



# Communist Policy and Tactics 1969, 2. hluti

---

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnámál – Trúnaðarskýrslur – Communist Policy & Tactics

Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

---

[bjarnibenediktsson.is](http://bjarnibenediktsson.is)

Einkaskjalasafn nr. 360  
Stjórnámálamaðurinn  
Askja 2-39, Örk 7

©Borgarskjalasafn Reykjavíkur

CONFIDENTIAL

12/5 or 2/66

## COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

AUGUST 1969

### Summary

#### Problems facing the Soviet Leadership

The Soviet leaders will want to create an atmosphere of success for their policies next year, when the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth is to be celebrated, and the 24th Congress of the CPSU seems likely to meet. But neither at home nor abroad have Soviet policies been able to achieve very much.

#### Sino-Soviet Relations

2. The border incident on 13 August was fairly serious and shows that tension remains high and will probably continue to be so, despite the apparently successful conclusion of the Khabarovsk talks. There is no reason to suppose that trouble on the Eastern border will lead the Soviet Union to make any ready concessions in negotiations with the West.

#### Czechoslovakia

3. Widespread disorder in Czechoslovakia on and around the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion did not pose a serious threat to the Government's authority. The emergency decree of 22 August is a definite tightening of internal discipline. Stronger measures may be required, but Husak must hope that he has control of the country now, and has satisfied Moscow as well.

#### Rumania

4. President Nixon's visit was a success for Rumania but it annoyed the other Warsaw Pact States. Soviet disapproval has been shown by the cancellation of Brezhnev's proposed visit and by the low level delegation to the Rumanian Party Congress. The Congress endorsed both Rumania's foreign and domestic policies. Strain in Rumanian relations with the Soviet Union persists, and the Russians may take stronger action against Rumania's independent foreign policy.

#### European and Asian Security

5. The Soviet action of calling for a European Security Conference while remaining studiously vague about its possible agenda casts doubt on Russian intentions. The Russians are similarly vague over their proposals for Asian Security. The response of Asian countries has been guarded.

#### China

6. Outbreaks of disorder are again causing concern, although they are not as serious as those in mid 1968.

#### Communist Front Organisations

7. The Front Organisations have now returned to order following their disarray after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians are holding conferences again, although with limited success. A test will come in October when the WFTU and a conference on European Security will meet; both seem likely to revive arguments about Czechoslovakia. A further strain would be the resumption of full Chinese activity within the front organisations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROBLEMS FACING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

The 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth is to be celebrated in April, 1970. The XXIVth Congress of the CPSU, which might well inaugurate the new Five Year Plan, also falls due then, although no announcement of its date has yet been made. The Soviet leaders will want to create an atmosphere of success for their policies around these occasions. But, on the basis of their present performance, it is questionable whether they will be able to do this convincingly, at least for the members of the establishment who matter.

2. On the economic side, the reforms have tended to stagnate and have failed to impart the stimulus needed to maintain high rates of growth; money incentives are not being accompanied by sufficient supplies of the goods people want (especially housing and cars) and the inflationary situation remains serious, jeopardising productivity increases. Harvest prospects are unpromising, though reserves are adequate. More generally on the home front, dissent is a persistent irritant and the image of authoritarianism and repressiveness is growing. Quite possibly this is already causing a damaging degree of non-cooperation on the part of the intelligentsia. The stories told by recent defectors like A. Kuznetsov must have increased the leadership's embarrassment. Unhealthily nationalistic voices are beginning to sound in literature. A major dereliction by regional administration has been brought to light in Azerbaidzhan which has already led to the replacement of the First Party Secretary by the Chief of the local KGB, and will probably lead to a wider purge. Three Candidate members of the Politburo in charge of major Republics have publicly acknowledged shortcomings in their areas. There have been some indications that there may be tension between the High Command and the Party leadership.

3. The Soviet Union's achievements appear no more promising in foreign policy. Consolidation of the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe is making only limited progress. No satisfactory method has been found for dealing with the Chinese, who are quite likely to stage further incidents over the period of the Lenin anniversary. The apparent short term success of the world communist conference is beginning to be obscured by the difficulties of putting the right glosses on its basic document. The pursuit of anti-imperialism along Party lines which is reflected in that document, does not square with the Soviet Government's policy of working for limited accommodations with the West in certain areas; and this contradiction could be inducing some paralysis. The Soviet Government probably sees itself at a disadvantage in negotiating with the United States at a moment when achievements and successes like Apollo and President Nixon's visit to Rumania seem to have placed America in a position of comparative strength. Early agreement on strategic arms limitation is not possible, if only because of the extreme complexity of the subject. The Middle East situation remains intractable despite the expenditure of considerable negotiating effort. And finally, little progress seems likely on the Soviet Union's proposals for European and Asian security.

4. No doubt the Soviet leaders refuse to see the picture in such dismal colours as this, but they will be hard put to it to find many glimmers of light. They are devising one or two cheering features such as an amendment to the Constitution and a possible reorganisation of the Party, and also a reorganisation of the collective farm system. But these will not be able to disguise the real state of affairs, which seems to be dominated by reaction and stagnation. The present inner leadership, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to criticism. Whether any of their ambitious junior colleagues have the courage to criticise is another

/matter

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

matter; and it is difficult to see what attractive alternative policies they could offer within the framework of the system and in present circumstances. Although no internal political crisis is in sight, the conditions for one may be developing.

CONFIDENTIAL

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

In an article in "Problems of Peace and Socialism" in mid-July, Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union would not be provoked into ill-considered action vis-a-vis China but would defend its interests firmly. A major editorial article in Pravda of 28 August took a similar line, pointing also to the dangers for the whole world if the dispute were to escalate to war. Nevertheless, Soviet propaganda continues to show certain threatening features. For instance, comment on the anniversary in August of the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol in 1939, when the Russians defeated the Japanese on the Eastern border of Mongolia, contrived to convey the strong implication that a successful military campaign in this area could be repeated today. (Indeed one commentator on Soviet television made the revealing slip of referring to the Chinese as the defeated enemy of 1939.)

2. The continuing tension on the Sino-Soviet frontiers was demonstrated by the fairly serious incident on 13 August on the border between Kazakhstan and Sinkiang, when two Soviet border guards were killed and many Chinese are said to have been killed and wounded. It is not possible to say which side started the incident: the Chinese accused the Russians of penetrating 2 kilometres into Chinese territory and the Russians accused the Chinese of penetrating 700 metres into Soviet territory. The protests exchanged about the incident were fairly restrained in tone, and the follow-up propaganda on both sides, although extensive, was not as raucous as during some periods earlier in the year. There were mass meetings in China but not nearly as many as followed the second Ussuri incident on 15 March.

3. On 19 August the Chinese delivered another protest to the Russians about activities on the frontiers. This alleged that the Russians had instigated 429 incidents during June and July and that during the same period the Russians had penetrated 3 kilometres into Chinese territory near the location of the incident of 13 August. It is not clear why the Chinese chose to issue a general protest less than a week after their protest of 13 August about the incident on that day. It may be that they wished to point out, just before the anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that Soviet aggressiveness found expression in the Sino-Soviet, as well as the Eastern European, context.

4. The meeting of the Sino-Soviet commission on the navigation of border rivers, which ended at Khabarovsk on 8 August, seems to have reached a limited degree of agreement, although it has not affected the general state of Sino-Soviet relations. According to the Russians, "certain measures to improve the shipping situation" on border rivers were agreed and it was decided that a further meeting should take place in China next year. The Chinese announcement about the conclusion of the talks said that the Chinese delegation had displayed "an attitude of making the conference a success and seeking solutions to the problems". According to Soviet sources, the Chinese tried to turn the meeting into a discussion of the general border dispute. This attempt clearly failed; hence perhaps the implication in the Chinese announcement that China made concessions. A wish to appear conciliatory in this connexion may also have been behind the revelation, in the Chinese protest of 19 August, that the Russians had menaced Chinese vessels on the border rivers while the Khabarovsk discussions were proceeding.

/ . 5.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. As for the future, the frontier incidents seem likely to continue. Some may be serious and the Russians may be expected to deal very firmly with the Chinese. But the Chinese have no interest in a general war, which they would be sure to lose. And, despite some speculation to the contrary, it seems on balance unlikely that the Russians will launch a large scale attack: certainly full-scale war would not be in their interests. Tension in Sino-Soviet relations generally is likely to continue, with each side attempting to blame the other for this. Negotiations on the general frontier dispute are very unlikely.

6. Although the Russians seem to be settling down to a long period of trouble with China, it does not follow that they will change their policies towards the West. They no doubt calculate that they can contain the Chinese threat for the foreseeable future and, although this threat may be an additional reason for wanting a period of calm in East-West relations, there is no reason to suppose that the Russians will be any more ready than hitherto to make concessions in East-West negotiations.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE ANNIVERSARY

There was widespread public disorder in Czechoslovakia on and around the first anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion. In Prague large numbers of young people assembled in Wenceslas Square and adjoining areas on 20 August and on the following day many people complied with the suggestions in illegal pamphlets by walking to work and boycotting shops and public transport. The call for a five-minute stoppage of traffic at noon was widely observed; car horns and some factory sirens were sounded for five minutes. Disturbances took place throughout the evening of 21 August. Large forces of police, troops and People's Militia were deployed to control the disturbances; it is estimated that up to 200 Czechoslovak tanks were brought into Prague during the afternoon of 21 August. The Security Forces appear initially to have acted with restraint and without vindictiveness; tanks were used for their psychological effect and mobile road blocks. The crowds were particularly hostile to the People's Militia and there is some evidence at a later stage of deliberate brutality on the part of the police. No Soviet troops were involved in suppressing the demonstrations.

2. There were few signs of organisation among the demonstrators. It seems unlikely that the disturbances constituted a serious threat to the Government's authority and the casualties may well have been the result of inexperience in handling civil disorder (the Ministry of the Interior admitted that four demonstrators had been killed, though claiming that the injury rate was higher among the security forces than the demonstrators). The Czechoslovak, Soviet and "invader" press has nevertheless made a concerted effort to depict the disturbances as the work of counter revolutionaries. Particular attention has been given to allegations that foreigners were found to be acting as links between leaders of individual groups of demonstrators, echoing allegations made before the anniversary that foreign radio stations were deliberately fomenting trouble.

3. The disturbances were followed on 22 August by the publication of an emergency decree. This will have effect until the end of the year; it establishes penalties for a loosely defined range of offences against public order (including refusal to carry out the duties of one's employment, in such a way as to hamper efforts to maintain order and to maintain the uninterrupted flow of work) and increases the maximum sentence for others. Court procedures for trying these offences will involve a considerable loss of protection for the accused. The law also provides that anyone infringing the "socialist social order" may be summarily dismissed from his employment or, in the case of students, expelled from their place of study. Though the decree is not notably draconian by East European standards, and it is too early to see how widely it will be used in practice, its adoption bears witness to continuing popular dissatisfaction with the leadership's policies and may be interpreted as part of the price which the leaders are having to pay to avoid more direct Soviet interference in party affairs and the internal administration of the country. Verbal attacks on Dubcek and some other 1968 leaders for "errors", without which allegedly there would have been no invasion, have been intensified recently and there have been calls for them to give up public office altogether. The award of the Order of Lenin to Husak on 27 August suggests that his handling of the situation has Moscow's at least qualified approval. But Husak may feel that he has imposed sufficient discipline on the party and the people to satisfy Moscow and himself, and that he can now get on with the job of restoring the economy - a daunting enough task in present circumstances.

4. The demotion at any moment of Dubcek, Smirkovsky and maybe others is to be expected. There are also signs that some use is being made of the emergency decree. If the Russians or Husak himself decided that the situation requires restrictive measures for example on foreign travel which is still liberally allowed, or sweeping use of the emergency law or the exemplary punishment rather than retirement of such people as Dubcek and Smirkovsky, popular morale would sink even lower, and the economic situation decline even more. But up to now, discipline has taken the form mainly of expulsion (or resignation) from the Party or loss of position or job.



CONFIDENTIAL

RUMANIA : PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT AND THE  
10TH PARTY CONGRESS

President Nixon's decision to accept an invitation to visit Rumania, extended by President Ceausescu earlier this year, must have been welcome to the latter, because of the boost such a visit would give to Rumania's independent foreign policy. But the Rumanians showed themselves well aware, by refraining from mounting a propaganda build-up before the visit and by stressing Soviet-Rumanian friendship, of the implications for relations with Moscow, especially soon after Rumanian outspokenness at the world Communist conference.

2. The visit itself, (2-3 August) was undoubtedly a success. The crowds showed warm enthusiasm for the President. Ceausescu has enhanced his international stature and his popularity at home.

3. The Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies were very annoyed by the visit. On the one hand they had been given little or no notice of the final agreement concerning the visit and on the other it seems that they had not even been informed of Ceausescu's earlier invitation to President Nixon, despite several high-level inter-party and Warsaw Pact meetings at the time. But Moscow has so far expressed its disapproval by actions of limited scope, and Rumania seems likely to get away with the visit without more serious repercussions in the short term. The main Soviet reaction was the postponement of Brezhnev's visit to Rumania, arranged for July, and with it the signing of the new Soviet/Rumanian Friendship Treaty. In addition, the Soviet delegations to the 10th Congress of the Rumanian Party, and to the celebrations later in the month of the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Rumania, were not headed by top level Party leaders, in sharp distinction to the Party Congress in 1965, which Brezhnev attended. The other Warsaw Pact States followed suit. Soviet displeasure was further displayed by the minimal press coverage of President Nixon's visit and by an article in "New Times" which pointedly drew attention to the dangers of nationalism in Eastern Europe and alleged American determination to exploit any unusual development in the area. This in turn was followed by the speech, at the Rumanian Congress, of the leader of the Soviet delegation, Party Secretary Katushev, warning of the "perfidious tactics of bridge building" and "economic penetration" by the West. In an oblique reference to the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" he spoke of the unanimous approval of Brezhnev's statement at the Moscow conference that the CPSU would "spare no effort for strengthening the cohesion of the communist movement, that it will fully carry out its internationalist duty".

4. Thus the 10th Party Congress (6-12 August) which opened just three days after the departure of President Nixon, was unmistakably over-shadowed by that visit. Soviet and Eastern European disapproval had affected the level of their delegations. The Chinese had also seen fit not to attend but did send their "warm congratulations" to the Congress and wished the Rumanian people success "in the defence of national independence". Other absentees included the North Koreans, the Cubans and the Albanians; but some 70 communist and workers' parties did attend.

/ 5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. In his opening speech to the Congress Ceausescu, attempting to redress the uneasy balance after President Nixon's visit, emphasised Rumania's close ties with her allies of the Warsaw Pact and especially with USSR. He stressed that this relationship provided the cornerstone of Rumania's foreign policy. Nevertheless, although his speech contained various unfriendly references to the United States, Ceausescu also emphasised that it would be Rumania's policy to promote good relations with all countries. He stressed too that Rumania did not favour an international system which depended on blocs and reaffirmed her clear support for the concepts of sovereignty, equality, independence and non-interference - i.e. her rejection of "limited sovereignty".

6. Later he asked the Congress to confirm the April 1968 Central Committee decision to rehabilitate many of those purged under the regime of Gheorghiu Dej and, in this context, again referred to the "mistakes and illegal actions" of the previous period. A later speech by D. Popescu underlined this attitude when he said that "socialist humanism has stepped out of the passages of text books and has become an actuality".

7. In general the Congress and its final documents endorsed Rumania's current foreign policy and heralded no new initiatives. The same was true of her internal policy, where the Five Year Plan (1971-1975) was approved. Approval was given too for the Party's present policy of democratic centralism. This means that pluralism will not be tolerated and that the reins of power will remain firmly in the hands of the Party. Rumania will not embark on liberalisation, except to a limited and strictly controlled degree.

8. At the Congress and enlarged Central Committee of the Party was elected and certain changes were made in the Executive Committee and Presidium. By the dismissal of Gheorghiu Apostol and the honourable retirement to the Central Auditing Committee of Chivu Stoica, Ceausescu has rid himself of conservatives who were formerly close to Gheorghiu Dej and were, at one time at least, acceptable to and sympathetic to the Russians. Ceausescu has strengthened his own position within the Party, while at the same time changes in the party election system, suggesting a more democratic approach, have given the appearance of a wide basis of support for his present policies.

9. The 10th Party Congress left Rumania's current policies unaltered. The coincidence of President Nixon's visit left Soviet-Rumanian relations strained, though not critical so far as can be seen. The cool message sent by the Soviet leaders on the occasion of Rumania's 25th Anniversary - ten days after the Congress - suggests that this strain may persist. It may therefore be some time before the Russians agree to sign the new Soviet/Rumanian Treaty of Friendship. Moreover, the Soviet reaction may not yet be fully visible: it could become apparent later that Moscow is only waiting for a more suitable time to take stronger action against Rumania's independent foreign policy.

CONFIDENTIAL

EUROPEAN AND ASIAN SECURITY

European Security

The Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries are continuing to press for a conference on European security as proposed in the Budapest appeal of 17 March, 1969. But, despite repeated enquiries, the Soviet Government have declined to add anything to the generalities in the appeal about what should be discussed at such a conference. One or two of the Eastern European governments have recently made some general suggestions on an informal basis. These suggestions have not all been consistent with each other. The issues mentioned for possible discussion at a conference have included general declarations about respect for national independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty (largely on the lines of the United Nations charter) disarmament and troop reductions, including nuclear free zones and non-proliferation; economic co-operation, including some kind of understanding between EFTA, EEC and CMEA; technological and cultural co-operation; Germany; and European frontiers.

2. This attitude of calling for a conference while at the same time remaining studiously vague about its possible agenda casts serious doubt on the constructiveness of Soviet intentions. The decision of each European country as to whether there should in due course be a conference on European security is bound to depend on what has been proposed for discussion at that conference. A major criterion here will be whether the suggested subjects offer a reasonable prospect of progress, including progress on the central issue of Germany: a conference which made no significant progress would cause wide-spread disappointment and worsen, rather than improve the atmosphere in Europe. NATO has been engaged since April in an intensive study of the possible subjects for successful negotiation, and of the best means of initiating such a negotiation. There is no sign that equivalent work has been undertaken by the Warsaw Pact countries. The Budapest appeal, as the Warsaw Pact States well know, contained totally unacceptable demands about Germany, and the rest of it was generalities. So long as this is the only official Soviet or Eastern European proposal regarding the subjects for discussion at any conference, the prospects of general agreement on holding such a conference cannot be good.

Asian Security

3. From early June onwards official Soviet statements about foreign policy have been referring to the need for an Asian security system. But it is not at all clear how far the Russians will now press this initiative. A leading article on foreign policy in Kommunist approved for publication on 24 July ignored the subject altogether, although it echoed other sections of Gromyko's speech of 10 July. And although Soviet officials were hinting at the end of July that definite proposals would soon be put forward the Soviet ambassadors in Asia who have now returned to their posts from their briefing in Moscow have had nothing to add to the very vague remarks they had made earlier in the summer.

4. Soviet ideas on Asian security may therefore still not have been formulated. The theme may be kept in play only for propaganda purposes. Alternatively, if there is still to be an initiative, it could come in Gromyko's speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September.

5. Up to now, the Soviet display of interest in Asian security has evoked an Asian response varying from negative to guarded. Any detailed Soviet proposals would be unlikely to fare much better. Meanwhile, the separate, but no doubt related, Soviet idea of a conference in Kabul on economic co-operation and especially trade transit routes between the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran and perhaps Nepal, seems to have foundered on Pakistan's refusal to take part in a conference attended by India. Yahya Khan has accepted an invitation to visit Moscow. If he goes he may come under pressure to relent on this, but is unlikely to do so.

DISORDERS IN CHINA

By July outbreaks of disorder had again reached a level at which they were causing concern to the Chinese leaders. Following the call for unity repeatedly uttered since the beginning of the year and propounded as a major theme of the Ninth Party Congress, the resurgence of disorders is significant in showing the extent of malaise caused by the Cultural Revolution.

2. The disorders have been fairly widespread, although they have apparently not reached the level of violence of mid-1968, when in some areas Red Guard and Rebel groups looted large quantities of arms and perpetrated mass killings. The central authorities recently issued a series of directives denouncing "anarchist tendencies" and faction-fighting. These indicate that, as in 1968, they intend to use the armed forces to curb unruly elements, both by persuasion and by threat of force.
3. The recent directives referred to disorders in four provinces, Shansi in the north, Kiangsi and Kiangsu in the east and Shensi in mid-Western China. According to a wall-poster, Taiyuan, the provincial capital of Shansi, was sealed off by troops on 20 July. There have been reports of unrest in some other areas, including Hopei (the province nearest to Peking). Inner Mongolia and Chekiang.
4. The precise causes of disorder in each affected area are not known, but there are several factors which may have contributed to the unrest in many cases: exasperation felt by many people following three years of political buffeting in the Cultural Revolution; disillusionment felt by those who hoped for an improvement in living standards following the criticism of persons in authority; youth's unwillingness to settle in the countryside; resistance by radical elements to the imposition of order and control; and weakness of local administration caused by the diffidence of officials and dissension between factions represented in low-level Revolutionary Committees.
5. Among numerous press articles reflecting the leaders' anxiety, the most important was a joint editorial of the People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily, published on 24 August under the title "Firmly grasp revolutionary mass criticism". The editorial amounted to a strong call for the suppression both of "erroneous tendencies within the revolutionary ranks", e.g. sectarianism and anarchism, and of "economism", corruption among officials and youth and racial antagonism. Other articles have focused on the problems of indiscipline among workers and of ensuring that the peasants set aside adequate grain for storage rather than sharing out too much of the crop for their own consumption.
6. An earlier joint editorial, published for Army Day (1 August), transmitted a new instruction by Mao enjoining the army to exercise "meticulous care" in performing its role in the Cultural Revolution. The implication was that Mao still wishes the army to do its utmost to settle disputes and restore order by means other than the use of force.

CONFIDENTIAL

## THE STATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST

### FRONT ORGANISATIONS

For six months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia the front organisations were in such a state of disarray that they had to cancel all their meetings. Since then the Russians have managed, by means of financial pressure and the removal of those officials who dared to criticise Soviet action against Dubcek, to bring the front organisations back into line. Though they now feel confident enough to hold front conferences again, it may be doubted that things will ever return to their previous disciplined unanimity.

2. The first real test came with the World Assembly for Peace, organised by the World Council of Peace (WCP), in East Berlin on 21-24 June and attended by 1,100 persons, where elaborate precautions were taken to keep the proceedings under strict control. The elected Czech delegation was replaced at the last moment by a new one, which asked delegates not to raise the Czech question; journalists were excluded from all but the opening and closing sessions and carefully segregated from delegates; and speakers known to be critical of the Soviet Union found it difficult to reach the rostrum and, even if they managed to speak, found that their opinions were excluded from the reports. Although the organisers tried hard to concentrate the discussions on Viet Nam, the only subject on which the delegates were apparently agreed, many participants insisted on raising the Czech question under the item "European Security".

3. Dissension on the question became so deep, and tempers so frayed, that the drafting commission had to work all night to produce an agreed text of the final documents, and the organisers did not dare to hold the final press conference, normally the climax of such a meeting. The WCP emerged with a badly battered image, but clearly hopes to retrieve its fortunes by means of a considerable influx of new officials. Though the Indian Communist, Romesh Chandra, remains Secretary General, several Secretaries and members of the Presidential Committee have been replaced.

4. The next big test will come in October when the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) is due to hold its Seventh Congress in Budapest. Though Louis Saillant, WFTU's French General Secretary, has announced that he will retire, on genuine grounds of ill-health, the fate of Renato Bitossi, the Italian President, hangs in the balance. It is well-known that the Russians want to get rid of both for they issued a joint statement last September strongly criticising the August invasion of Czechoslovakia. But if the Russians try to remove Bitossi, the CGIL, which is the WFTU's largest affiliate in the West, has threatened to disaffiliate. Either way the Russians face a setback. The Czech question is bound to dominate the proceedings in any case because the Congress must either endorse or reject all statements issued in WFTU's name since it last met.

5. Another crisis will face the front organisations in October, when, unless it is postponed yet again, the ill-fated Conference on European Security, which the WCP has been trying to organise since early 1968, is due to be held in Vienna. Judging by the WCP's experience at the World Peace Assembly, many of its members (particularly the Italians and Scandinavians) and certainly the observers, such as the Yugoslavs, the non-aligned and the genuine pacifists, will insist that European security cannot be discussed without reference to Czechoslovakia. The organisers want to use the Conference (a) to condemn the

/ "neo-Nazi"

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

"neo-Nazi" German Federal Government; (b) to attack NATO; and (c) to give propaganda support to the Soviet proposals for an inter-governmental conference on European security.

6. Since the disarray in the front organisations caused by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the stubborn opposition to Soviet actions which manifested itself amongst front members, particularly in Western European countries, the Russians have tried to divert attention elsewhere. Viet Nam, as for several years, has provided the main target, but although it provides a useful unifying theme, pro-Vietcong propaganda has reached saturation point. The next priority has been the Middle East, but here the front organisations' unqualified support for the Arabs and partisan attacks on "Israeli imperialism" have repelled many would-be supporters from the ranks of intellectuals, churchmen and pacifists, whom the WCP particularly tries to attract.

7. Led by the WFTU, the front organisations are making special efforts at present to extend their influence in Africa and Latin America, in addition to the Middle East. WFTU's method is to infiltrate, financially assist and then use for its own purposes existing regional trade union organisations e.g. the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU), the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) and the Permanent Congress for Trade Union Unity of the Workers of Latin America (CPUSTAL). In addition the WCP, the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ) are also making special efforts in these areas. But progress is not easy: in the Middle East they only receive local support so long as they maintain a fully pro-Arab and anti-Israeli line. In Africa they are only supported for their anti-colonialist line. And in Latin America the situation is dominated by the Cubans, who will only tolerate front activities if they follow Cuban policy exclusively. Though Soviet-Cuban relations are improving there is still considerable mutual mistrust; and most front meetings are held in Chile and not Cuba.

8. Lastly a disturbing possibility must be exercising the front organisations and their Soviet masters. This is that a restoration of more normal conditions in China and a resumption of wider external relations might lead the Chinese to revert to their pre-1965 practice of taking part in front meetings. Though relations have been virtually severed since December 1964, the Chinese have never resigned or been expelled and indeed still hold nominal office in most front organisations. If they were to start attending meetings again and loudly challenging Soviet policies at every turn, the organisations would either have to expel them or face chaos. Such a confrontation might appeal to the Chinese, particularly at a time when the Soviet Union is still vulnerable to criticism over Czechoslovakia, and when the Chinese attempt to set up their own rival organisations has been an almost complete failure.

CONFIDENTIAL

Chronology

- 23 July-2 August Warsaw Pact Air Exercise in G.D.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland and U.S.S.R.
- 29 July-3 August Finnish President Kekkonen on holiday with Kosygin in U.S.S.R.
- August
- 2-3 President Nixon in Rumania
- 2-10 Husak and Svoboda meet Brezhnev and Podgorny in the Crimea.
- 2-27 Hungarian Party 1st Secretary Kadar on holiday in U.S.S.R. at invitation of CC of CPSU.
- 5 Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski meets Gromyko in U.S.S.R.
- 5-12 Kosygin on holiday in Budapest at invitation of Hungarian P.M. Fock.
- 6-12 Rumanian Xth Party Congress.
- 6- 22 General Alexei Yepishev, Political Head of Soviet Armed Forces, and other leading political officers in Czechoslovakia.
- 8 Conclusion of Sino-Soviet talks on border navigation at Khabarovsk.
- 10-15 Soviet-Czech Command Post Exercise in Czechoslovakia.
- 11 Soviet Marshal Konev visits East Germany.
- 13 Sino-Soviet border clash in Sinkiang. Exchange of protests.
- 19 Chinese protest note on frontier incidents in June and July.
- 19-21 Demonstrations in Czechoslovakia on the anniversary of the invasion.
- 20 Foreign Affairs Committees of the Soviet of the Union, and the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet recommend ratification of Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Supreme Soviet Praesidium.

/ 20-23



CONFIDENTIAL

- 20-23 S.P.D. delegation led by Helmut Schmidt in Moscow.
- 22 Emergency law on public order in Czechoslovakia.
- 23 Celebration of 25th anniversary of Liberation of Rumania.
- 27 Soviet Party and Government delegation led by Mazurov (First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) in Czechoslovakia to celebrate 25th Anniversary of the Slovak uprising.
- 28 Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends protest notes to several Western Embassies in Prague about an "anti-Czech campaign" on news media. The text of a similar Czechoslovak note to China published in Pravda.

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICSNOVEMBER, 1969SUMMARYEuropean Security

A further high level Warsaw Pact meeting seems probable in early December. But a major shift in the Warsaw Pact position on European Security is unlikely. Warsaw Pact diplomats are saying that the U.S. and Canada may participate in a Conference, provided that East Germany also does. The Warsaw Pact may now be considering a series of Conferences. The Poles' desire to include regional disarmament in a Conference Agenda may be one element behind reports of dissension at the Prague meeting of the Warsaw Pact. The Russians probably want a Conference that would simply cement the status quo and restore the image of a peace-loving Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union and the Fedayeen

Despite Shelepin's remark about Soviet support to the Fedayeen, the official Soviet line still appears to be support for the Arab "countries". Verbal support for the Fedayeen may be extended for tactical reasons but direct material aid is unlikely.

Solzhenitsyn

Solzhenitsyn defended himself firmly at the meeting which recommended his expulsion from the USSR Writers' Union. The measures so far taken may have little practical effect on his life, but they indicate his increasingly precarious personal position.

Labour Developments in the Soviet Union

The Soviet authorities have recently adopted measures to make more efficient use of the labour force. The most radical was the recommendation for widespread application in industry of the "Shchekino experiment", which involves labour being laid off.

Chinese Internal Affairs

The Chinese leadership is intent on restoring the administration of the country and re-constructing the Party organisation after the cultural revolution. Disorder appears to have died out. The current emphasis on preparations for war may have economic ends.

National Congress of the CPGB

The Congress endorsed the leadership's earlier declaration deploring the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but the dissident vote was substantial; the issue has not been finally resolved. The leadership was also under fire on other issues, including its stand on the Basic Document of the World Communist Conference. Party membership continues to fall. The leadership cannot be very optimistic about the future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUROPEAN SECURITY

A further high level Warsaw Pact meeting seems likely early in December. It may add a gloss or two to the proposals in the Prague Declaration of 31 October, but we do not expect any major alteration in the position which the Warsaw Pact countries have now adopted. Meanwhile, the various contacts, both formal and informal, which we and others have had with these countries in November have revealed a little more of their thinking.

2. The Prague Declaration did not mention the question of United States and Canadian participation in the proposed conference, but seemed to leave it open for further consideration. Since then, the Rumanian Foreign Minister has said publicly that the Prague meeting assumed that the North Americans would participate. But the East Europeans generally have been taking the line that the United States and Canada may participate provided the West agrees to East German participation, and that this need not involve recognition of East Germany.

3. Although the Prague Declaration specifically mentioned only one conference, it now seems as if the Warsaw Pact countries are thinking of a series of conferences, at which the subjects discussed would be in an ascending scale of difficulty. The Yugoslavs have suggested instead a permanent forum for consultations and co-operation.

4. As late as two weeks before the Prague Meeting, the Poles were still advocating a three-point treaty on European security, covering the two items in the Prague Declaration (the non-use of force and economic and other cooperation) and regional disarmament as well. Several Warsaw Pact diplomats have said that disarmament was omitted from the Prague Declaration because it was too difficult to tackle at this stage. It has even been suggested that Western proposals to discuss disarmament would be regarded as delaying tactics. Nevertheless, the Poles seem still to have some kind of draft document, perhaps a treaty, up their sleeves.

5. The Polish failure to have their ideas on regional disarmament adopted at the Warsaw Pact meeting may account for the reports that the meeting was not altogether harmonious. There could well have been other bones of contention: for instance, Soviet insistence on avoiding formulations which might appear to undermine the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty; and differences between East Germany and some of the others about the degree of enhancement of the latter's status which should be required from any conference.

6. In general, the smaller Warsaw Pact countries, though possibly not East Germany, seem genuinely to want a conference. Some of them believe that the opening of an East-West dialogue will reduce the risk of violent Soviet action within Eastern Europe and generally help to undermine the doctrine of limited sovereignty; and will also increase their ability to build-up exchanges, especially in the economic field, with the West. The Rumanians seem to hope that negotiations might weaken military blocs and increase the room for manoeuvre enjoyed by small States.

7. The Russians show no sign of readiness for negotiations involving give and take on the substantive issues. But they probably do want a conference of the type proposed in the Prague Declaration, or indeed any international meeting that would tend to cement the status quo. As they see it, such a conference would be a public relations vehicle designed to

/restore

CONFIDENTIAL

restore the image of a peace-loving Soviet Union engaged in a major diplomatic effort to reduce tension. Furthermore, if the West declines to accept the proposal for a conference now the Soviet Union will exploit this in their propaganda; and if the West unexpectedly agrees to a conference, there will be some enhancement of the status quo. Either way, there are gains for the Russians (or so they may believe) and further opportunities so sow dissension among the Western Powers.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FEDAYEEN

The Soviet Trades Union leader, Shelepin, said on 20 October at the Congress of the World Federation of Trades Unions: "We view the struggle of Palestinian patriots to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression as a just national liberation, anti-imperialist struggle and we shall offer it our support". This is the most open declaration of support for the Fedayeen from any Soviet leader so far. But, although reported in Trud, the Soviet Trades Union paper, Shelepin's remark was omitted from Pravda's summary of his speech. This seems to indicate that the CPSU does not wish to give further publicity to the remark.

2. A different impression was given by the head of the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 31 October. Asked twice about the Soviet attitude to the activities of the Palestinian guerillas in the Lebanon, he said that it would be wrong to deny the just struggle of the Palestinians against the invader but that the Soviet Union assisted all Arab countries (emphasising the word countries) which waged a just struggle against Israel. The statement on the Middle East issued on 27 November by the Warsaw Pact countries less Rumania also spoke of Soviet assistance to countries and did not mention the Fedayeen at all.

3. An article in Pravda of 19 November seemed to indicate Soviet satisfaction with the outcome of the trouble in the Lebanon. It said that the right of the Palestinian guerillas to be active on Lebanese soil had been confirmed, and the Fedayeen were depicted as responsible organisations. But Soviet approval seemed to be withheld from the most extreme guerillas: Pravda said there were elements in the Palestinian movement which by their extremism might hinder the Arab struggle.

4. The UAR press said on 20 November that a Palestinian Delegation would soon visit Moscow but this has not been confirmed.

5. The growing success and support of the Fedayeen in the Middle East probably led the Soviet Government to accord more attention to them. The Russians would wish, especially in view of Chinese competition, to maintain a reputation as the standard-bearer of the oppressed, as well as their influence upon the ruling Arab Governments. It is possible also that, with the Soviet-American talks on the Middle East in a crucial phase, the Russians are beginning to hedge their bets, so that if no solution is reached they will be on reasonable terms with all Arab elements in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government are apparently still working for a diplomatic solution to the Middle East problem and they may well fear that a rise in temperature on any Middle Eastern front, such as the Fedayeen might cause, could stimulate the Israelis to further successful military action, with unforeseeable consequences. It seems probable that the Soviet Union will pay increased public attention and accord verbal support to the Fedayeen, but will not start giving them direct material support.

CONFIDENTIAL

SOLZHENITSYN

The expulsion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from the Writers' Union of the U.S.S.R. on 4 November was perhaps the most serious move by the Soviet authorities against the free-thinking members of the Soviet literary world since the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel in February 1966. The resolution for his expulsion was adopted at a meeting of the Ryazan Writers' Organisation which, in addition to six out of the seven members, was attended by six literary and Party officials from Moscow and Ryazan. The main charges against Solzhenitsyn were that he had painted a black picture of Soviet life, that he had failed to take sufficient measures to prevent the publication of his works in the West, and that he had not dissociated himself from alleged attempts in the West to use his works as anti-Soviet propaganda. Solzhenitsyn made a vigorous counter-attack, dwelling in particular on the corrupting effect on Soviet society of secrecy about Stalin's crimes and on the harassing tactics which the KGB had been employing against him.

2. The Ryazan resolution was later endorsed by the Secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union. It is perhaps significant that the official report of the Secretariat's meeting did not state that their decision was adopted unanimously. Solzhenitsyn's reaction to the Secretariat's decision was to send them an open letter in which he described Soviet society as "sick" and denounced the administrative measures which he said were being prepared against a number of other Soviet writers. Solzhenitsyn now has the right of appeal to the "higher organs" of the U.S.S.R. Union of Writers. If he chose to exercise it there would probably be considerable opposition to his expulsion in the Secretariat of the U.S.S.R. Union of Writers since this is a more liberal body than the RSFSR Union Secretariat and includes such people as Tvardovsky and Simonov.

3. More recently the Soviet authorities have stated that "nobody is going to hold Solzhenitsyn and prevent him from going away even if he desires to go where his anti-Soviet works and letters are received with such delight every time". Solzhenitsyn is unlikely to want to leave the Soviet Union and this is probably a further stage in the authorities' attempts to damage his standing as a patriotic writer. Just possibly the Soviet authorities might go on to raise the serious charge of "anti-Soviet propaganda" against Solzhenitsyn. But being aware of the great interest which is taken in him abroad, the Soviet authorities may not wish to take any further action against him for the present. Nevertheless, his expulsion from the Writers' Union is in itself indicative of disdain for Western public opinion.

4. Solzhenitsyn has been in difficulties with the authorities for some time. Expulsion from the Writers' Union would normally be a serious blow to any Soviet writer, since it would make it impossible for him to publish his works in the Soviet Union, and, if he lived and worked in Moscow, might serve as a justification for forcing him to move to the provinces. But as Solzhenitsyn has had nothing published in the Soviet Union since January 1966, and already lives in the provincial town of Ryazan, the measures so far taken have probably had little practical effect on him. However, it indicates that his personal position is becoming increasingly precarious, and the Soviet internal atmosphere increasingly oppressive.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

LABOUR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Faced with declining growth rates in productivity and the prospect of a general shortage of labour, the Party and Government have adopted a number of measures in the course of the year designed to make more efficient use of the labour force.

2. These have included planned redundancies in some industries with redistribution of workers to areas of shortages; incentives to housewives, pensioners and semi-invalids to take jobs in the consumer and service industries; wider employment of women in skilled agricultural work; cutting management personnel and re-employing them on the factory floor; and more effective recruitment of labour.

3. The most radical step was the Party's recommendation of the so-called "Shchekino experiment" for widespread application in industry. Under this scheme, which was pioneered by the Shchekino Chemical Combine, unproductive workers are laid off and the savings used to improve incentives to the remainder; at the same time higher work norms are introduced. While the experiment has been adopted by a number of other enterprises, it has met with little enthusiasm from the Trades Unions.

4. The question of whether the country as a whole is short of labour has been debated in the Soviet press. According to a leading official, there are vacancies for a million industrial workers in the Russian Republic, where the shortage is especially acute in the more remote development areas. However, in the opinion of Professor Birman, one of the architects of the economic reform, there is no overall shortage of labour in the Soviet Union; and flagging productivity is caused more by manpower wastage, together with bad management and investment.

CONFIDENTIAL

### CHINESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The main preoccupations of the Chinese leadership over the present situation in the country were revealed in a National Day editorial on 1 October. The editorial stated that serious attention must be paid to the work of improving Revolutionary Committees (the organs of administration and control at all levels). The editorial also called for greater efforts in purging and reconstructing the Party organisation, which was gravely undermined during the Cultural Revolution. The article added that since the United States and "the social-imperialists" (i.e. the Russians) were plotting war against China, the people should guard against surprise attacks, keep to their posts and be ready to defend the frontiers. These themes have been followed up in subsequent articles in the central and provincial press. There has also been a good deal of emphasis in Chinese propaganda on the need for Revolutionary Committees at all levels to conduct their affairs in a practical and sensible fashion.

2. There have been no new reports of serious disorders in Peking or the Provinces since August. Recent reports by the official New China News Agency have suggested that the situation in Taiyuan (Shansi province), which was one of the trouble spots in July, has now improved. However, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Shansi and Kweichow Revolutionary Committees have been absent from view recently and may have fallen from favour. Although the Chinese authorities seem to have curbed open clashes between Red Guard groups, it is evident that rivalries between the different factions continue to bedevil the work of Revolutionary Committees and impede the task of reconstituting the Party.

3. Meanwhile the Chinese leaders have been turning their attention increasingly to forward economic planning. Some Revolutionary Committees have announced agricultural plans, in certain cases extending over the next five years. A recent article in the authoritative official organ, Red Flag, outlined the strategy for future industrial development. Though the article reaffirmed the importance of heavy industry, it placed considerable emphasis on showing that industry must be at the service of agriculture. The article added that new factories should be established in comparatively underdeveloped inland areas as part of a long-term plan to create "relatively independent but varied" local industrial systems.

4. The Chinese delayed the announcement of their latest two nuclear tests conducted in late September until after the National Day celebrations, perhaps in order to avoid giving an impression of sabre-rattling before the Sino-Soviet border negotiations. After the opening of the talks on 20 October the Chinese domestic news service released articles warning the people that they should not lower their guard simply because the Russians had come to the negotiating table. The Chinese press throughout the country has been laying great stress on the need for "preparations against war", which includes stockpiling of materials, dispersal of industry and population, the construction of shelters and the storage of grain. While the Chinese appear to feel some genuine alarm over the possibility of a Soviet attack, many of the policies advocated under the banner of "preparations against war" dovetail neatly with related campaigns to strengthen unity, to increase production and to economise on scarce resources. It seems from this that the Chinese leadership is to some extent dramatising the threat of a Soviet attack in order to lend urgency to a broad range of economic policies.



CONFIDENTIAL

THE THIRTY-FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE  
COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN

15-18 November, 1969

The biennial National Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain was held in London from 15-18 November 1969. In the previous weeks, the split in the Party over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had been extensively aired in the Morning Star and the Communist weekly Comment. The division of opinion revealed was deep enough to give rise to rumours of a serious challenge to the leadership itself. In the event, the Congress was not quite so dramatic.

2. The Executive Committee's original statement deploring the invasion of Czechoslovakia was endorsed by a majority of 295 votes to 118, a clear victory for the leadership, although the dissidents probably secured the largest minority vote on a major issue of policy ever recorded at a British Communist Party congress. The debate was introduced by the head of the Party's International Department who restated the Executive's view that any interference in a "socialist" country from outside, even if dictated by the best of intentions, was harmful to socialism in that country. British Communists could never accept the right of any Communist Party or socialist state to interfere in this way; any attempt to impose unity could only weaken it. He and others pointed out the manifest inconsistencies of the case for intervention, which the editor of the Morning Star, winding up the debate, said would have been laughed out of court if similar evidence had been produced of a Communist plot putting a capitalist system in imminent danger. One opposition speaker argued that the Czechoslovak Communist Party had recently expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries for their military intervention and asked "are you saying that the present Czech leaders are stooges of some other Parties?" Another declared that the Executive's decision had been "conceived in ignorance, and vanity keeps them from admitting their mistakes". And Palme Dutt, the Party's former vice-president, said it caused him "great pain that for the first time in over half a century the British Party has failed in combatting anti-Soviet slanders".

3. The leadership was also under fire on other issues. After a debate on the International Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow, the Executive Committee's position in supporting the conference documents with reservations was endorsed, but with fifty-two votes against it. An amendment calling for endorsement of the main document of the Moscow Conference without qualification received sixty-nine votes.

4. It is interesting that Pravda's report of the Congress noted that it had approved the Executive Committee's position on Czechoslovakia and on the International Communist Conference without however saying what that position was. Rude Pravo's report recorded the essential facts of the Czechoslovakia debate, but suggested that opposition to the leadership on this issue was stronger in Local Party organisations than among Congress delegates.

5. The Congress wholeheartedly supported the Soviet call for a European Security Conference. It also demanded full diplomatic recognition for East Germany. In speeches and resolutions, the maintenance of peace in Europe was constantly associated with the need to keep Britain out of the

/Common

CONFIDENTIAL

Common Market.

6. It was announced at the Congress that, since the previous Congress in 1967, Party membership had fallen by nearly 2,000 to 30,607 and that the circulation of the Morning Star was down to 52,300, a drop of 5,500. Moreover, as all Party members are uncomfortably aware, the membership of the Young Communist League is also falling rapidly - from over 6,000 at the last Congress to 3,850 today. It was admitted in the draft resolutions for the Congress that recruiting had been affected "to some degree" by Czechoslovakia and divisions in the international movement. Although the Party leadership predictably survived the Thirty-first Congress intact (all its candidates for the Executive Committee, including eight new names, were adopted), its assumption that after a vigorous debate the issue of Czechoslovakia would be laid aside is unlikely to be fulfilled. With falling membership and a seriously divided Party, the leadership cannot face the future with much optimism.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CHRONOLOGY

- 30 October -  
3 November Meeting of Warsaw Pact military leaders in Prague.
- November
- 3 Soviet-Czechoslovak trade protocol signed in Prague.
- 3 - 22 South Vietnam NLF Chairman Nguyen Hyu Tho leads NLF and PRG delegation to Soviet Union.
- 4 The Ryazan Writers' Organisation adopt a resolution to expel Solzhenitsyn from the USSR Writers' Union.
- 6 - 12 President of Sudan Revolutionary Council Nimieri in Moscow.
- 7 52nd Anniversary of October Revolution.
- 10 - 15 Hungarian President visits India.
- 11 - 19 Soviet Defence Minister Grechko in Cuba.
- 12 - 14 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev in Belgium.
- 12 - 21 President Sunay of Turkey in Soviet Union.
- 15 Federal German Government Note to Soviet Union on renunciation of the use of force.
- 16 - 21 Hungarian President visits Iran.
- 17 Preliminary talks on Strategic Arms Limitation open between U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Helsinki.
- 20 Announcement that Yugoslavia and China have agreed in principle to exchange Ambassadors.
- 21 East German Defence Minister in Moscow.
- 22 Announcement of Soviet-Sudanese agreement on development of economic and technical co-operation.
- 24 U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. ratify Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- 24 - 29 Rumanian Premier Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu in U.K.
- 24 Danish Foreign Minister Hartling in Moscow.
- 24 - 29 President Svoboda of Czechoslovakia in Iran
- 25 3rd All-Union Kolkhozniks' Congress opens in Moscow.
- 26 53 Members of Czech National Council Resign.  
Chinese delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Li Hsien-nien in Albania.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CHRONOLOGY

(cont'd)

November

- 27 Statement on Middle East by six European Communist States.
- 27 Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen in Moscow.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

DECEMBER, 1969

SUMMARY

The Anniversary of Stalin's Birth

The single commemorative article in Pravda followed the basic propositions of the Central Committee decree of 1956. The anniversary was not used to signal a further re-habilitation of Stalin. But this does not mean that there will be any let-up in the increasingly Neo-Stalinist domestic policy of the present Soviet leadership.

Soviet and East European attitudes towards the Federal German Republic

2. The Communiqué following the Moscow summit of 3-4 December was distinctly more forthcoming than the previous Warsaw Pact line about the Federal Republic. Immediately afterwards the Russians agreed, without pre-conditions, to open talks with the Federal Republic on the non-use of force. Ulbricht's draft treaty on relations with the Federal Republic seems to be a blocking or delaying tactic. But the Warsaw Pact states seem to be pursuing an essentially co-ordinated policy, which consists of a more forthcoming public line combined with firmness on matters of substance.

Soviet Plan and Budget for 1970

3. These reflect increasing strains in the economy as well as the damage caused by unusually severe weather last winter. In 1970 the planned rate of increase for consumer goods production will once again exceed that for producer goods. The overt defence budget for 1970 represents the smallest percentage increase for some years but the science vote, which covers an undisclosed amount of defence expenditure, has again been substantially increased.

Soviet Collective Farm Congress

4. The Congress did not make many innovations and was largely a formality. But it codified a good many recent reforms and re-affirmed farmers' rights. This may help the welfare side of the agricultural problem but the progress of agriculture itself will depend on other factors.

Control of the Press in Yugoslavia

5. The Praesidium of the Yugoslav Party has proposed a press law which purports to reject any state monopoly of information but would require every journal to equip itself with a programme circumscribing its activities. This reflects the Party's concern at the decline of discipline in the information media and the arts. But the measures eventually adopted to limit freedom of the press are unlikely to be severely restrictive by East European standards.

/Yugoslav-Bulgarian

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

6. The Bulgarian Foreign Minister's visit to Yugoslavia produced no agreement on the substance of the dispute about Macedonia. Neither side has sufficient motive to make any real concession in order to end this essentially verbal squabble. Each side can now claim that it has tried to heal the breach and been frustrated by the intransigence of the other.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

THE 90TH ANNIVERSARY OF STALIN'S BIRTH

This event was marked in the Soviet Union by a short unsigned article, without photograph, in Pravda of 21 December. No other national newspaper mentioned the occasion. This was the first official commemorative article since that in Pravda on Stalin's 80th birthday in 1959, and thus the first time the present régime had expressed a view on Stalin's place in Soviet history.

2. Contrary to some forecasts, the anniversary was not used to signal a further re-habilitation of Stalin. Faced with the dilemma of how to handle a potentially explosive issue, the Soviet leadership fell back on the basic propositions of the official Party line, set out in a Central Committee decree on the harmful consequences of the Stalin cult, issued under Khrushchev in June, 1956. Pravda thus makes itself appear more critical of Stalin than might have been expected in the light of pressure from conservative elements, some of whose views have appeared in the Party's leading theoretical journal, Kommunist. Pravda writes, for instance, that Stalin over-estimated his own merits and came to believe in his own infallibility. He had committed theoretical and political errors which "assumed a grave character in the last period of his life." In the post-war years, he had frequently taken personal decisions which did not correspond to the country's economic requirements. Pravda also follows the 1959 article in admitting that Stalin miscalculated the timing of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. This is a little surprising because Soviet military writers have in recent years glossed over or denied this charge.

3. To compensate for this, and in contrast to the 1956 decree and the 1959 Pravda article, tribute is paid to Stalin's wartime leadership which has been praised in Soviet military memoirs since Brezhnev's public tribute to Stalin's war role in May, 1965. Pravda also tones down the former criticisms of Stalin by omitting any reference to the "mass" nature of the purges, and by not describing Stalin's victims as "innocent", "honest" and "devoted to Socialism and Soviet power" as they had been in the 1956 decree. Similarly, Lenin's Testament to the 13th Party Congress in 1923 is quoted, but Lenin's description in it of Stalin as "too rude" - a quality which Lenin regarded as "intolerable in one who holds the post of General Secretary" of the party - is omitted. And the general impression is given that Stalin's serious mistakes were confined to the last period of his life.

4. By endorsing the 20th Party Congress line on the personality cult and reaffirming the present régime's adherence to the principles of collective leadership, Pravda appears to be giving an assurance that no major rehabilitation of Stalin is in prospect. The line adopted serves to fend off pressure from ultra-conservative elements, and to counter the claims of dissident Soviet intellectuals about a return to Stalinist methods. The Politburo is probably aware that a rehabilitation of Stalin would alienate large sections not only of Soviet but also of East European people. It would also exacerbate the already strained relations with Western European Communist parties and might be held to detract from the credibility of Soviet proposals for European security and détente in Europe.

/5. The present

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The present Soviet leadership's approach to Stalin is thus somewhat ambivalent, and the attempt by Pravda to present a "balanced" version of Stalin's role does not suggest that there will be any let-up in the régime's increasingly neo-Stalinist domestic policy of tighter social and cultural discipline.

In other Communist countries

6. The Soviet Union's East European allies generally played safe and reprinted in the party press the Pravda article, either fully or in summarised form. The Rumanian Press observed a discreet silence. Countries not committed to the Soviet Union were less inhibited. In Albania, Zeri i Popullit predictably carried a leading article extolling Stalin, and the 14th volume of his works was published. The North Korean Party daily published a portrait of Stalin and a long article praising him as "an indomitable revolutionary fighter, faithful successor to the cause of Lenin and an outstanding figure of the international Communist movement". The North Vietnamese daily similarly praised Stalin as Lenin's great successor, and claimed that "like the Soviet people, all progressive mankind highly value Stalin's services and works". Peking Radio in a number of broadcasts in Russian put out statements by Lenin and Stalin on the struggle against revisionism.

7. In the Mongolian People's Republic, which is traditionally loyal to the Soviet Union, Unen, the Party daily, carried an article in the main praising Stalin. Although it referred to the 20th CPSU Congress criticism of the personality cult, Unen claimed that the CPSU and other fraternal parties nevertheless "highly value" Stalin's great services, and concluded; "The name of J. V. Stalin, an ardent revolutionary and one of the continuers of the cause of V.I. Lenin, his devotion to Marxism-Leninism and organisational talent, will always remain in the hearts of people for whom the cause of socialism and the working man is dear."



**CONFIDENTIAL**

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE  
FEDERAL GERMAN REPUBLIC

The summit meeting of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, which took place in Moscow on 3-4 December, devoted most of its attention to relations with the Federal Republic. The communiqué after the meeting represented the first attempt by the Warsaw Pact powers to reconcile their views in a joint statement about their attitude to the new Bonn Government. The statement recognised the growth in the Federal Republic of "tendencies directed at a realistic policy" and described the Federal Republic's signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a "positive move". The communiqué fell short of making Federal German recognition of East Germany or of German frontiers a pre-condition of progress on other issues between the Federal Republic and members of the Warsaw Pact. All this looked as though it must have been unwelcome to East Germany. Perhaps in order to compensate Ulbricht, the communiqué also included a reference to the dangers of revanchism and neo-Nazism, which had almost disappeared from Soviet pronouncements on the Federal Republic since the new Bonn Government took office. In general, the communiqué was distinctly more forthcoming than the previous Warsaw Pact line about the Federal Republic.

2. Immediately after the Moscow meeting, at which the question was presumably discussed, the Russians agreed to open talks with the Federal Republic in Moscow on the renunciation of the use of force. Moreover, they did so without pre-conditions, thus departing from their behaviour in their exchanges on this subject with the previous Federal Government. The first meeting between Gromyko and the German Ambassador, Herr Allardt, took place at very short notice on 8 December. The atmosphere was described as "businesslike", but it still remains to be seen whether the evident change in the style of Soviet policy will be followed by any change for the better in the substance. Meanwhile, the Poles have agreed to talks with Bonn. They seem eager for political and economic talks but have shown themselves very conscious since the Moscow meeting of the need to avoid getting ahead of their allies.

3. Ulbricht on 18 December sent the Federal German President a draft treaty on relations between the two parts of Germany. This contained the maximum East German demands and added some important new ones, for instance for the annulment of all "discriminatory" Federal legislation and the corresponding court decisions. The language of the new draft treaty is closer to that of a formal international document than was the language of the only other East German draft treaty on inner-German relations, which was dated September, 1967. The provisions of the new treaty, and its very rapid publication, gave the impression that it was intended as a blocking or delaying tactic rather than a genuine effort to reach an understanding with the Federal Government. In any event, Ulbricht no doubt saw the advantages of this gambit: if the treaty were rejected by the Federal Government, he could claim to his allies and to the world that he had done his best to reach agreement but had been repulsed by Bonn; but if the Federal Government agreed to start talks, this would be a further step towards recognition of East Germany.

/4. The draft

**CONFIDENTIAL**

4. The draft treaty refers to "relations based on equal rights and valid in international law" instead of using the usual East German phrase about "recognition in international law". Although this new formulation might suggest a shift of emphasis in East German desiderata, it seems unlikely that Ulbricht is prepared to compromise on his long-standing demand for full international recognition. He seems less interested in bringing about discussions between the two parts of Germany than in scoring propaganda points and delaying and hampering negotiations between his allies and the Federal Government.

5. It is difficult to judge how far the various moves by the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany were successfully co-ordinated at the Moscow meeting of Warsaw Pact states. Even the East Germans seem to be trying to present their policy in a superficially constructive way, while on the other hand there is no evidence yet that the substance of Warsaw Pact policy towards Bonn has changed. It can thus be argued that the Warsaw Pact, in spite of the differences of interest between its members, is pursuing an essentially co-ordinated policy which consists of a more forthcoming public line combined with firmness on substance.

SOVIET PLAN AND BUDGET FOR 1970

The plan and budget for 1970 were announced on 16 December, together with some provisional results for 1969. These reflect increasing strains in the economy as well as the damage caused by unusually severe weather last winter.

2. The relatively modest target for industrial growth in 1969 was revised downwards during the course of the year; a further decrease is envisaged in 1970. In 1969, planned increases in national income and productivity were not met, while agricultural production fell below the 1968 level. Plans for capital construction, housing and steel production were also under-fulfilled.
3. An average grain crop was achieved despite constant disruptions of the harvest cycle by bad weather. But the gross yield of 160.5 million tons is bound to include a larger amount of poor quality grain than usual.
4. In the plan for 1970, the rate of increase for consumer goods production will once again exceed that for producer goods, although there is still no sign of any significant switch of capital resources to the consumer sector. The acceptance of lower growth rates in industrial output may have been influenced by the need to modernise the infrastructure and improve quality.
5. The overt defence budget for 1970 represents an increase of only 1% over 1969. This is the smallest percentage rise for some years and might have been calculated with an eye to the Soviet Union's international image. On the other hand, the science vote, which covers an undisclosed amount of defence expenditure has again been substantially increased.

CONFIDENTIAL

SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM (KOLKHOZ) CONGRESS

The Third All-Union Kolkhoz Congress took place from 25 to 27 November. It was convened to discuss and approve a new Collective Farm Charter, drafted by a commission set up in 1966 under the chairmanship of Brezhnev. The Congress, which was little more than a formality, also approved the creation of a system of Kolkhoz councils and elected an All-Union body under the chairmanship of the Minister of Agriculture of the U. S. S. R.

2. The new charter codifies the many changes in Kolkhoz management since the previous charter was adopted in 1935, and in effect guarantees the continuation of the collective farm system with limited autonomy for the individual kolkhoz. The charter reaffirms the right of members to private plots and livestock; and ensures greater financial security for workers and an increased share in administration. It also sanctions the growth of subsidiary kolkhoz industries, encourages co-operation between collective and state farms, and provides for the establishment of a central social insurance fund - this last being the only significant innovation.

3. The charter was approved unanimously with only minor alterations to the draft. There was no discussion at the Congress of proposals which had been the subject of controversy, such as kolkhoz unions and the adoption of the "mechanised link" system as the basic production unit within collective farms. The "link" is a system under which a group of farm workers is allotted for a specific time a particular area of land and the necessary machinery, and shares in the profits of its work. This idea has been criticised as tending towards a revival of the principles of private property. Before the Congress there were signs that its supporters, who had backing in the Komsomol and RSFSR Government, would win the day over those who wished to see the brigade (a larger, more diverse and more easily controlled unit) reinstated as the basic production unit; but the new charter gives sanction to the "link" system only as one of several forms of the organisation of farm labour.

4. The establishment of kolkhoz councils, which evidently will have little more than an advisory role, as distinct from unions, which would probably have enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy, means that there will be no diminution of government control over collective farm affairs; but the councils may give farm workers a sense of somewhat greater participation in the affairs of the collective farms.

5. The Congress did not make many innovations, but it has regularised and institutionalised a good many recent reforms and reaffirmed farmers' rights. It has given greater security of income and, perhaps, authorised a certain amount of flexibility at the farm level. To this extent the Congress have helped to tackle the welfare side of the agricultural problem. It has not prepared the ground for any new leap forward in Soviet agriculture, the progress of which will depend more than anything on investment, materials and machinery, and sensible planning.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROL OF THE PRESS IN YUGOSLAVIA

At its 6th session, held on 17 November, the Praesidium of the Yugoslav Party (LCY) approved in principle a lengthy report on the information media which was published on 27 November. While the report recognises that a "free" press, radio and television are essential and rejects the notion of a state (or any other) monopoly of information, it makes an elaborate and not wholly successful attempt to square these ideals with the need, as the authors see it, to ensure that journalism is also "responsible". To this end it proposes a new press law which, inter alia, would require every journal or other means of information to equip itself with a programme defining and circumscribing its range of activities and extending responsibility for what is published to the organisation which sponsors the publication (in many cases the popular front movement of the LCY) as well as the editors.

2. Several speakers, especially Kardelj who wound up in the Praesidium debate on the report, were sceptical about the practicability of a new law on the lines proposed, and it seems likely that it will be modified before it reaches the statute book (if it ever does). Nevertheless the report and the debate are symptomatic of the LCY's serious concern at the accelerating growth of indiscipline in the information media and the arts. Recent attempts to check allegedly unhealthy trends include the dismissal of and prison sentence on the editor of Knjizevne Novine for publishing an article which "slandered" the Soviet Union on the eve of Gromyko's visit to Belgrade in September, the withdrawal of a "pro-cominformist" play from the repertoire of the Belgrade Drama Theatre and a call by the Belgrade University LCY Committee for the dismissal of the editorial board of the University weekly "Student".

3. It is unnecessary (as the examples cited show) to interpret this illiberal reaction as an attempt to appease Soviet opinion by a demonstration of Yugoslav ideological purity. Dissent ranges all round the political horizon in Yugoslavia, and party conservatives have good reason to be alarmed (particularly since the fall of Vice-President Rankovic in 1966) at the threat which it appears to pose generally to the maintenance of the LCY's authority and the cohesion of the Yugoslav state. Moderate party leaders cannot afford to ignore these misgivings and may well be obliged to take further repressive action before the situation eases. It nevertheless seems unlikely that any measures taken will be severely restrictive by East European standards.

YUGOSLAV/BULGARIAN RELATIONS

The visit of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister to Yugoslavia from 8-14 December was a severe test of both sides' willingness to reduce the temperature of their dispute over Macedonia. The greater part of historic Macedonia is a constituent republic of the Yugoslav Federation; the Yugoslavs claim that there are oppressed "Macedonian" minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. This is contested by the Bulgarians, who deny that there is a Macedonian language distinct from Bulgarian.

2. Most of the pressure for the visit appears to have come from the Bulgarians, no doubt as a result of some persuasion from Moscow to make a contribution to the current improvement in Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact neighbours. In the event the visit produced no agreement on essentials, the communiqué merely recording tersely that "frank talks were held on essential questions of bilateral relations about which both sides expressed their views and the wish for the further development of relations between the two countries".

3. The reason for the failure of this initiative is probably that neither side has sufficient motive to make any real concession in order to put an end to what is essentially a verbal squabble. While the Bulgarians have in the past been prepared from time to time to moderate their public pronouncements on the Macedonian question, their feelings on it are strong enough to make them reluctant to go so far as to abjure their case in public. Clearly little less than this would have satisfied the Yugoslavs, who for their part are not so apprehensive as they may have been immediately after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia that the Soviet Union might use Bulgarian feelings over Macedonia as a pretext for a physical attack on Yugoslavia. As things stand each side can now claim that it has made an effort to heal the breach but has been frustrated by the intransigence of the other.

CONFIDENTIAL

CHRONOLOGY

- 24 November -  
1 December Danish Foreign Minister in Moscow
- December
- 2 Death of Marshal Voroshilov, former President of Supreme Soviet.
- 3-4 Meeting of Party and Government leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and U.S.S.R. in Moscow
- 7 U.S.S.R agrees to open talks on renunciation of force with the Federal German Republic on 8 December.  
China releases two U.S. Citizens detained since 16 February
- 8 Soviet-Federal German talks on renunciation of force open in Moscow
- 8-12 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev in Belgrade
- 8-16 Rumanian Minister of Armed Forces in Moscow  
North Korean Foreign Minister in Moscow
- 9-10 Military Council of Joint Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact meets in Moscow
- 9-12 Anwar Sadat leads U.A.R. delegation to Moscow
- 10-11 Joint Plenum of the Boards of Creative (i.e. Arts) Unions of the U.S.S.R., in Moscow
- 11 Meeting in Warsaw between U.S. Ambassador and Chinese Chargé d'Affaires
- 11-16 44th Session of CMEA Executive Committee in Moscow
- 14 TASS announces return to Moscow for Supreme Soviet of Leader and Deputy Leader of Soviet delegation at Peking talks
- 16 Former Czechoslovak Party First Secretary Dubcek appointed Ambassador to Turkey
- 16-22 Luxembourg Foreign Minister in U.S.S.R.
- 17-18 Hungarian Party Leader Kadar visits Prague

CONFIDENTIAL

December

- 18 East German Party leader Ulbricht sends draft treaty on inner-German relations to Federal President Heinemann
- 21 Soviet draft Plan and Budget for 1970 approved  
90th anniversary of Stalin's birth
- 22 Polish Note to Federal Republic agrees to talks between them  
U.S. and U.S.S.R. conclude preliminary Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki, agreeing to reopen them in Vienna on 16 April, 1970
- 22-23 Committee of Defence Ministers of Warsaw Pact states meets in Moscow
- 22-29 Hungarian Foreign Minister in U.S.S.R.
- 23 Soviet Defence Minister Grechko in Afghanistan