience.

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS IN
HUNGARY, POLAND, BULGARIA AND EAST GERMANY

The Leaderships

The Hungarian leaders' position has been the most difficult. Kadar's prestige has been shaken by Hungarian participation in the invasion. Despite disputes within the Polish Party there has been general support for the invasion. There has probably been criticism of the action in East Germany despite Ulbricht's support for it. There may even have been unease about the action in the Bulgarian Party.

Public Opinion

There have been no mass protests and the majority of the smaller demonstrations have taken place in East Germany. The impact of the invasion has been most marked on the intellectuals.

POLAND: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTY

General Moczar is making a new bid in the struggle for leadership. Despite his nationalist line he has been making efforts to please the Russians. He may be promoted a full member of the Politburo at the next Party Congress.

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FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY DIFFICULTIES
OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA

There has been a bitter dispute between the hard and soft wings of the Party, which has split over the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Despite the difficulties of maintaining unity, the official line of the Party continues its condemnation of the invasion.

VIET-NAM

There is no sign of any change of objective either by North Viet-Nam or by the Liberation Front as a result of the bombing halt agreement. The Russians may have exerted some influence with Hanoi in favour of an agreement, but probably do not wish to expose themselves too much to Chinese criticism. The Chinese are in a difficult position having opposed peace talks in the past. They have made very little comment on the bombing halt.

SOVIET UNION AND INDONESIA

The Soviet Union has been showing increasing interest in gaining influence over a revived Indonesian Communist Party with particular object of countering China. This aim was probably behind the campaign against alleged ill-treatment of political prisoners in Indonesia.

SOVIET INTERNAL

Economic Reforms

The economic reforms after three years remain limited in scope. Efforts are being made to maintain a balance between central control and local initiative. Events in Czechoslovakia must reinforce official opinion against the more imaginative proposals of Soviet economists.

Agriculture

Despite a good harvest, Brezhnev criticised a number of aspects of agricultural work at a Central Committee plenum. He called for a better use of existing resources, but made no promise of greater investments.

CUBA INTERNAL

There is increasing evidence of public discontent in Cuba. This appears to have been local in origin rather than foreign-inspired.

CHINA INTERNAL

Continued emphasis on a return to stability, with stress on the role

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of the working class, was reflected in speeches and publications on the National Day. In rebuilding the organs of Party and State, the Chinese leadership are ignoring formal constitutional processes and are providing theoretical justification for this. The Revolutionary Committees may become a permanent part of the State structure. A Party Central Committee Plenum in the second half of October announced that the Ninth Party Congress would be held "at an appropriate date" and also resolved to expel Liu Shao-Ch'i from his Party and State posts.

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Another major part of Soviet propaganda has been the Federal Republic of Germany, with the Russians adopting the Federal Republic as a model for their own system. The Federal Republic is being used as a model for their own system.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Apart from their preoccupations in Czechoslovakia itself, the chief concern of the Soviet Government in recent weeks has been to play down the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis on other aspects of their foreign policy. This is likely to have been one of Kosygin's main objects in visiting Finland. This aim was also evident in the speech by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, at the United Nations on 3 October. While suggesting no new initiatives, he maintained that the Soviet Union desired friendship with all countries, not excluding the United States. On the other hand the speech also left no doubt that the first priority among Soviet objectives is the consolidation of their position in Eastern Europe. Mr. Gromyko went to some lengths to try to win acceptance for the idea that the Soviet Union had a right to a free hand in what she regarded as her sphere of influence. This was certainly the main object in the Foreign Minister's development of the theme of the "Socialist Commonwealth", by which he tried to argue that the normal United Nations principles of sovereignty and non-interference did not apply to relations between Communist countries. The definition of the extent of the area of the "Socialist Commonwealth" was deliberately left vague. It is convenient to the Russians thus to cause uncertainty about Soviet intentions towards countries outside the Warsaw Pact area, notably Yugoslavia.

The Russians have failed to gain acceptance for their claims that "business as usual" can proceed in their relations with the West and other countries; as a result they are showing extreme sensitivity towards statements which have pointed out that the Czechoslovak situation cannot logically be treated in isolation and must have an effect on East/West relations. This seems to have been particularly the case in regard to Mr. Stewart's speech at the United Nations General Assembly. Soviet propaganda has singled out Britain as a "ringleader" of an alleged anti-Soviet campaign. It is clear that one motive for this selective Soviet propaganda treatment is to try, as in the past, to sow dissension between NATO countries and to deter the Alliance from a firm and co-ordinated response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Another major target of Soviet propaganda has been the Federal Republic of Germany, with the Russians adopting the familiar tactics of trying to use German "revanchism" as an excuse for their own actions and as a smokescreen to deflect world attention.

It is still difficult to estimate what repercussions the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia may have in the long term on the leadership in the Kremlin and on the future course of Soviet foreign policy.

The continuous absence of any public policy statement on the subject is striking. The resolution adopted at the Plenum of the Central Committee on 31 October simply approved the foreign policy of the Politburo without, as is often done, even summarising it. The resolution, though very short, claimed three times that support for this policy was unanimous, which gives the impression of protesting too much. But, even if there are

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serious differences about immediate action, Soviet long-term aims, whether nationalist or ideological, are likely to remain ambitious. The main inhibition on the pursuit of these aims has been and will remain the desire to avoid a confrontation with the West. But as before they will be on the look-out for opportunities to extend their influence, even though they are still preoccupied by their problems in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe generally.

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SOVIET/CZECHOSLOVAK RELATIONS

The month which began with Dubcek's visit to Moscow, followed by the announcement of the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement on the indefinite stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, ended with the 50th Anniversary of Czechoslovak independence, the passage of the new federalisation law, and student demonstrations in Prague with the slogan "truth will triumph over tyranny". Once more, the Russians have found Czechoslovak liberalism to be hydra-headed.

During their visit to Moscow on 3-4 October, Dubcek, Husak and Cernik certainly made further concessions to Soviet demands. Apart from the tough terms of the agreement on stationing troops, they seem to have accepted the need for still closer control of the press and to have given way on some other points. Knowledge of these concessions has undoubtedly depressed public opinion despite the prospect of the withdrawal of large numbers of "allied" troops. However there is still a clear determination within the Party and in the country at large to cling to the essentials of the post-January policies. The press has shown that Party control can be a double-edged weapon by a well-orchestrated campaign of rebuttal of Soviet charges of counter-revolutionary activities and of more discreet criticism of the renewed signs of life from discredited conservative politicians who lost office after January. The Czechoslovak leaders have thus still not been edged off their familiar tightrope. Speculation about splits among them does not seem to be based on hard fact, although it would not be surprising if there had been some differences on tactics. For the moment, also, the discredited conservatives do not seem to have achieved any substantial support. The forthcoming Central Committee meeting, which could well take place in November, should reveal the extent to which the Czechoslovak leaders are still masters of their own house.

From the Soviet point of view, the situation is hardly more satisfactory than it was before Dubcek's visit to Moscow. Despite some concessions by Prague, the Russians cannot yet be sure that Czechoslovakia will develop in a way tolerable to themselves, and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov is still in Prague negotiating with the Czechoslovak leaders.

The Russians must expect that if their pressures relent, the Czechoslovaks under their present leaders will only be tempted to exploit this. For this reason, their best hope would seem to lie in bringing about important personnel changes in the Czechoslovak leadership. Some Government changes will have to take place soon to take account of the new federal structure of the Czechoslovak State. But the Czechoslovaks will no doubt try to continue their technique, hitherto successful, of replacing outgoing liberals by other liberals or, at worst, moderates.

The Soviet position, however, remains strong. Already any radical initiatives by the Czechoslovaks of a kind that would displease the Russians (in so far as such things were ever contemplated by the Czechoslovaks even before the invasion) can be excluded. The Soviet policy of gradually eroding Czechoslovak resistance has been reasonably

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successful on specific points. But there are as yet few signs of a more satisfactory relationship between the two countries being evolved. It may be that Kuznetsov, with his reputation for flexibility and pragmatism, has urged that only time can bring the crack in the Czechoslovak will which the Russians must hope for. A policy of patience would also fit the general requirements of Soviet policy towards the outside world and the communist movement. They need so far as possible to stress the alleged "legality" of their position in Czechoslovakia, and to avoid another crude demonstration of power. Much will depend on whether these considerations prove stronger than the Soviet thirst for further concessions from the Czechoslovaks. If they do not, Czechoslovak resentment at Soviet interference may well be driven under ground.

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REPERCUSSIONS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS IN
HUNGARY, POLAND, BULGARIA AND EAST GERMANY

The Leaderships

The Hungarian party leaders were placed in a more difficult position by the invasion than the other three satellites. Kadar's policies were in some respects similar to Dubcek's and his support for the Czechoslovak leadership was genuine and domestically popular. The fact that he was obliged to go along with the invasion has shocked the Hungarian population and reminded them of the hard facts surrounding their relationship with the Soviet Union. Kadar's prestige has been shaken but there is no evidence that events have strengthened the conservative wing of the Party.

In Poland even the "partisans", who are reputed to be less subservient to Moscow, have given full public support to the invasion and to the Party's explanation of the reasons for it. There are, however, reports of bitter disputes within the Polish party though their exact nature is not known.

Although there seems no doubt that Ulbricht was in favour of it, some of the East German leaders are said to have described the invasion as "a ghastly mistake". Though there have been some arrests in East Germany, both there and in Poland the authorities have been somewhat inhibited in their repression of dissent, perhaps because they were not united.

Although there have been no overt signs of dissent in Bulgaria there may have been some unease in the Bulgarian Party about their subservience to Soviet policy.

Public Opinion

The workers in all four countries appear to have remained largely indifferent. There has certainly been no enthusiasm for the invasion. On the other hand there seem to have been no mass protests, though there were several small demonstrations, slogan-painting and distribution of pamphlets in East Germany. There are reports that many East Germans do not believe the official explanations and that pressure has been brought to bear on intellectuals and youth groups and especially on church leaders who had earlier defied the authorities openly. There have also been some signs of intensified disaffection among the young in Bulgaria.

The impact on intellectuals in all four countries has been very marked. The general atmosphere among the intelligentsia seems however to be one of dejected admiration for the bravery of their Czech and Slovak colleagues combined with something approaching despair about the situation in their own countries.

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POLAND: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTY

The struggle for the leadership of the Polish Party was temporarily eclipsed by the events in Czechoslovakia, whose immediate result in Poland was to unite the Party while increasing its isolation from the rest of the nation. The struggle is now coming into the open again as preparations are completed for the V Congress which opens on 11 November.

General Moczar is once again making most of the running. Alone among the Polish leaders he has been deliberately exerting himself to win support. As the leader of the "Partisan" faction, and with his security and police background, he is reputed to be a hard-liner so far as internal affairs are concerned but to oppose the "Muscovite" wing of the Party whom he accused in veiled terms, earlier this year, of being mere Russian puppets. It is noteworthy therefore that he has recently gone out of his way to persuade both the intellectuals and the Russians - in some particularly fulsome speeches - that he is well disposed towards them. Rumours, probably deliberately stimulated, have been circulating that the election of delegates to the V Congress is reflecting increased support for the Partisans, and that Moczar is likely to take over from Gomulka at the Congress. Gomulka and his supporters have reacted in a number of speeches indicating the dangers for Poland of narrowly based nationalism.

The other reputed contender for the leadership, Gierak, seems to have been lying low.

Perhaps the most likely outcome of the Congress, about which however we cannot speculate with confidence, is that Moczar will be promoted from candidate membership to full membership of the Politburo. He will then be in a strong position to claim the eventual succession. However Gomulka may well retain his position as the leader for the time being unless the struggle within the Party is complicated by some outside factor such as renewed trouble from the students.

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FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY DIFFICULTIES
OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A meeting of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party on October 20-21 spotlighted the difficulties which the invasion of Czechoslovakia has caused for the Party. The meeting accepted the resignation from the Central Committee and Politburo of Mme. Vermeersch (widow of Thorez, the former Party Secretary-General) who could not accept the Party's condemnation of the invasion, and reprimanded another Politburo-member, Roger Garaudy, who had denounced the invasion more strongly than had the Party leadership. Both deviations probably have considerable support at lower levels of the Party - Mme. Vermeersch's views among the Stalinist old guard accustomed to supporting Moscow come what may, and Garaudy's among the younger, reformist elements who share his enthusiasm for Dubcek. The difficulties of maintaining unity over the issue may have been increased by Soviet attempts to put pressure on the Party leadership and to rally militants against the official line. If anything, however, the line has hardened since the invasion. It was restated in stronger terms than before at the Central Committee meeting, which emphasized that "the information which we have been given by the Soviet comrades does not invalidate our views on the situation in Czechoslovakia", and rejected one by one the main Soviet pretexts for the invasion. On French initiative a delegation was to visit Moscow on November 4; but hopes that it would remove the Party's difficulties over Czechoslovakia cannot have been high.

The Chinese would appear to be in a more difficult position. They have opposed the recent talks in the past, and clearly they will do. On the other hand the fact that there has been some progress in Paris may well lead them to be cautious in their comments if they are to retain any influence on events. On 3 November the People's Daily published without comment President Johnson's statement of 31 October and the 2 November statement of the North Vietnamese Government. There will have been very little comment, although a communiqué (devoted largely to other matters) issued on 2 November after a Central Committee session, referred to the tacit consent and support of the Soviet revolutionists for the policies of the US imperialists in Viet-Nam, and called upon the people of Viet-Nam to fight on to the end. Meanwhile despite the evident uneasiness of the Chinese about recent developments there is no sign that they are thinking of any loosening of their material support for North Viet-Nam.

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VIET-NAM

Details of what the North Viet-Nameese have agreed to in exchange for a cessation of American bombing are not clear. But they include the opening of a further phase of talks with both the South Viet-Nameese Government and the N.L.F. present. It is unlikely however that this betokens any significant change of objective on the part of either the North Viet-Nameese or the Liberation Front. A broadcast appeal by Ho Chi Minh on 2 November called for an increased resolve to liberate the South and defend the North, and for the settlement of the internal affairs of South Viet-Nam in accordance with the programme of the N.L.F. The leader of the N.L.F. delegation to the Paris talks confirmed the Fronts Programme for United Viet-Nam and their determination to continue their struggle until final victory, on her arrival in Paris.

The Russians may have exerted their influence with Hanoi in favour of reaching an agreement with the Americans, although the extent to which they may have given a lead to Hanoi is far from clear. The Soviet Press reported President Johnson's statement of 31 October in a low key, and official Soviet comment was delayed until after the North Viet-Nameese reaction was announced. On 2 November a Soviet Government statement said that it regarded the understanding reached in Paris as an important factor towards reaching a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. The Russians may not wish to expose themselves, more than is necessary to Chinese criticism and they have shown no signs of any renewed interest in Co-Chairmanship activity.

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SOVIET UNION AND INDONESIA

A Soviet propaganda campaign against the alleged ill-treatment of political prisoners in Indonesia culminated in a series of protests, and a personal plea from President Podgorny to President Suharto, against the latter's rejection of appeals for clemency by leading Communists and others sentenced to death or life imprisonment for their part in the 1965 attempted coup. A CPSU Central Committee statement said that "the entire responsibility for the baleful consequences" of Djakarta's policy would rest with those "interested in maintaining the frenzy of anti-Communism....." The further postponement or cancellation of a visit by a Soviet mission due in Djakarta in October to discuss the rescheduling of Indonesia's debts may indicate that other pressures will be exerted. The Soviet motive for these actions seems to be the hope of establishing a dominating influence over a revived Indonesian Communist movement. Soviet propaganda organs had taken advantage of the suppression of a new outbreak of Communist insurrection in Java earlier this year to point out the "tragic results of the adventurist policy of Mao and his followers in Indonesia", and it has been alleged in Djakarta that Indonesian graduates from both Soviet and Chinese universities are involved in a Communist revival in the capital. But although Moscow's closer allies have supported the recent campaign on behalf of the Indonesian Communist leaders, Peking appears to have remained silent.

SOVIET INTERNAL

Economic Reforms

The economic reforms have now entered their fourth year. In a Pravda article marking the occasion, the Chairman of Gosplan indicated that the new five-year plan will include a reduction in the number of centrally-planned indices which, he said, would result in greater autonomy for the all-Union ministries. At the same time he emphasised the need to increase the powers of local planning authorities. He is evidently seeking to maintain the balance between central control and scope for local initiative, which has been a sticking point of the reforms since their inception. The main problem is that the reforms were only modestly conceived and cautiously applied; they are being mechanically extended throughout the country, but are not biting deeply, and their effect on economic growth is probably relatively slight.

While there is no evidence as yet that events in Czechoslovakia have stiffened conservative opposition to the Soviet reforms, they are bound to reinforce official opinion against the more imaginative proposals of the liberal Soviet economists.

Agriculture

At the end of October Brezhnev reported to a Central Committee Plenum on the situation in agriculture. He was able to announce that the grain harvest was expected to exceed 165 million tons, the second highest ever recorded. But the mood was not one of self congratulation. Referring to the continuous growth of the population and the growing need of industry for agricultural raw materials, Brezhnev called for greater agricultural outputs. In particular he demanded average grain harvests in the near future of 190-200 million tons, a difficult target, as he himself admitted. Brezhnev made no promises of greater investments as an incentive. His theme was that better use should be made of existing resources. Pointing out that of 21.2 milliard roubles allotted to agriculture for the first three years of the five year plan only 17.3 milliard would actually be invested in that sector, Brezhnev blamed the planning organs for diverting resources from agriculture to industry. He also criticised local authorities for failing to fulfil their obligations towards the agricultural sector. Despite the assurances of the present leadership, agriculture is clearly still suffering at the expense of industry.

At the Plenum Brezhnev reaffirmed the extensive land improvement programme adopted in May 1966 and particularly associated with his name. It has been the subject of some controversy. Another controversial subject - the adoption of new collective farm statutes - was not mentioned at the Plenum and appears to have been shelved once again.

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CUBA INTERNAL

Against the continuing background of queues and food shortages, evidence has accumulated over the past few months of muted public discontent. In a speech on 28 September Castro gave details of 15 major acts of alleged sabotage, involving interference with machinery and arson in factories and warehouses and even on ships, as well as a larger number of less important instances. This appears to be the first occasion for some time that the Cuban régime has admitted the commission of acts of sabotage, certainly on anything like this scale.

In addition, there have been numerous reports from Oriente province of minor public demonstrations, attacks on outlying military posts, epidemics and of mounting tension.

It seems to be the case that this discontent has local rather than expatriate roots, but it is difficult to be certain about its extent and impact. It is certainly interesting that Castro has now launched a campaign to "decapitate anti-Castro resistance" on a national scale through the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution. At all events, Castro's police apparatus has hitherto proved an effective one and it may well be a deliberate policy on Castro's part to generate at this stage a climate of suspicion and vigilance which would help justify, if need be, further repression and even further privations.

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CHINA INTERNAL

The celebrations of National Day (1 October) reflected the leaders' preoccupation with a return to stable conditions. The parade was well organised on similar lines to those held before the Cultural Revolution (i.e. up to 1965) and in sharp contrast to the unruly manifestations of mass enthusiasm seen in 1966. Mao and Lin Piao were present, at the head of a group of 14 who apparently form the inner circle of leadership.

The editorial published for National Day in the People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily outlined the principal current trends in the Cultural Revolution, notably the emphasis on the role of the working class. It made clear that in the process of reviving Party organs new entrants for the Party are to be sought primarily among the industrial workers. As at the previous two National Days, Lin Piao delivered the main speech while Chou En-lai addressed a reception on the previous evening. Lin Piao's speech - his first to be publicly reported since November 1967 - was unremarkable and echoed the general content of the National Day editorial. Chou En-lai's speech included a further strong attack on the Soviet leadership. He said that "a new historical stage of opposing U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism" has begun.

A Red Flag editorial, published on 16 October, carried two new instructions from Mao in which he noted that the Party must maintain its vigour by "getting rid of waste and letting in the fresh air" and that the Party must "rely directly on the revolutionary masses". The editorial indicated that leading bodies of the "three-in-one combination" - i.e. presumably the Revolutionary Committee or new bodies set up by the Committees - should take part in the control of recruitment to the Party. However, other accounts have suggested that this work should be assigned to "Party nucleus groups" within the Revolutionary Committees.

The editorial issued a strong warning against the wholesale re-introduction of old-style Party officials, a theme which has been taken up strongly in Shanghai and in many provincial newspapers; it also described the Revolutionary Committee as the "most representative revolutionary organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and decried the "formalism" of elections as used to constitute the former Party and State organs.

This pronouncement appears to provide the theoretical justification for ignoring constitutional processes in rebuilding the organs of Party and State. For the first time, the report of those attending the National Day celebration made no reference to membership of the National People's Congress Standing Committee; together with the latest statement by Red Flag, this may signify that the leaders now regard the system of Revolutionary Committees, which were originally described as "provisional organs of power", as a suitable permanent replacement for the old State structure.

A Plenum of the Central Committee was held in the second half of the month, ending on 31 October. Like its immediate predecessor, the 11th of August 1966, this Plenum was "enlarged", being attended not

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only by members and alternate members of the Central Committee but by a number of extraneous elements. A communiqué published after the Plenum reported that conditions had now been prepared for convening the 9th Party Congress and this would be held "at an appropriate date". The communiqué also reported the adoption of a resolution to expel Liu Shao-ch'i from his party and state posts and "continue to settle accounts with him and his accomplices". The precise significance of this last ominous phrase is not yet known. The passage on Liu confirmed the suspicion that normal constitutional requirements (i.e. a decision of the National People's Congress) would be ignored in dismissing Liu from his post as Head of State.

Besides the expected endorsement of current Cultural Revolution policies (recruitment of new Party membership primarily from among industrial workers; simplification of administrative structures; reform of education; manual labour for cadres etc.) the communiqué also emphasised the consolidation and development of the revolutionary committees, giving further weight to the view that they may become a permanent feature of the new state structure. The communiqué also referred to the emergence of a "new leap in socialist construction", a theme familiar from the first stages of the Cultural Revolution.

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CHRONOLOGY

22 September to 6 October Iraqi Military Delegation visits Soviet Union.

OCTOBER

- 1 Chinese National Day - Speech by Lin Piao - walk out by representatives of Soviet Union, Poland, E. Germany Bulgaria and Hungary.
- 1 Speech by Rumanian President Ceausescu on Rumania's place in the "Socialist world".
- 1-5 Prime Minister of the Yemeni Republic visits Soviet Union.
- 3 Soviet Foreign Minister's speech to United Nations General Assembly.
- 3-4 Czechoslovak Party and Government Delegation led by Dubcek visits Moscow for talks.
- 3-5 Austrian President visits Yugoslavia.
- 6 19th Anniversary of "DDR" - speech by Prime Minister Stoph.
- 7 "Harvest Festival" speech by Rumanian President Ceausescu.
- 7-9 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visits Finland for confidential talks with President Kekkonen.
- 8-9 Meeting between Soviet and Rumanian Trade Union Delegations in Moscow.
- 9 Meeting of pro-Soviet Communist group at Liben (Prague) addressed by former Presidium Candidate member Antonin Kapek - Soviet officers present.
- 9-11 Trial in Moscow of Pavel Litvinov and Larissa Daniel.
- 11 Statement by Central Committee of CPSU condemning "persecution" of Communists in Indonesia.
- 13-31 Twelfth enlarged session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party - passes resolution stripping Liu Shao-ch'i of all Party and State Offices.
- 14-15 Czechoslovak Prime Minister Cernik visits Moscow.
- 15 Chinese 'Red Flag' editorial on Party rectification.

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- 15-17 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visits Czechoslovakia.
- 15-19 Soviet Union Trades Union Delegation under Shelepin visits Japan.
- 15-20 Soviet warships visit Morocco.
- 16 Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty on partial withdrawal of troops and continued stationing of some forces on semi-permanent basis.
- 17 Chinese "Red Flag" prints appeal by "Stalin Group of the Soviet Union".
- 17 Incident between Chinese and Soviet officials in Hanoi.
- 17-18 U.S. Under-Secretary of State Katzenbach visits Yugoslavia.
- 17-21 Bulgarian Economic Delegation visits Soviet Union.
- 18 Czechoslovak National Assembly ratifies Treaty with Soviet Union on Troop Stationing.
- 19 Conference in Moscow of "Greek exiles".
- 20 Speech by President Tito at Leskovak strongly criticising Soviet Union.
- 20 Meeting of Central Committee of French Communist Party.
- 20 Chinese press quotes Western reports of Paris talks on Viet-Nam.
- 21 New British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Duncan Wilson, presents Credentials.
- 21 "Pravda" article strongly criticising British Government.
- 21 Speech by President Tito at Prokuplje.
- 21-24 Finnish Foreign Minister visits Hungary.
- 23 Publication of "Open Letter" from 39 out of 42 members of Secretariat of Soviet Writers Union to Czechoslovak Writers' Union.
- 22-25 19th Plenum of East German S.E.D.
- 22-4 Nov Finnish Prime Minister visits Soviet Union.
- 23-25 President of Poland visits Iraq.
- 24 Speech by Hungarian Party First Secretary Kadar to workers' rally.

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- 24 Soviet representative in Czechoslovakia, Deputy-Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, sees Dubcek, Indra and Bilak.
- 24 Plenary Session of Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee - decisions on electoral procedure, new "Front of Socialist unity" and new national minority councils.
- 24 Chinese Ministry of Defence reception for Rumanian Army Day.
- 24 Chinese Note to Burma calling for curb of Chinese Nationalist Activities in Burma.
- 24-31 Indian Military Delegation visits Soviet Union.
- 25 Soviet unmanned Soyuz-II satellite launched.
- 25 Kuznetsov sees Czechoslovak Prime Minister Cernik.
- 25 Speech by Soviet Party General Secretary Brezhnev to 50th Anniversary Meeting of the Youth Organisation, Komsomol.
- 25 Speech by Czechoslovak Party First Secretary Dubcek at Pardubice announces Central Committee Plenum "before long".
- 26 Soviet manned Soyuz-III satellite launched.
- 26 North Viet-Nameese "Nan Dan" comments unfavourably on President Johnson's News Conference of 24 October.
- 27 Law on Czechoslovak Federation promulgated by National Assembly.
- 27 Article by Czechoslovak Prime Minister Cernik in "Izvestia".
- 28 50th Anniversary of Foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic - anti-Soviet demonstrations in Prague - celebratory meeting in Moscow.
- 29-30 Conference of Warsaw Pact Defence Ministers in Moscow.
- 29-30 Czechoslovak leaders visit Bratislava for federalisation celebrations.
- 30 Soyuz-III lands.
- 20-31 Plenary Session of CPSU Central Committee on Agriculture and Foreign Policy - addressed by Brezhnev.
- 31 Soviet Note to China denying air intrusions over China alleged in Chinese Note of 16 September.
- 31 President Johnson announces bombing halt in Viet-Nam.

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