



# Communist Policy and Tactics 1969, 4. hluti

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## Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

FEBRUARY 1969

SUMMARY

The Soviet Leadership

There has recently been speculation in the West about the possibility of political changes in the Kremlin. The evidence for these changes is inconclusive, although there are indications of dissatisfaction and conflict in the Soviet leadership. But despite the more obvious policy failures of recent months the Soviet Party and Government seem to accept that it is of overriding importance to present an appearance of solidarity.

Rumanian-Yugoslav Relations

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia there was common cause between Yugoslavia and Rumania in their opposition to the invasion and to the Soviet theory of "the socialist commonwealth" which emerged after the invasion. As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Rumania is more vulnerable than Yugoslavia to Soviet pressure, but the Rumanians remain determined to safeguard the independence over foreign policy issues which they have won. The Yugoslavs welcome the Rumanian attitude and the two countries have drawn closer together. There has been speculation that Hungary may also be tempted to draw closer to Yugoslavia and Rumania but the Hungarians are at present lying low.

Sino-American Relations

The Chinese first announced in November 1968 that they were prepared to resume their talks with the Americans in Warsaw, but subsequently withdrew their willingness to hold talks following the defection at The Hague of Liao Ho-shu. There may have been, however, other reasons behind the cancellation, connected with the difficulty of bringing the cultural revolution to a conclusion. Rational policy planning in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still difficult.

China: Internal Affairs

Developments in China reflect the continuing efforts of the leadership to put an end to the confusion brought about by the cultural revolution on the one hand, and to exploit the radical initiatives opened up by the revolution on the other. Educational and agricultural reforms are being introduced and these are aiming to increase local self-sufficiency. The need to "purify the class ranks" continues to be given publicity. The army has also been exhorted to respect the revolutionary committees and the collective leadership.



THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP

There has recently been a great deal of speculation in the West about the possibility of political changes in the Kremlin. The evidence on which this speculation is based is inconclusive. Much of it results from the general diffusion of authority, which is a feature of collective leadership in the Soviet Government, and which inevitably gives rise to uncertainty about relationships between the leaders.

Various explanations were offered by Soviet sources for Kosygin's prolonged absence in January. Some suggested that he was badly ill with a liver complaint; others that he was in good health and merely on holiday. Kosygin's absence also coincided with that of Deputy Prime Minister Mazurov. Brezhnev and Podgorny were also away from Moscow in the first part of January. When they returned for the cosmonaut celebration on 22 January, they were met by what may have been an attempted assassination. There is no firm evidence that the shots fired in the Kremlin were connected with any political conspiracy, but this incident clearly had an unsettling effect on the leaders. They showed signs of uncertainty about how to handle it.

During this period, two of the younger members of the Politburo have been more in the news. Polyansky, one of the Deputy Prime Ministers, was shown in at least one Moscow cinema on a trip to North Korea which took place in September, 1968. He was also listed as being present when the Hungarian Party leader, Kadar, had talks in Moscow with Podgorny and Kosygin. Meanwhile, Shelepin travelled to Cairo for an Arab Trade Union Congress where he made a violent speech which used tougher language about the Middle East dispute and the World Communist Movement than has been used recently by other Soviet leaders or in Soviet public media. This speech was printed only in the Soviet Trade Union newspaper, Trud. From the speech it might be deduced that Shelepin is in favour of a tougher, more anti-Western policy in the Middle East than is being conducted at present by the Politburo. At one moment he appeared also to be advocating a purge of the Communist movement when he said, "We must, in the most decisive way, expose and remove from our ranks, all lackeys of imperialism and reaction, two-faced Januses of all kinds, who directly or indirectly feed water to the mill of the enemies of the workers".

These tenuous indications of dissatisfaction and conflict acquire more significance when set in the context of some of the more obvious policy failures of the Soviet Government over recent months. Externally, the Soviet Union has not succeeded in establishing as much discipline as it would like in Eastern Europe following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Attempts at increasing military and economic integration have met not only with determined opposition from the Rumanians, backed by the Yugoslavs, but also with suspected sabotage from the Hungarians and possibly others. A more moderate and pragmatic policy towards the West appears to have been adopted for the time being, but it is likely that not all elements in the Soviet leadership are agreed about this. Internally the economy is not performing up to expectations and the economic reforms have failed to produce the results which were hoped of them when they were introduced by Kosygin in 1965. The 1968 industrial growth rates were disappointing.

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Despite these difficulties, the Soviet Party and Government seem to accept that it is of overriding importance to present an appearance of solidarity and stability, and this consideration is likely to operate strongly against change for some time to come. It does not preclude change; but it necessarily raises the level of tolerance of internal strains and disagreement. Unsettled weather, therefore, need not necessarily be taken as a prelude to a major storm.



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RUMANIAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

The invasion of Czechoslovakia last summer was strongly criticised at the time by both the Yugoslav and the Rumanian Governments. The Yugoslavs had welcomed the reforms which were taking place within Czechoslovakia. They regarded them as evidence for their claim that their own economic reforms would set the pace for developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The essentially conservative Rumanians, on the other hand, probably had less sympathy for the Czechoslovak Action Programme. But they were at one with the Yugoslavs in holding that each Party is alone qualified to determine its approach to Marxism/Leninism. There was therefore common cause between Yugoslavia and Rumania in their opposition to the Soviet theory of "limited sovereignty" which emerged after the invasion.

As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Rumania is far more vulnerable than Yugoslavia to action of the kind which the Soviet Union took against Czechoslovakia in August. It was no doubt with this consideration in mind that the Rumanian Government were eventually persuaded to state publicly that they felt that the Moscow Agreement should be faithfully carried out. But it has become steadily clearer that the Rumanians are determined, so far as prudence allows, to continue to assert their right of independence of action and in particular to oppose any suggestion of an increase in the Soviet Union's direction and control of the C.M.E.A. This policy has been well received in Belgrade since the Yugoslavs, with only observer status within the C.M.E.A., find Rumanian intransigence helpful at a time when their own relations with the Soviet Union are again strained.

In January the Rumanians made it clear that they would oppose any supra-national economic measures in C.M.E.A., and they stoutly defended this policy when the C.M.E.A. Council met in East Berlin. This increase in Rumanian confidence was again manifested by the meeting of Presidents Ceausescu and Tito at Temesvar in Rumania, on 1-2 February, and in Ceausescu's subsequent speech criticising the holding of military manoeuvres near geographical borders. Though ostensibly directed at the West, this speech was also clearly intended to be heard in Moscow. It accords well with Yugoslav policy; and Rumanian-Yugoslav relations can be expected to continue to improve.

The Yugoslav Prime Minister's visit to Budapest on 5 February, and Kadar's simultaneous visit to Moscow, has caused speculation whether the Soviet Union may not fear that Hungary too might be tempted to draw closer to Yugoslavia and Rumania. There is no evidence for this at present; the Hungarians probably realise, from the Czechoslovak experience of last August, that they can best safeguard their economic reforms by lying low in other fields, particularly foreign affairs.



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SINO/AMERICAN RELATIONS

After a lapse of 13 months the Chinese announced in November 1968 that they were prepared to resume their talks with the Americans in Warsaw. The new session was to take place on 20 February 1969. The Chinese willingness to resume the talks seemed to provide further evidence of their intention to return to more flexible tactics in foreign policy with the phasing-out of the Cultural Revolution. It also suggested that the Chinese wished at least to conduct a tactical reconnaissance of the new American Administration, if nothing more dramatic.

However, the Chinese announced on 19 February that the resumption of the talks would be "unsuitable . . . in the present anti-China atmosphere solely created by the United States". The Chinese gave as the reason for this decision the defection in the Netherlands of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires at The Hague and his subsequent appearance in the United States. This need not be wholly untrue. Certainly Liao Ho-shu's defection, which took place at the beginning of February, put the Chinese in an embarrassing position. They might well have felt that to sit down at the table with the Americans when the latter had just become host to this defector (something the Chinese have stomached in the past) would, in present circumstances, be liable to misinterpretation. Even if the Chinese wished to put their relations with the Americans on a better footing they would presumably have hesitated to weaken their hand in any discussions by displaying excessive eagerness. They must also have been conscious of the effect of their decision to resume the Warsaw talks on their credibility as intransigent revolutionaries. In agreeing to start the talks again they had already given a propaganda hostage to their Soviet critics and one which had been exploited; the defection of Liao may simply have tipped the balance against the talks.

On the other hand, the reason given by the Chinese may not have been the real one. The Chinese press launched a series of vituperative attacks on Mr. Nixon personally soon after his inauguration. It may be, therefore, that even at that point they were regretting their earlier decision to talk; and any such regrets would since have been confirmed by Mr. Nixon's firm stand at his press conference on 27 January on Chinese representation in the United Nations.

In any event, the Chinese decision must be seen against a background of continuing hesitation in announcing a firm date for the 9th Party Congress and apparent difficulty in bringing the Cultural Revolution to a conclusion. Cancellation of the Warsaw Talks need not signify the simple victory of a particular faction in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; but it is nevertheless true that disturbances within the Ministry must continue to make rational policy planning difficult. Apart from this, the Chinese leaders may well have found that other major preoccupations prevented them, to an extent that had not been anticipated in November, from devoting to foreign policy the attention they had hoped.



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CHINA: INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Developments in China reflect two main preoccupations within the leadership. On the one hand a determined effort is being made to put an end to the confusion brought about by the anti-authoritarian aspects of the Cultural Revolution. Measures continue to be taken to restore public order and economic production, and to strengthen the authority of the Revolutionary Committees. On the other hand, Mao appears resolved to exploit his victory over leaders who had opposed his policies by pursuing radical initiatives in various fields involving important reforms in education and rural economic organisation, and the large-scale movement of youth and other urban dwellers to the countryside.

The reforms now being introduced are consistent with principles expounded by Mao in the period preceding the Cultural Revolution. In the rural areas the educational reforms involve transferring the administration of primary and secondary education from local Government organs to production brigades and communes (production brigades are subordinate to communes). Generally, the period of education is shortened, class-work is combined with productive labour and stronger emphasis is given to politics. For higher education, students are in future to be selected only from young people who have already had working experience and who have demonstrated good political qualities. New responsibilities are being given to the production brigades in running medical services; and reforms introduced in the field of agriculture include mechanisation, land improvement and irrigation. There has also been some discussion of a proposal to institute a system of supervision by the communes over rural commercial and banking operations. The movement of youth and others to the countryside received new emphasis with a directive issued by Mao in late December 1968. Over 3 million 1966-67 graduates and school-leavers have so far been sent to the rural areas and pioneer regions, as well as up to a million officials and other town-dwellers, many of them unemployed. This policy may be regarded as useful in shifting the burden of feeding a section of the urban population, for whom urban employment is not available, on to the rural areas, thereby lessening to some extent problems of procurement and costs of transport and distribution.

The overall aim of these reforms is clearly to increase local self-sufficiency and to shift some of the costs of capital construction and social services away from the State, while maintaining strong central planning control. Recent news items have spoken of "leaping forward" in production in 1969, but reports of targets for the year, both in industry (where they have been given for a few individual factories) and in agriculture, suggest that fairly modest increases are expected.

A highly publicised People's Daily editorial on 21 February emphasised the need to complete the work of "purifying the class ranks" and to get on with Party rectification. The "purification of class ranks", which resembles an orthodox Communist rectification campaign rather than the unruly mass campaign of the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, is undertaken generally in low-level political and administrative departments, in commercial units, among factory staffs and among commune and production brigade officials. A major theme in connection with this campaign has been Mao's injunction to "narrow the target of attack" - to prevent the indiscriminate denunciation of persons

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who have made mistakes as "counter-revolutionaries". The Revolutionary Committees - which are dominated in most cases by People's Liberation Army representatives - appear to exercise control over both the "purification of ranks" and rectification of the Party at the lower levels.

The celebration of the Lunar New Year ("Spring Festival") has been marked as usual with a publicity campaign on solidarity between the people and the PLA. This year, however, exceptional emphasis has been given to the PLA's duty to "trust, respect and support" the Revolutionary Committees and to respect collective leadership within the Committees. While it is clear that the PLA will continue to play a key role in running the country, the latest comments suggest that the leaders may now feel a desire to check the tendency towards concentration of administrative powers in the hands of the PLA.



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CHRONOLOGY

- 1 The Soviet Union and Peru open diplomatic relations
- 1-2 President Tito visits Rumania
- 1-12 The Foreign Minister of the D.D.R. visits Syria
- 2-4 Czechoslovak National Front Delegation visits Moscow
- 5-11 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union
- 6-14 Head of Soviet Gosplan, Baibakov, visits Algeria
- 6-10 Kadar visits Moscow
- 8 Italian Communist Party Congress opens
- 8 D.D.R. Government declaration on closing land access to Berlin for Bundesversammlung
- 9 President of South Yemen leaves Soviet Union Communiqué issued
- 10 Radio Vltava closes down
- 12 Soviet naval visit to Iran
- 13 Soviet Government Statement to FRG on Bundesversammlung
- 13 Warsaw Pact meeting in East Berlin
- 14 North Vietnamese Labour and Planning Delegation arrives in Peking
- 14 Sino-Cuban Trade Protocol for 1969 signed in Peking
- 16 Publication of Soviet Government Statement in Bundesversammlung
- 16 Japanese trade delegation arrives in Peking
- 17-22 Finnish Foreign Minister visits Soviet Union
- 17 Ulbricht meets Brezhnev and leaves Soviet Union
- 18 Chinese announce their refusal to attend Sino-U.S. meeting in Warsaw
- 19-20 Marshal Yakubovsky visits Rumania
- 21 Czechoslovak Minister of Defence visits the Soviet Union
- 21 Preparatory meeting for International Communist Conference opens in Budapest



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- 23 Yugoslav economic delegation arrives in Peking for trade talks
- 24-28 Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade visits Malaysia
- 26 Polish Foreign Minister arrives in Moscow for official visit
- 26 Hungarian Government and Party delegation arrives in Moscow
- 26 U.A.R. trade delegation arrives in China



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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

SEPTEMBER 1969

SUMMARY

Soviet-Yugoslav relations

Gromyko's visit to Belgrade produced no surprises and went far to confirm Yugoslav claims that "normalisation" of relations would occur only on their terms. There is no evidence to suggest that the Yugoslavs will make any real sacrifice for the benefit of better relations with the Russians. Tito's meeting with Ceausescu has meanwhile confirmed the belief of both countries in the principles of sovereignty, full equality and non-interference in internal affairs.

Czechoslovakia

2. Recent developments, including the revocation of the Party's official post-invasion statements and Dubcek's removal from his party and parliamentary offices, represent another step in the process of "normalisation". Husak and others of the new men may be attempting to establish a centre position. The Czech leaders must also face the problem of how to complete the required emasculation of the reform movement without alienating their own people.

The Soviet economy

3. This year's harvest is likely to be well below the planned figure, although the weather is largely to blame. Industry has also suffered from the weather, but endemic inefficiencies are admitted to be at fault as well. The 1966 reforms, as at present implemented, have yet to prove their worth and although the standard of living rose last year, a restrictive income policy has been resorted to in order to reduce inflationary pressures.

North Vietnam

Ho Chi Minh's death seems unlikely to alter the general situation very much. Those now ruling North Vietnam are equally dedicated to the establishment of a communist regime in the South, and will if possible continue to keep at arm's length from the Sino-Soviet dispute. Soviet and Chinese attitudes to the war remain unchanged. At home, Ho's death could add to the burdens of the present leaders.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The Peking meeting of Chou-en-Lai and Kosygin indicated the seriousness with which both sides regarded the border dispute. Recent Soviet propaganda had perhaps been overplayed. The meeting is unlikely to affect relations between the two countries deeply, although it has taken some of the heat out of their dispute. There have been no frontier incidents since the meeting, and Soviet propaganda has moderated somewhat.

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YUGOSLAV/SOVIET RELATIONS

The ground had been well prepared for Gromyko's visit to Belgrade from 2-6 September. It produced no surprises and went far to confirm Yugoslav claims that "normalisation" would take place only on their terms. The published communiqué in particular explicitly reaffirmed the principles contained in the Yugoslav/Soviet Belgrade Declaration of 1955 - i.e. respect for sovereignty, equality of rights and non-intervention in internal affairs. There was no countervailing assertion of the Soviet Union's right to defend the security of its friends, though this was a theme which Gromyko took up in a speech on 2 September and the purity of the Yugoslav position is in any case impaired by the fact that the Belgrade principles had visibly failed to be applied to relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The declaration made no mention of the 1956 Moscow Declaration which extended the 1955 principles to Party as well as state relations.

2. References in the communiqué to international questions were routine. Emphasis was however laid on the development of bilateral cooperation in trade, culture, science and technology.

3. In practical terms this "agreement to differ" is likely to produce some mitigation of the more outspoken Yugoslav press criticism of Soviet policy so long as the other side reciprocates. (The editor of the literary paper Knjizevne Novine was dismissed, and the offending number withdrawn from circulation, after it had published an allegedly chauvinist article on Czechoslovakia on the eve of Gromyko's visit). The threat of a Soviet squeeze on the Yugoslav economy would appear to have been lifted, though the Yugoslavs would probably not want to increase significantly the Comecon share of their foreign trade (which has recently fallen below 30% of the total). An increase in the flow of delegations of various kinds in both directions is no doubt to be expected.

4. For the Russians, the exercise has had the advantage of shortening their front in Europe. They will hope to exploit the opportunities offered by increased bilateral contacts to influence Yugoslav public opinion, and have already achieved agreement to resume distribution in Yugoslavia of a Soviet propaganda journal which was suspended in November 1968. They may also expect some increase in Yugoslav support for Soviet positions and initiatives in the United Nations and elsewhere, at least where clear Yugoslav interests would not be affected adversely.

5. There is, however, no evidence to contradict the general impression created by the communiqué that the Yugoslavs are not prepared to sacrifice essentials for the sake of better relations with the Soviet Union. Gromyko's visit was closely followed by a "routine" meeting between Tito and Ceausescu at the Iron Gates on 20 September (their fifth since January 1968). Their joint statement stressed the desire of both sides to develop "the widest cooperation with all countries on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty, full equality and non-interference in internal affairs". No reference was made to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact or Comecon, and the talks conveyed the clear message that both governments are bent on maintaining a special relationship as a basis for the comprehensive, non-sectarian approach to world-wide communist and "progressive" forces to which both are committed. The Yugoslavs' confidence in pursuing these aims is based on the belief that the Russians have learned a salutary lesson from their recent experiences with Czechoslovakia. If this belief is controverted by an increase in Soviet pressure on Rumania (or themselves), their reaction is likely to be correspondingly sharp.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Developments in the last few weeks culminating in the Central Committee Meeting of 25th - 27th September, the revocation of the Party's official statements of 1968 condemning the invasion, and the removal of Dubcek from his Party and Parliamentary offices (though not from the Central Committee or from the Party itself) represent another step in the process of "normalisation". The Czechoslovak leaders still face the problem of how they are to complete the required emasculation of the political reform movement without alienating their own people, especially the workers and the technical intelligentsia who are deeply attached to the memory of the "Prague spring" and whose cooperation is essential to the conduct of the economy. There are signs of continuing disagreement within the Czechoslovak leadership as to how far they should go.

2. The Party and Government reshuffle has removed many but not all remaining reformers from top positions but it has not handed over power to extreme pro-Moscow conservatives. Some at least of the new men seem, like Husak himself, to be seeking to establish a centre position. In economic and technical positions leaders associated with the reform have held a good deal of ground. In political fields such as security, education and culture, however, the men who are now in highest authority represent a shift towards conservatism. Meanwhile Husak has called for a thorough personal review of the Party and state apparatus.

3. There have been a few trials on minor political charges, such as distributing leaflets, resulting in a number of suspended sentences, and at least one more serious prosecution seems to be on the way. The "amnesty" which called on those who had left the country to return or legalise their positions before September has now come to an end and there have been the first signs of tightening controls, aimed so far at stopping the brain drain, on residence abroad. Very large numbers are however continuing to travel abroad.

4. In addition to erasing the Praesidium declaration of 21 August 1968 and formally declaring the post-invasion 14th Party Congress illegal, Husak's report to the Central Committee and the Central Committee Resolution came very close to full justification of the invasion. Although the Czechoslovak leaders are still a long way from the glorification of it in which the invaders themselves continue to indulge, what they have done will have given some satisfaction in Moscow.



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THE SOVIET ECONOMY

The Soviet leaders face a number of problems on this front; and the country's economic performance has certainly fallen short of what was planned.

2. The Soviet harvest is almost over. It looks as if the grain harvest may approach the average figure for the last five years (152.3 million tons). This would be well below the planned average for the current Five Year Plan (169 million tons) and nowhere near the target of 190-200 million tons for the next few years which Brezhnev announced last October. In discussing harvest prospects, the Soviet press has emphasised the difficulties caused by bad weather. Dust storms and unusually severe frosts during the winter in most southern areas inflicted great damage on the winter grain crops. The prolonged cold spring together with the need to resow the ruined winter crops over considerable areas created additional problems for the spring sowing campaign. In some areas of the country the weather was too hot at the most important period of grain formation while in other areas cold and rain prevented the crops from ripening.

3. The weather has been given some of the blame for the relatively disappointing showing of the rest of the Soviet economy during the first half of 1969, but it is clear from the Soviet press that this has also been caused by other factors endemic in the economy. The increase in gross industrial product, at 6.9% for the first six months of 1969, is the lowest yet recorded for this period in the 1960s and is below the 7.3% planned for the year as a whole. Delays in construction, failure to install new capacity and equipment as planned despite an increase in approved investment, inadequate utilisation of existing capacity, defects of organisation and the effects of the five day week have all been mentioned by the Soviet press as among the causes of the slowing down of the economy so far this year. There are of course other factors involved. For instance, the difficulties in implementing investment plans are a perennial problem in the Soviet Union. A considerable number of projects are begun simultaneously and left unfinished for lack of additional funds, equipment, labour and building materials. In 1968 the value of unfinished construction reached 80% of the year's investment programme, and the economist V.A. Trapeznikov, (Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology) has recently advocated the halving of the number of projects in process of construction. Confusion in the administration and organisation of transport have compounded the effects of the weather in paralysing traffic and actually reducing the tonnage carried by railways and inland waterways.

4. The economic reforms introduced in 1966 aimed at making the economy function more efficiently; but as at present implemented they can be expected to yield only marginal improvement. By the end of June 1966 the reforms had been applied in enterprises producing 4% of Soviet gross industrial output; the corresponding percentage grew to 26 by June 1967, to 50 by June 1968 and to over 80 by June 1969. The most efficient enterprises were selected first for the introduction of the reforms, and it is therefore not surprising that the economic results for the first half of 1967 showed a considerable improvement over those for the same period in 1966. But since then less efficient enterprises have transferred to the new system; the reforms themselves have been applied mechanically and other factors and policies, notably the slow introduction of new technology and the continuing priority given to defence and space projects, have combined to reduce the rate of economic growth.

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Output and productivity do not seem to be responding sufficiently to the stimuli of the reforms and are showing growth rates markedly below the average achieved in the early 1960s.

5. The standard of living has continued to rise throughout 1968-69. According to Soviet data, real income per head rose slightly more than 6% in 1968, about the same rate as in 1966-67. However, consumption of goods and services rose by slightly less than the 5% average annual rate of 1966-67. The output of consumer goods and the expansion of service industries have not been enough to mop up excess spending power, and this has led to the beginnings of an inflationary situation. But the restrictive incomes policy pursued throughout 1969 has tended to reduce inflationary pressures.



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NORTH VIETNAM

The death of President Ho Chi Minh was announced on 3 September, shortly after warnings that he was seriously ill. It had been clear for some months however that he was no longer playing a major role in the affairs of the country. The ensuing announcement in the party newspaper, Nan Dan, that the leadership would be collective, suggests that the same group of men will continue to run the country much as before. This group, who have worked together, and with Ho, over many years, includes Le Duan, the Party First Secretary, Truong Chinh, a Party theoretician, Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister, and General Giap. Less important is the octogenarian Ton Duc Thang, the former Vice President who has succeeded Ho as President. He will probably be concerned mostly with the ceremonial functions of Head of State. Ho's position as Chairman of the Party Central Committee remains unfilled, although Le Duan has been listed first at all official occasions since Ho's death.

2. Despite differences of emphasis in the policies advocated by the present leaders, particularly between Le Duan and Chinh, all support the same objective of establishing a communist regime in the South. There is thus no reason to expect any significant change in policies, nor a willingness to make concessions to negotiate an end to the war.

3. The North Vietnamese are also likely to continue their policy of keeping at arm's length from the Sino-Soviet dispute, thereby hoping to offend neither country. In this way they may aim to ensure the continuing supply of aid from both, and a balance between the pressures from either to pursue a particular course in the war or the negotiations. A feature of the Ho Chi Minh funeral arrangements was the studied equality of treatment given to the Soviet and Chinese delegations. Such an outlook is likely to be common to all the present leaders, and it would be idle to go very far in identifying individuals with pro-Peking or pro-Moscow policies.

4. There has been no change in Chinese and Soviet attitudes. China continues to urge a continuing war and complete victory. This was again emphasised in the communiqué issued after talks between the Chinese delegation to Ho Chi Minh's funeral and the North Vietnamese leaders. The Russians are more cautious, and the communiqué after the talks between Kosygin (who led the Soviet delegation to the funeral) and the North Vietnamese simply recorded that the North Vietnamese had themselves described their aim as total victory.

5. While Ho's death is unlikely to produce any sharp changes in North Vietnamese policies, the loss of his dominant personality, and of all that his name evoked internationally and throughout all Vietnam, removes an important element from the Vietnam scene, and may well add to the burdens of the present leaders.

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### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The short and unexpected meeting of the Soviet and Chinese Prime Ministers in Peking on 11 September was a sign of the seriousness with which both sides had come to regard the tense border situation. The Russians presumably do not want trouble on the frontier, and the main effort of Soviet policy in recent months in her relations with China has been directed to trying to show the Chinese that further provocations by them on the frontier will be dealt with ruthlessly, and thus to deter them. But the effect of Soviet propaganda has been to give rise to the belief in much of the Western press and perhaps in Peking too that the Russians were seriously contemplating an attack, and this belief was considerably reinforced by the rumours that the Russians had been consulting other Communist parties over their reaction to a strike against China.

2. The Chinese certainly showed distinct signs of concern. The 28 August Central Committee directive to prepare for war was evidence of this, as were some of the slogans for the National Day celebrations.

3. The Russians may therefore have concluded that their propaganda had overplayed itself; and Kosygin's visit to Peking was probably intended to reassure the Chinese that the Russians did not want war. At the same time, Kosygin may have proposed that the two sides should take steps to introduce a greater degree of normality in their state relations.

4. It is now generally accepted that the initiative for the meeting came from the Russians, but the fact that the Chinese agreed to it at all indicates that they too recognised the dangers of the situation escalating out of control. In the past the Chinese have been reluctant to hold high level talks with the Russians. At the 9th Party Congress, Lin Piao revealed that the Chinese had turned down an attempt by Kosygin to communicate with them by telephone after the Ussuri river incidents in March, although he added that the Chinese were still "considering" their response to the Soviet statement of 29 March proposing a resumption of border talks. The brevity of Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi suggested that the Chinese wished to avoid a face-to-face encounter there; alternatively, his sudden return to Peking may have been precipitated by some internal crisis. In either case it would have been very difficult for the Chinese to decline a Soviet offer of a meeting in the wake of Ho Chi Minh's funeral and testament.

5. It is too early to speculate on the long-term effect of the meeting on relations between the two countries. The differences between them, both nationalist and ideological run very deep. Kosygin's previous visit to Peking in February 1965 resulted in no lasting improvement in relations. But the September meeting did show some immediate results in a lull in Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda and an apparent absence of frontier incidents. The truce in propaganda was not observed by the Chinese, however, and Soviet radio and press have since resumed attacks on the Chinese leadership. Rumours that both sides were withdrawing forces from the frontier have not been confirmed. The Russians are meanwhile capitalising on the general impression that the initiative for the meeting was theirs. They continue to present themselves as the reasonable party in a dispute in which the Chinese are both obstinate and guilty. The Chinese statement of 7 October about further talks in Peking may have been partly designed to counter this: but it now seems almost certain that negotiations on the frontier questions will take place.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 24 August - Soviet Economic Commission in Indonesia for  
23 September talks
- September
- 1 East German Foreign Minister Winzer meets Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow
- 1 - 6 Rumanian President Ceausescu in Iran
- 2 - 6 Gromyko in Yugoslavia
- 3 North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh dies
- 4 - 9 Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi in Moscow  
Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Hanoi to pay respects to Ho Chi Minh
- 6 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin meets Indian Premier Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi, whilst en route to Hanoi
- 6 - 10 Kosygin, Party Secretary Katushev and Deputy Chairman of Supreme Soviet Praesidium Yasnov in Hanoi
- 7 Rumanian Delegation to Ho Chi Minh's funeral, led by Prime Minister Maurer, in Peking to meet Chou En-lai
- 8 Prague City Journalists Organisation disbanded. The Praesidium of the Committee of Czech Journalists resigns
- 8 - 12 President Podgorny in Sofia for 25th Anniversary of Liberation of Bulgaria
- 9 Ho Chi Minh's Funeral.  
Podstupka, Chief editor of Bratislava Pravda, resigns
- 10 Soviet statement claims that there were 488 incidents on the Sino-Soviet border from June-mid-August 1969  
Mongolian Foreign Minister meets Gromyko in Moscow
- 11 Kosygin and Chou En-lai meet in Peking
- 11 - 15 Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh in Moscow
- 11 - 17 Austrian President in Rumania
- 15 Polish C.P. 1st Secretary Gomulka meets Czechoslovak C.P. 1st Secretary Husak at Ostrava in Czechoslovakia

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September

- 15 - 16 Czechoslovak C.P. Secretaries Kempny and Lenart in the Soviet Union  
Amnesty for Czechs abroad to return to Czechoslovakia expires
- 16 - 17 Czechoslovak Prime Minister Cernik in Moscow
- 19 Gromyko's speech to the U.N. General Assembly
- 20 Ceausescu and President Tito of Yugoslavia meet at the Iron Gates
- 22 China conducts underground nuclear test
- 22 - 26 Finnish President Kekkonen in Rumania
- 22 - 28 Warsaw Pact Exercises in Poland, watched by Soviet Defence Minister Grechko and Warsaw Pact Chief Yakubovsky, and by Defence Ministers or Chiefs of Staff from all other Warsaw Pact countries
- 23 Ton Duc Thang elected North Vietnamese President. Nguyen Luong Bang becomes Vice-President
- 23 - 24 Ilichev, Kozyrev and Semenov (Deputy Foreign Ministers of USSR) meet Czech Deputy Foreign Ministers Klusak and Trhlik in Moscow
- 25 - 26 Bulgarian C.P. 1st Secretary Zhivkov in Moscow. Syrian Prime Minister Atasi in Moscow
- 25 - 27 Czechoslovak C.P. Central Committee meeting in Prague.  
Dubcek dismissed from the Party Praesidium, and from his post of Chairman of Parliament.  
Srnkovsky and Dr. Hajek expelled from the Central Committee;  
while other C.C. members associated with the post-January movement resign
- 27 Federal Government of Czechoslovakia resigns. Premier Cernik asked to form a new Government
- 29 China explodes nuclear device in the atmosphere

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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

May 1969

Summary

World Communist Conference

The conference is due to begin on 5 June. There will be fewer participants than at the last conference in 1960. At least 5 of the 14 ruling parties will probably be absent. The Russians are interested in a show of unity. There is therefore no question of anything so controversial as an agreed indictment of China: and the Russians must be trying to avoid discussion of Czechoslovakia. The main conference document is in four sections of which only the third - about "united action against imperialism" - has so far been agreed. The document no doubt already takes account of views different from those of the Soviet Union. It refers to the sovereignty of communist parties and appears to imply that China and Albania are still within the Communist fold. It may be expected to mention Vietnam, the Middle East and European security. The conference is certain to achieve much less than the previous one. All controversial issues are likely to be avoided in an entirely anodyne final document. But even this will be worth having, as a show of apparent unity, from the Soviet point of view.

Sino-Soviet Relations

2. There was sharp propaganda in May. A minor incident may have occurred on the Sinkiang border. Talks about the navigation of border rivers may open in June but are unlikely to get far. The Chinese reply to the Soviet proposal of talks on the general frontier question was skilful but its proposals will not be acceptable to the Russians. Frontier negotiations are unlikely. Relations will remain strained. There have been indications that the Russians do not expect the open dispute to end when Mao goes.

The German Question

3. The recognition of East Germany by Iraq, Cambodia and the Sudan represents an important breakthrough for the international status of the East German régime and potentially a significant development in the German question. Gomulka has made a speech which, although it did not involve any very important departure from views expressed before in Eastern Europe, appeared designed to suggest a possibility of progress in Bonn-Warsaw relations. But Gomulka was obviously motivated in part by the imminence of the Federal German elections and it will be interesting to see whether a consistently more forthcoming Polish attitude towards Bonn now develops.

Developments following the Budapest declaration

4. The call for a conference on European security remains an important aspect of the international posture of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. Kosygin has approved the Finnish proposal that such a

conference/



conference and a preparatory meeting should be held in Helsinki. President Kekkonen has denied persistent reports that the Finnish Government were persuaded by the Russians to make this proposal. There have been indications from Soviet and Eastern European representatives that the question of Canadian and United States participation in a conference is negotiable. The proposal for a conference will no doubt continue to receive support in official Communist pronouncements but the authors of the Budapest declaration do not seem to expect substantive progress soon.

#### Soviet Agriculture

5. An article by a senior member of the Soviet Ministry of Finance has implied that the short-fall in agricultural investment was caused by increased military expenditure. Agriculture has always been the first sector to suffer from unexpected demands on the budget, although Brezhnev criticised this practice in 1968. The past winter has produced a series of disasters which threaten to reduce grain output by at least 15%. Livestock figures, already declining, would be further affected by a bad harvest. The new collective farm charter does not introduce any major new reforms but has opened the way for discussion of several controversial issues, including the proposal for a management structure for collective farms based on elective unions and the question of reorganising farm labour on the "link" system. The latter involves payment of workers on the basis of the harvest which they produce. Objections that this would encourage interest in private property appear to have been over-ruled.



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PROSPECTS FOR THE WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

The final preparatory meeting began on 23 May and the conference itself is due to open on 5 June. It has been preceded by a month of intensive visiting in Eastern Europe.

2. It seems probable that only about 70 parties will attend, compared with 81 at the last conference in 1960. Rumanian participation is certain. There are reports, relayed by the Czechoslovak press, that Cuba may after all be represented. But, despite President Podgorny's visit to North Korea between 14 and 19 May, there are no firm indications that the North Korean party will reverse its intention not to participate in the conference. Thus, of the 14 ruling parties, at least five will probably be absent: China, Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea and Yugoslavia.

3. There can be no question this time of once more papering over Sino-Soviet differences. On the other hand anything so controversial as an agreed indictment of the Chinese is also out of the question, since the original Soviet aim in calling for a conference, namely to condemn China, has been superseded by the need to achieve simply a semblance of unity in the greater part of the World Communist movement. The Russians must also be making strenuous efforts to prevent discussion of Czechoslovakia, which would certainly lead to bitter polemics. But the Italians, at least, persist in their wish to see it discussed.

4. The Australian Communist Party has revealed that the draft of the main conference document is in four sections, only one of which was agreed at the previous preparatory meeting in March 1969. According to this report, the first section deals with "the world-wide struggle against imperialism" and the second with "the main revolutionary forces opposing imperialism", which are defined as "the Socialist world", "the international working class" and "the national liberation movement"; the third section is "a call for united action against imperialism", and the fourth "examines problems of uniting the Communist movement". Open opposition to the draft, especially by the Italian Party, persisted at the end of May. According to Rude Pravo on 26 May, 54 delegations at the final preparatory meeting had by that date approved all four sections of the draft, while the remaining ten delegations represented at the meeting considered that the final document should consist of the third section alone. The document eventually approved by the conference may accordingly be confined to the agreed third section or may include some or all of the others. A unanimous vote may not be achieved, or some procedure may perhaps be devised which avoids the necessity for an actual vote. In view of their interest in apparent unity, the Russians will no doubt have already made considerable concessions in the drafting to views which differ from their own. Failure to agree on the bulk of the document would therefore be a setback for Moscow.

5. Parts of the draft document have appeared in the Western press. One sentence combines the importance of respecting proletarian internationalism, mutual aid, equality of rights, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. This appears to go some way to meet the Rumanian party and is far from being an endorsement of the Brezhnev doctrine; but the Russians and others will no doubt interpret it as they wish. A reference in the document

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to the establishment of socialism in 14 states, though not explicit, implies that China and Albania are still held to be within the Communist fold. There is a mention of the polemical divergencies in the movement, followed by an expression of hope that they will eventually be removed by consultation and common action. The first section of the document, about the alleged imperialist threat, may be expected to attack principally the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and NATO in general. The third section will no doubt include a call for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and mention the Middle East, very likely with an expression of support for the Security Council resolution of November 1967. It may also be expected to endorse the Warsaw Pact's call for a conference on European security.

6. The conference seems certain to achieve much less than its predecessor in 1960, when the final "statement", although a contradictory amalgam of Soviet and Chinese views which did no more than paper over disagreements, was an agreed Communist document of considerable scope, detail and significance. This time, the prospect is that all controversial issues will be avoided, and that the agreed document will demonstrate, by failing to mention China and Czechoslovakia, that the world Communist movement cannot agree any formula on the most difficult issues facing it, and is reduced to an anodyne statement on uncontroversial matters. But even this very meagre result would be worth having from the Soviet point of view, because of the need for a show of unity, however unreal.



SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Propaganda on both sides was sharp and plentiful in May. The Russians seem to have been attempting to drum up international support for their position. This was no doubt one reason for President Podgorny's visit to North Korea and perhaps was a secondary purpose of Mr. Kosygin's visits to India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The poor attendance of Asian Parties at the World Communist Conference is being balanced to some extent by fairly intensive Soviet diplomatic activity in Asia.

2. There were persistent rumours, mainly from Soviet sources, of further clashes, some of them alleging trouble on the Sinkiang sector of the Sino-Soviet frontier. There has been one direct Chinese allegation about recent incidents in this sector. Something may well have happened there but, if so, it was probably on a small scale. Meanwhile, the ice on the Ussuri River has thawed, making incidents there somewhat less likely in the coming months.

3. On 26 April, the Soviet side proposed a meeting in May of the joint commission on navigation on the border rivers. On 11 May, the Chinese agreed to a meeting but proposed mid-June, i.e. during or just after the World Communist Conference. The Chinese statement included some very sharp accusations. It was not mentioned in the Soviet press until the publication of the Soviet reply of 23 May, which suggested a meeting on 18 June.

4. In a statement on 24 May, the Chinese replied to the Soviet statement of 29 March, which had proposed negotiations on the general question of Sino-Soviet frontiers. The Chinese statement was skilfully written and well timed, in view of the imminence of the World Communist Conference. It said that it must be confirmed that the Treaties relating to the present frontiers were all "unequal"; but that China was still ready to take them as a basis for negotiating the overall settlement of the boundary question. It added that any territory held in violation of the "unequal" treaties (by which the Chinese presumably mean certain later Soviet acquisitions in the border area) must in principle be handed back, although adjustments at individual places on the boundary could be made. Meanwhile it suggested that in sectors where a river forms the frontier, frontier guards on each side should not cross the central line of the main river channel. The statement flatly denied the Soviet assertion that maps exchanged in 1861 had given Damansky Island, where the March clashes took place, to Russia.

5. Negotiations on the general question of the frontiers remain unlikely. The language of the Chinese statement may be relatively restrained but many points in it are calculated to needle Soviet susceptibilities and its substance will not be acceptable to the Russians. They cannot accept that there is any doubt about their right to all present Soviet territory, and they cannot agree to the proposal on the delineation of river borders, since it suggests that Damansky Island is Chinese territory. The Chinese know this, so their proposals can hardly be meant seriously. Judging on past form, it is not even certain that talks on the narrower question of the navigation of border rivers will get going. The recent behaviour of both sides has been influenced by the desire to appear reasonable before the World Communist Conference.

Once/



Once the Conference is over, there will be less need to strike reasonable postures. Even if talks on navigation do take place, they are not likely to be fruitful: and there are indications of Soviet willingness to admit this privately.

6. Sino-Soviet relations seem likely to remain very strained in the coming months. As regards the more distant future, the fact that the important articles in Pravda in May by the writer Konstantin Simonov included an attack on Lin Piao strongly suggests that the Russians do not expect the open dispute with China to end with the disappearance of Mao. There has been some other evidence tending to confirm that this is so.



DRAFT CHRONOLOGY

April

30 Iraq recognises East Germany.

May

- 1 Civilian May Day parade in Moscow.
- 2 Soviet Union announces that it has proposed to China that a meeting of the Soviet-Chinese frontier navigation commission be held in May in Khabarovsk.
- 5-7 Kosygin visits India for funeral of President Husain.
- 5-9 First Secretary of Bulgarian CP Zhivkov visits East Germany.
- 6-11 East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer on official visit to Iraq.
- 7 Major-General Pyotr Grigorenko arrested in Tashkent.
- 8 Cambodia establishes diplomatic relations with East Germany.  
Cernik, Husak and Svoboda visit the headquarters of Central Group of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia.
- 11 China accepts Soviet proposal for a meeting of the joint frontier navigation commission.
- 13-20 Minister of Technology visits the Soviet Union.
- 14-19 President Podgorny visits North Korea.  
Joint manoeuvres by Bulgarian, Hungarian, Rumanian and Soviet ground forces on Soviet territory.
- 15-16 Husak visits Hungary.
- 16 First Secretary of Rumanian CP Ceausescu and Chairman of Council of Ministers Maurer visit Moscow.  
Gomulka offers to sign an inter-state treaty with the Federal Republic recognising the Oder-Neisse line.
- 18-23 Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev in Czechoslovakia.
- 19-20 Ceausescu leads Rumanian delegation to Poland.
- 19-21 President Kekkonen of Finland meets Kosygin in Leningrad.
- 20-24 Podgorny in Mongolia.

20-23/



May

- 20-23 Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen visits Poland.
- 22-24 Marshal Yakubovsky in Prague.
- 23 Soviet Union proposes that the Soviet-Chinese frontier navigation commission meet in Khabarovsk on 18 June.
- Final Preparatory Committee meeting for World Communist Conference begins in Moscow.
- Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers Baibakov arrives in Czechoslovakia.
- 24 Chinese statement in reply to Soviet statement of 29 March on the border question.
- Husak visits Warsaw.
- 26 Cambodian Foreign Minister arrives in GDR.
- 26 Husak visits East Berlin.
- 26-28 Italian Foreign Minister Nenni in Yugoslavia.
- 26-30 Kosygin visits Afghanistan.
- 27 Sudan recognises East Germany. President Svoboda announces amnesty for Czech citizens living abroad.
- 29 Czechoslovak CP Central Committee meeting opens in Prague
- 30 Kosygin arrives in Pakistan.



THE GERMAN QUESTION

Recognition of East Germany

The announcement on 30 April that Iraq had recognised the "DDR" was followed on 8 May by the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the "DDR" and Cambodia, and on 27 May the new Government of the Sudan followed suit. Since these are the first non-communist states to extend full recognition to the "DDR", these moves represent a breakthrough of great importance to the international status of the East German régime, and potentially a significant development in the German question.

2. There is no reason to suppose that the moves were concerted in advance. East German influence in Iraq has been increasing steadily and in February this year the ruling Baath party passed a resolution calling for recognition of the "DDR". Herr Winzer's subsequent visit to Baghdad and the Iraqi Foreign Minister's visits to Moscow and East Berlin prepared the ground further. The final decision may have been a quid pro quo for advantages from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe in the fields of trade and arms supplies. Cambodia's motives were quite different, Prince Sihanouk having frequently stated that his policy of strict neutrality demand the equal treatment of the two German states. According to his own account he decided on recognition of the "DDR" as long ago as March 1968, but delayed the announcement out of consideration for the Federal German Government. The motives of the new Sudanese Government are as yet obscure, but it includes several known communists.

3. The timing of these acts of recognition was probably prompted by pre-election rivalry which the Governments concerned may have seen as weakening the Coalition in Bonn, and it is possible that some other Governments may be tempted to recognise East Germany in the next few months. The "DDR", which seems to have been as much surprised as delighted by these developments, may be expected to redouble its efforts to improve its international status.

Polish Policy on Germany

4. In an election speech on 17 May Gomulka called upon the Federal Government to conclude a treaty with Poland recognising the Oder-Neisse frontier as final, in the same way as the treaty between Poland and the "DDR" in 1950. If Bonn considered this contrary to the Potsdam agreement, it should ask the Four Powers whether it had the right to conclude such a treaty. The reply would be instructive. Gomulka did not specifically make a frontier agreement conditional upon recognition of the "DDR", but stated that a normalisation of relations with Bonn would require, inter alia, renunciation of the Federal Government's claims to sole representation of the German people through the recognition of a second German State, the "DDR".

5. Although the substance of Gomulka's speech did not involve any very important departure from views expressed in the past in Eastern Europe, the offer of an agreement on the frontiers appears designed to suggest a possibility of progress in Bonn-Warsaw relations, where all progress

previously/



previously seemed blocked. And the tone of the speech was unprecedentedly forthcoming for a Polish leader talking about the Federal Republic. Some of his formulations and the manner in which the offer was presented can hardly have been welcome to the East German leaders. There was clearly a desire on the Polish part to exploit differences between the two parties in the Bonn coalition. Gomulka probably hoped, by dangling the prospect of diplomatic relations implied by the conclusion of a treaty, to encourage the SPD to call for concessions towards Poland in order to achieve this success for their eastern policy, and also to encourage support in the Federal Republic generally for recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. At the same time the Poles seem to believe that the Soviet Union is flirting with Bonn, and to fear that they may be isolated unless they do the same. It will be interesting to see whether a consistently more forthcoming Polish attitude towards Bonn now develops - and if so whether it persists after the Federal elections in September.



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SOVIET AGRICULTURE

A recent article by a senior member of the Soviet Ministry of Finance has stated that not all the allocations intended for capital investment in agriculture have been made owing to "the worsening of the international situation". Although the allocations provided for 1969 exceed the level for 1968, they do not reach the amount laid down by the directives of the 23rd Party Congress for the development of the economy in 1966/70. The implication of this article is that the short-fall in agricultural investment has been caused by increased military expenditure.

2. Agriculture has always been the first sector of the Soviet economy to suffer from any unexpected demands on the budget. This latest instance runs counter to Brezhnev's speech at the central committee plenum in October 1968, when he criticised the practice of diverting resources intended for agriculture to other sectors of the economy. In saying this Brezhnev was echoing the complaints which have been made by Polyansky and other members of the "agricultural lobby" in recent years.

3. Although grain production during the current five-year plan (1966-70) has increased, the general trend of agricultural production has been below planned figures. The present year would therefore be a crucial one even in the best of climatic conditions. In fact, the past winter has produced a series of disasters which threatens to reduce grain output by at least 15%. Livestock figures, which have already been declining, will be further affected if this year's harvest turns out to be poor. The first setback to crops was caused by dust storms affecting some of the best grain growing lands in the Soviet Union. This was compounded by severe frosts in roughly the same areas, where there was little protective snow cover.

4. The long awaited draft of the new collective farm charter was published at the end of April. It was prepared by a special central committee commission set up by Brezhnev in 1966 and will be submitted, after public discussion, for approval at the third collective farmers congress in November 1969.

5. The new charter has codified the considerable changes made in agricultural administration since the original statutes were adopted in 1935, but has not introduced any major new reforms. However, despite its conservative nature its preparation has opened the way for the discussion of several controversial issues which could result in radical reforms. These issues include the proposal for a management structure for collective farms based on elective unions, and the question of reorganising farm labour on the so-called "link" system, which has already been recommended for adoption in the RSFSR. Under this system, a small group of workers known as a "link" is allocated a particular area of land, together with the necessary machinery, for which they are responsible throughout the season. They are paid on the basis of the harvest which they produce. Advocates of this system argue that it encourages collective farm workers to take a deeper and more personal interest in the land. The system has been criticised in the past on the grounds that it tends to encourage the interest in private property among the peasantry; but in a recent article Voronov, a Politburo member long associated with agriculture and Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, has said that this argument is not justified and that the system can now be widely applied.



DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE BUDAPEST  
DECLARATION

The call for a conference on European security, which was resuscitated in the Warsaw Pact declaration issued at Budapest on 17 March, remains an important aspect of the international posture of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. It was mentioned in the communiqué following President Ceausescu's visit in late May to Poland and, rather curiously, in the communiqué on President Podgorny's visit to North Korea. A certain amount of diplomatic activity to promote it also continues: Bulgarian Ambassadors in various capitals have handed over copies of a declaration issued by the Bulgarian National Assembly in support of the Budapest declaration.

2. Meanwhile, Finland proposed on 5 May that a conference on European security and a preparatory meeting for such a conference should be held in Helsinki. Soviet news media published the Finnish document three days later, but refrained until 11 May from expressing explicit approval. The communiqué on the meeting in Leningrad on 19 May between President Kekkonen and Mr. Kosygin said that the latter considered the Finnish initiative to be "a valuable contribution" towards efforts for peace in Europe. There have been persistent reports that the Finnish Government were persuaded by the Russians to make their proposal. These have been denied publicly by President Kekkonen. But it is still widely held that the Finnish initiative would not have been made without some advance knowledge of Soviet approval. The recipients of the Finnish proposal included both the Federal Republic and the "DDR", and the United States and Canada. The inclusion of the last two might seem at variance with Soviet opposition to their participation in any conference on European security. But Soviet Ambassadors and other Eastern European representatives have recently been indicating that this point is negotiable.

3. The proposal for a conference will no doubt continue to receive support in official Communist pronouncements, including the basic document to be approved by the world Communist conference. It may also be placed on the agenda of the 1969 Session of the United Nations General Assembly. But there are many indications that the authors of the Warsaw Pact declaration, including the Russians, do not expect actual progress soon. Soviet representatives have been reported as saying that a conference is unlikely to take place for two years at least.



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COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS

APRIL 1969

SUMMARY

*Delayed in  
coming from  
London.*

Chinese Party Congress

Lin Piao's report to the Congress said that the Cultural Revolution was not yet over. The report contained no new important guide-lines for domestic or foreign policy. As regards the latter, the report was couched in terms that were standard before the Cultural Revolution. The United States remained "the most ferocious enemy"; but unremitting efforts would be made against the present Soviet leaders. The Party Constitution adopted by the Congress named Lin Piao as Mao's future successor and enshrined Mao's thought as Marxist/Leninist doctrine for the era of the collapse of imperialism and the socialist advance to world-wide victory. The membership of the new Politburo and enlarged Central Committee reflects the ascendancy of the army. The great majority of the Central Committee members are new. The main reason for holding the Congress seems to have been to legitimise the new order that emerged during the Cultural Revolution. A somewhat more stable internal situation seems to be foreshadowed. But the big questions on the reconstruction of the Party and the future of the State apparatus and on possible new economic policies have not been answered. The Sino-Soviet dispute will not be alleviated by the Congress.

The CMEA Summit Meeting

2. This long-delayed summit was expected to discuss the fundamental question of CMEA's future. But the two main courses apparently under discussion - supranational planning and convertibility of the Rouble within CMEA - were not mentioned in the communique. This did however refer to the coordination of national development plans, very much a second best alternative for the Russians. There was only one concrete result - the decision in principle to set up a special Investment Bank for CMEA. The communique referred to the sovereignty and equality of socialist states, thus reflecting the views of certain Eastern European countries. The main Soviet objective in holding the meeting was apparently to restore the image of normal working relations and a degree of unity in the socialist world. Moscow achieved this but may have accepted, for the present at least, failure to gain acceptance for Soviet views on CMEA's future development.

Czechoslovakia

3. Dubcek's fall may have been brought about as much by tensions within the Czechoslovak Party as by Soviet pressure. Husak's attitudes, and his successful management of the Slovak Party in recent months, were well calculated to appeal to those in the centre of the Czechoslovak Party who felt the need for a tougher régime. The majority of the new Praesidium are centrists of a pragmatic disposition. The new leaders have imposed

tighter/

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tighter controls on the mass media and are devoting great attention to reimposing discipline at all levels. But since his election Husak has also emphasised that the essentials of the post-January policies will be maintained. He has also said that top priority will be given to the economic reforms. The leadership changes have been accepted reluctantly by Czechoslovak public opinion. Most important institutions have declared support for Husak, although some, notably the trade unions, have made it clear that this does not mean the abandonment of their earlier policies. Although the Soviet leaders were evidently gratified by the fall of Dubcek, it is by no means certain that they will decide to work with Husak. They will no doubt continue to use the conservatives in the Czechoslovak Party to influence policy in a pro-Soviet direction.

The Finnish Communist Party Congress

4. The Congress produced a public rift between "hard-liners" and "liberals". The latter, who favour continued participation in the Government coalition and have opposed the invasion of Czechoslovakia, were strengthened in the Central Committee elections and the "hard-liners" walked out of the Congress. A degree of compromise may eventually be achieved. Fenno-Soviet governmental relations are not likely to be affected in the short term. Relations between the Finnish C.P. and the C.P.S.U. are more difficult to predict. After supporting the Finnish minority of "hard-liners" because of the latter's attitude over Czechoslovakia, Moscow now seems to be trying to restore the unity of the Finnish Party and to maintain its participation in Government.



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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

The Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Peking from 1-24 April. This Congress, which had been much postponed, was the first for 11 years.

2. The Congress adopted a new Party Constitution, confirmed Lin Piao as Mao's future successor and elected a new and much enlarged Central Committee. Mao himself addressed the Congress at two of its three plenary sessions. Unlike the last Congress, the proceedings this time were largely secret and no foreign delegates were present.

The Political Report

3. Lin Piao's lengthy Political Report contained no new important guide lines either for domestic or foreign policy. He offered a historical and ideological explanation of the Cultural Revolution; and, in spite of earlier claims in the press that the Cultural Revolution would gain "all-round victory" in 1969, he said that it was not yet over. He called for continued criticism of erroneous ideas and further efforts to "consolidate the revolutionary great alliance" and "purify the class ranks". He again emphasised the importance of re-educating intellectuals and of being lenient to people who, although they had made mistakes, might still be open to correction. While noting with satisfaction that Revolutionary Committees had been established, Lin did not put forward any plans for the future form of State organs or for reactivating the Party organisation. The Report was also reticent about the economy.

4. As regards foreign policy, Lin Piao's Report was couched in terms that were standard before the Cultural Revolution. The United States remained the "most ferocious enemy"; but unremitting efforts would be made to unite "genuine Marxist-Leninists" against the present Soviet leaders. Viet-Nam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Palestine were identified as areas of promise in the revolutionary struggle. Lin Piao reiterated that China would not attack unless attacked; but she must be prepared for war, conventional or nuclear, launched by the Americans and Russians. He added that the Chinese Government were considering their reply to the Soviet proposal of 29 March for the resumption of negotiations on the border question, and put on record once again the Chinese position on such negotiations. He also referred in strong terms to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The Party Constitution

5. The new Party Constitution differs only slightly from the draft which was circulated following the Central Committee meeting in October 1968. It enshrines Mao's thought as "Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory". It names Lin Piao as Mao's successor. The provisions on Party organisation and procedure invest wider powers than previously in the highest leading bodies, the Politburo and its Standing Committee. It is stipulated that, while a Party Congress should meet once every five years, the time may be varied in "special circumstances". But the new Constitution

does/

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does not lay down the frequency of Central Committee meetings. This contrasts with the provisions of the former (1956) Constitution for annual meetings of the Party Congress and bi-annual meetings of the Central Committee - provisions which, however, were not observed.

The New Politburo

6. A plenary meeting of the new Central Committee on 28 April elected a new Politburo and Standing Committee. The Politburo has 21 full and 4 alternate members. The Standing Committee has 5 members, two less than previously. Both bodies are headed by Mao followed by Lin Piao. The three remaining members of the Standing Committee are Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister, Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng. It is here, it seems, that the Party will be run and crucial policy decisions made. All but one of the fourteen leaders in Mao's "proletarian headquarters" in recent months have been absorbed into the Politburo. The membership of the Politburo, like that of the Central Committee itself, reflects the ascendancy of the army in the affairs of the nation; and, by comparison with the previous Politburo seems to show a decline in the influence of the experienced civil administrators. Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister, and Li Fu-ch'un, Head of the State Planning Commission, both of whom have been criticised during the Cultural Revolution, now lose their places on the Politburo although they remain on the Central Committee.

7. The Central Committee did not elect a Secretariat, possibly in order to prevent the formation of a rival power caucus to the Standing Committee.

The new Central Committee

8. The new Central Committee, with 170 full and 109 alternate members, is considerably larger than its predecessor, which at its maximum in May 1958 had 194 members. Of the 170 members of the Eighth Central Committee believed to be alive now, only 54 - just under a third - gained places on the Ninth Central Committee. None of the major Party leaders disgraced in the course of the Cultural Revolution appears in the new Central Committee, although at least two important provincial figures who have been severely criticised are included. 101 members of the Committee come from Provincial Revolutionary Committees. All the Chairmen and Acting Chairmen of these Committees are included, the great majority as full members. Army representation on the Committee (including officers serving on Revolutionary Committees) numbers 107 (about 40 per cent) and is thus significantly larger than on the Eighth Central Committee (about 26 per cent). Officials who served in the Party and Government machines before the Cultural Revolution provide 82 members of the new Central Committee, including 36 who now hold posts on Revolutionary Committees at provincial level, and 19 from Central Government Ministries (excluding the Defence Ministry). Other categories represented in the Committee are workers and peasants, intellectuals and Red Guards (2 only, reflecting the decline of their prestige since late 1968). 49 members are new names.

Conclusion



Conclusion

9. It is too early to assess with confidence the significance of the Congress for Chinese development. But it seems clear already that, despite the widespread expectation of important changes, the main reason for holding the Congress was to legitimise the new order that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution, and consecrate in some form the relationship between the new central and provincial leaders. It is clear, as a result of the Congress, that the army will continue to play the major role in running the country in the coming period; but it will apparently not have a free hand. A somewhat more stable internal situation seems to be foreshadowed. But the big questions have not been answered: plans for the reconstruction of the party as a whole; the future of the state apparatus; and whether new economic policies are imminent. It is also far from clear whether China will yet resume a more active foreign policy, although Lin Piao's report suggested that any such policy would follow lines familiar in the period immediately before the Cultural Revolution. The Congress did nothing which is likely to alleviate the Sino-Soviet dispute; indeed it gave solemn endorsement to the very policies and attitudes which are anathema to the Soviet Party.



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C.M.E.A. SUMMIT MEETING

The 23rd Extraordinary meeting of CMEA - the long delayed "economic summit" of Soviet bloc Party and Government leaders - took place from 23-26 April in Moscow. It was scheduled originally to last two days only.

2. It was expected to discuss the fundamental but very controversial problem of the direction in which CMEA should now develop. There is wide agreement that the organisation is unsatisfactory and that change is needed. But the views of the members on what should be done are not altogether clear. It would not be surprising if they were divided on a number of far-reaching issues, or if divisions were between different groups of members on different issues. Political and economic interests do not always point in the same direction (e.g. most obviously for East Germany) and the Russians themselves, whose attitude towards economic reform even within their own country remains ambivalent, may not be giving members a clear lead. Every aspect of economic reform has political implications, in regard to which, again, the members of CMEA have divided views and interests. In general, the movement towards economic unity in Western Europe is disturbing to all of them. Some of them see the development of the EEC and EFTA as having reduced already their prospects of increased earnings of much-needed hard currency. Should they close ranks in self-defence, or do what they can, individually in their bilateral arrangements with Western trading partners, and collectively through wider international organisations such as the EEC and the GATT, to keep the golden door to the West as wide open as possible? They have generally rejected the idea of self-sufficiency for CMEA, if not in all cases explicitly. Closing ranks, if it is to take place by consent, must therefore be a matter of improving the effectiveness of the organisation, but without making it inward-looking. Broadly speaking, it looks as if two types of reform are being canvassed:

(a) The Soviet Union, with support from Bulgaria and in somewhat ambiguous terms from Poland and East Germany, has been arguing for "integration". This would apparently mean supranational planning, probably with a system of majority decision-making, and would greatly increase Soviet political, as well as economic, control in Eastern Europe. It would therefore be particularly welcome to the Russians at a time when they are anxious to consolidate their grip on the bloc. The Rumanians are flatly opposed: it is not clear how much support they have from others - probably a good deal.

(b) Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are the primary advocates of giving the rouble some degree of convertibility within CMEA, so as to depart at long last from bilateral trading arrangements and thus give an important fillip to intra-CMEA trade. There are trade experts, some in important party and government positions, who also argue that convertibility within CMEA should lead eventually to a degree of genuine convertibility of the rouble on world markets, which would enable countries which make a trade profit within CMEA to buy more in the West. The Russians have long resisted this, but give the impression of yielding ground inch by inch.

3. Neither/

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3. Neither of these ways forward is mentioned in the communiqué on the summit meeting. But there are indications that they were discussed and that the eventual communiqué differed considerably from the original draft. The communiqué did however contain references to the coordination of national development plans as the principal method of shaping stable and beneficial economic relations between member countries. This marks a reversion to a policy which was promoted by Khrushchev, but which has been less in evidence over the past five years. It represents very much a second best, from the Soviet point of view, to any measures of economic integration.

4. Although Pravda said that the meeting had taken unanimously decisions of major importance, the communiqué reveals only one concrete result, namely the decision in principle to set up a special Investment Bank for CMEA. Cernik said on his return to Prague that certain conclusions reached at the meeting would "gradually become known to the public" and the communiqué records a decision to start drafting the main lines for the further development of economic, scientific and technical cooperation between member countries, and agreement to elaborate proposals on the further improvement of the work of CMEA organs. The communiqué was silent on the question of Soviet economic aid to Czechoslovakia. References in the communiqué to the "strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries as free, sovereign and equal states" and to the benefit of developing economic ties with other countries irrespective of their social systems seem to reflect primarily certain East European interests; or perhaps to betoken a subtler Soviet approach than has been evident since the Czechoslovak crisis.

5. All the evidence suggests that the main Soviet objective in holding this summit was political: to restore the image of normal working relations and of a degree of unity in the socialist world. This aim would be particularly important after the change of leadership in Czechoslovakia and before the final preparations for the world communist conference on 5 June. The visiting delegations, on the other hand, came to talk not politics but economics. On this assessment, the Russians may have accepted, for the present at least, failure to get their way about CMEA's future development. But they may have cause for worry later if anything comes of the interesting passing references in the communiqué to the expansion of direct international trade between enterprises in CMEA countries (which would no doubt be more difficult to control than centralised trade at the national level) and to the improvement of the existing CMEA bank (which may be taken by some Eastern European countries as a signal to press even harder for multilateral clearing arrangements in CMEA).

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Despite the apparent calm which followed the stern reaction of the Czechoslovak Party Praesidium to the "ice hockey riots" in late March, the political crisis in Czechoslovakia became steadily more acute and led up to the Central Committee Meeting on 17 April at which Husak replaced Dubcek as First Secretary of the Party. The crisis brought to a head tensions which had been growing for some time within the Party. At the same time there were sustained pressures by the Soviet leaders designed to weaken the position of the Czechoslovak progressives and install a more pliable leadership. As a result of these tensions and pressures, major policy and personnel changes at the Central Committee Meeting became inevitable.

2. The debate within the Party had centered around the interpretation of the resolutions of the November Central Committee Plenum which attempted to strike a balance between continuing the reform programme and restoring unity and discipline to the Party. Party members had come increasingly to realise that so long as political tension in the country, such as that which surrounded the dispute about Smrkovsky's position or the aftermath of Jan Palach's death, remained high, little or no real progress could be made with the reform programme. This was particularly serious in the economic field since inflationary pressures were growing in strength and the need for firm measures was clear. The Slovak Party's claim that relative calm and order had been maintained in Slovakia since the invasion in contrast to the agitated situation in the Czech lands may also have been influential. It seems in retrospect that all these criticisms may have come to focus on the position of Dubcek as Party leader.

3. Dubcek's fall may thus have been brought about as much by tensions of this kind within the Czechoslovak Party as by direct pressure from the Soviet leaders for his replacement. The Russians no doubt did all they could to encourage the break-up of the Dubcek leadership and probably indicated their acceptance of Husak. But acceptability to the Soviet Union was almost certainly not the only reason for the choice of Husak. As the man principally responsible for the resolute and successful management of the Slovak Party in recent months, his attitudes, publicly stated in a major speech shortly before the Central Committee meeting, were well calculated to appeal to those in the centre of the Czechoslovak Party who felt the need for a tougher regime. The composition of the new 11-man Praesidium, a majority of whose members are centrists of a pragmatic or "realistic" disposition and in which there are no fewer than 5 Slovaks, bears out this interpretation.

4. The first actions of the new Party leaders were to impose tighter controls on the mass media. The censorship has been strengthened and important personnel changes have been made, notably in the Party daily Rude Pravo, whose dogmatic, ideological preachings now seem even more dogmatic than the pronouncements of the leadership. The Party is clearly also devoting great attention to the re-imposition of discipline at all levels. While the leaders have committed themselves to developing freedom of discussion and expression within the Party, both Husak and Strougal, the leader of the Party Bureau for the Czech Lands, have emphasised the need for unity in deed as in word. Strougal has even spoken of the need to expel from the Party persistent dissenters.

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5. While insisting on the need for more disciplinarian methods, Husak has since his election also repeatedly emphasised that the "essential features of the post-January policies" will be maintained and that the new leaders are confident that they have sufficient scope to solve their problems in their own way. On returning from Moscow after the CMEA Summit Meeting at the end of the month, Husak was at pains to say that his talks with the Soviet leaders had confirmed his opinion on the latter point. Husak has also said that top priority will be given to the economic reforms and another Central Committee Meeting is planned in May to discuss the draft legislation on the status and work of enterprises under the new economic system.

6. The leadership changes have been accepted reluctantly by Czechoslovak public opinion. Most of the important institutions have declared their support for Husak, although some, notably the Trade Unions, have made it clear that this support does not mean the abandonment of their earlier policies or support for the Action Programme. Neither the Trade Unions nor other institutions like the National Assembly, of which Dubcek is now the Chairman, are likely voluntarily or quickly to renounce the greater influence and independence which they have recently obtained. The inclusion of Polacek, the Chairman of the Trade Union Council, in the new Praesidium suggests that Husak recognises the importance of avoiding a conflict between Party and Unions. But he will require considerable skill and he will not be able to delay concrete action if he is to convince the Unions, and the public at large, that he is determined to press ahead with extensive reforms. And any signs that the Party is allowing too important a role to other institutions could well revive Soviet suspicions that the Party's "leading role" is being eroded.

7. The future, like the past, will therefore depend very largely on the Soviet attitude. The Soviet leaders were evidently gratified by the fall of Dubcek. But it is by no means yet certain that they see in Husak the man whom they would most like to lead the Czechoslovak Party. And even if they do, for whatever reason, decide to work with Husak in the coming months, they will no doubt continue to use the conservatives in the Czechoslovak Party (to the cultivation of whom they have devoted so much effort in recent months, apparently with considerable success) to influence Czechoslovak policy in a more pro-Soviet direction. This means of pressure is likely to prove an effective tool in their hands.

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RIFT IN THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY

Despite Soviet warnings about the need to preserve unity, the Finnish Party Congress in Helsinki on 3-6 April produced a major clash between "hard-liners" and "liberals", and brought to a head a crisis which had been simmering in the Party for some years.

2. From 1948, when a Communist attempt to seize power was narrowly averted, until 1966 the Party was excluded from Government. During this period the Party leadership was staunchly Stalinist. In January 1966 moderates won control of the leadership. In the following May the Communists joined the Coalition Government as a junior partner, and became the only non-ruling European Communist Party for many years to participate in government. Liberal tendencies in the Party leadership grew stronger, while the Stalinist old guard urged the Party to leave the government on the grounds that it did not have enough influence there. The conflict sharpened with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a clear division appearing between the Party leadership, which opposed it, and the Stalinists.

3. The results of the Central Committee elections at the recent Congress strengthened the existing moderate leadership. The Stalinist minority group walked out of the Congress. Although this minority seems determined to stick to its guns, the general expectation in Finland is that a compromise between the moderates and the Stalinists may eventually be worked out, leading to at least a semblance of unity. Governmental relations between Finland and the Soviet Union are not likely to be affected in the short run. The moderate wing of the Finnish Party can be expected to adhere to its arguments for continuing in the Government. Relations between the Finnish C.P. and the C.P.S.U. are more difficult to predict. After giving considerable support to the Stalinist minority, partly because of the latter's attitude over Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union seems now to be concentrating its efforts on trying to restore the unity of the Party and maintaining its participation in Government.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 31 March Marshal Grechko and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semyonov arrive in Czechoslovakia
- April 1969
- 1-24 9th Congress of Chinese Communist Party
- 1-7 President Podgorny visits Morocco
- 2 Czechoslovak Government reintroduces advance censorship of press
- 3-6 15th Congress of Finnish Communist Party - "Stalinist" opposition members walk out
- 3 "Kommunist" No. 5, including a major article on China, appears
- 7-9 Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu visits Moscow
- 8 Meeting of Czechoslovak Praesidium imposes further restrictive measures on mass media
- 8-11 Marshal Grechko visits Soviet troops in East Germany
- 10 Soviet Government statement attacking NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington
- 10 Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Ivan Bashev, meets Gromyko in Moscow for unofficial talks
- 10-11 Gomulka and PZPR delegation visit East Berlin
- 11 Soviet Note to China repeating offer of 29 March to resume border discussions
- 11-13 Marshal Grechko again in Czechoslovakia
- 12 Yugoslav General Election
- 14 Chinese Party Congress adopts Lin Piao's political report and confirms him as Mao's successor
- 14 Soviet Union-USA talks on peaceful uses of nuclear explosions begin in Vienna
- 14-16 Warsaw Pact anti-aircraft exercises in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Soviet Union

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- 14-18 Bulgarian Communist Party First Secretary  
Zhivkov visits Austria
- 15 North Korea shoots down US reconnaissance  
aircraft
- 15 Polish Minister of Defence Jaruzelski visits USSR
- 17 Plenary meeting of Czechoslovak CP Central Committee -  
Dubcek replaced by Husak as First Secretary
- 23-26 CMEA summit meeting in Moscow
- 23-28 Czechoslovak Trade Union Delegation led by Polacek  
visits Moscow
- 24-26 Chairman of Czechoslovak National Front, Erban, visits  
Poland.

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