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CONFIDENTIAL

THE UNIVERSITY AND SOCIETY*

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by

James A. Perkins

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The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the most critical problems currently faced by the university. An analysis of these problems will bring into focus the troubled relationship between the university and society. While this paper is written with the United States in mind, the author has reason to believe that these problems are not unique in other countries.

* This paper is an elaboration of a statement prepared for a Bilderberg session in February 1970.

THE UNIVERSITY AND SOCIETY*

The university in the United States is under pressure. And like most organizations devoted to the spirit and the mind, it does not prosper under pressure -- at least not the kinds of pressure to which it has been subjected during the last half-decade.

At best, the relationship between the university and society has been a delicate one. A creature of society, the university is most useful when independent of it. A servant of society yet society looks to the university for leadership. An instrument of social cohesion and national identity, it is an indispensable instrument for social criticism.

In times of social stability this relationship is manageable. But change induced by the prospects and promises of technology and democracy has been so rapid that few institutions have been able to prepare for the inevitable demands that follow. The universities and systems of higher education are no exception.

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The first pressure is the increased demand for admission. Throughout the world the largest numerical increase in the growth of the student body has been at the primary and secondary level, but by all odds the highest percentage increase in educational growth has been in higher education. While experiences differ from country to country it is safe to say that on the average the number of students entering higher education has doubled in the decades from 1950 to 1970. If there were no other problem, this astonishing growth would, by itself, result in almost intolerable strains on most institutions of higher education in most countries.

The root cause of this increase in the numbers in higher education, or rather the root causes, are to be found in the requirements of a modern technological society. The need for trained or even semi-trained manpower is unending. No country and no people have a chance of entering the modern world with only a small fraction of the population attaining the equivalent of a secondary school degree. And no country and no people can hope to provide the leadership necessary for a modern society if only a very small fraction acquire the equivalent of a college or university degree. It is, of course, unwise to be too specific about what the threshold figures for advanced education should be for any particular country. But for this writer 30 per cent of the

relevant age group going through secondary school and 5 per cent of the relevant age group going through the university are the threshold figures for a modern society. This does not mean that with 30 per cent acquiring secondary school degrees and 5 per cent acquiring university degrees the country has adequate manpower for the modern world. It means simply that until these figures are reached a society has today little chance of entering on the current world stage. Furthermore, larger percentages than these will be necessary for those countries who would lead. It is a somber note that progress toward even these limited objectives has not been uniformly steady, and large parts of the world are nowhere near these threshold figures.

Nevertheless, most countries have democratized their secondary education. Heretofore, in many places, secondary education was the selective and narrow route through which entrance to college and university was determined. Admission to the university was really controlled by careful selection of secondary school through examinations taken at the ages of 11 or 12. With the widening of admissions to secondary education, however, traditional policies of automatic entry into university have led to enrollments that, in many cases, are almost grotesque. Over 100,000 students are enrolled in the Universities of Paris and Mexico apiece. Those countries

that have tried to regulate this tide by turning aside large fractions of the new graduates from secondary school have run into much social opposition, which has been matched only by the reaction of students who have been admitted to find that there were no places prepared for them.

The central fact about numbers is that we have opened wide the gates to secondary education but have planned higher education on the traditional bases of professional standards and high selectivity. It is this mismatch of numbers and of social doctrine that is at the core of the crisis of university entrance. We are trying to pour the ocean into our wine glasses and we are getting wet.

The second pressure on the universities is inadequate finance, which stems directly but not exclusively from the problem of numbers. As a consequence of the unanticipated doubling of our student entrance during the decade of the Sixties, we are suddenly faced with large demands for funds, for which neither fiscal policy nor tax structures were adequately prepared. The result has been shortages in every part of the system, including both manpower and money.

There is no more costly enterprise than that of trying to meet unanticipated financial needs. A very high price is exacted from society when it is negligent in its planning, and higher

education is bearing one of the highest of these costs. The budgets of the universities have gone up not only to accommodate a doubled enrollment within a decade but also to deal with the improvidence that comes from continuing old patterns which are unnecessarily expensive. The shocking fact is that the productivity of higher education has not improved during this decade, the per capita cost of student education has increased, and the effect of these multiplying factors and soaring budgets has fallen largely on the public treasuries -- indeed, in most countries, exclusively on the public treasuries.

As a result of the twin pressures of numbers and costs, there is hardly a university in the world that is not in financial difficulty that runs all the way from serious to catastrophic. The consequences are not difficult to discover. First, there has been an enormous increase in the use of public funds, and these funds have become an increasingly important element in every budget.

Another consequence has, of course, been an increase in public surveillance of academic expenditures -- which has in turn raised deep problems about the future autonomy of individual institutions and of the whole educational system. It takes no crystal-ball gazer to anticipate that, as educational budgets increase as a fraction of total government budgets, the public demand for surveillance will increase. Thus, a whole new set of relationships between the university and the central government and the

public as taxpayer stands high on the agenda of university managers. The university, as it relies more heavily on public funding, is held accountable not only for its use of those funds but for its actions on other matters - e.g., its political stands, its handling of student unrest, etc.

A third problem arises from the demand for relevance. It is the students who have presented the university with this demand, and this is true not only in the U.S. but everywhere in the world. The first problem of relevance is that traditional education offers little nourishment for the most crucial needs of new countries, or for the needs of some older countries that are in the process of modernization. The Latin American universities, for example, with their heavy emphasis on law, medicine and letters have not seemed completely relevant to the new thrust of student demands for appropriate preparation for the managing of societies that are both democratic and technologically sophisticated.

The problem of relevant curricula comes under two headings. First is the relevance of general subject matter: that is, a better balance of humanities, social sciences, and sciences that most universities have provided or are even now prepared to provide. A second problem is the applicability of the education received. An educational system may offer a balanced diet of the three large disciplinary areas but all of them at such an abstract level that students would find their needs not met. So in addition to a

balanced curriculum among the three great fields of knowledge, universities are also under pressure to provide a balance between basic and applied studies. Obviously the newer the country the more pressing are the demands for applicable knowledge, while for the mature countries a more balanced diet between basic and applied work is desirable.

Even in more mature countries the drive to make studies relevant to the new problems of society is also strong. In the United States, for example, current difficulties in securing federal support for established scientific programs arise from an increasing concern that research has become too remote from pressing social tasks facing both public and private institutions. In the past it was assumed that abstract studies would promote, sooner or later, the solution of real problems. It is the temper of the times that this assumption is not now taken for granted.

One other point needs to be made about the matter of relevance. As the numbers of students have increased, larger and wider cross sections of our societies have been admitted to the universities and many of today's students are first-generation entrants without any family tradition to prepare them for the rigor of their studies. In addition, many are from minority groups or heretofore deprived groups of their societies, and the immediate utility of their university experience has had to be demonstrated

not only to them but to the families who could ill spare them. The result has been an insistence on the part of these new classes of students at the university that there be a direct and visible demonstration that what they were being taught had a direct connection with the agonies of the environments from which they came. In the United States this has been most vividly witnessed by the demands of many black students for courses that would help them improve the city ghettos. In Latin America, the Indian from Bolivia, Colombia and Peru is demanding an education that will help rescue him and his family from the grinding poverty of his culture. In less harsh tones perhaps, this case is being stated with greater and greater emphasis by students coming from the industrial cities of England as well as the southern parts of Italy.

Even a casual observer will see the connection between numbers, costs and relevance. To provide education that is relevant to a variety of demands is costly business, while higher costs require demonstrably higher relevance. And as the university meets these demands for relevance and offers differentiated programs, one can expect an increased interest in university attendance, which will feed the cycle of numbers, costs, and relevance. This brings up one of the ironic features of the current scene, namely, that these problems are in large part the result of the university's successful adaptation to the needs of its various publics. As the university succeeds, its problems increase rather than decrease.

But even these three interrelated issues of costs, numbers and the demand for relevance do not, by themselves, determine the atmosphere in which the university is struggling to perform its mission today. By themselves they would have produced convulsions of major proportions, and the problems of adjustment would have been severe. But there are deeper matters at work that have enormously complicated the role of the university in society. Perhaps the most important of these is the relation of the university to the priorities of society. This is in fact another large difficulty that the university is facing.

Somewhere in the beginning of the Sixties, at least in the more developed countries, the leading edge of these societies shifted its social priorities away from attention to affluence, full employment, and peace-keeping by military power, and toward more preoccupation with justice for the minorities and the poor, the quality of the environment, and peace-keeping through the subordination of national ambitions to the idea of the international community. Not every country has felt this shift in priorities in either the same manner or the same degree. But that some glacial change began to take place during this past decade is hard to deny.

One feature of this shift was the adoption of the new priorities by the young, while much of the adult world, with vivid recollection of the Depression and the two world wars, was not about to abandon its deep concern for a rising GNP and world peace by military means if necessary.

Much has been made of the generation gap, and while there has always been such a gap, something new has been added. As societies modernize, the individual becomes free of both restraints and duties imposed by tribe and family. Modern society requires mobility and encourages it. The young are sent to school while the adults are drawn into the whirlpool of professional life. Thus the young are left to create their own culture and their own societies.

This disjunction of the generations would have produced a whole variety of complicated social problems even if the pressing concerns for justice and peace had not been adopted by this new generation. But independence fueled by zeal, alienation fed by distrust, separatism exaggerated by fundamental differences in philosophy -- all have served to present the universities with problems that are not just complex, but explosive. They are explosive because the generations coming to the university saw their dissatisfactions, caused by numbers, costs and relevance, through the red glare of anger at the society of which the university was an increasingly important part.

In these circumstances it was inevitable that the university -- while trying to deal with its internal priorities -- would find the new social concerns of its students almost impossible to resolve. They might be resolved if the students were content to have the university function as a neutral forum in which these serious external problems could be debated. But having become so

closely identified with the society that supported it, the university, clearly, was not only an instrument for investigation, but a target for opposition. The problem here stems from a schizophrenia not yet resolved -- namely, whether the university is more valuable as a neutral arena for inquiry and debate, or more valuable as a lever for social reform.

In general, when societies are divided, universities have had difficulty in establishing their neutrality, or at least maintaining it, whereas when a society has a substantial consensus on its main priorities, university neutrality becomes the more possible. (The contrast between Germany and Sweden is a good example of this point.) It is not surprising, therefore, that the countries that have had the most difficulty with their universities have been those with the deepest divisions in their social philosophies and social programs. Universities are struggling today with this enormously complex problem, which has become a heavily political issue.

Most systems are trying to plot a course between the two extremes of neutrality and social activism by maintaining the maximum of independence from society while also making concessions to the new concerns in admissions policy and curricular ventures. Numbers, costs, and relevance are terribly important issues, but the central question is, to reiterate, the role and mission of the university: Is it a neutral and protected arena for free thought,

or an instrument for social betterment? The division of opinion on this question has produced a crisis that has inflamed the others.

Behind even the crisis of university identity and mission there is another and deeper problem that imperils the very idea of the university itself. This is the emergence of a skepticism that denies the possibility of objective, rational thought. It would take a whole book by itself to trace the widening attack on the rationality of man and even on his potential for rationality. Suffice it to say that the comfortable Western belief that reasoning man in a reasonable universe would increasingly comprehend his environment to the benefit of a better evolution of mankind is a notion that has less currency with each passing year. In its place has risen a mysticism and a belief that somewhere in the dark reaches of the mind, in the senses and sensations, in feeling rather than in thought, one is more likely to find truth than in an objective examination of the world around us. All this has undermined one of the central notions upon which the university is based -- that learning is cumulative and that the opportunity for rational discourse is its raison d'etre. With these concepts under attack, the idea of the university itself is in question.

Is it surprising therefore that the problem of university governance is both universal and pressing? Any institution that had

such a series of interrelated problems placed on its agenda within a relatively few years would have staggered under the load. And even those institutions with a well established administrative apparatus, fully staffed by people with great technical skills, would have been hard pressed to deal with this load of concurrent problems.

Yet even in the face of these difficulties, the university cannot afford to ignore its obligation to try to be what society must become -- an open, rational, self-disciplined and essentially humane community. It must work with society on the difficult task of reordering its priorities and remodeling its institutions to deal effectively with our great new purposes. The prospect is staggering. The world-wide university community is a sensitive network of persons and institutions, a complex that can give direction to society but cannot change it. This community can state its interests but not protect them. It can point the paths and light the way for society, but it cannot expect society to fall in line. Society may not -- and perhaps in some cases should not.

There can be no doubt, however, that the university and the intellectual community that it represents have a political and social role. Central to the university's responsibility is to maintain a balance between itself and society, to set its own standards that are quite independent of society's pressures and yet compatible with its goals. Further, the university not

only must concern itself with reordering current priorities but also must address itself to preparing the next generation for dealing with matters that now can be only dimly perceived. It is this role -- maintaining a balance between its goals and those of the society of which it is a part -- that is undoubtedly among the most difficult and delicate for the modern university. And it is this role that will continue to preoccupy all those who would see the university survive.

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THE FUTURE FUNCTION OF THE UNIVERSITY IN OUR SOCIETYby Sir Eric AshbyIntroduction

When the steering committee chose this theme for the conference it prescribed that the introductory paper 'should not deal with the causes of unrest nor with the managerial and organisational problems of our present universities, but should rather be focused on the question "what is the university for", and should be directed to the future'. I accept these reservations and I understand why they were imposed. Too much has been written already about student unrest; and we have become obsessed by the organisational problems of universities at the cost of time which would be better spent on their educational and philosophical problems. I assume that the conference wishes to discuss ends rather than means, and, since managerial problems are to be excluded, I assume that the purpose of this paper is to set out questions for discussion, not solutions.

Nevertheless I begin with student unrest, not out of perversity but because it is for me a natural starting point for discussion of what universities are for. I believe that universities are for students. So I begin by asking: What has my generation got to learn from a sit-in? We have two things to learn. First, that the organisers of student protests (whose motives are frequently political and have nothing to do with the university) cannot mobilise massive support except on a moral issue (war, racial discrimination, victimisation, poverty); second, that the sit-in itself commonly takes the form of a carnival or an evangelical rally. For hundreds of normal, law-abiding students the occupation of a building is (to quote one witness):

one of the deepest experiences of my life. We were packed in those rooms and corridors with hardly room to breathe, talking the whole night through. We came to no agreement but it was a great experience just the same.

This hunger for a community spirit, followed by a pathetic satisfaction with such an ephemeral and impoverished experience of communal life, is the second lesson my generation has to learn from a sit-in.

Protests may be organised by vicious demagogues, out for real mischief, or they may be responses to genuine grievances. But if they are large protests they will be supported by many young people who are drawn to them by one or both of two motives: a moral issue or hunger for a community spirit.

This is all I have to say about student unrest, but it is essential to a later part of my argument. It confronts our generation with two questions about the future of the university in our society. Should the university include a moral content to higher education? And should universities be designed as communities to satisfy this hunger for social cohesion among students? There are many other considerations to the future of universities, but in my view these two must be included. Later in this paper I attempt to explain why.

A definition of function

The word 'university' is heavily encumbered with tradition. It would be a pity if the conference were to stray into semantic discussions about what the word means; for, like a sister word 'church', it has an enormously diverse range of meanings but there is an underlying purpose which covers most of the meanings. The underlying purpose has never been better expressed than it was by Rashdall, writing 70 years ago about universities in the middle ages. Their great contribution to society, he wrote, was 'that they placed the administration of human affairs in the hands of educated men.'

This statement begs many questions about what is meant by the word 'educated'. The conference will doubtless wish to spend some time on these questions. But the statement is on one point unambiguous, namely that, by tradition, universities are primarily concerned with educating people. Their prime product is 'not a book but a man'. Research, advice to governments, service to industry: for centuries activities like these have been undertaken as sidelines. It is only recently that they have competed with the prime function and sometimes displaced it. The conference is invited to begin its discussion by examining the proposition that the principal contribution of the university to society for the rest of this century should still be to place the administration of human affairs in the hands of educated men. In modern context this means that the university exists to educate all who are likely to bear responsibility in the professions,

government, the media of mass communication, industry, and business. If this proposition is accepted, other activities carried on in a university have to be justified by their relevance to this central function.

To whom is the university responsible?

It follows from this proposition that the basic questions to be asked about the university are: Who is to be taught? What is to be taught? and Who is to teach? My paper invites the conference to discuss these three questions which (as I hope to show) cover a great deal. But first there is a prior question to be asked, namely: To whom is the university responsible for supplying answers to these questions? To the students, regarded as clients? Or to the corporations or services or professions which employ graduates? Or to parliament which finances higher education? Or, in answering these questions, should the university be responsible only to itself as a guild of masters and scholars?

In dealing with this prior question, the following considerations are relevant. It can be said broadly that the shape and size of a university system in a country depends on the balance between three social forces in that country. The forces are the pressure from candidates to enter the system, the suction from employers drawing graduates out of the system, and the inner controls exercised by the system itself. Thus the system in the United States has been dominated by the market of candidates seeking admission and the system in the Soviet Union has been dominated by the planned demands of the state for graduates. The balance is changing in both these systems. In America the needs of the state for highly trained technologists of all sorts, from sinologists to missile engineers, has injected both money and influence into the university system. In the Soviet Union the expectations of young people for higher education has recently influenced developments there. In Britain until recently the size and shape of universities were determined largely by the universities themselves. On one hand they limit entry to the numbers they believe they can handle (so that even today only a little over half the qualified applicants to universities find places and the staff-student ratio is about 1:9). On the other hand the universities have not adjusted their intake to the needs of employers. For instance,

those who plan manpower needs predicted that about two thirds of graduates ought to be scientists or technologists and one third ought to be in arts or social sciences; in fact the intake into universities has been about half and half of these two categories. But in Britain the balance of forces is changing too. It is government policy that the dominating factor, determining the size and shape of the whole system of higher education in Britain, shall be 'a place for every qualified applicant' - possibly modified, in ways not yet thought about properly, to take account of manpower needs and of the universities' own conception of their function.

Clearly the answer to the question: To whom is the university responsible? depends on the balance between these three forces. If the student is to be regarded as the customer, there is something to be said for giving him a 'university voucher' and letting him shop in an open competitive market, purchasing history at Oxford if that is what attracts him, economics at London, sociology at Sussex. If the employer is to be regarded as the customer, there is something to be said for scholarships tied to subjects, so many for medicine, so many for metallurgy, and so on, and in adjusting curricula to meet the customer's specification. If parliament is the customer, a case can be made for civil servants, as agents of parliament, controlling curricula, admissions, and appointments. For reasons which may emerge at the conference, I would reject an exclusive responsibility to any of these three customers. There remains the residual case: Are not academics themselves the best judges of what and who should be taught, just as doctors, even in a national health service, are the best judges of diagnosis and treatment? This is the case for autonomous universities, responsible only to their own inner integrity; the 20th century interpretation of the concept of the university as a guild. The objection to this case is familiar. A university run by professors becomes a university run for professors; if all students were being trained to become professors, this might not matter. But the function of the university is to put the administration of human affairs in the hands of educated men, and professors are not very experienced about human affairs.

It is for the conference to seek answers to the question. I venture only three comments to illustrate the difficulties in finding satisfactory answers. (i) The achievements of knowledge rest upon

continuity, consistency of approach, and the slow development of the inner logic of a subject. If the determination of what is to be taught were to be solely in the hands of students or employers this continuity would be repeatedly interrupted; the pressure would be for relevance - a concept which, in the minds of many students and employers, means recipes and instant-formularies, not the sort of systematic knowledge which has led to our present understanding of physics or psychology or history. The fragmentation of knowledge, which is our present anxiety due to specialisation, would be made even worse, and the fragments would have even less cohesion. (ii) The dangers of too close a control by the agents of parliament is that education becomes politicized and loses its capacity to criticise society in a detached way. (iii) To leave the sole responsibility to universities themselves has not, in the past, been encouraging. It is commonly said in Britain that every major reform in higher education has been provoked by some outside agency: royal commissions, or public criticism by persons outside universities, or influence from abroad; and this is not unfair criticism.

The three basic questions.

I now ask the conference to address its discussion to what I suggest are the three basic questions: Who is to be taught at universities? What is to be taught? Who is to teach? The questions cannot be separated. The first is the most difficult. Nothing is likely to stem the tide of social equality in western society. Already Americans speak of 'universal higher education'. To suggest that universal education ought to stop at 18 would (I guess) seem as philistine and reactionary in 1990 as the suggestion (which actually was made in 1890) that any child can be taught by the time he is 14 all he needs to know for the ordinary occupations of industry and commerce.

So there is no prospect that student numbers will be contained even within their present dimensions. One can foresee only two limiting factors: the first is the limit of benefit which a degree or diploma offers to the individual. So long as a degree or diploma is a passport for a better job and a higher place in the social scale, young people will press for higher education and expect to get it.

The second limiting factor is how much the state can afford. Hence the familiar dilemma. Even a comparatively wealthy country cannot indefinitely enlarge its system of higher education without lowering the stand of some of it. (The words are deliberately underlined, for they should be a theme for discussion by the conference. The danger is that the standard of all of it may be lowered. The socio-political problem is how to put on the market 'Volkswagen' as well as 'Mercedes' standard diplomas and degrees.) It is at this point that it is important to distinguish higher education, which is certain to expand, from university education. Again there is a dilemma. If it is a university degree or diploma which is the status symbol (as in England, where it confers the right to wear a gown and coloured hood on ceremonial occasions and to put the letters B.A. after one's name) then students will not be satisfied with anything less than a university degree or diploma. But the danger of such expansion if it takes place in universities is that we would neglect or cheapen the education of those to be entrusted with the administration of human affairs.

This brings the argument to a point to which the conference is invited to give attention. Would it be agreed that, whatever arrangements a country may make to provide mass higher education (e.g. through multi-purpose universities as in America, polytechnics as is the intention in Britain, special 'staff colleges' as in the Soviet Union), there must be filters in the university system so that what Rashdall called 'the great contribution of the university to society' can still continue. There must be, within the system, opportunities for the intellect to be stretched to its capacity, the critical faculty sharpened to the point where it can change ideas, by close contact with men who really are intellectual masters. Not many students are fit for this austere discipline, but those who are must be able to find it, or the thin clear stream of excellence on which society depends for innovation, for statesmanship, for wise judgement in unforeseen crises, will dry up.

To discuss the kinds of filter would take the conference into problems of administration. Suffice it to say that the filter of massive failure rates (as in France) does not seem to be a good solution; nor (in my view) is the filter of very stringent selection with low failure rates (as in Britain), unless it could be accompanied by an extinction of the snob-value of having attended a university,

coupled with a corresponding rise in the status accorded to other institutions of higher education. Some form of stratification, either between and within universities, as in the U.S.A., or between different kinds of institutions, as in the Soviet Union, might be the best solution; or an idea now being considered in Britain - to give a 2-year course leading to a degree in general education, and to keep for another 2 years a small proportion of students to receive the most exacting apprenticeship the university can offer. In developing the argument this way, the assumption I am making (and it is one the conference may wish to challenge) is that those who will be entrusted with the administration of human affairs need an intellectual apprenticeship in every way as intense, searching, and uncompromising as the apprenticeship needed for solo violinists or ballet dancers. They may learn much of their professional expertise 'on the job' but they should enter their profession with a basic training which includes not only a repertoire of facts but the habit of clear thinking based on evidence, and some mastery of the two major symbols of communication: words and mathematical symbols.

The difficulties in the way of providing this quality of education are (i) that it cannot be provided except through close contact with teachers who are themselves distinguished and (ii) our techniques for selecting the students to receive it are clumsy and unreliable. This prompts me to make a digression: that employers in the future should be much more willing than they are now to release potential leaders for 2-3 years of university education as adult students, when their qualities have been recognised, and universities should be more flexible than they are now in accepting such students. Indeed, I suggest that the university of the future may make what Rashdall called 'its great contribution to society' by lifting the age-range of students it accepts for its most exacting courses, and engaging itself on what we now call 'refresher courses' as one of its major activities, not as a sideline for vacations and week-ends.

I have laboured at this part of the argument, perhaps at too great a length, because it leads to a conclusion unpalatable in our egalitarian society, namely that universities - although they will be obliged to take part in mass higher education, should not lose sight of the fact (if the conference accepts it as a fact) that their unique contribution to society will still be to keep uncontaminated

a thin clear stream of intellectual excellence. If this is so, the problem facing the universities is how to be, at the same time, popular and elitist. If they are not popular they will not secure the public funds to possess great libraries, giant computers, sophisticated medical schools. If they are not elitist they will be making the totally untenable assumption that you can train great doctors, lawyers, civil servants, newspaper editors, engineers, scholars, with less personal attention than it takes to train a solo violinist or an opera singer. To put my argument into one sentence. Somewhere in the university, whatever other activities it has, a very few selected students must be educated very well; in the belief that however egalitarian society gets, its fortunes will depend upon the ideas, the work, and the influence of a handful of perceptive men. And since this is the university's most important function, I deal with the other two of my three questions (what is to be taught? Who is to Teach?) - with reference to this elite minority. My defence for doing this is that the mass higher educational function of universities (which I regard as supplementary to its main function) is really either an extension of secondary schooling to the age of 20-21 or it is the provision of vocational training; both important activities, but not the university's unique activity.

What is to be taught? Here - in a climate of self examination, not to say self castigation, of universities, I think a positive assertion needs to be made. Some institutions already teach some disciplines supremely well. A physicist or economist trained at Cambridge, an engineer from the grandes écoles, a graduate in business management from Harvard or in metallurgy from Göttingen: the best of these have acquired much more than a technique; they have acquired a style of thinking and a capacity to innovate and therefore to adapt their expertise to unpredictable circumstances. I think that it is fair to say that in our best universities education to administer technological human affairs - from medicine to business - is already good. And the secret of its quality is easily discovered. When those of us who have had to administer human affairs examine our debt to our alma mater we recognise that the debt is not to an institution; it is to some great teacher whose pupil we became. In teaching at its highest level, as in friendship, there must be a good deal of one-to one relationship.

The problem, in my view, is not what to teach about physics for professional physicists, about medicine for medical students, about economics for students who are going to become economists. Specialist subjects where knowledge is advancing rapidly are on the whole well taught: the evidence for this is whether graduate students rapidly outstrip their teachers, and they frequently do. The problem is two fold: what else should the university teach to physicists, doctors, economists? And - since the highest responsibilities in the management of human affairs fall frequently upon men who are not specialists - what should the university offer to men with this destiny before them? What, especially, is the place of humanistic studies in the university as I have defined it?

It is a two fold problem but it is the same problem. Even the narrow professional work of a physicist, doctor, or economist, may suddenly confront him with poignant issues for which the university has not prepared him: a desirable economic policy involving increased unemployment; the application of a drug which will limit population but may encourage permissiveness; the export to a foreign country of techniques of atomic fission. And the 'generalist' in the civil service or in industry may be dealing with issues of this order all the time; for example pollution in cities; trade in armaments to the Third World: the integration of minority groups (be they West Indians in Birmingham or Roman Catholics in Belfast) into society. If the university's great contribution to society is to place the administration of human affairs in the hands of educated men, how does it educate them to administer affairs like these?

One answer is that the university does not do so: the management of these affairs is learnt only through experience. This answer does not satisfy me, and it certainly does not satisfy many students. When students brashly ask the university (as a group of them did in an English university recently) to teach them 'life', and not history, English, or geography, they are fumbling toward something which is difficult to define, but important. The students call it 'relevance' though by relevance they usually mean a sort of intellectual parochialism (instant courses to solve the problems of racial minorities, housing, and hunger, often tied to preconceived political doctrines: the assumption, for instance, that the consumer society is corrupt). This sort of relevance has to be rejected. But there is

another sort of relevance. All the examples of issues I listed just now involve questions of moral principle. These are questions which are not examined in the prevailing matrix of specialised university studies. The matrix presupposes objectivity, rational thought disengaged from its consequences, the privilege of being able to think without taking decisions. But in the administration of human affairs decisions have to be taken and if they are not governed by principles, they have to be governed by expediency. Some critics of our universities (e.g. Chomsky and O'Brien) assert that the principles which guide intellectuals in administration are untaught but nonetheless there. They call them 'counter-revolutionary subordination', by which they mean the enlistment of intellectuals into a conspiracy to preserve the status quo and a suppression of those who would upset it. I think Chomsky and O'Brien distort the situation (the very fact that Chomsky dedicates a book to those who refuse to be drafted into the Vietnam war, and yet remains a highly respected professor at MIT, is evidence against his assertion!) But, like the students, Chomsky too is fumbling toward something important. The university cannot function at all except under what Raymond Aron calls 'the moral code of liberalism'. This code makes possible the production of excellent scientists, engineers, economists, scholars. But it is not proving a sufficient guide to contemporary issues in the administration of human affairs. By its very silence about the moral implications of scholarship the university does make assumptions about moral questions.

What, then, is to be taught to fit students to tackle these issues? Not, of course, a kit of moral principles. Nor, in my view, potted courses on ethics or sociology. I think I would seek an answer in an entirely different approach, tackling at the university not formal disciplines but problems, with the aid of men who are already administering human affairs. For example, anyone who is likely to administer human affairs, whether as specialist or generalist, ought to have reflected on the future of cities in industrial countries; not by listening to 25 lectures on urban development, but by sitting at seminar until he is really embarrassed and perplexed by the deterioration which we now realise will inevitably overtake some of our cities and the dilemmas which bedevil all solutions. Anyone at the conference could make a list of a dozen such complex and imminent problems. This is, of course, nothing more than a variant of the

'case method' as it is practised at the Harvard Business School. But it would be a novel approach to interdisciplinary problems in human affairs.

A second approach would be to examine, much more thoroughly than we do at present, the ways in which the very techniques and conventions of scholarship carry their own repertoire of moral principles. One cannot be a good practising scientist or scholar without some measure of the virtues of humility, courage, tolerance, and respect for the humanity of others. (One's cherished theories may, for example, be upset by some junior competitor with a different coloured skin, deplorable political views, and an unacceptable religion). There is a limited, but significant, moral authority inherent in the processes of scholarship itself. It provides principles which are useful not only for scholarship but for all rational decision making in politics or business or private life.

Taken alone as ingredients of a university education these studies (which could bring together at the seminar table philosophers, politicians, sociologists, civil servants, economists, architects) would lack the hard and essential discipline of the codified orthodoxy of (say) history or economics. But, as an antithesis to this codified orthodoxy (which has also to be mastered) one of the tasks of the university is (I suggest) to convey to the elite among students the dismaying experience of seeking for principles by which decisions can be made about what are, perhaps, insoluble problems. It is the art of all administrators: to navigate decisions, equipped only with incomplete maps. I invite the conference to consider whether curricular changes like these ought to be made, and if so, how they might be made. For the administration of human affairs by expediency and not by principles is a course which universities ought to be ashamed to contemplate. Yet where - if not in universities - will young people today find the principles? That is one reason why I drew a lesson for myself from the observation that student unrest generally centres on moral problems, and the students' solution to these problems is commonly based on naive principles because they have not been given the opportunity to discover any sounder ones.

The other lesson I drew for myself was the students' hunger for some common purpose to cement the community of youth, and their evident delight at the shallow but euphoric solidarity which unites them in

some protest or other. The common belief that they exclude their elders from this community is (in my experience) not correct. One of the paradoxes of student life is this rejection of experience of our generation coupled with complaints that professors do not have enough informal contact with students. There is a good deal of evidence to indicate that a student, who now, in a way which was very rare two generations ago, breaks his ties with home and family (sometimes painfully, sometimes only in term time and with no tension on either side) really needs to find a substitute for home and family at the university. The tradition of English collegiate universities and American fraternities or the small American liberal arts college is to supply this substitute. But it is not the European tradition, and it is not being sustained in the large civic universities of Britain or in most American universities. The bonds of family life are now so weakened when a boy or girl leaves home for college that the provision of a substitute-family, i.e. the concept of the 'university - as - community' of senior and junior scholars, may be more important for the stability of the universities of 1970-2000 than we are at present disposed to grant. For the university cannot hope to fulfil its function unless there is common consent between its senior and its junior members as to the purpose of the place. And this common consent may not be possible unless there is - at any rate at that level of the university where men are being prepared to take responsibility for the administration of human affairs - a deliberately created pattern of partnership in which the student feels he has a secure and clearly defined place. This, if the conference were to agree that it is a valid point, would greatly affect the management and organisation of universities, and the obligations of university teachers.

Finally the third question: Who shall teach? In the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, when they were the models for English higher education (and in similar colleges in the United States), the teachers were chosen on grounds of both erudition and piety; and the curriculum was intended to be not only informative but edifying. Curricula chosen to be edifying, and piety as a criterion for the choice of professors, are now out of date. The influence of German universities brought to Britain and America the ideal of the professor as Gelehrter; and it has - after long resistance - driven out the ideal of the professor as in loco parentis. Professors are now appointed on criteria of

scholarship; it is a common complaint on both sides of the Atlantic that insufficient weight is given to the professor's record as a teacher and none to his record as a companion for youth.

If the propositions put forward earlier in this paper survive the criticism of the conference, they would effect the answer to the question: Who shall teach those who will administer human affairs? The prime criterion would be - as it is now - quality of mind; for only the flexible, innovative, lively mind can teach others how to adapt the knowledge of the past to the needs of the future. The lively mind is compelled to explore and to innovate. So universities should remain centres of research as they are now; otherwise they will not attract innovators. In talk of university reform the suggestion is often made that research should be concentrated into research institutes and not in universities. There are grave dangers in this suggestion, for it would withdraw some of the nations' most acute intellects from contact with the young. I would incline to the other extreme: that no one original and gifted enough to advance knowledge seriously should be out of touch with students. This contact - sitting over a fire discussing an essay, talking in the laboratory during an experiment - is the irreplaceable cultural link between generations. To isolate gifted scholars in research institutes or museums is to diminish their influence on the next generation; they would influence the young only through books.

So I suggest to the conference that posts in universities should be made more, not less, attractive to men of powerful and original minds. But there are two dangers. These minds are needed also by the state and in industry. Therefore many professors find themselves advising governments, acting as consultants, using the university as a base for extra-mural activities. Some of the disenchantment with universities is due to the fact that the names of great scholars appear in the catalogue, but the scholars themselves are never on the campus. This creates the impression on students (and on university administrators too) that, for these professors, the main purpose of the university does not have a high priority. It would be a useful contribution if the conference could suggest ways to deal with this problem, for it is not a simple one. On the one hand - in the light of earlier passages in this paper - it is essential that professors should not be isolated from the outside world. If they are to educate men to manage human

affairs they would be better for some experience of human affairs themselves. On the other hand we have reached a state of affairs in some universities where a professor would be indignant if it was suggested to him that educating the young and doing research relevant to his teaching added up to a full-time job, even though he expects a full-time salary for performing the job. One possible solution might be to enlist the co-operation of professional associations and government services and industry in two ways. The first would be that professors are borrowed to advise and consult, but for blocks of full-time secondment, so that they do not live a schizophrenic life between several competing pulls of loyalty. The other is to persuade these associations and institutions outside the university that it is a responsibility of all men of high intelligence and experience to take part in the education of those who will administer human affairs in the next generation; so that statesmen, senior civil servants, town planners, industrialists are all willing at one time or another to come back to the university to expose their ideas, prejudices, and (most important) their principles, to the sharp interrogation of the young.

Three postscripts

(i) Pressure is sometimes put on universities to take a corporate stand on some aspect of human affairs. In times of extremely grave crisis (e.g. the threat of facism, the imposition of apartheid) this may be inevitable. But it is surely far more valuable for the university to make its contribution to society through its individual staff and graduates, acting as individuals. For once the university takes a corporate stand on some issue extraneous to its own functions it is in fact seeking to exercise power; and the price of exercising power is to surrender freedom. If the university loses its freedom, its individual members lose theirs. Professors would no longer be regarded as detached and objective critics of society. Their advice to governments would no longer be regarded as disinterested. Their teaching (in economics or sociology or history) would - however much they might disclaim it - be regarded as constrained or coloured by the corporate pronouncements of the university they serve. It is for reasons such as this that universities, while sheltering a great diversity of committed individuals (committed, too, in diverse ways) should itself

remain uncommitted. On these grounds I regret the addition of "service" to the functions of the American university, unless that means (which it commonly does not) service by individuals and not service by the university as a corporation - except one kind of service: to place 'the administration of human affairs.. in the hands of educated men'.

(ii) Implicit in the thesis developed in this paper there is an attitude toward the identity of the university. Some people hope and predict that the boundaries between the university and the community it serves will dissolve, that (as we said about the University of Wisconsin a long time ago) its campus would be the whole state; its clientele the whole citizenry. Students (who for admirable reasons favour the elimination of all distinctions between themselves and the rest of their generation) press for this. Those who value the university as intellectual service station press for it. Governments and industrialists encourage it, because it enables them to get expert advice from distinguished professors on the cheap. My thesis opposes this view. If the boundaries which contain (and even to some degree isolate) the university dissolve, the university will (I submit) do less well its unique job for society. It must remain an identifiable institution, with an identifiable function which takes precedence over the many other activities universities will inevitably be expected to accept.

(iii) In the past, one outstanding contribution of universities is that they have endowed their graduates with a common core of culture. In Victorian England those who administered human affairs could exchange Latin quips as (somewhat facetious) symbols of the common educational experience they have shared. To wish for the revival of a common core of culture is unprofitable nostalgia. Yet if the university - with its purpose defined as it has been in this paper - could give its graduates some similar common and shared endowment it would be a valuable cement to society. Might this be possible, not (as in the past) through a corpus of knowledge shared by all educated men, but through a common approach, learnt at the seminars I described above, to complex social problems: a repertoire not of facts, but of moral principles learnt from the pragmatic requirements of scholarship and of techniques arising from some mastery of the symbols of communication: words and mathematics?

ADDENDUM II

Changes in the final list of participants :

The following persons are not able to attend :

BERNABEI, Ettore	(Italy)
CORTERIER, Peter	(Germany)
DAVIGNON, Vicomte Etienne	(Belgium)
SCHMIDT, Helmut	(Germany)
ZAGARI, Mario	(Italy)

Changes in room numbers :

KROGH, P.F.	20
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Bilderberg Meetings
17-19 April 1970

Priorities in Foreign Policy

Karl Kaiser

University of the Saarland

Part II: Trends and Problems on the European Scene
(Paper to be delivered orally)

Questions for Discussion

I. GOALS

1. What long term goals, if any, are behind Western support for a European Security Conference?
2. What is the future security system underlying plans for a balanced force reduction between East and West?
3. Which conceptions about future American-Soviet and American-European relations are implied in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)?

II. CONSEQUENCES

4. Which conclusions can be drawn for the structure of East-West relations in Europe from Soviet policy since the intervention in the CSSR?
5. What are the possible implications of the Hague meeting of EEC governments?
6. What are the long term consequences of West Germany's intra-German policies after the Brandt-Stoph meeting in Erfurt and of her Ostpolitik after contacts in Moscow and Warsaw?

III. PERSPECTIVES

7. Has the moment come for NATO members to seriously consider reshaping the Alliance to fit the probable and not the extreme case of military conflict by lowering the overall conventional military posture and by strengthening its political functions of stabilizing the East-West relationship?

8. What could be the possible shape of the third Europe (after Monnet's first and de Gaulle's second) to emerge in the forthcoming years?

9. What could be the nature of US-European relations assuming Professor Allison's "elite young Americans" increasingly shape American foreign policy?

AGENDA

- I Future function of the University in our society
- II Priorities in foreign policy.

ORDRE DU JOUR

- I Le rôle futur de l'université dans notre société.
- II Les priorités en matière de politique étrangère.

IMPORTANT.

- LOCATION: The Conference Room, Secretariat, Dining Room, Travel Desk and Bar are located on the ground floor. Please follow the arrows from the Lobby.
- MEALS: Breakfast will be served in the Dining Room or in the bedrooms from 7.00 a.m. onwards. As a rule lunch will be served at about 1.00 p.m. and dinner at about 8.00 p.m.
- SESSIONS: The first session will start at 10.00 a.m. on Friday, the 17th.
- THERMAL SWIMMING POOL: Is at the exclusive disposal of the participants from 6.30 to 10.30 a.m. and from 5.00 to 8.00 p.m. Arrows from the Lobby indicate the way.
- LAUNDRY AND PRESSING: To be given to the maid before 9.00 a.m. It will be returned by 6.00 p.m. (No service on Sunday).
- PERSONAL EXPENSES: Drinks, cables, telephone calls, etc. will be at the expense of the participants. Price list of drinks is enclosed. Tips and taxes are included in the prices. Participants may sign for their drinks (giving room number) or pay cash.
- CABLES: Cables may be sent from the Telephone Desk in the Lobby.
- TRAVEL FORMS: Participants are requested to fill in the attached form and hand it in at the Travel Desk as soon as possible.
- MAIL: Mail for participants may be collected at the Concierge's Desk in the Lobby.
- NEWSPAPERS: Newspapers will be available at the entrance to the Dining Room or later at the rear of the Conference Room.
- CHURCH SERVICES: Protestant service: Sunday at 9.30 a.m. (three minutes walk).
Roman Catholic service: Sunday at 7.30 a.m. (ten minutes walk).
- MONEY EXCHANGE: For cashing Travellers' Cheques and money exchange apply to the Reception Desk in the Lobby.

CREDIT CARDS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.

ADDENDUM

Change in the final list of participants :

The following person is not able to attend :

EHMKE, Horst (Germany)

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BILDERBERG MEETING
Bad Ragaz. Switzerland
1970



BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE. April 1970
SMIDSWATER 1
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TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

To the participants
of the Bad Ragaz Conference

Dear Sir,

I am sending you herewith a copy of the working paper of
Monsieur Edgar Faure (Item I of the Agenda) as well as a copy
of the working paper of Professor Graham Allison.
(Item II of the Agenda).

The working paper of Professor Karl Kaiser (Item II of the
Agenda) will reach you within a few days.

Yours sincerely

N. Volz