



Communist Policy and Tactics 1969, 1. hluti

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICSOCTOBER 1969SUMMARYSoviet foreign policy

Following a static phase in their policy towards the West, the Russians have recently made some new moves, notably the agreement to open preliminary talks on Strategic Arms Limitation. But the Prague meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers produced no evidence of genuine interest in the main issues of European security. Although the Russians will doubtless negotiate seriously with the United States on Strategic Arms Limitation, they appear to be feeling their way on the problems of Germany and Europe. The chances of chalking up a foreign policy success before the next CPSU Congress seems low.

Czechoslovakia

2. The treatment given to the leaders during their visit to the Soviet Union appears to indicate that the Russians feel the best way to restore the situation in Czechoslovakia is to back Husak. He must still make acceptable to the nation the measures taken to satisfy the Russians. The Czechoslovak people appear to be either apathetic or in despair. Little real economic assistance appears to be forthcoming from the Russians, and the emphasis on the development of the heavy industrial sector in the Moscow communiqué may indicate the closer gearing of the Czechoslovak economy to the CMEA and to Soviet requirements.

Sino-Soviet relations

3. The border issue will be the main topic in the talks in Peking. The Chinese have tried to win back the propaganda initiative by appearing as the instigators of these talks; meanwhile their essential position on the border has not changed. The Russians and the Chinese have made it clear that talks on an inter-state matter will not eradicate the other differences between them. There has been a lessening of tension over the border. The talks seem unlikely to produce more than an agreement on measures to de-fuse the frontier issue.

West European Communist parties

4. Any Soviet hopes that the Husak regime's action in rescinding official Czechoslovak condemnation of the invasion would silence communist critics in Western Europe have proved vain. A vigorous debate on the Czechoslovak problem still continues in the major communist parties. Many critics would deny that they are anti-Soviet, but their refusal to toe the line on this issue may well prove an intractable problem for Moscow.

Cuba

5. Castro's regime apparently remains secure, despite continued economic difficulties. Cuban foreign policy, including support for revolutionary movements in Latin America, has become more moderate recently, due to an increasing pre-occupation with internal affairs and probably to Soviet pressure as well. Cuba's relations with Moscow have continued to improve since the World Communist Conference; and Havana is still economically dependent on the Russians. Sino-Cuban relations remain frigid.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Earlier this year, Soviet policy towards the West seemed to be going through a static period. Admittedly, the Russians were negotiating, rather unhurriedly, about the Middle East and in the summer they made a move towards the United States position on arms control on the seabed. But their main preoccupation was with events in the Communist world, especially the World Communist Conference in Moscow, relations with Czechoslovakia, and above all the Sino-Soviet dispute.

2. Recently, however, the Russians have made some new moves in East/West relations. By far the most important was the agreement announced on 25 October, less than a week after the beginning of Sino-Soviet talks in Peking, to start preliminary discussions about strategic arms limitation with the Americans on 17 November in Helsinki. These talks will no doubt be protracted.

3. On 30 and 31 October, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers met at Prague and followed up the Budapest Declaration, issued in March, with a new declaration about European security. This was disappointing in many respects. Admittedly, it was shorter and less polemical than previous efforts. But it provided no evidence that the Russians and their allies are genuinely interested in negotiations on the main issues. The two items which the Prague Declaration proposed for the agenda of a conference on European security were of marginal significance. The standard Warsaw Pact demands on the German question were again implied. There was still no recognition that the United States and Canada must participate in any conference. Another feature of the Declaration was that it omitted the suggestion, which the Poles had been canvassing for some months, that regional disarmament should be among the matters discussed at the proposed conference.

4. One Soviet motive in issuing this Declaration was probably tactical: they wanted to anticipate the December Ministerial Meeting of NATO, which they knew was likely to review the studies of European security carried out by the Alliance since April. The Russians also probably had in mind, as with the Budapest Declaration, that East German participation in any conference, however sparse the agenda, would enhance the international standing of the Ulbricht regime and thus tend to cement the status quo.

5. The new Federal German coalition government is composed of the two parties which the Russians had openly hoped would gain power. Brezhnev, speaking in East Berlin on 7 October, said that, if the new German Government made a turn towards reason in its foreign policy, the Soviet Union would respond. This was the key note of Soviet propaganda about Germany for the rest of the month: the Russians sought to give the impression that they recognised certain hopeful signs but, before forming a definite view, wanted to see whether the new Government would translate its good intentions into action. At the same time, the Russians have seemed to be hinting that some of the standard Soviet demands in regard to the German question might eventually be watered down. But there has certainly not been any clear indication yet of a definite shift in the Soviet position. For example, Brezhnev's speech on 27 October omitted to mention international recognition of East Germany among the usual Soviet demands; but the very next day this particular stipulation reappeared in the Joint Statement after the visit of the Czechoslovak leaders to the Soviet Union.

6. The decision to engage on preliminary talks on strategic arms limitation has been followed by a good deal of Soviet propaganda highly critical of the United States. In particular, the Americans were attacked

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in connection with Viet Nam and were accused of responsibility for trouble in the Lebanon. All this was no doubt designed to show that the Soviet Union was entering the strategic arms limitation talks on equal terms and not under pressure, and had not abandoned its "principled views" on other international matters. The propaganda would also be designed to forestall Chinese criticism, and possibly criticism from hard-liners in the Soviet establishment, about alleged collusion with the United States.

7. The renewed activity in Soviet foreign policy described above is no doubt designed in part to create an impression of confidence and determination before the next congress of the CPSU, which is due next spring. But it does not seem likely that the Russians will be able to chalk up any real "successes" before then. They will no doubt negotiate seriously about strategic arms limitation, but in German and European affairs they still seem to be feeling their way.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. The visit of the Czechoslovak leaders to the Soviet Union from 20 to 28 October marked a decisive step in the settlement of Husak's main external problem - his relations with the Soviet Union. It is not clear whether the internal tensions which have been set up in the process will prove to be intolerable, but Husak can now hope for a period of calm. No progress has yet been made in alleviating Czechoslovakia's economic problems, though one probable result of the Moscow meeting will be to bind the Czechoslovak economy more closely to that of the USSR.

Relations with the Soviet Union

2. The whole of the top Czechoslovak leadership was given full red-carpet treatment in the Soviet Union for nine days. This must have been intended by the Russians as the seal of approval on the Czechoslovak leadership and on the "full identity of views" recorded in the Communiqué. The Soviet leaders probably do not even now regard the situation as completely restored: but it seems clear that they have decided that the best way to restore it is to back Husak for the present. A return visit by Soviet leaders to Czechoslovakia has been announced and must be expected to demonstrate this over again.

3. One of the sacrifices Husak has made is his acknowledgement of Czechoslovakia's subservience to the USSR in foreign policy. The new federal government programme declares that foreign policy will be decided according to the tasks of the "socialist community". However, the Czechoslovaks still appear to be keen on bilateral contacts with the West, as are the other East Europeans.

Internal

4. Husak is left with his main internal problem which is to make acceptable to the nation the reactionary measures he has taken to satisfy the Russians. Despite continual assurances (coming not only from Husak but from the pro-Moscow wing) that there is to be no return to the Novotny period he has had to identify himself with a large number of such measures, especially since the Central Committee plenum at the end of September. He has not gone so far as to welcome the Soviet invasion of 1968 (others, such as the first secretary of the Slovak Party, have) but he has described it as an act of "socialist solidarity", referred to the events of the first half of 1968 as essentially "a plot against socialist society" and appealed to the people to welcome the "contingent of friends" from the Soviet army "temporarily stationed in our territory". He has denounced Dubcek and in more violent terms Smrkovsky.

5. Among the reactionary measures, which have recently been instituted are restrictions on travel into and out of Czechoslovakia which seem likely to bring Czechoslovakia into line with other East European countries. The Party newspaper has called for a "serious review" of the practice of judicial rehabilitation and has stated that this has gone too far in some cases. The Ministry of Education has instituted a vicious campaign to encourage people in the academic world to spy and report on one another. Purges at all levels and in all types of institutions have continued to remove persons connected with the reform movement. The emergency law of 22 August has been used to deal summarily with some hundreds of offenders on unknown charges.

6. Reports of popular reactions to these measures suggest that apathy

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if not despair prevails over active resistance (though there are reports of resistance, mostly of the passive or Schweikian variety). Dubcek is reported to have defended himself at the Central Committee Meeting in September and to have warned the Party that the measures being taken would lead to an avalanche of popular discontent. But unless some unexpected event comparable with the suicide of Jan Palach crystallises popular feeling, it seems likely that Husak may get away with it.

Economic aspects of the communiqué of 28 October

7. The Russians have offered little real economic assistance to Czechoslovakia, and the communiqué following the Moscow meetings is notable for its reiteration of the line laid down in last December's agreement, following the visit to Prague by Baibakov, Chairman of Gosplan. Further increases in Soviet deliveries of essential raw materials are envisaged, together with much-needed but unspecified equipment, all of which, it is claimed, will lead to a substantial growth in trade between the two countries. Moscow has also agreed to step up supplies of consumer goods next year, and has offered assistance in the purchase from abroad of certain goods in short supply. This could imply some element of foreign currency credit on the part of the Russians, but there is no indication of any hard currency loan.

8. The Moscow communiqué, by emphasising the continued development of heavy industrial sectors, perpetuates one of the worst features of the command system, as far as the Czechoslovak reformers were concerned. A restructuring of industry leading to increased specialisation in order to restore Czechoslovakia's international competitiveness was one of their fundamental aims. Progress in this direction is now likely to be slow, and, judging by the communiqué and subsequent statements, will be geared more to CMEA and above all Soviet economic requirements than to the demands of international markets.

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WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

October saw several West European Communist Parties facing problems created by their inability to continue giving Moscow unquestioning support - especially after Czechoslovakia - or to find a basis for a new equilibrium. Any Soviet hopes that the Husak regime's action in rescinding official Czechoslovak condemnations of the invasion would finally silence West European Communist critics have proved vain. Major parties with ambitions to establish left-wing political alliances, such as the Italian (PCI) and French (PCF) parties, found it necessary both to repeat their criticism of events in Czechoslovakia and to draw a line against more radical condemnation voiced by prominent members. When the Austrian CP appeared likely to deal with a similar problem by expelling the offender, the distinguished veteran and former Minister Ernst Fischer, a third of the Central Committee immediately protested but they failed to prevent the expulsion. The British party (CPGB), preparing for its 31st Party Congress in November, was also sharply divided over a motion approving the Executive Committee's critical attitude to the invasion and subsequent developments. Criticism was also voiced by the Spanish Communist Party (in exile) and the Swiss Communist press, and at the Swedish Communist Party's 22nd Congress in September, where the Warsaw Pact countries' delegations first protested and finally walked out.

2. Having for one reason or another refused to accept Moscow's fait accompli, the different parties face problems. The PCI Politburo, with a well-established tradition of free-thinking about East European socialism and little die-hard opposition in its own ranks, published a statement on 30 September expressing sorrow at the results of the recent Czechoslovak Central Committee meeting, and referring to the need it felt to restate its opinion on this occasion "as a Party determined to pursue its own autonomous path". On 2 October, the Party paper L'Unita replied sharply to crude attacks on Italian Communists critical of the Soviet Union which had appeared in the Moscow magazine Oktyabr. On the other hand, a PCI Central Committee meeting on 13-17 October devoted much attention to the problem posed by some even more independent-minded Italian Communists, including members of the Committee, whose criticisms of the Soviet Union in their recently founded magazine Il Manifesto implied, according to L'Unita, that the Party should break with the Warsaw Pact countries - a much more extreme attitude than that of the PCI leaders who still profess allegiance to Moscow. The Central Committee took no action against the offenders, but suggested that they should mend their ways.

3. The French Communist Party, whose Central Committee also met in mid-October, shows much less tendency to question Soviet policies, possibly because its leaders are more vulnerable to pressure from Moscow and from die-hard opposition within the PCF. But while the Party generally maintains a cautious silence on controversial issues, prominent members continue to express indignation. At the beginning of October, the veteran Communist and distinguished writer Louis Aragon described the demand of the new Czechoslovak Minister of Education for information on the political attitudes of students and teachers as "worse than the military operations of August 1968". Aragon also expressed his conviction that the PCF could never withdraw its disapproval of events in Czechoslovakia. One of the subjects discussed by the Central Committee was the behaviour of Roger Garaudy, Director of the Party's Centre for Marxist Studies and Research, who had given an interview to the Yugoslav magazine Kommunist, in which he strongly criticised the consequences of Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia

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and the Moscow conference of Communist Parties; and praised Yugoslav ideas on socialism, from which he believed Western Communist Parties might profit. But apart from repeating an earlier rebuke for such undisciplined behaviour, the Party leaders took no administrative action against Garaudy; and Secretary-General Waldeck Rochet confirmed Aragon's remark about not having withdrawn disapproval of what happened in Czechoslovakia, even though the Party had refrained from passing any resolution to this effect.

4. The proposal to expel Ernst Fischer from the Austrian Party brought out the gravity of their divisions over Czechoslovakia. Fischer, who declared in September 1968 that the Party should break with the Soviet leaders, was later condemned in Izvestia as fit only for "the rubbish heap of history". The Party leaders, who also condemned the invasion but said that Fischer had gone too far, handed over his case in February to a seven man arbitration commission, whose recommendation to expel him was rejected by a majority of the Central Committee at the end of May. The announcement on 13 October that the arbitration commission had refused to change its verdict provoked 27 members of the Central Committee to issue an immediate written protest. The Party Chairman who in July had congratulated Fischer on his services to the Party, said in a radio interview that, even though the Party had adopted a critical attitude towards the invasion and still maintained this attitude, Fischer had gone too far "in that he has sharpened relations with the Soviet Communist Party and other fraternal parties". Nevertheless the Chairman regretted that the arbitration commission had refused to change its decision. Although the chief editor of the Party theoretical magazine denied that Fischer's expulsion would cause a split in the Party, other Austrian observers believe that the Party will have difficulty in eliminating the taint of subservience to Moscow. A statement issued by "a majority of the Politburo" on 17 October admitted that the Party was "in a serious crisis at present".

5. In the CPGB, unlike the other parties, the whole Executive Committee is the object of attacks both within the party and from Czechoslovakia itself over its attitude to events in that country. The aims of the internal opposition are to force the leadership to dampen the forthright criticism which appears in the Party press, and to withdraw its resolution asking for the forthcoming Congress to approve its attitude over the past year; or to defeat the resolution. But a meeting of the Executive Committee on 13-14 September resulted in a strong reaffirmation of its original position and on 3 October the Party newspaper Morning Star refuted criticism which had appeared in the Czechoslovak magazine Tvorba. Correspondence in the Party press has reflected opposing viewpoints impartially and at some length, and the stage is set for a confrontation at the Party Congress.

6. Developments in West European Parties during October appear to bear out the Swiss Communist Chairman's statement, when reiterating his Party's criticism of events in Czechoslovakia, that "even if you prevent anti-Soviet tendencies from showing themselves, they do exist none the less" (Voix Ouvrière, 2 October). Many if not all of the Communists currently criticising Soviet "mistakes" would deny that this made them anti-Soviet or even prejudiced their allegiance, but Moscow would not agree. The clash between Moscow's efforts to silence criticism and Western Communists' refusal to toe the Soviet line seems likely to prove an intractable problem. Despite its efficient management of the discussion about Czechoslovakia at the Moscow conference, the CPSU is continuing to pay a price for the invasion.

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DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA

Despite continued and massive Soviet economic support, the Cuban people are still undergoing considerable shortages and rationing of food and other necessities. They have so far accepted their lot with a mixture of resignation and passivity, but the regime shows signs of increasing concern at the low morale of the workers, whose productivity and will for serious work have steadily declined. The Government's attempts to retrieve the situation by "moral" rather than "material" incentives have been unsuccessful.

2. There are occasional ripples of discontent, but Castro apparently remains secure, and can still count on the support of the vast majority of peasants, students, and soldiers. In the comparatively near future, however, the standing of the regime may depend to a considerable extent on how it fares over the much publicised 10 million tons sugar target which Castro has set for 1970.

3. In their foreign policy the Cubans have shown signs of comparative moderation during recent months. This is due in part to an increasing preoccupation with domestic affairs and in particular with the forthcoming sugar harvest. In addition the Russians appear to be exploiting Cuba's continued economic dependence on them to persuade Castro to tone down his support for revolutionary violence in Latin America. The appeal of the Cuban example to revolutionary groups in Latin America has put Moscow in a dilemma. The Russians are probably anxious to moderate Havana's militant foreign policies because of their interest in good relations with existing governments in other Latin American countries. But at the same time the Russians do not wish to be out flanked themselves and the Basic Document adopted by this year's World Communist Conference did make some concessions to Cuban-style militancy in Latin America. Although belligerent Cuban propaganda towards Latin America has diminished, Cuba has shown interest in, and may have materially supported, instances of urban terrorism. There are persistent rumours that certain Latin American Governments may now be more favourably disposed towards the resumption of relations with Cuba, but no firm indications that resumption is anywhere imminent. Relations between Cuba and Mexico - usually quite good - have been strained of late, but not to breaking point.

5. Notwithstanding ideological differences, Cuba's relations with Moscow have continued to improve since the World Communist Conference. A Soviet naval flotilla made a goodwill visit to Cuba in July, the first visit by such a squadron to Latin American waters. Castro continues to support Soviet policy towards Czechoslovakia, and he has shown signs of coolness towards the Rumanians. When the Soviet sugar agreement with Cuba, which already involves a heavy subsidy, comes up for renewal in 1970, it is possible that Moscow might wish to make the next agreement more realistic.

6. Cuba continues to remain aloof from the Sino-Soviet dispute. Cuban press reporting of this year's border clashes has carefully given equal prominence to both Soviet and Chinese versions of these incidents. Despite this impartiality, Cuba's relations with China remain frigid and are presumably heavily influenced by Cuba's close dependence on the Soviet Union.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Talks between the Soviet and Chinese Governments opened in Peking on 20 October. The Soviet Delegation was headed by First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and the Chinese delegation by Vice Foreign Minister, Ch'iao Kuan-hua.

2. The Chinese have said that the talks are about the Sino-Soviet border. The Russians for their part, say they are about "questions of interest to both sides"; and Brezhnev's speech of 27 October mentioned the "frontier and other questions". There is little to be learned about the nature of the talks from the composition of the two delegations; each consists of diplomats experienced in dealing with the other side, and officials concerned with the border. Certainly the border will be the predominant subject and a Soviet official said that it would be the first to be discussed; but, depending on the Chinese attitude, the Russians may wish to take advantage of Kuznetsov's presence in Peking to raise commerce and transport too. A Soviet source has said that further talks will take place later in Moscow at Prime Ministerial level; but this may have assumed a degree of success at the first stage which seems far from being assured.

3. The Chinese seem to have been trying to win back the propaganda initiative which the Russians gained by Kosygin's brief visit to Peking in September. The first official indication that talks were to be held came in a Chinese statement of 7 October. This claimed that during the meeting between Chou En-lai and Kosygin the Chinese side had proposed measures to maintain the status quo on the border and prevent clashes, and had said that these measures should be agreed before border talks proper began. This was apparently reiterated in two letters to the Soviet Government on 18 September and 6 October. Despite the Chinese attempts to claim credit for having made the first move, it seems likely that it was the Russians who actually proposed the talks, and that the Chinese agreed partly because they were worried that the Soviet-inspired rumours of possible strikes against Chinese territory were not all bluff.

4. The Chinese position on the border issue has not shifted. The 7 October statement, which was couched in moderate terms, stated that Peking was prepared to negotiate with the Russians on the basis of the existing "unequal" border treaties, and that China had never demanded the return of territory lost under these to Tsarist Russia. The statement omitted the standard Chinese demand that the Russians should recognise that the "unequal" treaties had been imposed on China. This demand did, however, re-appear in a Chinese statement published one day later, which was a detailed reply to the Soviet statement of 13 June, and formally restated the Chinese position on the border question in a comparatively harsh tone.

5. There has been no Soviet reply to the Chinese statement of 8 October. The first Soviet comment on the Peking talks came in Brezhnev's speech of 27 October. He set out to portray the Soviet position as reasonable and restrained, and emphasised that the Soviet Union had always been ready to talk to the Chinese and were anxious to normalise interstate relations. But he firmly restated Soviet determination not to budge from their ideological position. Furthermore, on the day of Kuznetsov's departure for Peking, the Russians released a summary of an article by Suslov, the most senior Soviet ideologist, which included an attack on the Chinese for their deviation from Marxism-Leninism and for

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splitting the communist movement. The article was approved for publication on 10 October and may have been written and timed to serve as a public reminder of the Soviet position that talks on inter-state relations do not presuppose concessions on matters of ideological principle. The Chinese have observed a similar distinction: in their statement of 7 October they pointed out that "irreconcilable differences of principle" would remain between the two countries even if a border settlement were successfully negotiated.

6. Neither side has yet indicated clearly what its territorial claims would be in the event of serious border negotiations. The Russians appear to claim no territory. The Chinese claim only the areas which they say Russia occupied in excess of that ceded under the "unequal" treaties. This excess seems to consist of an area in the Pamir Mountains, roughly the size of the Crimea, near the Sino-Afghan frontier; a small but for the Russians strategically important and vulnerable island, Hei-hsia-tzu, at the Amur-Ussuri confluence opposite Khabarovsk; and an area of about 375 square miles on the border near the Eastern juncture of the Sino-Soviet-Mongolian frontiers. In addition there is the contentious problem of the exact position of the border line along the Amur and Ussuri rivers, and the control of the many river islands, such as Damansky and Goldinsky where incidents have taken place this year. In the West, parts of the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border are probably not clearly demarcated although the Chinese do not apparently claim any territory here. In this region nomads present an additional problem.

7. Meanwhile, the situation on the border seems calm. There have been no reports of clashes. Each side has severely curtailed its press and radio attacks on the other. But it seems unlikely that a definitive border settlement will be reached. Although the area at stake is comparatively small, Soviet prestige is engaged and China is hardly likely to abandon all her claims without a quid pro quo. The talks will probably drag on for some time and, if they do not end in failure, the most likely outcome seems to be an agreement on limited measures to prevent further clashes and generally de-fuse the border situation. If so Sino-Soviet relations may become much less tense than they have been this year, but they will still be bedevilled by the ideological differences between the two countries and their competition for influence in the World Communist movement and the Third World.

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CHRONOLOGY

26 September -

- 1 October President Kekkonen of Finland in Hungary
- October
- 1 20th Anniversary of Chinese People's Republic -
Mao Tse-tung attends celebrations in Peking
- 1 - 3 Polish CP First Secretary Gomulka and Prime Minister
Cyrankiewicz in USSR
- 1 - 4 Kekkonen in Czechoslovakia
- 3 Syrian Premier Atasi meets Soviet Premier Kosygin
in Moscow
- 3 - 7 Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Grechko in
Czechoslovakia
- 4 Anthony Grey released from house arrest in Peking
- 6 - 8 Party leaders Brezhnev (USSR), Kadar (Hungary),
Husak (Czechoslovakia), Gomulka (Poland), and
Zhivkov (Bulgaria) in East Berlin for East Germany's
20th Anniversary Celebrations
- 6 - 13 President Nyerere of Tanzania in Moscow
- 7 China announces agreement to hold border talks with
USSR
- 8 Chinese statement replying to Soviet note of 13 June
on border question
- 8 - 10 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev in Hungary
- 9 Private visas for Czechoslovaks to visit Western
states cancelled
- 9 - 13 French Foreign Minister Schumann in Moscow
- 9 - 16 Warsaw Pact Staff Exercises in Czechoslovakia, Poland,
East Germany and USSR
- 12 Meeting between President Jonas of Austria and
President Tito of Yugoslavia
- 13 Meeting of Warsaw Pact Defence Ministers in East
Berlin
- 13 - 15 President Nyerere of Tanzania in Budapest
- 13 - 18 Rumanian President Ceausescu and Premier Maurer
in India

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October

- 13 - 20 North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong in Moscow
- 14 - 18 Soviet President Podgorny in Finland
- 15 Ernst Fischer expelled from Austrian CP
Dubcek, Smrkovsky and others resign from Praesidium
of Czechoslovak Federal Assembly
- 15 - 16 President Nyerere of Tanzania in Belgrade
- 15 - 17 43rd Session of CMEA Executive Committee in Moscow
- 17 - 18 Mongolian CP First Secretary Tsedenbal in Moscow
- 17 - 31 7th Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions
in Budapest
- 19 - 26 Indian Defence Minister Swaran Singh in Moscow
- 20 Sino-Soviet talks open in Peking
- 20 - 26 Finnish Prime Minister Koivisto in Bulgaria
- 20 - 28 Czechoslovak delegation led by Husak and President
Svoboda in Moscow
- 21 - 25 Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer and Foreign Minister
Manescu in Belgium
- 21 - 26 Pham Van Dong in China
- 21 - 28 French Naval Chief of Staff Patou in Moscow
- 24 Spies Peter and Helen Kroger released by United Kingdom
- 25 Soviet Union and USA agree to open preliminary talks
on Strategic Arms Limitation in Helsinki on 17 November
- 30 - 31 Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meet in Prague
- 31 Prague declaration on European security

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS
JUNE - JULY*, 1969

SUMMARY

World Communist Conference

The main document adopted by the Conference makes even less pretence at laying down a clearcut programme for the Communist movement than the one issued by the last world conference in 1960. The controversies over China and Czechoslovakia are not mentioned directly. The document is more militant than the current Soviet line in respect of national revolutionary movements and armed revolution. Brezhnev's speech showed Soviet policies very much as before. It upheld the doctrine of limited sovereignty. The attack in it on the Chinese leaders was the most extensive by a Soviet leader since the fall of Khrushchev. On balance, the conference seems to have been a short-term success for the CPSU, but a long-term failure.

Soviet Foreign Policy

Gromyko's speech of 10 July was forthcoming in manner but it revealed no change of substance. It was short but sharp on relations between socialist countries, relatively restrained about the Federal German Republic, unclear about Berlin and unoriginal about European and Asian security. Its harshest language was reserved for the Chinese leaders. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks took pride of place in the section on disarmament. The most forthcoming section was the important one on U.S.-Soviet relations. In general, the Soviet Union wants calm in its relations with the West. Although serious negotiations are in progress on the Middle East and will probably take place on strategic arms limitation, there is no indication that the Russians are prepared to do business about other issues or to take concrete steps to further a general East/West detente.

Soviet Internal Scene

The climate of reaction has recently become markedly more sultry. A. Kuznetsov's decision to live in Britain will strengthen those in the Soviet establishment who favour a more repressive attitude towards intellectuals. The liberal intelligentsia is gradually being intimidated.

Czechoslovakia

At the Central Committee Plenum at the end of May, Husák virtually interred the Action Programme and made it clear that the "post-January policies" would be followed only in the modified form prescribed after the invasion. Without saying outright that the invasion has been justified, the Central Committee emphasised disarray and lack of discipline in the Czechoslovak Party before August 1968. The general situation in the country is one of discontent and pessimism. Not all the gains of 1968 have yet been lost. But Husák will need to show results in the economic field without delay if he is to consolidate his position, which will also depend on what happens on the anniversary of the

* Note: Monthly issues will be resumed in August.

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Yugoslavia: Non-aligned Consultative Meeting

Although it was something of an achievement to agree a final document, the outcome of the consultative meeting was probably a disappointment to the Yugoslav leadership, in view of the failure to take any positive steps towards a third non-aligned summit.

Soviet-Yugoslav Relations

The present cautious "normalisation" of inter-governmental relations is not likely to prove very substantial. Soviet motives are tactical and the Yugoslavs will not compromise on their resistance to Soviet "hegemonism". No rapprochement is likely in inter-party relations.

Chinese Ambassadors

By late July, 17 Chinese ambassadors had arrived at their posts. The order of their appointment broadly reflected the value attached by China to relations with the receiving states. There have been increasing signs of a return to a more orthodox style in Chinese diplomacy.

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WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

The Conference took place in Moscow from 5 to 17 June. 75 Parties attended, including observer delegations from Cuba and Sweden. The main conference document was signed in its entirety by 66 Parties of which five, including the Rumanians, expressed oral reservations. The Dominican Party refused to sign at all. The British referred the decision back to their Central Committee, which decided against signature. Four Parties, including the Italians, signed only one of the four sections of the document. The Norwegian Party has not announced a decision on whether to sign.

2. A number of other documents, including statements on Vietnam and the Middle East and a peace appeal, were also endorsed, apparently unanimously. They were of a routine nature. A 13-Party Commission was set up to prepare a world congress against imperialism; but this has received little publicity so far.

3. The main document makes even less pretence at laying down a clear-cut programme for the communist movement than the document issued by the last world conference in 1960. The controversies over China and Czechoslovakia are not mentioned, although there is one very brief reference to right and left wing deviations; and, although there are prohibitions on intervention in internal affairs and a defence of sovereignty, various phrases, including one about the indivisibility of the national and international responsibilities of communist parties, could be used in the future by the Russians as implicit justification for interventions of the kind they made in Czechoslovakia.

4. The document's attack on imperialism is lengthy and hard-hitting. The United States remain the main target and are accused of having grown more aggressive. The Federal German Republic is also given a good deal of attention; and so too, more noticeably than before, is Japan. As regards European security, the full catalogue of standard demands on the German question is rehearsed and there is a suggestion for a conference of European peoples, preparatory to a conference of states. A passing reference to the new left in the West is coupled with a warning to young people against pseudo-revolutionary ideas.

5. The section on communist unity, which is much shorter than the others, insists that what unites the movement is stronger than what divides it, but admits that some of the divergencies "may last long". The document ends on a conciliatory note by pointing out that the absence of certain Parties must not be allowed to hinder fraternal ties and co-operation between all Parties without exception.

6. One interesting feature of the document is that in certain particulars it expresses views which are more militant than the current Soviet line: and there is evidence that changes in this direction were made during the last phases of drafting. Considerably more prominence has been given to the national revolutionary movement as a force of change than would have been the case if the document had faithfully reflected recent Soviet doctrine. Armed revolution, of which Moscow is now shy because of the difficulties it would make for Soviet relations with the Government concerned, is accorded several approving mentions. It is stated that "the policy of peaceful coexistence does not contradict the right of any oppressed people to fight for its liberations by any means . . . armed or peaceful". The document defines peaceful coexistence mainly in terms of struggle and describes it as being forced on the imperialist countries. But the document

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also lays exceptional stress on the importance of the Cuban revolution, which is held to have opened "a new phase of the revolutionary movement" in Latin America. The document says that the popular movement "takes the road of armed struggle" in some Latin American countries, and "in the course of this struggle, the fighting spirit of the working class grows, the political consciousness of the peasantry is awakened and the rural masses are aroused". This is a Cuban, not a Soviet, view.

7. There are other passages in the final document which the Russians cannot regard as fully satisfactory. For instance, the mention of fourteen Socialist States implies that Yugoslavia, China and Albania are still held to be within the fold. The revolution in China is cited among the events which opened up "new world perspectives". There is also the specific statement that there is no longer a leading centre of the world communist movement.

8. Brezhnev's speech at the Conference was the first major pronouncement by a leading Soviet figure for many months. It was an authoritative performance, providing a thorough guide to the general direction of Soviet policy. This is very much as before, and the only novelty was Brezhnev's passing reference to the need for a security system in Asia. He indicated that imperialism was not to be underestimated and, no doubt because of the sophistication of part of his audience, took more account of advances in the Western democracies than is customary in Soviet analyses. Although he accused imperialist propaganda of fabricating "the notorious theory of 'limited sovereignty'", thus repudiating this term, he referred to the need to combine the national and international tasks of the socialist states, and to proletarian internationalism, in a way which made it clear that the substance of the doctrine is not being abandoned. His attack on the Chinese leaders, the centre-piece of his speech, was the most extensive by a Soviet leader since the fall of Khrushchev. Brezhnev was at pains to present the Soviet attitude as sober and restrained. He claimed that China's actions boiled down in practice to helping imperialism directly or indirectly. Like the basic document, Brezhnev named the working class as the leading force against imperialism but also gave unusual prominence (though in more qualified terms than the document) to the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in the Third World. As for internal affairs, Brezhnev went some way towards identifying himself with a policy of improving living standards within measurable time. In general, although Brezhnev's speech will not have won over the delegations opposed to the CPSU, it probably impressed the faithful and may perhaps add somewhat to his standing within the Soviet Union.

9. Viewed in the short term, and considering the limited objectives which they probably set themselves on the eve of the conference, it can be regarded as having been quite a success for the Russians. It was an achievement to bring 75 parties together in Moscow for a conference which the Russians had been trying to hold for five years. It was also an achievement to have the basic document endorsed by the great majority of delegations, even if there were many Soviet concessions in the drafting. After the turmoil in the world Communist movement in the last months of 1968, the Russians have managed to re-assert, at least for a time, their broad ascendancy over a large part of the movement. Their ability to do this was clearly shown when, despite an earlier private understanding with the Rumanians, Brezhnev attacked the Chinese leadership and was followed in this by three-quarters of the other delegations. The Rumanian delegation seems to have been outmanoeuvred: after Ceausescu had protested against Brezhnev's criticism of China he took the inglorious but prudent decision not to walk out and to sign the whole basic document, albeit with reservations. The Russians avoided

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the development of any real debate on the embarrassing subject of Czechoslovakia, despite specific criticisms of the invasion in several speeches. Husák's speech, rebuking the parties which raised this issue, coming as it did immediately after the critical speech by the Italian delegate, was a significant success for the CPSU and an example of their efficient stage management of the conference.

10. But in other important respects the Russians failed, most notably in that this conference, to an unprecedented extent, was a conference of only part of the movement: five of the 14 ruling parties were absent, as were nearly all the important parties in Asia. As expected, the Russians failed to obtain a formal condemnation of China, which was probably their objective when they originally called for a conference five years ago, even if they had since realised it was unattainable. The failure to achieve unanimous endorsement of the major document was a clear demonstration of how, even among the faithful, the CPSU can no longer call the tune entirely. Another aspect which will have been unwelcome to the CPSU was the unprecedented publicity given in reports on the conference in the Soviet press to the dissident views expressed during the debates; and it seems quite possible that certain parties made this unedited reporting of the conference a condition of their taking part in it. Since all attending parties spoke during the course of the Conference, even the smallest were given the chance to shine, and several Parties gained prominence by deviating from the Soviet line. The Australians and the British among others criticised the invasion of Czechoslovakia; the Dominicans, a very minor Party, felt the basic document was not aggressive enough and refused to sign. Other small Parties such as those of San Marino and Reunion expressed reservations or signed only part of the document. The Conference provided a platform on which these Parties, as well as major dissenters such as the Italians and Rumanians, could express their views. So much for the short term: on balance the pluses in this category outweigh the minuses.

11. It is the longer term results, however, which matter more, and here the balance seems to go the other way. The differences, both in interests and in views, between ruling and non-ruling parties received open expression and may now join those between the Soviet Union and China, and between the Soviet Union and Rumania, as a recognised feature of the movement. The ties of the CPSU with the majority of Western parties, such as those of Britain and Italy, may become increasingly formal. The toleration of dissent, which was exemplified by the failure to chide parties for declining fully to endorse the basic document or not attending the conference at all, was an admission that "democratic centralism", i.e. a monolithic movement led by Moscow, is no more, even when China and its friends are absent. A major conference which could not arrest the disintegration of the movement, or reconcile any of the underlying differences, would be a long term failure, even if it had provided short term benefits for Moscow.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 10 July contained an important and carefully constructed exposition of Soviet foreign policy, building up to a very clear statement of Soviet readiness for negotiations with the United States. But, although Gromyko's manner was forthcoming (as in the equivalent speech last year), he revealed no changes in the substance of Soviet foreign policy.

2. The first section of the speech, dealing with relations between Socialist countries, was short but strongly worded. It included the exhortation: "Let everyone whom this may concern know that (the Warsaw Pact) will never allow anyone to encroach on the security of its members and the gains of Socialism in these countries". This seems to contain a clear warning to the West not to tamper with the East European countries and to eschew subversive "bridge-building". Although Gromyko did not actually mention the doctrine of "limited sovereignty", he restated the inalienable right of members of the Socialist community to request and provide mutual assistance in times of crisis.
3. The section dealing with Vietnam and the Middle East is notable for the mildness of the accusations against the United States. That on the Federal Republic contains a statement of Soviet willingness to improve relations with Bonn and, although there is some very critical language, the "rise of neo-Nazism" is accorded less attention than usual. Gromyko's cryptic reference to Berlin implied that the Soviet Government was ready under certain conditions for an exchange of opinions with the Western Powers. But the conditions and the subjects of the possible exchange were not made clear: and the first editorial comment on the speech - in Izvestiya of 13 July - did not mention this feature of it. There was nothing new in the speech on European security or Asian security; but the emphasis on the United Nations in the concluding section of the speech could perhaps herald some Soviet initiative in New York, conceivably about Asian security.
4. Much the harshest language in the whole speech was in a strongly worded attack on the Chinese leaders. Its substance was not particularly remarkable, except for the implication, which will not have pleased all participants in the conference, that the world conference of Communist Parties had agreed in condemning Chinese policy, and a statement that the Chinese had outdone all enemies of the Soviet Union in their slanders.
5. There followed a lengthy, and deliberately reasonable, passage on disarmament. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks took pride of place. Otherwise the content offered little of note apart from the revival of a proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean. In his important and explicit remarks on bilateral relations with the United States, Gromyko said that the Soviet Union favoured the development of good relations; that a common language could be found; that the United States Government would find a willingness on the Soviet part to agree on bilateral questions and on unsolved world problems; and that President Nixon's remarks in favour of a well-prepared Soviet/American meeting at the highest level had not gone unnoticed in the Soviet Union. This passage is of interest, particularly in view of speculation about the effect of President Nixon's visit to Rumania on US-Soviet relations. But even this passage, the most forthcoming in the speech, did not indicate any single move which the Russians themselves are prepared to take in order to achieve improvements.

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6. In general the speech does not seem to alter Soviet foreign policy. The emphasis on negotiation was greater than in the short section on foreign policy in Brezhnev's speech to the Communist conference on 7 June, although it is interesting to note that both speakers boasted of the growing power and influence of the Soviet Union and "the Socialist community". This difference of emphasis between a statement on foreign policy by a Party leader and one by a Minister of Foreign Affairs is to be expected and the two speeches should be read together in order to obtain a balanced view. The right assessment seems to be that the Russians, while interested in a period of calm with the West, are probably not as forthcoming as Gromyko tries to sound. They hope for economic and other benefits from Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and very probably intend to engage in genuine negotiations. They are also negotiating with apparent seriousness about the Middle East. But there is no indication that they are prepared to do business about other issues or to take concrete steps designed to further a general East-West detente of the type they profess to desire.

SOVIET INTERNAL SCENE

In recent weeks the climate of reaction within the country has become markedly more sultry. Three young writers of liberal outlook, including Evtushenko, have been removed from the editorial board of the leading literary journal for young people, Youth. The party journal, Kommunist, has attacked several 'populist' editors for purveying a heresy that the little man, the ruled as distinct from the ruler, is the true bearer of socialist values. Pravda has criticised a new literary encyclopedia for objective presentation. Nevertheless, the scene up to now has not been unrelievedly repressive; in particular, a Leningrad journal has shown that it is still possible to get away with discussion of political themes in the guise of science fiction. But the decision of the prominent liberal writer Anatoly Kuznetsov to live in Britain will strengthen those in the Soviet establishment who favour a repressive attitude towards intellectuals. His subsequent letters to the Soviet authorities have demonstrated the despair already felt by at least some of them.

2. A new daily newspaper, Socialist Industry, which aims at a conservative working class readership, has been inaugurated by the Party Central Committee. Its main emphasis is on technological advance and moral duty. It has already begun to rehabilitate the Stakhanovite cult of exceptional achievement by the individual worker, which Khrushchev abolished as inefficient. This rehabilitation is being undertaken in the context of condemning 'people with dirty consciences' who shouted down Stalin's policies of industrialisation and collectivisation.

3. It has been reported that a trial opened at the beginning of July in Tashkent of the leaders of a demonstration by Tartars, who had been deported from the Crimea during the war, against the refusal of the authorities to allow them to return to their homes. There are less certain reports of similar repression of other protesting minorities. General Grigorenko, who has espoused several demonstrative liberal causes, is reported to be under police interrogation for supporting the Tartars.

4. Marchenko, a political writer who has already served one sentence in a prison camp for his support of other imprisoned writers, is reported to be facing a new trial on a charge of having smuggled to the West his account of the conditions in these camps.

5. In mid-July the Chairman of the State Security Committee in the Republic of Azerbaidzhan was made First Secretary of the Republic Party Central Committee. The appointment is probably designed to counteract a tendency towards too much local independence, especially in economic matters, which his predecessor seems to have encouraged, and which had been criticised by Brezhnev.

6. While the spread of repressive tendencies seems to have little impact on the life of the ordinary Russian, it is clear that the liberal intelligentsia is gradually becoming intimidated and more discreet in its evasion of restrictions. Only the hardiest of spirits now have the courage to step ostentatiously out of line.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Central Committee Plenum at the end of May was the first since that of mid-April at which Husák took over the First Secretaryship. The Plenum had been intended to discuss economic reforms, and especially the status of enterprises under the new system. In the event, it dealt almost entirely with political affairs. In his speech, Husák put off the economic problems; he affirmed that the Party's leading role and the authority of the plan in economic matters must be restored and announced that a programme for economic consolidation and reform would be put before the autumn plenum. Meanwhile, the laws on the enterprises, on planning and on taxes would be suspended until the economic policy had been mapped out as a whole; the creation of additional workers' councils was also to be suspended.

2. Husák concentrated on the consolidation and unity of the Party. He virtually interred the Action Programme and made it clear that the "post-January policies" would be followed only in the modified form prescribed after the invasion by the November 1968 plenum.

3. The Central Committee expelled six progressives including Professor Sik and Kriegal (also expelled from the Party as a result of his speech), and dismissed two Central Committee secretaries. Without saying outright that the invasion had been justified, the Committee emphasised the disarray and lack of discipline in the Czechoslovak Party before August 1968 and said that a Marxist analysis of all these events would have to be worked out. The vital element was party unity on the basis of democratic centralism. Party members must execute party decisions or be dealt with according to the rules. There should however be no revenge-seeking. Husák indicated that there were dangerous opportunists in the trade unions and the youth organisations.

5. After the Plenum the progressive-minded Praesidium of the Prague City Party Committee resigned as a body, perhaps anticipating the inevitable. It should not however be assumed that the new men, for example the new First Secretary of this Committee, Matejka, are downright conservatives. It was also at this time that Strougal was appointed Deputy First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Party. The significance of this is not clear but the decision, while it may well have been Husák's own, may also leave him less room for manoeuvre. The Czech Students Union has been dissolved as a consequence of its refusal to join the National Front, and the delicate problem of replacing it has not yet been solved. The most important trades union leaders appear to be supporting Husák and advising their members against involvement in the protest meetings and, for example, the token 15 minute strikes which were organised in some large enterprises as a demonstration against the banning of the Students Union.

6. There have been numerous speeches by party leaders assuring their listeners that there would be no return to the Fifties, no mass purges or arbitrary arrests. These speeches are evidence of widespread public anxiety. In addition to the signs of disquiet in the trades unions, including the publication on 25 July of an open letter from the leadership of the Metalworkers' Union, appealing to its members to reject various attempts to cause trouble on 21 August, some basic party organisations have been criticised for withholding dues payable to the Centre, "as a sign of disagreement over policy", and banking the money instead.

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7. On the other hand, the rehabilitation of victims of the regime in the Fifties, including non-communists, continues. Moreover, Czechoslovaks are still being allowed to travel abroad in large numbers.

8. The general picture is, however, one of discontent and pessimism. Some of the measures taken by the government in an effort to stem the persistent economic crisis - including the introduction of contracts with large enterprises which tie wage increases to specific rises in production and lay down delivery levels to internal and export markets - may prove effective but are unlikely to increase the leadership's popularity in the short term. Not all of the gains of 1968 have yet been lost. But Husák will need to show results in the economic field without much further delay if he is to consolidate his position. This position will also depend in part on the degree of trouble which may occur on the anniversary of the invasion, or the degree of resentment which may be caused by massive and elaborate Soviet precautions against such trouble.

YUGOSLAVIA: NON-ALIGNED CONSULTATIVE MEETING

Delegates of 51 of the 57 "non-aligned" countries represented at the Cairo conference in 1964 attended a "consultative meeting" from 8-12 July in Belgrade. The "final document", based on a Yugoslav draft, is mild in tone. It calls for progress on disarmament, better trade relations between developed and developing countries, more effective joint action by the non-aligned in the United Nations, and the exclusion of the threat of force in solving disputes. No agreement seems to have been reached either on holding a new non-aligned summit or on who should attend it; the document merely notes that views were exchanged on the desirability of a summit meeting after adequate preparation. While the document proclaims support for the "heroic struggle" of the people of Vietnam and "unreserved support for the Arab people of Palestine", European problems are nowhere mentioned explicitly. The Yugoslavs might, however, claim that the document's condemnation of "all other forms of foreign domination" contains an implied criticism of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.

2. Agreement on a final document, in however vague terms, represents something of an achievement given the conflicting views of many of the participants on the meaning of non-alignment and the wrecking tactics adopted before and during the meeting by the Algerians in particular. Nevertheless the meeting must have been a disappointment to the Yugoslav leadership in view of its failure to take any positive steps towards the convocation of a third non-aligned summit. Tito's personal attachment to a movement from which Yugoslavia has in the past drawn much glamour and publicity is well known. But another and possibly more powerful incentive for the Yugoslavs to persevere against the odds in seeking to revivify the non-aligned movement is their desire to counter Soviet "hegemonism" and in particular not to allow the idea of a non-aligned conference to be superseded by the proposal issued after the Moscow Communist conference in June, for a conference of all "anti-imperialist" forces.

YUGOSLAV - SOVIET RELATIONS

A cautious "normalisation" of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is under way. It was publicly foreshadowed by Tito as early as 30 April when he called for an end to "this political ping-pong". In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 10 July, Gromyko stressed that "the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the development of relations with socialist Yugoslavia, although these relations have not always been smooth". He added that the devotion of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia to the ideals of socialism and their common interest in expanding relations and contacts provided "a good basic for the further development of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia". In a foreign affairs debate in the Federal Assembly on 15 July, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister made no direct reference to the Soviet Union but asserted Yugoslavia's wish for good relations and "equal" co-operation with all European countries, subject to respect for well known Yugoslav principles. The Chairman of the Federal Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee, winding up the debate, said that Gromyko's statement would be "met with a favourable reception not only in parliament but also by the Yugoslav people".

2. This was followed on 16 July by a meeting between the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow and Brezhnev, at which the former handed over a message from the Yugoslav Government and the Praesidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (L.C.Y.) about relations and co-operation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and on 17 July by the publication of the "conclusions" of the L.C.Y. on the proceedings at the Moscow Communist conference. It is also expected that Gromyko will pay an official visit to Belgrade in September.

3. It is unlikely that this activity is the preliminary to any substantial rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs, probably rightly, see Soviet willingness to make overture to them as dictated basically by a tactical desire to reduce points of friction in Europe and to re-establish a general impression of harmony in Eastern Europe, partly in order to leave themselves free to concentrate on relations with China on the one hand and the United States on the other. The Yugoslavs cannot afford to rebuff these approaches, but their response shows no readiness to compromise their attachment to national sovereignty and resistance to "hegemonism"; the L.C.Y.'s comments on the Moscow conference in particular were distinctly cool and consisted mainly of a rehearsal of the reasons why the L.C.Y. had been right to stay away. Thus, though an inter-governmental dialogue has begun, no reconciliation is likely between the CPSU and the L.C.Y., and the Yugoslavs are not likely to engage in any form of co-operation with the Soviet Union which restricts their freedom of action.

CHINESE AMBASSADORS

On 15 May the Chinese People's Republic began the long expected reassignment of ambassadors, all but one of whom (Huang Hua in Cairo) had been recalled to Peking early in 1967 to take part in the Cultural Revolution. By late July, seventeen of a likely forty-four ambassadorial posts had been filled.

2. The ambassadors have clearly not been sent out in random order. Broadly the order of their appointment reflects the warmth of China's political relations with the countries concerned or the value which the Chinese attach to these relations. The first appointment was to Albania. There followed appointments to France, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Pakistan, Zambia, Tanzania, Guinea, Rumania, Sweden, Congo, Brassaville, Syria, Nepal, Mauretania, Algeria, Afghanistan and the Yemen.

3. Three of the ambassadors return to their original posts, in France, Zambia and the Yemen. Nine other postings represent reassignments of ambassadors who had been recalled in 1967. The remaining five appointments are also from within the foreign service. No appointments have so far been made from outside the profession.

4. In parallel with the return of the ambassadors there are increasing signs that the Chinese are reverting in their diplomatic practice from "revolutionary diplomacy" to a more orthodox style. No doubt this process will have been accelerated by their desire not to place gratuitously further diplomatic weapons in the hands of the Russians.

15	Formation of a People's Republic of China in North Vietnam
15-16	China and USSR withdraw troops from border on 7 June
16-17	Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
16-17	Soviet Union and PRC disagree on the role of the Third World Government in South Vietnam
17	Soviet statement in support of the Republic of China
18-19	Berlin Government sends Chinese salute to PRC
19-20	Czechoslovakia sends Chinese salute to PRC
20	China re-opens embassy in East Berlin border with PRC
21-24	Agreement signed on the subject of Malaya-Pakistan Agreement
25-26	Work on the subject of PRC in East Berlin
26-28	Bulgarian Chinese Embassy in Sofia visits Algeria
28	CPSU Central Committee Bureau
28-29	Non-governmental collaboration on European Security in Bucharest
29	Announcement of PRC's first visit to Rumania in August
30	People's Republic of South Yemen recognizes East Germany

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CHRONOLOGY

- May Preparatory Meeting for World Conference ends in Moscow.
30
31 Ota Sik and other reformers expelled from Czechoslovak CP Central Committee.
- June
1-3 The President of the Board of Trade visits Moscow, and on 3 June signs the Anglo-Soviet Long Term Trade Agreement for 1969-1975.
2 Ivory Coast breaks off relations with Soviet Union.
Strougal appointed deputy First Secretary of Czechoslovak CP.
Praesidium of Prague City Party Committee resign.
3-5 East German Foreign Minister Winzer in Syria.
3-6 Hungarian Prime Minister Fock in Prague.
5 Syria recognises "DDR".
5-17 World Communist Conference in Moscow.
6 Chinese Protest Note to Soviet Union on border incidents.
China accepts 18 June as date for opening of 15th meeting of Sino-Soviet Commission on border navigation to be held in Khabarovsk.
9-11 Polish Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz visits Czechoslovakia.
10 Formation of a "Provisional Government for South Vietnam" announced.
China and USSR exchange protests over a clash on the Sinkiang border on 9 June.
10-13 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Cairo.
12-13 Soviet Union and East European states recognise the "Provisional Government" of South Vietnam.
13 Soviet statement to China on the frontier question.
14-16 Berlin Governing Mayor Schutz visits Poland.
16-18 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Marko in Norway.
18 Khabarovsk meeting of Sino-Soviet Border Navigation Commission begins.
Agreement signed on establishment of Moscow-Hanoi Air Service.
21-24 World Assembly for Peace in East Berlin.
23-28 Bulgarian CP First Secretary Zhivkov visits Algeria.
26 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.
26-28 Non-governmental colloquium on European Security in Bucharest.
28 Announcement of President Nixon's visit to Rumania in August.
30 People's Republic of South Yemen recognises East Germany.

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- 3-12 Dr. Atassi, Syrian Head of State, in Moscow.
- 7-14 East German Premier Stoph in Moscow.
- 8 Sino-Soviet clash at Goldinsky Island in the Amur River.
- 8-9 Polish Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz in Moscow.
- 8-11 Hungarian Party First Secretary Kadar and Premier Fock in Bulgaria.
- 8-12 Consultative Conference of non-aligned states in Belgrade.
- 10 U.A.R. recognises East Germany.
Hungarian-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship signed in Sofia.
Foreign policy speech by Gromyko to Supreme Soviet.
- 12-19 Air Marshal Nur Khan, Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan, in Peking.
- 12-17 Sisco, U.S. Under-Secretary of State in Moscow.
- 20-27 Soviet naval squadron visits Cuba.
- 22 Celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Polish People's Republic, attended by Brezhnev and Podgorny, President Svoboda and First Secretary Husák of Czechoslovakia, and Prime Minister Stoph and Politburo member Honecker of East Germany.
U.S. relaxes restrictions on visits to China by American citizens.
- 23-26 M. Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister, visits Moscow.
- 24 Gerald Brooks released.
- 25 Kosygin receives leaders of West German F.D.P.
Brezhnev meets Sadovsky, First Secretary of the Slovak CP, and Colotka, Speaker of the Czechoslovak Federal Parliament, in Moscow.
Soviet-US agreement in principle to open Consulates in Leningrad and San Francisco.
- 27 Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Tepavac in Bonn.
- 28-29 Czechoslovak First Secretary Husák in Sofia.
- 29 Finnish President Kekkonen arrived for a holiday in the Caucasus.
- 30 Soviet writer Anatoly Kuznetsov granted permission to stay in U.K.