Bilderberg Meeting 1970, 2. hluti

Bjarni Benediktsson – Stjórnmál – Bilderberg Meeting, Bad Ragaz 17. – 19. apríl 1970 o.fl.

Tekið af vef Borgarskjalasafnsins

bjarnibenediktsson.is

Einkaskjalasafn nr. 360
Stjórnmálamaðurinn
Askja 2-44, Örk 5

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

17 - 19 April 1970

PRIORITIES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Karl Kaiser

University of the Saarland

For Statesmen there is nothing new about being faced with an inescapable necessity to act. The history of diplomacy consists of such real or imagined necessities. But for practically all statesmen to be forced to act on the same problem that is a somewhat unusual situation in international politics.

Man can no longer do without the relentless progression of technological advances, economic growth, and social change, but the ensuing damage to his social and physical environment is also progressing at such a steady rate that he is facing social and political disruption and ultimately physical extinction unless he stops this time bomb which has been ticking now for a while.

For the international system as a whole the problem of environment is one without escape; one cannot run away from it. A first part of this paper examines some consequences of these problems for international politics and for the priorities of foreign policy.

But the bulk of international politics continues to turn around problems that can be bypassed and where nations act on the assumption that they can pursue a free choice within certain limits, though these are steadily narrowing. With this contrast in mind the second part of the paper examines some long term implications of recent international developments paying special attention to the European scene.

I. The Imperatives of Ecology: The Impact of Environmental Problems on the Future of International Politics

1. Introduction

The problem of man's relationship to his physical and social environment has moved to the foreground of political preoccupation

in practically every country, particularly in the highly industrialized areas of the world. National programmes on the problems of environment are being developed, international organizations like the OECD have begun intensive work, NATO has established working groups, and the UN is preparing a global conference on these questions in 1972.

This process is part of those prises de conscience which have initiated various important changes in human history as, for example, the development of the concept of social justice initiated what we now call the welfare state, or the growing awareness for the right of racial equality brought forth measures fostering racial emancipation. Each of these innovative waves, while changing the domestic structure of politics, have had a varying impact on international politics. This also applies to environmental problems and their political consequences. They are most likely not only to have a profound impact on domestic politics but to make for new issues of conflict, patterns of behavior, and structures of state relations in international politics.

One of the striking aspects of the present debate on these questions is the absence of much concern or speculation about the impact on the future of international politics. This may be due not only to the inbred tendency of most politicians and scientists to view social problems and priorities for their solutions first in the national context but also to the indeterminate nature of the problem and our lack of information about it which make an assessment of its effects quite difficult. It follows that the considerations of this paper must therefore remain speculative, preliminary, and only a basis of discussion.

This part of the paper focuses exclusively on those dimensions of the problem of environment which could be relevant to international politics. It deliberately avoids any entanglement in a detailed discussion of the scientific and technical dimensions of the destruction of man's relationship to his environment or of possible solutions, though they are relevant in another context and can at times exercise a consuming fascination on those who study them.

2. What Kind of Environment and what Kind of Future?

There is a staggering variety and quantity of problems that are refered to under the motion of environmental problem. They range from the poisening of the air and water man breathes and drinks, the pesticides he eats with food, the traffic noise that wears on his nerves, the destruction of cities which breeds crime to the inability to systematically use natural resources with the ensuing incapacity to eliminate malnutrition and starvation and, to conclude the list, the inability of man to peacefully regulate relations with others on a permanent basis. The variety of problems that can be subsumed under the notion of environment is, in fact, unlimited, if the concept is taken literally to mean the entire physical and social world surrounding man including his fellow-man.

It may help to clarify the issue if one imagines a spectrum of environmental problems: whereas at the one end one would find cases where the destruction of the physical environment by the fallout of technology (e.g. pollution) or by the exploitation of natural resources (e.g. lowering of ground water level) constitutes the main cause of the problem, the other end would be occupied by cases where man's relationship with the social and political environment is in serious disorder as a result of lagging social and political innovation (e.g. wild growth of cities, inadequacy of public services, or insufficient development of peaceful techniques of conflict resolution). In between these two points the physical and socio-political dimensions are mixed in varying proportions; the worldwide problem of starvation and malnutrition is a typical example: this is as much a question of developing and applying new techniques of food production as of a change in social and political organization and in habits. (e.g. birth control or redistribution of wealth).

Because of the scope and variety of the questions involved this paper confines itself to those environmental problems which are near to the physical-technological rather than the socio-political end of the spectrum that was just described. The choice does not imply a judgement on the relevance but is dictated by practical considerations of staying within manageable limits of analysis.

One view should be rejected from the onset since it is the origin of widespread tecnocratic illusions: there are no environmental problems which are of a purely physical-technical nature and which could consequently be solved through the mere application of a counterbalancing technology. Even such a hard-core technological problem as pollution has an essential political dimension since the emission of waste products can be and is being regulated by political intervention and by political decisions which establish priorities for the expenditure of a society's resources.

One remark about the concept of future is necessary here. There are two basic methods to describe the future: one can, first, extrapolate and project present trends to a specific point in time; one can, second, change certain variables and in combination with a projection develop possible (and/or desirable) futures.

If one extrapolates the present deterioration of the relationship between man and environment rigorously into the future one can safely predict the extinction of mankind, which will be suffocated, poisened or starved by its own vaste, social chaos, and numbers. But despite man's extra-ordinary capacity for shortsightedness this outcome is unlikely since he will act to prevent that future outcome. On the other hand, the construction of possible futures is a complex exercise requiring much space, time, and many competent minds. For the purposes of this paper a middle way is chosen: the present trend will be extrapolated to assess possible consequences for international politics and to demonstrate the need for and some modalities of solutions which in turn may create a better and more desirable future than a mere continuation of the present trends.

3. The Inescapable Problem

The deterioration of man's relationship with his environment arises in the wake of production, of the application of technology, and of social change. This is most visible in the gradual destruction of the biosphere that complex and interdependent web of biological and anorganic cycles that forms the surface of the

earth and the area immediately above it. It supports human life, provides the resources for his economic existence and serves to deposit all the waste man produces.

The destruction proceeds in many forms, e.g. through the pollution and poisening of the air, the lakes, rivers, ground water and the open sea, the poisening of the soil or the destruction of the natural surface. The list of intriguing cases is endless. Only three examples shall be mentioned. The lead contamination of the air (mostly through gasoline), which is a great health hazard, according to analyses of snow layers in Greenland has passed from 0,005 ug/kg in 800 BC-1750 AD to 0,25 ug/kg in 1940-1952 AD. About half of the world petroleum production is transported by sea; the loss (normal and accidental spills like ship wreckage) is estimated at 0,1% of the total amount, i.e. one million tons a year. Finally one should point to the emission of some twelve billion tons of carbon dioxide a year (by the year 2000 an increase by 25%) carbon monoxide, and dust which may well initiate a change in world climate (though opinion is still divided).

All these developments, even if technological in origin, can have a profound impact on social life, for example as a result of a deterioration of the physical and mental health of entire populations or areas or as a consequence of the severe limitation of economic activities. Of course, this is even more true for those environmental problems which contain a more pronounced social and political dimension from the onset such as urban problems in the wake of social and economic changes.

Environmental problems are created by the same processes which modern societies deem indispensable for their future: technological progress, economic growth, and social change. The same pesticides which protect human and animal life now threaten it; the fertilizers which helped to increase agricultural yield to feed the exploding population now destroy the natural water processes; the automobile which gave unprecendented mobility to man now kills him in great numbers and contaminates the air.

Millions of men are spending all their energies to sustain this process by developing and applying new technology and by maintaining a high rate of growth amidst a steadily growing population. It is in this context that one has to see the earlier remark that for the international system as a whole the problem of environment cannot be escape. This does not mean that there are no solutions and that modern societies are doomed, but only that, unlike some other questions which the international community faces as a whole, this one must be dealt with. The problem is built into the goal orientation and momentum of modern societies and therefore bound to get worse. Within the industrialized part of the world many international problems have been dealt with through an attitude of restraint or inaction, and although an eventual negative outcome of such an attitude (e.g. on development aid) can be demonstrated, it does not appear as compelling as the destruction of environment which men can observe in front of their eyes. This is one reason why these questions are likely to affect international politics in the near future.

4. From Welfare Economics to Ecological Economics

The environmental problem has an important potential impact on expenditure and the domestic functions of governments; but this question can only be briefly outlined here although it has implications for international politics.

Even a minimum program to deal with the worst cases of destruction of the environment requires expenditures of staggering proportions. In each society hundreds of thousands of industrial plants and service facilities have to make substantial and costly adjustments to lower or eliminate the emission of various forms of waste. Each of countless towns has to invest millions not only to solve its problems of pollution, waste disposal etc. but to create an adequate infrastructure to assure normal economic activities, from water supply to transport and communication in the growing cities of the future. (New York may be a special case but the estimate of a one billion dollar investment a year over ten years to supply water alone gives an idea of the proportions). Millions of cars have to be refitted, new cars to be designed, in fact new

forms of transportation will have to be invented.

Each of the many necessary measures, in order to be applied, involves expenditures to build the required social and political infrastructure. New forms of organization have to be designed to deal with these problems e.g. for emergency measures and supervision in the case of pollution, not to speak of the additional judicial machinery. Thousands of cities have to be reshaped to preserve them as or turn them into meaningful forms of living together. In fact, while the task of merely improving the physical environment is difficult enough, the problem becomes the more strenuous the more one moves into its social and political dimensions. In order to preserve and recreate a quality of human life which industrial as well as under-developed societies are losing or have lost huge material resources have to be spent, age-old forms of social organization to be transformed and past habits to be broken. But even for the minimum requirement of feeding people gargantuan efforts will be necessary in the future. (If only a 1.000 Dollar investment is to be made to provide food for each of the 3 billion men to be born until the year 2000 an annual investment of 100 billion Dollars for this task alone (!) will be necessary for thirty years.

Our understanding of the interaction between environmental deterioration (e.g. pollution) and health, climate or social organization is only superficial. Huge research investments will be necessary in order to fully comprehend the intricate working of the biosphere, of man's role in it and of the social environment, and in order to develop new products, technologies and forms of social and political organization to solve these problems.

Two outcomes are likely. First, the debate on the priorities of environmental policies (whose problems are to be solved first with what methods?) and the distribution of the financial burden will be an important issue in future domestic politics of all developed countries. Second, the solution of the environmental problems cannot be left to self-stabilizing mechanisms since it lies in the very nature of these problems to be destabilizing.

They require large scale regulation, vast expenditures, and
political choices about priorities and the redistribution of
resources and national incomes.

For these reasons the problem of environment (in the broader
sense of the term) requires large scale intervention by political
authorities. The qualitative and quantitative (in particular
redistributive) expansion of the function of governmental
institutions which is likely to take place in the forthcoming
years may well be comparable to the similar process during which
the state increasingly assumed welfare functions. In fact, the
environmental problem is almost certain to bring about a qualitative
advance of the welfare state. But unlike the development in the
first phase of the welfare state the assumption of responsibilities
to solve the environmental questions must not necessarily
strengthen the compartmentalized nation-state structure of world
politics but may be compensated by ties which states have to build
in dealing with these common problems.

5. Possible Impacts on International Politics

The environmental problem is most unlikely to produce a
uniform trend in international politics which could be clearly
discerned and dealt with. On the contrary, even if one assumes
that human behaviour in this matter will be reasonable rational
this set of problems is likely to produce simultaneously very
different and at times contradictory trends. In this sence it fits
the complex multi-dimensional character of the contemporary
international system which defies simple formulas to describe its
structure. The consequences of the environmental problem could be
subsumed under three dichotomies: domesticism vs. external
involvment, conflict vs. multinational cooperation, regional vs.
global forms of ecological politics.

a) Domesticism vs. External Involvement

The preceeding sections describing the urgency of the problem
and some modalities of their solutions suggest that both political
authorities and domestic public opinion in most developed countries

will devote a good deal of energy, attention, and resources to
these questions in the forthcoming years. An alarmed public which
is bound to be increasingly touched by the deterioration of the
environment and information about its consequences is likely to
press politicians to devote more attention and resources to a
solution of these problems. Since the demands of domestic voters
traditionally focus more on the immediate problems at home than
on future problems or those of distant areas it is possible, at
least in the short run, that the public will press for the solution
of domestic environmental problems if necessary at the expense of
problems seemingly outside the borders such as the poisening of
the open sea or underdevelopment.

Therefore the question of environment is likely to further
strengthen what has sometimes been called the trend of "turning
inward" or of "domesticism" which can be observed in most countries.
It is motivated by political forces which regard domestic change
and reform as more important than foreign policy goals which go
beyond the safeguard of security.

Democratic governments will have to respond positively to
these demands and are beginning to do so. But all governments of
developed societies, regardless of their political regime, will
have to shift more resources to the ecological problem and assume
further burdens in addition to those of the welfare state and the
costly security policy. It is therefore likely that the
environmental problem will strengthen the political incentives in
East and West to lower military spending in the coming years and
therefore improve some of the conditions for a détente.

The two superpowers, too, will be affected by the
environmental problem, though each in different ways. Both
maintain very expensive military machinery and as the most advanced
industrial societies both suffer increasingly from the
deterioration of the environment. From the point of view of
available resources for approaches and solutions the environmental
question represents a greater problem to the Soviet Union than the
United States (although the prise de conscience over it is less

developed there than in America). But the advantage of the United
States is for the time being more than compensated by the waste of
resources through the Vietnam War. In any case, the growing burden
of the ecological problem will provide another powerful incentive
for the world powers to decrease expenditure on strategic arms and
their general military posture.

But the environmental problems also make for stronger
involvement of national entities with the outside world. The
processes of deterioration of the environment, notably in the
biosphere, are intricately interconnected. Poisened air and water
or a change in climate does not differentiate between nationals,
races or Communists and Capitalists. Therefore the nation state
has to deal with a special type of problem: its origins lie partly
outside their national frontiers; national solutions can be upset
by third parties; and the consequences of national policies affect
other states as well.

Therefore national administrations and private groups have to
concern themselves regularly even more with events and policies in
other countries than they do already. On many problems they cannot
act alone. The best German program to clean the Rhine (to safeguard
water for towns and industry and to safe tourism) will remain
futile unless Switzerland and France join it. Thus the
environmental problem provides further incentives for states to
draw practical political conclusions from the growing
interdependence among them.

b) Conflict vs. Multinational Cooperation

As the environmental problem becomes more and more aggravating
in industrial societies it is likely not only to cause domestic
conflicts about priorities, programs and burdens, but also to
create conflicts between states. In the immediate future, with
multinational cooperation on these matters still inadequate, there
is a high probability of disputes and tensions in the wake of the
deterioration of the environment. The adjacent states to rivers,
lakes, and oceans, neighboring states with pollution of the air
or the ground water etc. are likely to encounter considerable

difficulties in distributing the responsibility for the problems they share and the costs they incur to solve them. In the coming years diplomats will continue to care and negotiate about problems of security, power, and prestige, but increasingly the discussion of questions like sewage disposal, conditions of marine life, or lead contamination will enter into the catalogue of his routine activities (and make him even more dependent on the specialist than he already is).

While the propensity for conflict rises the incentives for cooperation are likely to become stronger too. To be sure, some problems of environment can be of only local importance and not concern other states. Moreover, one could argue that if everybody behaves responsibly and takes national measures the overall situation will improve. But the assumption that everybody acts rightly is highly unrealistic: some states are ineffective, some late, others do nothing; and anyhow, who knows what is right when we only partially comprehend the interaction between environment and human activities? Most important, one deals with problems which are steadily getting worse and many of which cannot be solved by a nation state in isolation (though some can). As the testing of nuclear weapons demonstrated, states have a high capacity to watch and rationalize a worsening threat to human life, but there comes a treshhold where a measure like the Test Ban Treaty can be implemented by some of the offenders (except China and France).

As the damage gets worse and danger signals steadily clearer the incentives for multinational cooperation get stronger. The likelyhood for action in the near future is greatest in those problem-areas where countries directly and visibly interfere with each other (e.g. river pollution) while it will probably take more time with those problems where the damage appears distant in space and time or where national boundaries are not crossed as in the case of the ocean, the outer air layers or the global climate.

An analogy could be drawn to the welfare state. It first compartmentalized international politics around nation states and

mate integration more difficult. But as the interdependence grows
and as welfare can no longer be produced alone mechanisms of
multinational cooperation steadily increase in importance. Since
the environmental problem is set on a worsening course and since
national action on many questions remains ineffective the incentives
for cooperation will become stronger as time passes.

c) Regional vs. Global Forms of Ecological Politics

The environmental question can lead to ecological politics by
inducing the administrations of different nation states to get
involved with each other, private and semi-public groupings, as
well as international organizations in order to deal with problems
of the environment by reviewing specific problems in this field,
by regulating conflicts, by adjusting their national programs to
each other, or by elaborating programs and solutions in common.

There are different degrees to which the environmental problem
can lead to ecological politics. In the short and medium run
geography will play a decisive role. States are most likely to
interact on these problems when they directly and noticeably
interfere with each other's environment. That happens most
frequently when they are neighbours or in geographical vicinity
to each other sharing e.g. a lake, a sea, a river, or a frontier
that cuts through industrialized and populated areas. For this
reason there are strong incentives for ecological politics to
evolve around specific problems, e.g. the maintenance of the Baltic
Sea or the Rhine, and therefore along regional lines. But there are
significant differences between states and areas. Europe has the
highest potential for ecological politics along regional lines, for
there are many highly industrialized states grouped together in a
shrinking space, inevitably interfering which each others
environmental problems. The intensive social, economic, and
political interaction which has developed among many of them is
likely to intensify this problem.

The potential for regional ecological politics is significantly
lower in other areas. This applies in particular to Australia and
Japan which are respectively a continent and an island with few

neighbours in the vicinity and to a lesser degree to the United
States, the Soviet Union and China (in that order) whose huge land
masses "absorb" many environmental problems and keep them domestic
for some time. The lesser number of neighbours plus the long coast
line give the United States a distinctly lower potential for
ecological involvement with other states than the Soviet Union or
China.

But, to repeat an earlier observation, many environmental
problems are shared by all countries on a global scale, in
particular those of the biosphere. Many questions which now appear
national or regional in importance have wider implications. Thus
the total of all national or regional problems of river pollution
make up an essential part of the future of the oceans (and of
other problems); the regional air pollution contributes to a global
deterioration with consequences for world health, climate, the
world economy etc. A multitude of processes important to human
survival are connected. The dynamics of an exploding population,
of the steady growth of production, technology, transport etc.
will raise many of the regional questions to the level of global
problems, and this may happen sooner than we assume now. Therefore
national and regional approaches to solve them can only be
preliminary or complementary phases of a global attack on the
problems of environment.

6. Approaches to deal with the problem

Our modern industrialized societies are, rougly speaking, the
product of an unplanned process; they are "historically grown".
But, as the example of the deterioration of man's relationship
with the environment shows, a continuation of an unchecked and
unplanned growth of the industrial and post-industrial society is
likely to lead to social chaos and threaten the physical existence
of the world population.

A reversal of this trend requires a different attitude toward
the future. The future is neither the mere continuation of the
trends of the present nor the result of a process one has to accept
with that fatalism which likes to see itself as the superior

scepticism of the statesman who looks at history as a process with its own momentum and direction. This passive attitude toward the historical process, barely adequate for past ages, under the conditions of our exploding populations, technology and production is bound to let a nightmare become reality.

The future is not only a matter of probability but also of choice. Desirable futures can be "invented". The strategies to achieve them should be implemented as a permanent process of redefining goals and methods in order to adjust to those developments that cannot be influenced or which are unforeseen.

The haphazard way in which governments now deal with the question of environment has nothing to do with such an active approach to create the future: they only attack a fraction of the problems at hand and leave important ones untouched; they do not act with a clear model of the future society and its manifold interdependent elements in mind but deal with partial questions the solutions of which may well create problems elsewhere, nationally and internationally.

a) Toward Multinational Project Politics?

The nature of the environmental problem requires a break not only with the way we handle the future but also with the way we conceive and implement political solutions. Our political and bureaucratic structures to some extent still reflect the methods of a pre-industrial age when governments and bureaucracies confined themselves to correcting the developments in the societies and economies which had their own momentum and direction. With the notable exception of the (unproductive) military sector from which one could learn a great deal in this respect governments have developed only marginal capacities to incorporate and use the results of modern science and technology and to gear private industry to the overall goals of society. This is particularly true for the ancient bureaucracies of Europe. Moreover, the administrative structures are tied to the nation state which has become too narrow a framwork to decide and act on many problems.

The environmental problems require for their solution a new synthesis of government, science and industry. The two latter sectors have to be included into the political process not so much because the problems of environment have to some extent their origins there but primarily because a solution is impossible without them. Science (including, of course, the Social Sciences), industry and governments have to join forces, to review and define problems, to develop preliminary (partial or more encompassing) models of the future and strategies to achieve them, to identify the problems on which research has to be undertaken, to define what new products or technologies could be or should be developed by industry, to assure a constant feedback from specific research results, inventions or events to production, the revision of strategies, and political measures, to review regularly the interaction between the activities that are being pursued.

Such a synthesis of research, production, and the governmental process could be organized around those specific national or regional problems which are regarded as urgent and where a sufficient willingness to act exists. Thus, to mention a concrete example, the adjacent states of the Baltic Sea who have every reason to be worried about its future and its impact on them can join for a Baltic Sea Project where they would review in common and with the help of common scientific bodies the entire question, the future of the Baltic Sea, the pollution, the marine life and future of fishing, the consequences for the climate; they could investigate possible sources of the problem, questions to be researched, measures to be undertaken, and initiate industrial and scientific cooperation to solve specific questions. Similar multinational projects can be imagined on many other matters which are urgent at the moment. They could make a first contribution to a solution of the problems and be continuously developed on the basis of experience.

b) The Role of International Organizations

The exchange of information on the problems of environment which is at present taking place between national administrations in various international organizations undoubtedly has its useful

aspects, but genuine progress only comes with concrete measures, and these require the kind of approach that was just outlined under the concept of "project politics".

International organizations, through preliminary study and identification of "cores" of problems, could play an important role as an initiator of specific regional projects, even if they involve some non-members. What matters most in this connection is that work on concrete projects gets started, and if international organizations are able to make a contribution without indulging in wasteful disputes over administrative competences, this is only for the better for it helps to prepare the ground for the assumption of a role only international organization can play.

One can easily imagine that all around the globe a number of multinational projects on environmental problems could be developed without much involvement of international organizations but there comes a point when their coordinating functing becomes indispensable. Because of the interconnection between a multitude of problems regional projects cannot proceed very far without dealing with or solving other open problems which interact with their own subject matter. A project for the maintenance of the Baltic Sea will have to be connected with attempts to stop pollution in a number of rivers which originate in the adjacent nations. A project to clean an international river has to be connected with the development of and regulations about new types of detergents. These are only two out of an unlimited number of examples. But they suffice to show that any attempt to solve environmental problems is inherently expansive in scope in order to be effective. It is here where international organizations can tie together a number of such projects along regional or functional lines or both.

A number of problems, however, require an initiative on a global level and cannot be dealt with by regional initiatives. Although the experiences of the latter projects can contribute to the global approaches, specific attempts to develop such unifying initiatives will remain indispensable. The development of the global climate which depends on a multitude of factors and may require

large scale measures all over the globe would be a typical example.
(It is, moreover, linked to the necessity of a global approach once
man is able to affect the climate by choice rather default as is
the case at the moment). The preservation of the oceans is another
important example.

Regional approaches can represent preliminary or complementary
measures in relation to global approaches as they could be pursued
by the UN. The actual effectiveness of measures will decide over
this question. If, for example, the United Nations through the FAO
can initiate a program involving governments, science, and industry
on a global scale to develop a new type of or substitute for today's
pesticides and does so more effectively than a regional project
could do, the problem should be dealt with on a global level.

But regardless of the level at which international organizations
get involved most of them will have to make substantial adjustments
in their internal structure and working methods. Those organizations
where educated gentlemen merely conduct a civilized intercourse and
deliver well-written speeches are unlikely to make an effective
contribution in this field. But international organizations which
have the ability to bring about the new synthesis of the spheres of
administration, research and production may be able to make that
contribution; this may mean a very different type of a dynamic
organization which becomes the permanent meeting ground and command
center for a large number of scientists, administrators and managers
all working towards the same purpose.

7. Conclusion

A great number of the environmental problems are soluble and
will be solved within a national context, and the manner in which
this will be done will express the specific tradition, style or
political culture of a nation. But a great number of problems which
are vital to the survival of these nations cannot be solved by them
in isolation and must be dealt with through common measures.

If one makes the optimistic but nevertheless realistic
assumption that men will act in the face of this steadily worsening

problem the environmental question and approaches to solve it will
be part of three larger evolutionary processes that are likely to
change the character of international politics in the remainder of
this century: first, an increasing effort to create rather than
fatalistically accept one's own future; second, a growing tendency
to seek solutions to problems through action which combines the
resources of society and state bureaucracy in new forms that
transcend our present pre-industrial structure of politics; and,
third, the gradual tying together of national political systems
through transnational links and multinational decision-making in
an increasingly interdependent system.

It will be perhaps the most difficult task of practitioners
and theorists of politics to make sure that in this process the
primacy of politics and the democratic nature of political control
are maintained.

Questions for Discussion

1. Are the physical, social and political effects of the
   deterioration of the environment largely overdramatized
   - a fad that will pass? - or is this as serious a threat
   to the physical existence of man and to social and political
   stability as it is often suggested?

2. What is the probable impact of the ecological problem on
   the structure of domestic politics and the economy; is it
   likely to shift the welfare state into the new "ecological
   phase" as this paper suggest?

3. Is the environmental problem likely to
   a) make countries turn further inward (towards "domesticism")?
   b) lead to disputes and tensions among states or to forms of
      cooperation on these matters?

4. Is the thesis (of this paper) acceptable that an effective
   attack on the environmental problem requires a new synthesis
   of science, government, and industry?

5. What framework of action appears most suitable: international
   organizations (global or regional) and/or "multinational
   projects" involving the countries sharing a problem? Or
   should these problems be left to nation states to be dealt
   with by traditional diplomacy?

6. Is the environmental problem likely to affect East-West
   relations? Does it offer a potential for measures of East-
   West cooperation?

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

17-19 April 1970

YOUNG AMERICANS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's

by Graham T. Allison

A Quiz

1. If Thailand were invaded by outside Communist
    military forces, what percent of Americans
    would favor sending U.S. troops to her support?

2. If Italy were invaded by outside Communist
    military forces, what percent of Americans
    would favor sending U.S. troops to her support?

3. If West Berlin were invaded by outside Communist
    military forces, what percent of Americans
    would favor sending U.S. troops to her support?

4. If Israel were in danger of being overrun by
    Soviet-aided Arabs, what percent of Americans
    would favor sending U.S. troops to her support?

Answers *

1. 25%
2. 27%
3. 26%
4. 9%

From the perspective of the year 2000, historians will conclude
that while the pre-eminent feature of international relations in the
quarter century after World War II was the Cold War, the predominant
change in the distribution of international power was neither the
expansion of the Soviet Union nor that of Communist China. Instead,

---

* Harris Poll, May, 1969. While the limits of polls of this sort
are notorious, the findings of this one are suggestive. It is
important to note that the question of a Communist invasion of
Western Europe was not asked. It seems reasonable to assume that the
percent favoring aid to Western Europe would be higher than the
percentages for West Berlin or Italy alone.

it was the expansion of American influence: economic, military, political and cultural.* Visions of Communist aggrandizement fueled the Cold War; the consequence was actual, massive American presence on every continent.

This expansion resulted from two major developments. On the one hand, as European influence in Asia, Africa and even Latin America declined, the United States filled the vacuum. The slippage of power from Europe to the United States was so smooth that it attracted little notice. On the other hand, as the Communists challenged the independence of nations around the globe, the United States responded with commitments, bases, soldiers, aid and defense expenditures. The threat seemed so blatant, and the American rejoinder so obviously defensive, that few Americans appreciated the scope of the U.S. expansion. But 25 years after the end of World War II, the United States found itself an imperial power. The empire had emerged more by default than design. Nevertheless, it was an empire of proportions unparalled in history:

- o defense treaties with 42 nations;
- o 3.5 million men in arms;
- o 1.2 million soldiers stationed abroad (twice the present total of all other nations in the world combined); **
- o over 2200 military bases in 33 countries;
- o having given $150 billion in foreign aid;
- o having spent more than a trillion dollars on defense;
- o controlling over half of all direct foreign investments;
- o producing (by American and American-owned corporations) considerably more than half of the world's total manufactured product. ***

---

* In formulating this assertion, the author is indebted to Samuel P. Huntington's "Political Development & the Decline of the American System of World Order," Daedalus, Summer, 1967.

** U.S. Military personnel and overseas troop deployments have fluctuated from over 12 million at the end of World War II, to 1.5 million for 1946-49; 3.6 million (1.1 million of whom were abroad) in 1952; 2.5 million (660,000 of whom were abroad) in 1960. Of the 1.2 million men currently abroad, approximately 500,000 are in Vietnam.

***Figures of this sort are often cited by alarmists who charge that the U.S. controls the world economy. In fact, what these idicators show primarily is that the U.S. domestic economy is very large. U.S. international economic influence is considerable, but it is largely a by-product of the mammoth domestic economy.

Unquestionably, Imperium Americana has been an empire with many differences: First, to pin the label "empire" on the extended American influence stretches the traditional meaning of the term. Rarely has the United States insisted on direct political control. Host countries, or client states, exercised considerable discretion; U.S. influence was brought to bear on a relatively small range of issues. Second, while not unrelated to American security and interest (economic and other), this empire has differed from others in its extent of rather sefless, idealistic commitment to the maintenance of international order, generation of economic development and encouragement of democratic government. Third, the American empire has arisen in an era of dramatic increases in national power and independence. Its size is, therefore, no measure of its influence relative to previous empires. Fourth, the basic guidelines of post-war American foreign policy were forged by a relatively few individuals. Revisionist historians who attack "a small group of willful men" forget that their policies won the support of most American citizens. But those historians are correct in emphasizing the importance of bold leadership in shaping the directions of these policies and developing support. (It is perhaps not inappropriate to note that the list of these leaders and the list of participants in the Bilderberg Meetings overlap considerably.)

That this American empire is becoming a thing of the past is the central hypothesis of this paper. More specifically, the hypothesis is that we are now in the twilight zone of American military and political influence in the world. If I were compelled to wager on what historians of the year 2000 will emphasize as the predominant change in the distribution of international power during the last 30 years of this century, I would bet that it will be the retraction of the power of the United States (and the concomitant emergence of other national and transnational centers of power). Let me quickly acknowledge, however, that bets about changes in international power are inherently uncertain. By placing my bet on what I judge to be the most likely outcome -- perhaps 20% probable -- and pursuing the arguments for it, I simply mean to sketch clearly one of the many possible shapes the future might take.

My bet is based on three considerations. First is the depth of the present disenchantment with the policies of the past. Though the poll with which this paper began is certainly no forecaster of future actions of the U.S. government, it is suggestive of something

fundamental. The broad bipartisan concensus that characterized American foreign policy for two decades after Second World War has given way to widespread, bipartisan confusion about the nature of the international arena, the character of the changes that foreign policy makers confront, and the desirable level of U.S. involvement in the external world. This uncertainty infects Americans both young and old -- the young only more so.

Second is the probable course of international events in the 1970's and thereafter. The extent to which the current confusion, coupled with the priorities of young Americans, can succeed in effecting a withdrawal of American political and military influence around the globe, depends in important ways on the pressures created by international events. For example, one can imagine events that might de-rail initial steps in this direction contained in the Nixon Doctrine. Obviously, it is impossible to predict with any confidence the critical events of the 1970's, much less of the rest of the century. Nevertheless, a large number of plausible sequences of events are consistent with a considerable withdrawal of American power.

Third are the attitudes of young Americans today, especially deeper beliefs that are likely to affect their preferences and choices as they rise to positions of influence within the government and society.

This paper deals only obliquely with the first set of considerations, the unravelling of the older consensus. Systematic pursuit of the second set of considerations would require sketching alternative future worlds, weaving into each the ways in which the American polity might play out its hand. This would be an interesting, if difficult, exercise, and require another, different paper. For it is the third set of considerations which I heve been assigned: what are the attitudes of young Americans towards foreign policy for the 1970's?

A SHORT ANSWER

Forced to give a short answer, I would offer two propositions. First, the current priorities of young Americans are predominantly, pervasively and indeed almost entirely <u>not</u> issues of foreign policy. Problems of foreign affairs (with the exception of Vietnam) are not what they think about, care about, or hope to spend their public lives doing something about. Indeed, I will put the point more

strongly, even at the risk of being misunderstood. Recall the agenda of past Bilderberg Meetings, for example (to take every fourth year), 1954: the attitude towards Communism and the Soviet Union, dependent areas and people overseas, economic policies and problems, European integration and the European Defense Community; 1958: the future of NATO, Western economic cooperation, the Western approach to Soviet Russia and Communism; 1962: political implications for the Atlantic Community of its members' policies in the U.N., implications for the Atlantic Community of prospective developments in the EEC and the OECD; 1966: the reorganization of NATO, the future of world economic relations. Think about Americans now between the ages 25 and 34, who might be given a 5% chance of rising over the next 30 years to positions of influence comparable to those of present Bilderberg participants. To assemble a conference as large as this one, from that pool of young elite Americans, on those subjects would be extremely difficult today. Issues of foreign affairs simply are not among most young Americans' preoccupations. Rather, today the objects of greatest concern are overwhelmingly domestic: the poor, the Blacks, the cities, the environment, law and order, the quality of American life.

My second proposition modifies the first. To the extent that foreign policy is currently important to young Americans, their posture expresses a generalized demand to "cool" foreign affairs. They want Vietnam over, defense budgets down, international entanglements cut. In a nutshell, their reading of the consequences of past foreign policies reinforces their domestic priorities. Hence their challenges to the guidelines that have governed American foreign policy in the post-war era and their demand that the empire which emerged as a consequence of those guidelines be drastically shrunk.

One could simply elaborate these propositions and let the discussion begin. But earlier conversations on this topic suggest that unless the question of young Americans' attitudes towards foreign policy is more precisely defined, many of the arguments will slip by each other. In order to facilitate productive discussion, but at the cost of being academic, I shall distiguish several separable issues and specify the question which I shall address.

SPECIFICATION OF THE QUESTION

What do we mean by "attitudes"? Which "young Americans" do we want to discuss? Are we concerned with their beliefs at the beginning of the 1970's or rather, over the course of the decade? Conversations with members of your steering committee have led me to address the following question: What are the deeper attitudes of 25 to 34 year old elite Americans towards foreign policy at the beginning of the 1970's? In short, what do Vice President Agnew's "effete intellectual snobs" think now?

This represents a significant narrowing of the question. I have chosen what I call the "very elite", that is, individuals who now appear to have a 5% chance of a Presidential appointment to a political-Executive position in the U.S. Government, or a position of comparable influence in the society.* This underrepresents the views of large segments of the young American population for example, the 20% who were sympathetic to George Wallace in the 1968 election and the few, but nonetheless interesting, young people in the Students for a Democratic Society. By focusing on the age group 25 - 34, I am blurring significant differences within this group and neglecting large numbers on either side of these age lines. I have chosen to concentrate on deeper attitudes rather than current demands on the grounds that while current demands shift rapidly, there exists beneath these demands a core of deeper attitudes and beliefs that will almost certainly affect the future behavior of the American government. I have concentrated on attitudes at the beginning of the 1970's rather than over the course of the decade, recognizing that this audience is more able than I to predict the agenda of events for the decade and to consider how these events will shape current attitudes.

A LONGER ANSWER

Very elite young Americans' (hereafter, simply young Americans') attitudes towards foreign policy today are defined in large part as challenges to, and questions about, the axioms that seem to have governed American foreign policy in the post-war era. For purposes of clarity, it will therefore be useful to formulate these assumptions. To state basic assumptions starkly is, of necessity, to caricature. But caricature can be instructive.

* A sample group of these individuals was identified by a panel of five older consultants. This paper represents my formulation of that group's views based on my very unscientific interviewing procedures.

Axioms of the Post-War Era

1. The pre-eminent feature of international politics is the conflict between Communism and the Free World.

2. The surest simple guide to U.S. interests in foreign policy is opposition to Communism.

3. Communism is on the march.
   a. Communist governments are rising and Western democracies may be declining. When will the Soviet Union overtake the U.S. in economic and military strength?
   b. Soviet Communist intentions vis-a-vis Western Europe are essentially aggressive.
   c. The main source of unrest, disorder, subversion, and civil war in underdeveloped areas is Communist influence and support.

4. Communism is monolithic.
   a. Communism has some unique adhesive quality that can paste over national and ethnic differences.
   b. Since the Communist bloc is cohesive, every nation that falls to Communism increases the power of the Communist bloc in its struggle with the Free World.

5. The U.S. has the power, responsibility and right to defend the Free World and maintain International Order.

6. Peace is indivisible. Therefore, collective defense is necessary. The new international order will be based primarily on U.S. assumption of responsibility, especially in demonstrating U.S. willingness to resist aggression.

7. The Third World really matters.
   a. It is the battle ground between Communism and the Free World
   b. Western capital will generate economic development and political stability with a minimum of violence.
   c. Instability is the great threat to progress in the Third World.

8. The U.S. can play an important role in inducing European integration which will, in some unspecified manner, solve the German problem.

9. Military strength is the primary route to national security.

a. Nuclear war is a serious passibility.

b. Neclear proliferation is a certain road to disaster.

10. While the U.S. has many domestic needs, the first order of business is U.S. national security, which is closely linked with the security of the Free World.

Not all of these axioms were believed by every post-war leader. Few were believed by anyone in completely unadulterated, extreme form. Over the course of the two decad s, many individual leaders came to question several of them. The assertion, however, is that in more or less sophisticated versions, these propositions were widely believed and deeply held, both explicitly and implicitly, and that for twenty-five years after World War II American foreign policy was (roughly) consistent with these guidelines.

All this is obviously painted with a broad brush. The limits of space do not permit refinement and support of the argument by quotation and footnotes. But lest memory's revisionist tendencies persuade one too quickly that he never really believed any of these propositions, or that if he did, it was only in the late 1940's, recall the speech that set the tone of U.S. foreign policy for the last imperial decade.

> Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans -- born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage -- and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today, at home and around the world.
>
> Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty . . . (The U.S. will) assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neghbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas . . .
>
> Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to serve surround the globe.
>
> Now the trumpet summons us again -- not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need -- not as a call to battle, though embattled we are -- but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation" -- a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty,

disease and war itself . . .

I do not shrink from this responsibility -- I welcome
it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places
with any other people or any other generation. The energy,
the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor
will light our country and all who serve it -- and the
glow from that fire can truly light the world.

The gap between President John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address
(January 21, 1961) and this generation's concerns is very wide.
Indeed, to state these axioms explicitly is to emphasize how far
1970 is from the post-war era for all Americans, how much the world
has changed, and how well some policies have succeeded. Today,
young Americans question every one of these assumptions, and many
would go further to assert the contrary of each. The clearest way to
see this contrast is to set out the basic assumptions of young
Americans in a similarly stark and summary fashion.

Axioms of Young Americans

1. While there are crucial differences between Communist and
   democratic regimes, the distinction between Communism and
   the Free World is not the critical divide.

2. Opposition to Communism is a misleading guide for U.S.
   Foreign policy.
   a. To the extent that the U.S. has legitimate foreign policy
      objectives, they are not summarized by the term "anti-
      Communist".
   b. Why is Communist Cuba worse than free Haiti or Greece?

3. The Soviet Union is an established, status quo oriented
   power.
   a. Future relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
      will be characterized by negotiations, cooperation and
      convergence of interests.

4. Nationalism is stronger than Communism.
   a. If North Vietnam captured Southeast Asia, would she be
      a greater or lesser threat to China?
   b. If Communist China captured India, would China be a
      greater or lesser threat to the U.S.?

5. The U.S. has neither the power, nor the responsibility, nor
   the right to guarantee the defense of the Free World.

    a. In the Third World, military involvement is more dangerous than military isolation.

    b. What right does the U.S. have to be supporting and enforcing its concept of what is good for other nations?

    c. The U.S. should reconsider all obligations to defend other nations.

6. Peace is divisible.

7. What could happen in Latin America, Africa, or Asia (with the possible exception of Japan) that could affect the security or vital interests of the United States?

    a. No foreseeable objective in the Third World could justify the expenditure of 40.000 American lives and $100 billion.

    b. Wars, revolution, and violence are inevitable in many parts of the World and will be necessary elements in economic and political development.

8. Europe has recovered and should now assume primary responsibility for its own problems, including defense.

9. Increasing military strength will only bring increased national insecurity

    a. Strategics "superiority" is meaningless.

    b. Nuclear war is incredible.

    c. Nuclear proliferation may be inevitable.

10. A number of pressing domestic requirements should have priority over all current issues of foreign affairs.

Again, these axioms are broad-brush caricature. And they are complicated by the fact that they represent a "compromise" between the minority, who are well-informed about problems of foreign policy and the majority, whose lack of knowledge matches their lack of concern.

Many of the particular axioms reflect prejudice rather than careful judgment based on a chain of well-reasoned arguments. Not all young Americans would subscribe to each. I disagree with several. Indeed, the bundle of axioms is not even internally consistent.

Moreover, by stating these axioms bluntly, without elaboration, the contrast between this generation's priorities and those of the past is oversimplified. First, to the extent that the new axioms represent challenges to the post-war concensus, many older elite

Americans now find the new list more satisfactory than the old.
Second, the formulation of the axioms as assertions rather than
questions suggests that a new, coherent concensus has formed. While
many young Americans believe that this is the case, only time and
 events will separate fashion from fundamentals. There can be no
doubt that these beliefs contain a large component of naive
isolationist sentiment. Third, particular axioms are not entirely
believed or wholly disbelieved. A more sophisticated account of
the argument would interpret the axioms probabilistically. In these
terms, the argument would turn on shifts in probability and
differences in nightmares. Given all these caveats, it is perhaps
most useful to think of the two sets of axioms as polar types.

     Nevertheless, if young Americans are compared with older
Americans on the extent of disbelief in the first set of assumptions
and belief in the second set, the differences are substantial. What
makes these differences significant are crucial experiences in which
these differences in attitudes are grounded.

A MINI-THEORY OF "CRUCIAL EXPERIENCES"

     The leaders who forged post-war American foreign policy did not
simply choose the post-war axioms. Rather, these deep attitudes and
beliefs emerged from experiences that formed the political
consciousness of those American leaders. Their fundamental attitudes
were founded upon, and reinforced by, disappointment in the after-
math of the First World War, the unavoidable lesson of isolationism,
Munich and the failure of the West, the confidence of being
unselfconsciously right in World War II, false hope shattered by
Communist aggression, the loss of Eastern Europe and China. Given
the differences in age between, say, John McClay and John Kennedy,
the difference between their experiences were enormous. But both
McCloy's generation and the generation that served with John Kennedy
as junior officers in World War II had grooved in their heads
furrows fertile for belief in the post-war axioms. Having seen the
cost of American isolationism, who could doubt that involvement
was necessary? Having fought the fight against the evils of Nazism,
could one forget the dangers of totalitarianism unchecked? *

_____

* It is interesting to not the congruence of perceptions and
priorities between American and European leaders in the post-war era
-- in part, reflecting similar international experiences, but also
incorporating quite dissimilar domestic components.

Consider in contrast the experiences of the current generation of young Americans. Vietnam is for this generation what World War II was for the last. It seems unlikely that the lessons of Vietnam will have less impact on subsequent American foreign policy than did the lessons of the First or Second World Wars.

What has this experience taught young Americans? First is militant disbelief in the older axioms. The American government's attempt to stretch the old guidelines in order to justify Vietnam has devalued that currency. This point cannot be overemphasized, for this, more than anything else, accounts for the formulation of current axioms as direct challenges to those of the past. Second is deep doubt about the reliability of the U.S. government as a source of information. Stalin taught the older generation to suspect official pronouncements of Communist governments; Lyndon Johnson cracked the credibility of the U.S. government for young Americans. Third is awareness that the U.S. government is no more moral -- in any simple sense of individual morality -- than other governments. The extensive use of fire power against villages, the devastation of entire areas by free droppings of B-52's, Songmy -- facts like these prevent young Americans from sharing their elders' confidence in the essential moral rightness of the U.S. government. Fouth is the recognition that the United States can "lose". All Americans learn from their school books that the United States never lost a war. But the gargantuan image of brave men, unlimited money and massive modern technology bogged down in a medieval quagmire will not soon be forgotten. Young Americans know that the U.S. is vincible (at least in foreign ventures). Finally, these factors and others converge as the costs of empire -- costs borne disproportionately by young Americans. Not that many of the young Americans with whom we are concerned actually fought in Vietnam. Rather they watched it unfold on television; they worried about how to escape it by graduate school or other deferments. What is more important, many of them made the long march from belief in, or silent approval of the war, through doubt about what their government was doing, to active opposition. For five years now, this war has kept daily before their consciousness the facts of an unsuccessful imperial venture: killing 40.000 Americans and wounding 250.000 more; devastating a small Asian country and killing perhaps a million of its people; sucking up more than 100 billion American dollars; deeply dividing the nation at home; and distracting attention

from first-order business.

But to represent the experiences of young Americans simply as Vietnam would be misleading. Before Vietnam, America was disco vering the Blacks, the poor and even less blatant problems is the quality of national life. Without Vietnam, strains in the American body politic would have etched these issues in the minds of young Americans and forced some national turning inward to these needs. Moreover, the international trends, which current attitudes reflect, were evident earlier. Neither the demise of monolithic Communism, nor the partial convergence of interests between the U.S. and the Soviet Union waited on Vietnam. More important, the fundamental character of international politics in the period of young Americans' formative experiences has been essentially orderly, relatively stable, indeed almost benign -- with the exception of American action in Vietnam. Since the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the security and vital interests of the U.S. have not been seriously threatened. That these experiences should have made young Americans less sensitive than their fathers to the Communist threat, the dangers of disorder in the Third World, or the emergence of Japan and Germenay is hardly surprising. In their experience, the major threat to the security and interests of the U.S. has been American entanglement in Vietnam. In sum, while both inter- national and domestic trends pointed in the direction of the current axioms, Vietnam has magnified the conflect between the costs of empire and the needs at home.

Differences between deep attitudes of young Americans and those of their predecessors are perhaps clearest if one considers what is likely to be a major issue in American foreign policy for the rest of this century: non-involvement versus involvement. More specifically, the issue is not whether the U.S. should return to the isolationist posture of the 1930's: culture and communications have laid that ghost to rest. Rather, the issue is the extent of American military and political involvement in external affairs. Most older Americans agree today that Vietnam was a mistake and that intervention in wars of liberation is very dangerous. Indeed, most older elite Americans would support further specification of the Nixon Doctrine to establish a presumption against sending U.S. troops to defend nations threatened by internal disorder and/or subversion. Few Americans call for "More Vietnams"! But these beliefs reflect the full impact of current events. It is not difficult to imagine a sequence of events that would cut

through these beliefs, uncovering in the minds of older Americans the
lessons of isolationism. For example, if Thailand were the victim of
overt aggression by Chinese Communist troops, many older elite
Americans would prefer that the U.S. send troops to defend Thailand.
To take a more extreme case, most older elite Americans believe that
the U.S. should maintain its commitments to the defense of Western
Europe.

About both cases, young Americans are either uncertain or
negative. For what lies beneath their surface demands for "No More
Vietnams" are deep-seated doubts about why U.S. troops should in any
circumstances be engaged in military operations in any other part of
the world. What will soon be known as the "lessons of involvement"
will, I suggest, be no less rooted in the consciousness of young
Americans today than were the "lessons of isolationism" in the
previous generation.

This contrast highlights the dual dangers we face. Older elite
Americans, like all mature men, have enormous difficulty in escaping
the lessons of the past, especially lessons grounded in the crucial
experiences of their youth. In a world where the pace of change is
ever more rapid, their tendency to fall back on old solutions when
confronted with new problems can spell disaster. Younger Americans
are able to see the world afresh, and to devise new solutions for new
problems, but they have insufficient historical perspective to
distinguish between froth and substance in current situations.
Unfortunately, each generation seems fated to rely on the axioms
grounded in its own crucial experiences in making its own mistakes.
But will these axioms suffice for the 1970's and thereafter?

FURTHER QUESTIONS

    1. How will current axioms and attitudes be shaped by the crucial happenings of the 1970's? For example , the population problem, the growing gap between rich and poor nations, starvation on television, the emergence of Japan, and the growth of German power.

    2. If Vietnam has cured young Americans of both the illusion and the arrogance of power, what impact has it had on the "arrogance of conscience," that is, the post-war American conviction that whatever goes wrong in the international arena must reflect some error of the U.S.?

    3. What plausible sequences of events might, when digested by American domestic politics, reverse the trend towards retraction of U.S. military and political influence?

        a. If Vietnamization succeeded not only in allowing the U.S. to excape Vietnam, but also in building a viable, non-Communist South Vietnam that survived for a decade?

        b. If the Nixon Administration introduced troops to preserve Laos?

        c. If, in the aftermath of a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Southeast Asia were captured by North Vietnam?

        d. If the U.S. stood by while Soviet-aided Arabs overcame Israel?

    4. How can the retraction of U.S. military and political influence be accomplished in an orderly, responsible fashion?

        a. Can a viable line be drawn between Western Europe (and Japan) and the rest of the world -- as most older elite Americans would prefer?

        b. What are the implications of American retraction for international order?

        c. What are the prospects for the transfer of capital (governmental and private) from the U.S. to Third World nations in a era of retraction?

    5. Is it possible to make real to the current generation of young Americans the dilemmas of international politics that are understood by older Americans -- in the absence of dramatic events?